IR 05000336/2001015
| ML020770494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/2002 |
| From: | David Lew NRC/RGN-I/DRS/PEB |
| To: | Price J, Danni Smith Dominion Nuclear Connecticut |
| References | |
| IR-01-015 | |
| Download: ML020770494 (17) | |
Text
rch 18, 2002
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 50-336/01-015 AND 50-423/01-015
Dear Mr. Price:
On February 1, 2002, the NRC completed a team inspection at your Millstone Units 2 & 3 reactor facilities. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection was an examination related to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that the overall implementation of the corrective action program at Millstone Units 2 and 3 was adequate.
Problems were generally properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. However, the team identified some instances where the evaluation of some lower level problems were not of sufficient detail.
Two Green findings were identified during the inspection regarding Unit 2 atmospheric dump valves and a Unit 3 emergency diesel air start system check valve. These green findings were determined to be a violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because the issues are being addressed within your corrective action process, the NRC is treating these as non-cited violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny these non-cited violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Millstone facility.
Mr. J. Alan Price 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
David C. Lew, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-336, 50-423 License Nos.: DPR-65, NPF-49
Enclosures:
(1) NRC Combined Inspection Report 50-336/01-015 and 50-423/01-015
REGION I==
Docket No.: 50-336, 50-423 License No.: DPR-65, NPF-49 Report No.: 50-336/01-015, 50-423/01-015 Licensee: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Facility: Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Dates: January 14 through February 1, 2002 Inspectors: J. Carrasco, Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
P. Cataldo, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 2 A. Della Greca, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS M. Gray, Reactor Inspector, DRS A. Lohmeier, Reactor Inspector, DRS (one-week)
L. Prividy, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS (one-week)
W. Schmidt, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS (lead)
B. Sienel, Resident Inspector, Unit 3 Approved by: David C. Lew, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000336/01-015, 05000423/01-015; on 01/14-02/01/02; Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Millstone Power Station; Units 2 and 3; biennial baseline inspection of identification and resolution of problems, corrective action program. Two violations were identified regarding the failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality.
The inspection was conducted by six region-based inspector and two resident inspectors. Two Green findings of very low safety significance were identified during this inspection and were classified as non-cited violations. The findings were evaluated using the significance determination process. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html.
Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall the licensee identified problems at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the CAP for resolution. The identification of repetitive trends appeared proper. However, the use of trend cause codes to identify possible precursor trends was limited. No deficiencies were identified in completed operability determinations. The significance level 1 root cause evaluations reviewed during the inspection sufficiently identified likely causal factors and corrective actions. The significance level 2 apparent cause evaluations generally appeared appropriate. The selected effectiveness reviews were of good quality.
Several instances were identified where the evaluation of problems documented in significance level 2 and level N condition reports were either not adequately evaluated or prioritized for completion, or were not completed in sufficient detail to provide for timely and effective corrective actions. Two instances involving Unit 2 atmospheric steam dump valves and a Unit 3 emergency diesel air start check valve were determined to be green findings.
Corrective actions appeared appropriate. The effectiveness reviews selected were of good quality, including several where the reviewer appropriately identified inadequate corrective actions. Some safety-related pump bearing oil problems concerns continue to occur, but previous corrective actions may not have had time to correct existing issues.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
! Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria V, for failure to perform an operability determination in accordance with procedures for the potential to pressurize the Unit 2 atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) actuators greater than their design limit.
However, the failure to perform on operability determination was considered to have a very low safety significance because, a subsequently performed license operability determination provided a reasonable basis for concluding that when the final evaluation is complete, the ADVs will be shown to be capable of performing their safety function in the existing configuration (Section 4OA2.2).
ii
! Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria XVI, for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality regarding two instances where a safety related check valve in the Unit 3 emergency diesel A air start system failed to prevent a pressure decrease in the associated air receiver tank.
However, the failure to identify and evaluate this problem is considered to have a very low safety significance because of the redundant air receivers and compressors, and remote monitoring of air receiver pressure. (Section 4OA2.2).
iii
Report Details 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Effectiveness of Problem Identification a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the process for identifying and resolving problems within the licensees corrective action program (CAP); items entered into this process are referred to as condition reports (CRs). The team reviewed CRs and other documents, identified in Attachment 1, to determine the licensees threshold for identifying problems and entering them into the CAP.
The team reviewed items from the licensees operating, maintenance, and quality assessment processes to determine if personnel initiated CRs after identifying problems. The team also reviewed a sample of work requests (WR), control room deficiencies, system health reports, surveillance test results, and completed preventive maintenance tasks, and operating experience information.
The team attended the licensees daily CR screening meeting (CRT) to assess the type of issues identified during the inspection. The team also conducted a plant walk-down of safety-related, risk significant areas to verify that observable system equipment and plant material adverse conditions were entered into the CAP. Additionally, the team interviewed plant personnel to discuss technical issues and the use of the CAP.
The inspectors reviewed quality assurance (QA) audit surveillance reports, departmental self-assessments, and an internal analysis of the corrective action program. The review was to determine if assessment findings were entered into the licensees corrective action program, and to determine if corrective actions were completed to resolve identified program deficiencies.
b. Issues and Findings Overall the team concluded the licensee is identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the CAP for resolution. The identification of repetitive trends appeared proper.
.2 Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues a. Inspection Scope The team screened CRs issued since the previous problem identification and resolution inspection and selected those listed in Attachment 1 of this report for detailed review to determine whether the issues were properly evaluated and resolved. The CR process requires that each CR be assigned a significance level; level 1 issues, are the most significant and receive a root cause determination; level 2 issues receive an apparent
cause determination; and level N issues are the least significant and require only correcting the condition. For selected CRs, the team reviewed the licensee reportability and operability assessment; the assignment of significance and priority; the technical adequacy, scope, and depth of the root or apparent cause evaluation; and the timeliness of resolution. The CRs documented issues in risk significant systems, including auxiliary feed water (AFW), service water (SW), instrument air, alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) electrical systems and several issues related to non-cited violations (NCVs) and Licensee Event Reports (LERs).
The team also assessed the backlog of corrective actions to determine if any, individually or collectively, represented an increased risk due to the delay in implementation. Additionally, the team attended the CRT to observe the review process and the basis for assigning significance levels.
b. Issues and Findings The team concluded the CRT assigned initial significance levels adequately to problems and identified appropriate departments responsible for resolution. From an evaluation standpoint, the majority of issues were properly prioritized (i.e., proper significance levels) to provide an appropriate level of evaluation. The team reviewed several existing operability determinations (OD), including several that were performed during the inspection, and did not identify any issues.
The significance level 1 root cause evaluations reviewed by the team sufficiently identified likely causal factors and corrective actions. The significance level 2 apparent cause evaluations generally appeared appropriate. Significance level N causal coding was generally not being done, as allowed by the process limiting the use of these codes to identify possible precursor trends. The team noted that while the use of the cause code information appeared unclear, CRT discussions observed during the inspection indicated the licensee recognized the need for training of department CR coordinators to achieve consistency in trending significance level 2 and N CRs. The CAP staff indicated that they intended to conduct such training soon.
Notwithstanding, the team identified instances where the licensees evaluation of problems documented in significance level 2 and level N condition reports were either not timely or completed in sufficient detail. Two issues involving steam atmospheric dump valves (ADV) and an emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start check valve were determined to be findings. The additional examples were minor issues when characterized using the group 1 and 2 questions (Appendix B of NRC Manual Chapter 0610*) and therefore the SDP was not applied.
Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve Actuators - Unit 2 Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria V, for failure to perform an operabilty determination in accordance with procedures for the potential to pressurize the Unit 2 atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) actuators greater than their design limit.
The ADVs are safety related, air operated valves that open when required to dump clean secondary side steam to the atmosphere, and thereby cool the primary side
reactor coolant system (RCS) when the non-safety condenser is unavailable. Operation of the ADVs also helps preclude opening of the spring loaded code safety valves. The ADVs are designed to fail closed, and, in accordance with the technical specification bases, be capable of operation remotely from the control room or manually using the valve handwheel.
In May 2000, the licensee determined the vendor specified that the air supply pressure to the ADV actuators should not exceed 100 psig to avoid component damage. The licensee further identified that the air supply to the ADVs does not include an air regulator. Since the instrument air compressors unload at setpoints between 108 psig and 115 psig, the licensee concluded there is a potential that the ADV actuators may be pressurized greater than their design limit during a full open signal.
The licensee initiated significance level N CR M2-00-1523 and closed it without further action, concluding that a supply line regulator may inhibit the ADV quick opening function during a full open signal. The licensee concluded the ADVs remained operable since there was not a history of ADV diaphragm failures. Additionally, the licensee noted that based on informal vendor observations during diaphragm leakage tests up to 125 psig, the actuators were not noted to distort and prevent ADV closure on spring action or subsequent manual operation.
The licensee reconsidered this issue in November 2001 (level N CR-01-11261), since they concluded that a properly selected air regulator may not inhibit the ADV quick opening function, and the potential remained to challenge the ADV actuator beyond the design limits. The licensee further indicated that the air supply at the ADV actuators had been measured to be 105 psig during unrelated air operator diagnostic testing. The CR reiterated the previous operability discussion and tracked a corrective action to initiate a purchase order by November 2002 to authorize the valve vendor to perform a weak link analysis and identify the actuator design margin.
The team concluded the licensee had not completed an evaluation of the ADV actuator design margin, or alternatively modified the air supply to ensure air supply pressure remains below the actuator design limit. In response to the teams conclusions, the licensee initiated CR-02-00882 to re-evaluate the problem. The licensee performed an OD after the inspection that concluded the ADVs remained operable based on their performance history and vendor observations, and reconsidered the priority of corrective actions to complete a vendor analysis of ADV design margins.
The issue is more than minor and had a credible impact on safety because there was the potential to pressurize both ADVs greater than the vendor specified design limit, possibly causing actuator damage. This issue affects the mitigating systems cornerstone because the reliability of ADVs to remove heat from the RCS was affected.
However, the failure to perform an OD was considered to have a very low safety significance in accordance with the Phase 1of the NRCs significance determination process (SDP) because, when performed, the OD provided a reasonable basis for concluding the ADV would remain capable of being operated manually, and because in the past te ADV had not failed due to diaphragm overpressurization. Therefore this design deficiency does not result in a loss of ADV safety function.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensees procedures MP-16-CAP-FAP01.1, step 2.1.6 requires that an OD be performed for conditions that have an actual or potential effect on system or component operability. Licensee procedure RP 5, Section 1.1., likewise, requires an OD be performed when a condition affects the design or qualification of a safety related component. Contrary to this, the licensee failed to perform an OD in November 2001 when it was identified that the ADV actuators could be pressurized beyond their design limit during a full open signal. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program in CR-02-00882, it is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-336/2001-15-01).
Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start System - Unit 3 Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria XVI, for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality regarding two instances where a safety related check valve in the Unit 3 A EDG air start system failed to close to prevent a pressure decrease in the associated air receiver tank.
The team reviewed two significant level N condition reports, (CR-01-09415 and CR-01-09486) that documented two instances in September 2001 where non-safety condensate traps remained open, causing control room alarms as pressure decreased in air receiver tank 3EGA*TK1A. The licensee entered the applicable technical specification action statement, cross-tied the redundant air receiver in accordance with procedures, and exited the action statement. The licensee initiated work requests, completed repairs to the traps, and closed the condition reports.
In reviewing these CRs, the team determined that safety related check valve (3EGA*V004), located between the condensate traps and the air receiver tank, did not close to perform its safety function to isolate the air receiver tank when a trap remained open. The team reviewed the quarterly inservice testing results for this check valve, and determined leakage tests completed before and subsequent to the trap failures demonstrated that the check valve performed as required against the maximum system differential pressure. Additionally, subsequent to the failures, this valve was opened and visually inspected in January 2002 as part of normal scheduled maintenance. Some wear was noted on the valve disc and arm, and these components were replaced.
The team concluded that the licensee missed two opportunities in September 2001 to identify that check valve 3EGA*V004 failed to perform its safety function. Consequently, the licensee did not determine why the valve passed quarterly inservice tests, but did not prevent loss of air receiver pressure when system condensate traps remained open.
This issue is more than minor and had a credible impact on safety, because the failure to recognize and determine the cause of this condition could result in additional instances of air receiver pressure decreasing under similar conditions. Additionally, the extent of this condition was not addressed.
This issue affects the mitigating systems cornerstone because the reliability of the EDG air start system was affected. However, the failure to identify and evaluate this problem was considered to have a very low safety significance in accordance with the Phase 1of the NRCs SDP, because redundant air receivers and compressors were provided for each EDG, and receiver pressure was monitored remotely. Consequently, there was no loss of the EDG air start safety function. The licensee initiated CR 02-00876 to address this issue.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as equipment failures, be promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this, the licensee failed to promptly identify a condition adverse to quality regarding two instances where safety related check valve 3EGA*V004 failed to close to prevent a pressure decrease in the associated air receiver tank. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program in CR-02-00876, it is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-423/2001-15-02).
Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer System - Unit 3 The team determined that the licensee did not document the operability basis for a Unit 3 EDG follow fuel transfer pump day tank level switch that was out of calibration. The licensee initiated significance level N CR-01-10263 in October 2001 to identify that the follow pump started at a day tank level of approximately 270 gallons verses the setpoint value of 322 gallons. The CR initiated a work order to re-calibrate the level switch, which had not been completed at the time of the inspection. The team observed that while the diesel generator technical specification bases discuss the primary and follow fuel transfer pump start setpoints in the context of maintaining at least the minimum required day tank volume of 278 gallons, the CR did not document the basis for determining there was not an operability issue. The team concluded that the out-of-calibration level switch to start the follow fuel pump did not affect system operability because the minimum required day tank volume during standby was maintained and monthly diesel generator testing verified that both the primary and follow fuel pumps automatically transfer sufficient fuel to the day tank to supply the EDG and refill the tank.
The licensee initiated CR-02-00876 to address the inadequately documented operability basis and CR-02-00873 to review the technical specification bases.
Direct Current Circuit Breaker Preventive Maintenance Interval - Unit 3 The team reviewed significance level 2 CR-01-00432, initiated by the licensee to evaluate the Unit 3 refueling outage preventive maintenance (PM) schedule for 125 volt direct current (DC) breakers. The licensee intended to increase the Unit 3 DC breaker preventive maintenance frequency from two to three years. In reviewing the issue, the team determined that 25% of the breaker pole tests had previously failed to meet the test acceptance criteria. These tests verified that the breaker tripping characteristics were within the specified limits. Considering these failure rates, the team concluded the evaluation did not provide an adequate basis for increasing the breaker preventative
maintenance frequency. The licensee initiated CR-02-00822 to re-evaluate the breaker test acceptance criteria, failure rate data, and the PM interval.
Degraded Grid Relay Setpoints - Unit 2 In reviewing significance level 2 CR-M2-00-2653, initiated in September 2000, the team determined that the licensee had not completed a revised degraded grid voltage relay calculation after concluding that calculation may not have identified the design basis scenario where the highest electrical loading would occur. Consequently, the safety-related AC busses may separate from offsite power while the offsite source was still available and unnecessarily rely on emergency diesel operation. The licensee evaluated the issue and determined that the calculation included sufficient margins to offset the potentially higher electrical loads present during other plant conditions.
Seismic Evaluation of Conduit Running Between Buildings - Unit 2 The team concluded the licensee did not document an adequate analysis of six Unit 2 safety-related rigid conduits that traversed the open space between the Auxiliary and Containment Buildings without flex connections to accommodate potential seismically generated relative displacements between buildings. The licensee evaluated this condition via Technical Evaluation M2-EV-00-0063 completed in 2000. The technical evaluation used non-specific engineering judgement to justify the seismic acceptability of these conduits, but recommended that the six conduits be analyzed. The technical evaluation was completed as a result of two similar conduits identified in 1996 (CR M2-96-0925). The original two conduits were evaluated and dispositioned satisfactorily by calculation 97-ENG-1539C2, Rev. 0. During the inspection the licensee had not completed an analysis and had not determined what the potential effects of a conduit failure would have been following a seismic event. Following identification by the team, the licensee completed a bounding analysis and documented the issue in CR-02-00859.
.3 Effectiveness of Corrective Actions a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the corrective actions associated with selected CRs to determine whether the identified causes were addressed and completed or scheduled to be completed in a timely fashion. The team reviewed CRs for repetitive problems to determine whether previous corrective actions were effective. The team also reviewed the removal of the instrument air system from the Maintenance Rule enhanced monitoring status. The team reviewed the CR backlog reduction initiative to determine if there were items that individually or collectively represented an adverse effect on plant risk or an adverse trend in the implementation of the CAP. The team reviewed several effectiveness reviews completed for level 1 CRs.
The team reviewed corrective actions for issues dealing with bearing oil in safety-related pumps, including the use of contaminated oil in a Unit 3 recirculation spray system pump (CR-01-00499), bearing failure of Unit 3 charging cooling pump CCE*P1A (CR-01-09938), and the use of the wrong oil in the Unit 2 turbine driven AFW (TDAFW)
pump (CR-01-11574). The team also reviewed the technical evaluations supporting
that the high pressure injection (HPI) safety system unavailability (SSU) performance indicator was not impacted by the December 2001 empty bearing oil bubbler on CCE*P1A (CRs 01-12085 and 02-00135).
b. Issues and Findings Corrective actions for level 1 and 2 issues appeared appropriate. The effectiveness reviews selected were appropriate, including several where the reviewer identified inadequate corrective actions.
The team concluded that the licensee continued to have oil lubrication issues on safety-related pumps. The effects of each were found to be of very low safety significance in previous NRC inspection reports. In reviewing the root cause evaluations, the corrective actions taken with respect to controls over oil storage and the required level of oil in bearings may not have had time to correct existing concerns. In one case the effectiveness review scheduled for a Unit 3 level 1 RSS pump wrong oil issue was not completed and pushed off to a subsequent Unit 2 TDAFW pump wrong oil issue. It appeared that, while the root causes for each issue were not specifically similar, if the effectiveness review was completed it would have identified that the corrective actions had not been effective. The team found that corrective actions for CR 01-09991 - Trico Oil Bubbler problems, generally acceptable to prevent recurrence, if they were implemented. However the team noted several intervening issues that developed more in-depth knowledge of bearing oil requirements including the technical evaluation and root cause analysis for the December 2001 lack of oil level in the CCE*P1bearing bubbler (CR-01-12085). The team agreed with the licensee that CCE*P1A was operable in December 2001 with no oil indicated in the bearing bubbler, because of oil that remained in the bearing sump and the limited time that the charging pump, supported by CCE*P1A, needed to be available for HPI; therefore the HPI SSU was not adversely impacted.
.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment a. Inspection Scope The team interviewed plant staff to determine if conditions existed that would result in personnel being hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC.
b. Issues and Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during this inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT 1 - SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION a. Partial List of Persons Contacted Diane Fredericks - Inspection Coordinator - Regulator Affairs Brian Sharrow - Regulator Affairs Dave Smith - Manager - Regulator Affairs Steve Heard - Manager - Performance Improvement Vince Wessling - Supervisor - Performance Improvement Tom Burns - Maintenance Mike Ahern - Manager - Asset Strategy Stephen Scace - Director - Engineering Chris Schwarz - Director - Station Operations and Maintenance Alan Price - Site Vice President b. List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed Open and Closed 05000336/2001-15-01 NCV Failure to perform an operability determination on the potential to pressurize the Unit 2 atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) actuators greater than their design limit.
05000423/2001-15-02 NCV Failure to failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality regarding two instances where a safety related check valve in the Unit 3 emergency diesel A air start system failed to close.
Closed 05000423/2001-003 LER Failure of Containment Air Lock Results in Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 c. List of Acronyms Used AC alternating current ADV atmospheric dump valves AFW auxiliary feedwater AWO automated work order CAP corrective action program CR condition reports CRT condition review team DC direct current EDG emergency diesel generator HPI high pressure injection LER licensee event report NCV non-cited violation OD operability determination PM preventive maintenance RSS recirculation spray system SSU safety system unavailability SW service water TS technical specification d. Documents
2001 CRs 01-01443 01-04306 01-06817 01-10516 Reviewed 01-01524 01-04320 01-06825 01-10596 01-01533 01-04323 01-07025 01-10792 01-00216 01-01649 01-04555 01-07097 01-10854 01-00230 01-01711 01-04676 01-07132 01-10869 01-00250 01-01753 01-04804 01-07210 01-10935 01-00257 01-01878 01-04910 01-07239 01-10961 01-00274 01-02004 01-04996 01-07245 01-10986 01-00315 01-02018 01-05062 01-07601 01-11085 01-00316 01-02055 01-05117 01-07742 01-11233 01-00329 01-02172 01-05162 01-07777 01-11261 01-00383 01-02175 01-05220 01-07974 01-11325 01-00384 01-02194 01-05238 01-08019 01-11452 01-00395 01-02196 01-05256 01-08165 01-11486 01-00396 01-02243 01-05301 01-08248 01-11499 01-00401 01-02288 01-05364 01-08424 01-11574 01-00403 01-02473 01-05371 01-08460 01-11597 01-00403 01-02484 01-05427 01-08514 01-11680 01-00406 01-02619 01-05452 01-08526 01-11709 01-00413 01-02653 01-05460 01-08544 01-11903 01-00427 01-02737 01-05485 01-08552 01-11957 01-00432 01-02824 01-05524 01-08665 01-12011 01-00438 01-02827 01-05547 01-08816 01-12027 01-00499 01-02873 01-05612 01-08835 01-12032 01-00503 01-02881 01-05629 01-09255 01-12058 01-00506 01-02907 01-05708 01-09328 01-12059 01-00549 01-02971 01-05880 01-09415 01-12109 01-00630 01-03015 01-05906 01-09474 01-12214 01-00659 01-03070 01-05943 01-09486 01-12225 01-00729 01-03081 01-05944 01-09555 01-12228 01-00783 01-03178 01-05946 01-09593 01-12229 01-00846 01-03301 01-05959 01-09613 01-12349 01-00848 01-03434 01-06023 01-09647 01-12411 01-00873 01-03534 01-06127 01-09862 02-00058 01-00926 01-03558 01-06128 01-09941 02-00135 01-00934 01-03610 01-06186 01-09965 02-00144 01-01000 01-03617 01-06270 01-09991 02-00422 01-01158 01-03841 01-06324 01-10262 02-00514 01-01243 01-03863 01-06336 01-10263 02-00786 01-01270 01-03879 01-06364 01-10308 02-00782 01-01284 01-04029 01-06459 01-10310 02-00718 01-01325 01-04076 01-06487 01-10318 02-00666 01-01345 01-04098 01-06510 01-10330 02-00860 01-01405 01-04127 01-06569 01-10336 02-00876 01-01415 01-04175 01-06638 01-10376 02-00882 01-01431 01-04225 01-06804 01-10466 01-01435 01-04284
Earlier CRs 11870 M2-98-1331 M3-96-0585 M3-96-1357 Reviewed 11252 M3 -01-0159 M3-96-0655 M3-97-0119 M2-00-1523 M3-00-0124 M3-96-0685 M3-97-1217 02508 M2-00-2653 M3-00-1655 M3-96-1018 M3-97-1502 07902 M2-96-0344 M3-00-2340 M3-96-1018 M3-97-1541 07962 M2-96-0925 M3-01-0176 M3-96-1165 M3-99-3671 11110 M2-97-10600 M3-96-0520 M3-96-1170 ARs 99010098, AR 99012527-15, 01006734, 96005261 EWRs M2-96123, M2-970109, M2-97149, M2-98023, M2-98029, M2-98039, M298083, M2-98087, M2-99018, M2-99019, M2-99034, M2-99059, M2-99089, M3-00058, M2-00096, M2-01-007 AWO M2-98-04358, M2-002604, M2-01-11420, M2-01-11851, M2-01-12282, M2-01-12340, M2-01-12475, M2-01-12476, M2-01-12478 M2-00-02605, M2-0015943, M2-01-07955, M2-01-02099, M2-01-07804, M2-01-08868,, M2-01-12479, M2-01-12481, M2-01-12482, M3-9712245, M3-97-12247 Design Change Notices DM3-00-0008-01 Revise Setpoint for All C&D Battery Chargers at MP3 Calculations 97-ENG-01774E2 Battery 201A & Charger, Associated Cable & Device Electrical Verification Calculation Technical Evaluations M3-EV-01-0013 Containment Recirculation Past Operability with Containment Bearing Oil in 3RSS*P1B during Post LOCA Long Term Cooling M3-EV-02-0001 Charging Pump Mission Time for NEI 99-02 M3-EV-02-0003 Charging Pump Seal Cooling Pump Empty Bubbler