IR 05000336/2002002
| ML021140142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/2002 |
| From: | Anthony Mcmurtray NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Price J, Danni Smith Dominion Nuclear Connecticut |
| References | |
| IR-02-002 | |
| Download: ML021140142 (39) | |
Text
April 24, 2002
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-336/02-02 AND 50-423/02-02
Dear Mr. Price:
On March 30, 2002, the NRC completed inspections at your Millstone Units 2 & 3 reactor facilities. The enclosed reports document the inspection findings which were discussed on April 10, 2002 with Messrs. D. Hicks and S. Scace and other members of your staff.
These inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat (DBT). On February 25, 2002, the NRC issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment. With the issuance of the Order, we will evaluate Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.'s compliance with these interim requirements.
Mr. J. Alan Price
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony McMurtray, Acting Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-336, 50-423 License Nos.: DPR-65, NPF-49
Enclosures:
(1)
NRC Inspection Report 50-336/02-02 Attachment 1: Supplemental Information Attachment 2: TI 2515/145 Reporting Requirements (2)
NRC Inspection Report 50-423/02-02 Attachment 1: Supplemental Information
Mr. J. Alan Price
REGION I==
Docket No.:
50-336 License No.:
DPR-65 Report No.:
50-336/02-02 Licensee:
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Facility:
Millstone Power Station, Unit 2 Location:
P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Dates:
February 10, 2002 - March 30, 2002 Inspectors:
S. M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Unit 2 P. C. Cataldo, Resident Inspector, Unit 2 B. E. Sienel, Resident Inspector, Unit 3 J. M. Brand, Resident Inspector, Seabrook G. T. Dental, Senior Resident Inspector, Seabrook T. F. Burns, Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
K. M. Jenison, Senior Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
M. C. Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS T. A. Moslak, Health Physicist, DRS Approved by:
Anthony McMurtray, Acting Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
ii SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000336-02-02; on 02/10-03/30/02; Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Millstone Power Station; Unit 2; Resident Inspection.
The inspection was conducted by resident and regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by the color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by no color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html A.
Inspector Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee Identified Violations No licensee violations were identified.
iii SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000423-02-02; on 02/10-03/30/02; Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Millstone Power Station; Unit 3; Resident Inspection.
The inspection was conducted by resident and regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by the color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by no color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html.
A.
Inspector Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee Identified Violations No licensee violations were identified.
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.................................................... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................... iii SUMMARY OF UNIT 3 STATUS................................................ 1 1.
REACTOR SAFETY................................................... 1 1R04 Equipment Alignment............................................. 1 1R05 Fire Protection.................................................. 2 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation................................... 3 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation........... 4 1R15 Operability Evaluations
........................................... 5 1R16 Operator Work-Arounds........................................... 5 1R19 Post Maintenance Testing......................................... 6 1R22 Surveillance Testing.............................................. 6 1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications...................................... 7 4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]............................................... 8 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification................................... 8 4OA6 Meetings, including Exit........................................... 8 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION.............................................. 9 List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed................................ 9 List of Acronyms Used.................................................. 9
Report Details Summary of Unit 3 Status The plant operated at approximately 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY (Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity)
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdowns of Risk-Significant Systems a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted partial system walkdowns of the train "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) combustion air intake and exhaust system and the train "B" EDG building ventilation system. The applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis report (FSAR) and related system descriptions for both of these systems were reviewed, as were the relevant operating and surveillance procedures and specific engineering procedures (EN 31089 & EN 31096). These reviews were performed to verify ventilation flow measurements and performance monitoring. In addition to verifying the proper status (e.g., fans), position (e.g., dampers), and condition of the active system equipment, the inspectors examined several equipment supports and other passive system components (e.g., penetrations) for structural integrity and evidence of long term degradation.
The inspectors discussed the impact of the observed area conditions (e.g., maintenance scaffolds, gas cylinder storage) with the cognizant system engineers. The inspectors examined the control room panel indications and reviewed some applicable alarm response procedures with the operators on shift, to confirm system operations in accordance with the design criteria and established operating limits. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective actions for two condition reports (CRs) 02-02553 and 02-03898, involving documented information that was misleading with regard to operation of both of the inspected EDG support systems. The inspectors confirmed that neither the identified CRs, nor any in-process work activities, adversely affected system operability. As appropriate, the area and equipment environmental qualification criteria were reviewed. The applicable requirements of the technical specifications, with respect to both temperature monitoring and controls, were verified to be maintaining the system equipment within their operable qualification envelopes.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Risk-Significant System Walkdown a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a complete walkdown of the portion of the underdrain system (SRW) designed to prevent groundwater leakage from adversely affecting the safety-related equipment in the containment recirculation pump vaults of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Building. The SRW system configuration and equipment lineup were examined in accordance with the details and notes of the SRW piping and instrumentation drawing, EM-106D-1. The system layout was also evaluated with respect to the design criteria delineated in design change record (DCR) M3-00004, Revision 1.
The inspectors examined the structural condition of the enclosed sump, 3SRW*SUMP 6, containing the groundwater leakage within the ESF building. This sump also serves as a supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) boundary; i.e., a plant secondary containment design feature. The Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)
provisions (3.6.1.6) for the SRW system operability were reviewed with the system engineer to verify that trending of the groundwater in-leakage ensured that the SRW system was capable of meeting its design criteria. The inspectors also confirmed that the sump is routinely opened for inspection and discussed the results of the most recent inspection with the SRW system engineer. In addition to checking various SRW structural and pipe support configuration details and electrical design features, the inspectors verified that piping that had been abandoned in place in each ESF vault was properly capped and isolated as a SLCRS boundary.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed walkdowns of two areas (Fire Areas CB-4 & CB-6) at elevation 4-6" in the Control Building and four areas (ESF-1, ESF-2, ESF-8 & ESF-9) at various elevations in the Engineering Safety Features (ESF) Building. The fire detection and suppression equipment located in these areas and overall area fire protection design features were checked for conformance to the general area description and design details specified in the Millstone Unit 3 Fire Protection Evaluation Report. The inspectors examined equipment (e.g., emergency lighting units, fire extinguishers) for evidence of degraded or inoperable conditions, assessed the transient combustible materials stored in each Fire Area, and discussed any identified issues with the cognizant operations and fire protection personnel. The inspectors also reviewed condition report CR-02-04291, documenting a licensee identified concern regarding fire extinguisher coverage in the ESF building. The inspectors discussed both the basis for the concern and the licensees follow-up corrective actions with the site Supervisor of Fire Operations.
During the backshift evening hours on March 28, the inspectors observed operator actions in support of an unannounced, graded fire brigade drill, involving a simulated turbine building fire scenario. The inspectors assessed the communications and direction provided by the Unit Supervisor in the implementation of the fire fighting strategy and noted those actions taken by the plant equipment operator designated as the Fire Technical Advisor for the shift crew. Subsequent to the drill performance, the inspectors reviewed the completed drill report and verified the assessment and evaluation activities with regard to the expected fire brigade actions and the documented acceptance criteria.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the maintenance rule related system health reports and supporting materials for the following systems:
Engineered Safety Features and Reactor Protection Systems
Station Blackout Diesel
Containment Structure and Containment Penetration Systems
Emergency Lighting The supporting material that was reviewed included an (a)(1) evaluation report for the emergency lighting system, various outstanding and completed maintenance activities, preventive maintenance documents, performance and availability trending, operability determinations, corrective actions for CRs and the designated compensatory measures.
For each CR reviewed, the inspectors evaluated the applicable systems maintenance rule scoping document, corrective actions taken in response to the equipment problem, and the maintenance rule functional failure determination. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee appropriately tracked the occurrences against the systems performance criteria, both for functional failures and unavailability time. The inspectors verified that any differences in calculational approaches that existed among the various systems and system engineers were not significant contributors to the required operability or availability determinations.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed work planning activities, priority assignments, and corrective actions for the emergent work items documented in three condition reports, as follows:
CR-02-01133 Valve 3SWP-V257 has stem-disc separation
CR-02-01485 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Fan 3HVU-FN2A tripped
CR-02-02482 Unplanned LCO entry - cleaning of Unit 3 control room kitchen/restroom sink drains results in breach of control building pressure boundary For all three issues, the operators on shift were interviewed and immediate response actions were reviewed. For the low lubricating water flow condition documented in CR-02-01133, the troubleshooting and action plan was reviewed and the inspectors noted that no stem-disc separation had occurred. The low-flow conditions were due to strainer sizing, rather that valve problems. The inspectors confirmed that the engineering evaluations determined the proper strainer mesh sizing for this application and the properly sized mesh strainers were installed in both trains of the circulating water pump lubricating water system.
For CR-02-01485, the inspectors verified that the immediate operator actions, in accordance with the related alarm response procedure, appropriately removed the failed CRDM fan from service, and started a spare fan. The inspectors also checked operations and health physics/chemistry actions to follow up on a containment radiation monitor (CMS22) particulate alert that alarmed around the time that the CRDM fan failed. The results of a containment air sample, along with the automatic reset of the CMS22 alarm, provided evidence that the CMS22 alarm was related to the degrading fan operation and not to a radiation event inside containment.
For CR-02-02482, the inspectors reviewed a related Millstone Unit 3 license amendment, issued on February 20, 2002. This amendment, No. 203, revised technical specification (TS) sections 3.7.7, "Plant Systems - Control Room Emergency Ventilation System," and 3.7.8, "Plant Systems - Control Room Envelope Pressurization System,"
and provided a 24-hour allowed outage time for an identified control room boundary breach. The inspectors interviewed the cognizant Shift Manager and Regulatory Affairs personnel and verified that this event was not reportable and did not constitute a situation requiring entry into TS 3.0.3. The licensee developed an action item, based on this issue, to post signs in the control room kitchen and restroom, warning that opening the sink drains result in breaches of the control room pressure boundary.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed operability determination (OD) MP3-38-01 against the criteria in Generic Letter 91-18, "Resolution of Degraded and Non-Conforming Conditions," and NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 "Operable/Operability-Ensuring the Functional Capability of a System or Component." The criteria in these documents were used to determine that the identified condition did not adversely affect safety system operability or plant safety. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the OD analysis for an intermittent alarm on the A channel of the digital rod position indication (DRPI) for one shutdown bank rod cluster control assembly to confirm the proper application of the relevant TS criteria. The system engineer was interviewed to determine the extent of the condition.
The inspectors also reviewed the design requirements for the DRPI system, as described in FSAR Section 7.7.1.3.2. The inspectors noted that this alarm was due to a problem with a coil on the A channel for this assembly. The alarm did not come in when the B channel was selected.
The inspectors reviewed for OD for CR-02-02205, documenting a condition involving the nonconformance of the service water (SWP) pump shaft coupling bolts with respect to the pump manufacturers specification. Millstone Station Procedure, RP 5, Revision 002-04, was reviewed to determine whether the identified SWP bolting material nonconformance raised any pump design or qualification questions that required an OD to be initiated. The inspectors noted that the licensees evaluation of the installed bolt condition was based, in part, upon an acceptable yield stress safety factor and that the nonconforming bolts met the required design criteria. The inspectors interviewed the cognizant system engineer regarding the history of SWP pump overhaul activities, which led to the identified discrepant conditions. The inspectors determined that the licensee had considered other bolting properties (e.g., corrosion resistance) in the CR operability assessment and in the disposition of the required design documentation for the subject coupling bolts.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Work-Arounds a.
Inspection Scope A selection of existing and closed operator workarounds was inspected and discussed with control room operators. For those operator workarounds that required operability determinations, risk assessments, and/or reasonable expectation of continued operability (RECO) evaluations, the inspectors reviewed the accompanying documentation. This documentation was reviewed to ensure the system reliability, system availability, mitigating system function (if appropriate) and potential for mis-operation were considered. For those operator workarounds that were established to account for system degradation, licensee corrective actions and the difficulty of operator compensatory actions were reviewed.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities to ensure: 1) the PMT was appropriate for the scope of the maintenance work completed; 2) the acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operability of the component; and 3)
the PMT was performed in accordance with procedures. The PMT activities related to the following work, system restorations, and testing were reviewed:
SP 3646A.1 A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Operability Test
SP 3670.5 Cold Weather Protection The inspectors specifically reviewed the PMT activities conducted on March 8, with respect to the "A" EDG testing performed following completion of planned work. The work was described in automated work order (AWO) M3 01-21646, "Jacket Water Cooler and Engine Air Cooler Heat Exchanger Inspection," and AWO M3 01-21314,
"3EGF*LS41A A EDG Follow Fuel Transfer Pump Level Control starts Pump at 270 gallon vice 322 gallon." Additionally, the inspectors verified the restoration of the safety-related dampers in both trains of the service water pumphouse ventilation system, from the winter mode of operation to the summer mode. The inspectors also confirmed that the Production Maintenance Management System (PMMS) restoration dates were consistent with those specified in Engineering & Design Coordination Report T-B-05710 affecting the system configuration, ventilation air flow rates, and balanced operation.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensee performance related to the following surveillance tests.
SP 3610A.2 Residual Heat Removal Pump 3RHS*P1B Operational Readiness Test
SP 3626.13 Service Water Heat Exchangers Fouling Determination
SP 3630D.1 Charging Pump Cooling 3CCE*P1A Operational Readiness Test
SP 3646A.9 Slave Relay Testing - Train B (Section 4.29, Safety Injection)
The residual heat removal, charging pump cooling, and slave relay tests were observed in the control room to confirm performance of the tests in accordance with approved procedures. The completed data sheets were reviewed for all tests to verify that the equipment met procedural acceptance criteria and was operable consistent with technical specification requirements. Additionally, the inspectors checked the conduct of licensee field activities in the ESF building with respect to the performance of SP 3626.13 on one train "A" ESF building ventilation air conditioning unit (3HVQ*ACUS1A).
The test results for this surveillance were reviewed and checked for consistency against other common system test results.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Design Change Notice (DCN) DM3-00-0047-02, involving a setpoint revision for the actuation of the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)
mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC). The setpoint change, from 5% to 15.1%
narrow range (NR) steam generator (SG) water level, was initiated, in part, as corrective action to an identified error in the SG level narrow range instrumentation. This error was documented in condition report CR-02-01953, which references a generic Westinghouse SG mid-deck plate pressure loss issue. The inspectors evaluated this modification in consideration of the AMSAC description provided in Section 7.8 of the FSAR, as well as information documented in NRC Information Notice 2002-10, dated March 7, 2002.
The inspectors also reviewed a licensee engineering summary of the proposed
"Resolution of SG Level Indication for Millstone Unit 3." This summary discussed the generic issues associated with the SG level indication problems documented in three Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letters. The licensees Safety Analysis Supervisor was interviewed regarding the implementation of the AMSAC modification, the determination of operability for all other trip setpoints potentially affected by this issue, and any plans for further design changes. With respect to 10 CFR 50.62, Requirements for Reduction of Risk from ATWS Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants and the Unit 3 design and safety analysis, the inspectors discussed the impacts of this issue with a member of the licensees Regulatory Affairs staff.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Refer to NRC Inspection Report 50-336/02-02, Section 4OA1 for specific details.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
.1 Resident Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to Messrs. D. Hicks and S. Scace and other members of licensee management on April 10, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during this inspection should be considered proprietary. No other proprietary information was identified.
.2 Site Management Visit and Other Public Meetings Millstone Annual Assessment Meeting In the afternoon of March 21, 2002, Mr. A. Randolph Blough, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), and Mr. Curtis Cowgill, Branch Chief, DRP, Branch 6, conducted the Millstone annual assessment meeting with Mr. J. Alan Price and other members of the licensee management.
Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) Meeting In the evening of March 21, 2002, Mr. A. Randolph Blough and Mr. Curtis Cowgill conducted a meeting with Mr. J. C. Markowicz and Mr. E. Woollacott and other members of NEAC. This meeting was held to discuss the annual assessment of the Millstone facilities and other items of interest.
ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION a.
List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed None b.
List of Acronyms Used AMSAC ATWS mitigation system actuation circuitry ATWS anticipated transient without scram AWO automated work order CR condition report CRDM control rod drive mechanism DCR design change record DRPI digital rod position indication EDG emergency diesel generator ESF engineered safety features FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report OD operability determination PMMS production maintenance management system PMT post-maintenance testing RECO reasonable expectation of continued operability SG steam generator SLCRS supplementary leak collection and release system SWP service water TS technical specification TRM technical requirements manual SRW underdrain system