IR 05000335/1989028
| ML17223A457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1990 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Elrod S, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223A456 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-89-28, 50-389-89-28, NUDOCS 9001180222 | |
| Download: ML17223A457 (21) | |
Text
~4 4E021 (4 P0 se tsO s
n +**++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/89-28 and 50-389/89-28 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Do'cket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
Inspection,Conducte
.
ov mber
December 11, 1989 Inspector:.
S.
A.
od-,-Senior Re dent Inspector M. A.
Sc
,
es dent spector Approved by:R..
Cr enja ection 1ef Di Ision of Reactor Projects
/
/
s Date Signed
/ i/
D te)Signed
/ /o ate igned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, review of nonroutine events, and followup of previous inspection findings'esults:
During this inspection period, the licensee made a large step towards resolving Unit 2 CEDMCS problems by resolving an electrical noi se issue.
The utility has begun preparation, in earnest, for the February, 1990, Unit 1 refueling outage.
In addition, during this inspection period, a ground fault occurred in the Unit 1 electrical circuits which support the turbine generator.
Within the areas inspected, the following noncited violations were identified:
Failure to control temporary changes to procedures, paragraph 2.a.
Failure to control welding activities on an isolated job, paragraph 4.
Failure to properly perform check valve survei llances, paragraph 5.
'93001 1PO 22
+C,C,1 QI PDC
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"D. Sager, St.
Lucie Site Vice President
"G. Boissy, Plant Manager
"J. Adams, Independent Safety Evaluation Group Member J,
Barrow, Operations Superintendent J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator S. Brain, Independent Safety Evaluation Group Leader
"H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
. "C. Burton, Operations Supervisor CD Crider, Outage Supervisor D. Culpepper, Site Juno Engineering Manager R.
Dawson, Maintenance Superintendent
"W. Dean, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- J. Harper, equality Assurance Superintendent C. Leppla, Instrumentation and Control Supervisor LE McLaughlin, Plant Licensing Supervisor L. Rogers, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
"N;" Roos," g'uality Control Supervisor
- R. Sipos, Service Manager
- C. Swiatek, Technical Staff Licensing Engineer
- DE West, Technical Staff Supervisor W. White, Security Superviso~
"C. Wilson, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
"G. Wood, Reliability Supervisor
"E. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
"Attended exit interview 2.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
Unit 1 began and ended the inspection period at power.
The unit ended the inspection period in day 88 of power operation.
Unit 2 began and ended the inspection period at power.
The unit ended the period in day 75 of power operatio I During this inspection period,'he following additional activities occurred:
The exit meeting for maintenance team inspection 335,389/89-24 was conducted on site.
/
The exit meeting for operator licensing requalification program inspection 50-335/OL-89-02 was held on site.
A special inspection 335,389/89-29, co'ncerning Limitorque valve operators, was conducted on site, I
The Project Section Chief for the St Lucie site was on site on November 28 and 29.
The resident inspectors were in the regional office the week of December 4 for meetings and training.
Plant Tours The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were'ware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determiiied that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant. tours and control room visits by site management was noted to be adequate.
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF, ECCS, and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory:
Unit
CCW, LPSI, and HPSI in the RAB pipe tunnel Unit 1 CVCS - safety-related emergency boration paths Unit 2 AFW Unit 1 4160V swi tchgear
I
No violations or deviations were identified in these areas.
Procedure maintenance at operating stations The licensee has located certain procedures at various stations around both units to facilitate off-normal operations at those specific stations.
Ouring a routine walkdown, the inspector found that, at one station, two procedures had TC cover sheets but no altered affected pages.
The procedures being checked were ONOPs
and 2-0030134, Rev 9/6 respectively, Alternate Shutdown, and ONOPs
and 2-0030135, Rev 5/6 respectively, Control Room Inaccessibility.
An expanded review in each unit's hot shut down panel room, AFW pump spaces, and control room showed that only the Unit 1 control room had both the TC cover sheets and the affected altered pages.
The remaining stations had only the TC cover sheets, which were inadequate to discern the entire TC.
The TC log in each control room was utilized by the inspector to determine the scope and content of the TCs.
b.
Procedure gI 5-PR/PSL-1, Preparation, Revision, Review/Approval of Procedures, Rev 36, section 5.5,4, required that copies of TCs be attached to the procedure in use.
When notified of the problem, the licensee promptly corrected the affected TCs at the respective stations, counseled the persons involved in TC distribution, and modified the distribution control sheets to show clearly that modified pages are to be included in the distribution.
Based on the licensee's prompt action, the inspectors determined that this violation met the criteria specified in Section V.G.I'f the NRC Enforcement Policy as a licensee identified violation and will not be cited.
This is identified as NCV 335,389/89-28-01.
Plant Operations Review'he inspectors periodically reviewed shi ft logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and
, auxiliary"logs",'operating. orders",:standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records.
The inspector s routinely observed operator alertness
,and, demeanor.
during plant tours.
Ouring routine
""'-"'pe'rations','ontrol
.'room','staffing, 'con'tr'ol'oom access and operator
- performanceand responseaction's were, observed and evaluated.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to assure that
- ".,"',
- ;,> ",'--,.'.:.operations,an'4;security,'.remained~:-at,::,an..'acceptable; level.
Shift turnov'ers wer'e observed
'to verify. that they were conducted in accordance with approved'icensee procedures.
Control room annunciator..status was verified...
,
I The inspectors reviewed the following safety-related tagouts (clearances):
1-,11-45 1C AFW pump j
1-08-404 Stack Monitor Purge Nozzle CEA Problems Major CEA-related problems have not occurred at St.
Lucie for approximately a year and one half; however, since the Spring 1989 Unit 2 outage, there have been a.number of events related to the CEDMCS and/or'ts power supply.
Previous IR 335,389/89-26 discussed CEA events for the month of October, 1989;.
This month has seen continued CEA and CEDMCS-related problems.
On the 14th of November, the plant ma'nager informed the NRC resident inspectors that CEDMCS-related problems were to be a
management policy deployment item for the year 1990.
The reliability group on site has dedicated an engineer to lead in the CEA problem resolution.
On November 16, Unit 1 had a dropped CEA.
This event is discussed in paragraph 6.
On November 21, Unit 2 experienced electrical noise in the CEDMCS electrical control circuitry, This subject is discussed
.in paragraph 4.
Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified. This included the review of selected surveillance test results.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch positions, and by review of completed logs and records.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that plant procedures involved were adequate, complete, and the correct revision.
Instrumentation..
and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Physical Protection The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by: proper display of picture badges; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Survei l lance Obser vati ons I
Various plant operations were veri fied to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical sources, The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of,the affected components were accomplished properly, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual di recting the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing
,were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel;.
The following surveillance tests were observed:
Unit
surveil;lance OP 0110050, Rev 18, Control Element Assembly Periodic Exercise, was performed satisfactorily on November 16.
Unit 1 surveillance I&C 0700051, Rev 6, Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Monthly Functional Test, was performed satisfactorily on November 21.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used'ere properly certified;
'and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Wot k requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
NPWO 7311/67 addressed repairs on the (}SPDS, which is a TS-required system on Unit 2.
The NPWO included trouble shooting spurious CET alarms which had been occurring for several months.
The number of CETs giving erratic readings was insufficient to make the system inoperable; however, this condition made an operational nuisance and increased the potential for operator confusion, IKC technicians replaced several circuit components.
No maintenance problems were identified.
NPWO 5320/62 trouble shot a
181 MCC ground fault that had affected nonsafety-related equipment supporting the turbine generator.
The fault was severe enough to convince the plant staff that a turbine
~
~
~.
s
trip was possible and/or there was a potential for plant electrical damage.
The fault was found to be two faults on the same MCC.
Intake screen cleaning motor and boric acid mixing motor shorts had created a phase-to-ground undervoltage that was seen through the 480 volt MCC.
The load center ground fault detectors had fai,led and were back ordered, which had prevented the plant from being immediately aware of the gr'ound faults.
NPWO 3171/61, cleaning of the 1A CCWHX Inlet Strainer was observed.
The screens within the strainer body were minimally clogged, but the screen ring retainers were replaced due to heavy corrosion.
Based on the relative cleanliness of the the 1A strainer screening, the licensee decided to not open the 1B strainer until the February 1990 outage when both strainer 'bodies would be examined more closely to determine corrosion-related repairs.
NPWO 0847/61 investigated 1A main feed pump elevated vibration levels.
Pump vibration levels had increased from one mi 1 to five mi ls over a
two week period, the normal vibration analysis data sample, period for these pumps.
Though the bolt appeared to be proper ly torqued, it was determined that loosening and retorquing the foundation-to-pump-pedestal bolt indicating the highest vibration amplitude reduced vibration to near one mi 1.
To the licensee's knowledge, the subject bolt group, had not been previously disturbed during the 1'ife of the plant.
The licensee has speculated that some small amount of corrosion buildup/reduction on the bolts had caused the change in vibration.
During the upcoming outage, the site plans to remove, inspect, and retorque all of the subject bolts on both Unit 1 main feed pumps.
NPWO 5832/62 controlled 2B MG set troubleshooting and repairs in October.
These repairs were thought to have solved noise problems in the CEDMCS control circuits.
A vendor had been brought in and a
great deal of effort had been expended trouble shooting circuit problems.
On November 21, noise was seen on Unit 2 CEA 32 in the form of a loss of upper gripper power from a circuit logic card.
Troubleshootihg revealed additional MG set output noise on the supply from the MG sets which was affecting both the MG set exciter and the CEDMCS.
During the weekend of December 2,
the electrical noise source was found to be an MG set output cable with an intermittent arcing short to an electrical connection box adjacent to the MG set.
Vibration had caused a reinforcement rib on the box's cover to wear through the insulation covering a'able splice.
The box cover had not been removed previously in the trouble shooting process and the cable splice insulation was original construction material.
At the end of the inspection period, the 2B MG set had not yet been run due to an
in-progress bearing replacement at the unit's flywheel.
The lic'ensee plans to inspect other connection boxes at available windows of opportunity.,
NPWO 0831/61 was issued on November 24 to replace a leaking one-inch ASME Code piping elbow in a lubrication li.ne to the 1C ICW pump shaft bearings.
During the course of the work, the welder had trouble performing the welds, i.e.,
the wrong gas was used, base material weldabi lity was poor, and adjacent interferences created welding geometry problems, but the job was eventually accepted by gC.
No scope change was submitted to the NPWO, yet additional work (interference removal)
was performed under the existing document.
This violated AP 0010132, Nuclear Plant Work Orders, Rev 39.
During the course of the work, the new elbow required repair itself, but the there was no scope change to the NPWO as required by the procedure and by ASME Code Section XI.
The NPWO and the safety-related support system was released for service by operations after a functional test.
On November 27, the NRC inspectors examined the job site and discussed their findings with the licensee.
Job quality was subsequently revisited by the licensee with gC writing deficiencies against indications around one of the welded joints and a grind gouge in an abutting pipe.
Site gC identified additional deficiencies on the welding of the removed interferences.
NCR 1-359 was submitted to Juno Site Engineering to disposition the indications and gouge.'he NCR disposition directed'that the grind marks be removed by %lending and the weld built up be applied to the gouge.
Attempts to weld build up the gouged pipe nipple under ASME Code Section XI failed in that wall of the nipple was holed (blown through).
Salt impregnation of the aluminum bronze base metal was thought to be a partial cause of the welding problems.
The NCR was resubmitted and dispositioned to replace the elbow and nipple.
The work has subsequently been satisfactorily completed.
The licensee has subsequently taken the following corrective actions:
Retrained gC personnel on weld acceptance criteria.
Submitted a plant change request on lubricating water piping repair options to circumvent aluminum bronze base metal problems during welding.
Discussed with mechanical maintenance personnel the importance of job scope changes to PWOs.
Slated additional personnel to receive training in ASME Code Section XI requirement Based on the above licensee prompt actions,; the inspectors determined that this violation met the criteria specified in Section V.G.I 'of the NRC Enforcement Policy as a licensee identified violation, and will not be cited.
This is identified as NCV 335/89-28-02.
5.
Onsite Followup of Written Nonroutine Event Reports (Units
and 2)
'(92700)
LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriately Events that were, reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
The following LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy:
(Closed)
LER 335-87-01, Non-Sei smic Masonry Walls Adjacent to Safety-Related Equipment Due,to Personnel and Procedural Errors.
This LER was previously discussed in IR 335,389/87-06.
Design control process changes were incomplete at that time.
Since the time of the LER, changes in engineering /Is specifically addressed seismic block wall loading and the proximity of safety-related equipment to non-seismic block walls.
Additionally, the A/E was placed on controlled distribution for, and required to comply with, engineering
/Is.
Licensee audits, such as 08.01.EBSTU.89.
addressed A/E
.adherence to requirements.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 335-87-18, Three Hour Fire Barrier Walls Found to Contain Voids in the Interior Grouting Due to Construction Practices Resulting in Derating of Some Fire Walls.
for Unit 1,
the design details for seismically designed walls specified that masonry walls be constructed with vertical reinforcement every four feet, and that the masonry block cells be filled with grout.
The licensee determined that the non-seismically designed walls did not include design details specifying vertical reinforcing or cell grouting.
The Unit 2 design details specified that maso'nry block walls were constructed with vertical reinforcement every four feet and that only the cells with 'reinforcement need to be filled with grout.
During the construction of Unit 2 the practice of grout filling block walls entirely was followed as was previously done on Unit 1; however, the licensee determined that eight Unit
block walls and fourteen Unit 2 block walls in the respective reactor auxiliary building were not entirely filled with grout.
The inspectors verified that automatic.fire detection was provided in those areas containing equipment essential to safe plant shutdown adjacent to the affected. walls.
In addition, the licensee verified that these areas were covered by an hourly fire watch.
The licensee has initiated actions to correct these fire barrier wall deficiencies and these actions will be reviewed during a
subsequent NRC inspection.
This LER is close (Closed)
LER 335-89-02, Misaligned Valve Caused Inoperability of the 1B Diesel Fuel Oil System Oue to Personnel Error.
This LER was addressed in IR 335/89-23.
It had remained open pending resolution of associated violation 335/89-20-03.
FPL letter L-89-384, addressing that violation, was accepted by an NRC response of November 9, 1989.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 335-89-04, Containment Fan Cooler Filters Left in Place During Unit Power Operation Oue to Inadequate Procedures.
This LER was addressed in IR 335/89-23.
It had remained open pending resolution of associated Violation 335/89-20-01, FPL letter L-89-384, addressing that violation, was accepted by an NRC response of November 9, 1989.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 389-89-08, Technical Specification Surveillance Performed Improperly Oue to Personnel Error.
This LER described two licensee-identified TS violations concerning surveillance of SI headers following use of the SI. system to fill SITs.
The events were accurately analyzed and reported as required.
The inspector examined and found the completed corrective action stated in the LER to be acceptable.
This LER is closed.
The licensee corrective actions associated with this event met NRC Enforcement Policy Section V.G ~ I criteria for not issuing a Notice of Violation and is identified as NCV 389/89-28-02.
6.
Onsite Followup of Events (Units 1 and 2)(93%02)
Nonroutine plant events were reviewed to determine the need for further or continued NRC response, to determine whether corrective actions appeared, appropriate, and to determine that TS were being met and that the public
",
health and safety received primary consideration.
for Potential generic impact and trend detection were also considered.
On the 16th of November, Unit 1 CEA 65, which is a peripheral CEA in regulating group 7,
dropped into the core while CEAs were being returned to their normal full power position following a Moderator Temperature Coefficient test.
Group
CEAs were being adjusted to the same height as CEA
when the event happened.
No apparent operator action or plant condition, caused the drop.
Subsequent trouble, shooting revealed no evidence of a problem.
No subsequent core physics problems were found and power was returned to 100 percent from 95 percent where it had stabilized after the CEA drop.
See paragraph 2.b.
above for a discussion of CEDMCS problems in genera Followup (Units 1 and 2) (92701)
'a
~
Fo1 1 owup of Inspection Identified Items v
ll li (Closed - Unit 2) IFI>389/86-20-02, Incorrect Valve Numbering System.
This item addressed a condition wher e two Unit
systems contained some valves with the same valve number.
During ins'pection 335, 389/88-17, the inspectors found that the licensee had 'decided to use the "2I" designator preceding valve numbers in the con'tainment spray system.
The inspector had also determined that the containment spray system valve numbers recorded in the TEDB had been changed to add a
leading zero.
The system drawing had not been changed at the time.
During this inspection the inspectors found drawing'998-G-088, Rev 19,. Flow Diagram Containment Spray and Refuel Water Systems, had been changed to include leading zeroes in the valve numbers.
Review of the TEDB and installed containment spray val',ve tags showed that leading zeroes were incorporated as committed.
The licensee had reconsidered and decided that there was no need to always use the
"2I" designator as long as the leading zeroes were used.
Procedure changes to add the leading zeroes had been reviewed by the FRG and were being processed for issue.
Several procedures were also changed to warn persons to be cautious of possible confusion between the
.containment spray and waste gas systems when writing NPWOs.
This item is closed.
b.
Fol lowup of 10CFR 21 Reports c ~
(Closed - Units
ahd 2)
P2189-18, Limitorque Corporation 10CFR
Notification of November 3, 1988, Concerning Melamine Torque Switches on SMB-000 and 00 Actuators.
Site activity regarding this 10CFR 21 report was previously discussed in IR 335,389/89-23.
Valve operator inspection and necessary torque switch replacement have since been completed and documented on CAR 100989 as well as various NPWOs for the specific operators.
This item is closed.
C Fol lowup of Headquarters and Regional Requests (Closed Units
and 2) TI2515/94, Verification of Changes Made to Comply With PWR Moderator Dilution Requirements, Multi-plant Action Item B-03.
This. item originated with an NRC-to-FPL letter, dated September 15, 1977, and addressing a then-recent limited boron dilution event.
FPL responded in letter L-77-370 which described certain attributes of a soon-to-be-installed sodium hydroxide additive system supporting the containment spray system.
The NRC in a letter dated March 1, 1979, accepted FPL's analysis and respons Inspection of this item involved review of correspondence, installed equipment, and plant documentation.
System attributes verified by this inspection included:
5000 gallon sodium hydroxide tank
- The tank strapping table shows the tank to hold.
5185 gallons.
TS to require 4000 gallons 'minimum - TS 3.6.2.2 requires 4010 gallons minimum.
Control room level indication and alarms on sodium hydroxide level (two alarms prior to dropping to the 4000 gallon level).
Control room flow indication
- LIS 07-70 indicated tank level and read out in the control room.
It had one alarm prior to sodium hydroxide level dropping to 4000 gallons and another alarm just prior to the tank being empty.
- FI 07-2 indicated and FR 07-2 recorded, in the control room, sodium hydroxide flow.
The system met the commitments made to the NRC except for the number of level alarms prior to dropping to the 4000 gallon level.
At the time of this inspection FPL and NRR were addressing the resolution of this issue.
This Inspection item is complete.
System Engineering Survey
'During this inspection period,
. the inspector conducted a
system engineering survey as requested by the Region II Office.
The following are the results of thi s survey:
Applicable site references:
(1)- AP 0005722, Rev 14, Shift Technical Advisor Training and gualification (2)- AP 0005723, Rev 16, Shift Technical Advisor Continuing Training Program (3)- AP 04005750, Rev 1, Duties and Responsibilities of the System Engineer The SEG, consisting of four system engineers and one lead engineer, reports to the Technical Support Staff Supervisor, who reports directly to the Plant Manager.
The SEG currently has four mechanical engineers and one electrical engineer
.
The following systems or components are covered by the SEG:
EDGs, CVCS, CCW, ICW, Radioactive Waste Management, AFW, Feed and Condensate, HPSI/LPSI, SITs, RCS,'nd Instrument Air.
Each system engineer has an'verage of three systems or major components.
The system engineers have all qualified as STAs and have served as STAs for at least one year prior to becoming system engineers.
This process appears to be an unwritten, site policy.
At the time of this survey, two'otential system engineers were completing their STA assignments.
In addition, plant m'anagement is planning to add two engineers to the SEG by the end of 1989.
System engineers interface with FPL corporate engineering, site maintenance department engineering, operations, the test and code group, FPL backfit construction, equipment vendors, individual trades or shop crews performing work on their equipment and other groups if necessary for performance of their duties.
Refer ence
section 8. 1 detailed the system engineer s'uties and responsibilities, and indicated general requirements and controls for the engineers.
The procedure requires system engineers to observe system operation and maintenance.
The SEG is also on-call for urgent work and trouble shooting.
System-engineer-to-system assignments were identified in site internal quarterly memos to the operations
.and maintenance departments and off duty phone numbers for the SEG are available.
Observations made by the inspectors and discussions with representatives of the various site entities confirmed that these groups knew the system engineers well.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 14, 1989 with those persons indicated in paragraph
above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and'iscussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
Proprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Numbe~
389/86-20-02 Status Closed Descri tion and Reference IFI - Incorrect numbering system on valves, paragraph 7.a.
335,389/P2189-18 Closed IFI Limitorque Corporation
CFR
notification of November 3, 1988, concerning melamine torque switches on SMB-000 and.00 actuators, paragraph Item Number (cont'd)
Status Descri tion and Reference 335,389/TI2515-94 Closed IFI - Verification of changes made to comply with PWR moderator dilution requirements, multi-plant action.item B-03, paragraph 7.c.
335,389/89-28-01 Closed NCV
-
Failure to maintain off normal procedures at remote operating stations, paragraph 2.a.-
335/89"28-02 Closed NCV - Failure to control ASME Code welding activities, paragraph 4.
l 389/89-28"02 Closed NCV - Improper performance of TS survei l-.
lance, LER 389-89-08, paragraph 5.,
9.
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms ABB AB AC A/E AFAS AFW
.
ALARA ANPO ANSI APa AS+ C ATWS BQAP CAR CCW CEA CEDMCS CET CFR CIS CST
.CVCS DC DDPS DEV ECCS EDG EPRI ESF F
FCV ASEA Brown Boveri (company)
Auxiliary Building Alternating Current Architect/Engineer Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Auxiliary Feedwater (system)
As Low as Reasonably Achievable (radiation exposure)
Auxiliary Nuclear Plant [unlicensed]
Operator American National Standards Institute Administrative Procedure ode American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Anticipated Transient Without. Scram Backfit Quality Assurance Procedure (EBASCO Services Inc.)
Corrective Action Request Component Cooling Water Control Element Assembly Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System Core Exit Thermocouple Code of Federal Regulations Containment Isolation System Condensate Storage Tank Chemical
& Volume Control System Direct Current Digital Data Processing System
.
Deviation (from Codes, Standards, Commitments, etc.)
Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Electric Power Research Insti.tute Engineered Safety Feature Fahrenheit Flow Control Valve
.:; FIS
'PL
'RG
.FSAR FT GDC
.
'VE
'X IIC ICW IFI ILRT IN INPO IR ISI IX JPE JPN LIV LTOP LCO LER LPSI MCC MFIV MFP MSIV MV MW NCV NPO NPS NPWO NRC
,
NSSS OI ONOP OP PCM PCV P&ID PIS Flow Indicator/Switch The Florida Power
& Light Company Facility Review Group Final Safety Analysis Report Flow Trarismitter General Design Criteria (from 10 CFR 50, General Electric Company NRC Generic Letter General;Maintenance Procedure Hydraulic Control Valve A GE relay designation Appendix A)
stem, etc.)
(system)
Health Physics High Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Heating and Ventilating Exhaust (fan, sy Heat Exchanger Instrumentation and Control Intake Cooling Water NRC Inspector Follow-up Item Integrated Leak Rate Testing NRC Information Notice Institute for Nuclear Power Operations NRC.Inspection Report InService Inspection (program)
Ion Exchanger (Juno Beach)
Power Plant Engineering (Juno Beach)
Nuclear Engineering Licensee Identified Violation Low Temperature Overpressure Protection TS Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Low Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Motor Control Center Main Feed Isolation Valve Main Feed Pump Main Steam Isolation Valve Motorized Valve Megawatt(s)
Non-Cited Violation (of NRC requirements)
Nuclear Plant Operator Nuclear Plant Supervisor Nuclear Plant Work Order Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Steam'upply System Operating Instruction Off Normal Operating Procedure Operating Procedure Plant Change/Modification Pressure Control Valve Piping
& Instrumentation Diagram Pressure Indicator/Switch
PM PORV psig ppm PT PWO PWR QA QC QI QSPDS RAB RCB RCO RCP RCPB
'RCS Rev RG RO RPS RWT SAL SALP SAS SDC SDCS SEG SG SI SIT SNPO SRO STA Tavg TC TCB TCW TEDB TI TE TMI TR TS URI V
VIO Preventive Maintenan'ce Power Operated Relief Valve Pounds per square inch (gage)
Part(s)
per Million Pressure Transmitter Plant Work Order Pressurized Water Reactor Quality Assurance Quality Control Quality Instruction Qualified Safety Parameter Display System Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Containment Building Reactor Control Operator Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Reactor Coolant System h
Revision
[NRC] Regulatory Guide Reactor [licensed] Operator Reactor Protection System Refueling Water Tank Service Advice Letter Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Safety Assessment System Shut Down Cooling Shut Down Cooling System System Engineering Group Steam Generator Safety Injection Safety Injection Tank
..Senior Nuclear Plant [unlicensed]
Operator Senior Reactor [licensed] Operator Shift Technical Advisor Reactor average temperature Temporary Change Trip Circuit Breaker Turbine Cooling Water Total Equipment Data Base
[NRC] Temporary Instruction Temperature Element Three Mile Island Temperature Recorder Technical Specification(s)
NRC Unresolved Item Volt(s)
Violation (of NRC requirements)