IR 05000335/1989031
| ML17223A617 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223A616 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-89-31, 50-389-89-31, NUDOCS 9004250190 | |
| Download: ML17223A617 (13) | |
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VII4ITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AECIOk jl 101 MARIETTASTREET. k W, ATLAkTA.GEOAQIA 30323
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Report Hos.:
50-335/89-31 and 50-389/89-31 Licensee:
Florida Power and Lioht Coepany 9250 Nest Flaqler Street Miami, FL 33102 Oocket Hos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Fac111ty Hase:
St. Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
January 22-26, 1990 Inspector: '. i.A.j'et~
es a
Accompanying Personnel:
E. Podolak F. Victor L. Zerr License Hos.:
OPR-67 and HPF-.16 jjA a
qne Approved by:
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Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safequards 5NNARY ljj a
gne Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of the annual radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
I Results:
In the areas inspected, violations. deviat1ons.
or exercise weaknesses were not identified.
Security guards and some maintenance personnel assigned emergency response activities were not respiratory qualified.
Nithin the scope of the observed exercise, the licensee fully demonstrated the capability of implementing its Emergency Plan and procedures to provide for the health and safety of the public in a radiological emergenc REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Lfcensee Employees
- R. Acosta, Actfnq Vice President, Nuclear Enqfneerinq
- S. Boissy. Plant Manager
- S. Borrow, Operations Superintendent
<<J. Brannfn, Emeraency News Center Controller H. Bumgardner, Corporate Coaeunfcatfons
- G. Casto, Emergency Planning Coordinator
<<Y. Chilson, Principal Enafneer
- R. Church, Chafrman.
Independent Safety and Evaluation Group
- T. Coste, Operations Support Center Lead Controller
<<J, Couture, Control Rooe Lead Controller
- C. Crfder, Outage Management Supervisor
- R. Czarnecky, Security Controller
- J. Danek, Corporate Health Physics
- R. Enqlmefer, Acting Director, equality Assurance
- R. Frethette, Chemistry Supervisor
<<J. Geiger, Vice President.
Nuclear Assurance
+H. Granus, Emerqency Operations Facility Dose Assessment
+il. Hagar, Nuclear Plant Supervisor
<<J. Harper, Superintendent, equality Assurance
- J. Hays, Manager, Nuclear Energy Services
<<J. Kuhpatfl, Eaerqency Operations Facility Controller
<<H. Leffhefa, Field Nonftorfnq Teaes Lead Controller
<<J. Nafsler, Eaerqency Planning Manager (FPL)
- S. Nathavan, TSC/ERDADS Controller
- R. NcDanfel. Fire Drill Controller
- D. Hfller, Offsfte Lead Controller
<<N. Hullfns, Health Physics Controller
<<B. Parks, Supervisor. equality Assurance
- G; Patrfssf.
Emergency News Center/Bnerqency Operations Center Controller
- P. Roach.
Emergency Operations Facility Controller
- J. Ruby. Admfnfstratfce Supervisor
<<C. Scott, Operations Support Center Supervisor
- C. Swfatek, Technical Staff - Engineering
{FPL)
- A. Taylor, Emergency Plannfnq
<<S. Yaldes, Technical Support Center Lead Controller
- T. Veenstra, Emergency News Center Manager
- R. Walker, Emerqency Preparedness Coordinator
- R. Malker, Control Room Controller
<<J. Halls, gualfty Assurance (FPL)
- 0. Rest, Technical Staff Supervisor
0th licensee employees contacted durfnq this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force.
er technicians, and administratf ve personnel.
Other Organizations
%. Bolch, Enercon
- C. Huitquist, State of Florida Nuclear Regulatory CNInfssfon J. Crlenjak, Section Chief, Dfvfsfon of Reactor Prospects
- S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector J. Norris, Pro)ect Manager, Lfcensinq H. Scott, Resident Inspector
- Attended exft interview 2.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Natters No previous emergency preparedness enforcement matters remained outstanding.
3.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a ma)or portion of the basic elements defined fn the licensee's Emergency Plan and orqanizatfon pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14).
Paraqraph IV.F of Appendix E
to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NURE6-0654.
The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives fn advance of the exercise.
The final exercise data and message packages were distributed durfng a pre-exercise licensee briefing held January 23, 1990.
The scenario developed for this off-hours, small scale limited partfcfpatfon exercise was detailed and exercised the onsite emergency organizations.
The exercise began durfng the midnight shift with Unft 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in a refueling outage.
The accident scenario began at 0405 with an ofl fire fn the 18 charging pump cubicle.
The fire caused extensive damaqe to the pump and required the declaration of an Unusual Event.
At about 0425.
a tube leak started in the 1A steam generator.
As the Control Room became aware of the leak, the leak rate increased to 15 gallons per minute (gpm).
A plant shutdown due to the primary leak exceeding 1 qpm was begu I
About 30 minutes later.
the tube leak enlarqed causing rapid loss of primary inventory.
This loss caused a rapid decrease fn pressurizer level and pressure resulting in a reactor trip.
As the reactor trfpped. the steam generator safeties lifted briefly.
The resultfnq flow loosened already faulty restrafnfna bolts on valve 8205.
The bolts fractured and the upper portion of the steam safety valve blur off the "B'efn steam line fnitiatina an excess steam demand event at 0458.
Safety fn)ection was initiated and containment was isolated.
A main steam isolation signal occurred which closed the main steam isolation valves, and steaa bypass became unavailable.
The "B'team generator continued an uncontrolled cooldown of the primary plant as ft eaptfed fts inventory out the safety valve hole.
Existing conditions required the declaration of an Alert around 0515.
The Emergency Coordinator requested the Guty Call Supervisor to call-out the Onsfte Emerqency Response Organization and commenced activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) fn response to the Alert declaration.
At 0530, the "B" steam generator effectively boiled dry and reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature rose as all heat reieval mechanisms were ceased.
The operators began to dump steaN fmnedfately through the faulted, contaminated
'A" steam generator atmospheric dump valve (AOV) initiating a radiological release to the atmosphere.
(Once-through coolfnq was not an available option due to a contingency message indicating that power operated relief valves
{PQRVs) were inoperable.
Activity assocfated with the release was such that there was no siqnificant doses beyond the site boundary but the steam trestle and surrounding areas became contaminated.
This area also included the outside access to the Unit 1 Control Ram and the TSC.
After the "B" steam generator was empty. the Control Rooa, whfch had been unsuccessful fn controllfnq the 'A'team generator ADV. dispatched a
Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) to the steam trestle accoapanfed by a Health Physics
{HP) technician.
The NPO determined that the ADV was )aaued.
The NPO successfully unjaded the valve but fn the process. fell free the steam trestle and incurred sfanfffcant injuries when he landed, some 25 feet below, on the "C" auxiliary feedwater pump.
The HP technician alerted the Control Room around 0650 to dispatch the Ffrst-afd/Decon Team and called for an ambulance because of the medical emerqency.
At 0658, qrass fires fn the Savannahs under the transmission lines caused a loss of offsfte power.
Emergency dfesel qenerators picked-up all essential loads includfnq emergency ceawnfcatfons equipment.
The loss of power telporarfly affected Iiqhtinq and telephones in the Control Room.
The loss of offsfte power coupled with the rapid failure of steam generator tubes required the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
Also at this time, the Offsite Emergency Response Oraanfzatfon was being activated at the Emeraency Operations Facility (EOF) and Emergency News Center (ENC).
Over the next hour, operators continued to cooldown the plant and Offsfte Field Teaws continued to monitor the radiological release.
At 0910 th Control Room received word that the fires were out fn the Savannahs and the load dispatcher was preparfnq to close breakers on e
e th transiwfssfon lines.
As the operators attempted to synchronize the emergency diesel generators to the qrfd the breaker to the 1B start-up transformer failed to close.
Followina trouble-shooting by an Electrical Repair Team. the breaker was repaired and operators successfully closed the breaker to the 1B start-up transformer around 0955.
The scenario ended at about 1100 with the initiation of shutdown coolfnq and subsequent closfnq of the A ADV to terminate the release.
The controllers provfded adequate qufdance throuahout the exercise.
The inspector observed no undue interaction between the controllers and the players.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Assfanment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that prfwary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established.
and that adequate staff was available to respond to an ewerqency pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(l),
Paraqraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specffic quidance promulgated fn Section Il.h of NNE6-0654.
The inspector observed that specific eo'.rqency assfgiments were sade for the licensee's onsfte emergency response or ganfzatfon, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the sfmlated emergency.
The fnftfal response orqanfzatfon was augmented by desiqnated licensee representatives.
Because of the scenario scope and condftfons, long tera or continuous staffing of the emergency response orqanfzatfon was not required.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufffcfent technical staff were avaflable to provide for continuous stafffnq of the augmented emeraency orqanfzatfon, ff needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffinq,. and operation of the emergency organization fn the TSC. the OSC, the EOF, and the ENC.
At each response center, the required staffina and assfqnment of responsibility was consistent with the licensee's approved procedures.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emerqency orqanization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to
6.
6.
Paraaraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR 50.
and speck fic quidancc promulqated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; 2) provision of adequate staffina to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas it all tiees; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organization interact1ons.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emerqcncy oraanization was adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional pos1tions within the organization.
Auqumentation of the initial emergency response oraanizations was accomplished through Nobilization of add1tional day-shift personnel.
Thc Nuclear Plant Supervisor
{NPS) ass1qned to thc exercise assumed the duties of Baerqency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emerqency.
and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.
Violations or deviations werc not observed, ENerqency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emerqency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific auidance promulgated in Section II.D of NURE6-0654, and guidance recaanended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
Bnerqency Plan Implementing Procedure No. 310022E titled "Classificat1ons of Emergencies'as used to promptly identify and properly classify the scenario siaalatcd events.
The Notification of Unusual Event. Alert, and Site Area Bierqency classifications were timely and correct by procedures.
The Notification of Unusual Event declared at about 0420 was due to an uncontrolled fire lasting in excess of 10 minutes.
The Alert was declared at about 0515 due to a rapid failure of steam generator tubes (greater than charqinq pump capacity).
The S1te Area Emergency was declared at about 0715 due to the rapid failure of steam generator tubes with a loss of offsite power (greater than charging pump capacity).
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Notification methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47{b)(5).
Paraaraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific quidance promulaated in Section II.E of NUREG-065 An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use fn providina fnforaatfon reaardfnq the simulated emergency condition to Federal, State, and local response orqan1zatfons, and to alert the licensee's auqiented emergency response oraanizatfon.
An 1nspector observed that notifications made by the 11censee at the Unusual Event, Alert, and Site Area Emergency were tfaely.
The inspector'urther observed that followup coamunfcatfons were not sade fn accordance with Section 4.2.1 of the Radfoloafcal Emergency Plan.
Mhen the Reactor Control Operator (RCO) was d1rected to notify the State concernfnq the low level release from the
"A" steam aenerator the RCO dfd not follow procedural guidance.
Instead of inftfatfna a separate followup message form, he retrieved the original notff1cation of an Alert messaae and added the new information to the or1ginal messaae fore.
The orfqfnal Alert messaae was sent to the State at about 0515, the followup release information was transmitted about an hour later at approxfaately 0615.
This findfna will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Itei (IFI).
IFI 50-335, 389/89-31-01:
Failure to follow procedural aufdance for followup aessaqe preparation and transmission.
The inspector also observed that a
known rad1oactfve release, althouah ll d b the "A'team aenerator ADV, occurred for about 50 minutes before the State was made aware that such a release was in progress.
As a result of this delay the State was unclear that there were two release events that had occurred fn the scenario play.
The first release event was out of the 'B" Hafn Steam Line Safety Valve and the second from the NV.
This finding will be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-335, 389/89-31-02:
Failure to dfsseafnate fnforaatfon to qoverreental aaencfes about low level radfologfcal releases assocfated with a plant casualty event.
Vfolatfons. or dev1atfons were not identified.
Emeraency Cooeunfcatfons (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prowpt ceaavnfcations among 'prfnc1pal response oraanfzatfons and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47{b){8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendfx E to
CFR 50, and specific aufdance promulqated fn Section II.H of NUREG-0654.
Th
t bserved activation, staffinq, and operation of the e
nspec or o
emergency response facilities and observed the use o
q pme f euf nt at the iliti Em rqency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room, OSC, TSC, EOF, and the ENC.
An inspector observed that frequent and tfmely status updates were provided by each emergency facility's manage Control Room.;
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Rooe operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required response to the simulated emeraency.
Emeraency procedures were avaflable and followed.
Technical Support Center - This facility was actfvated following a request by the NPS after reviewing the simulated emcraency conditions.
Activation of the TSC took approximately one hour and, 45 minutes.
The delay fn manning appeared to be caused by sfwilated radfoloafcal contamination along the primary access route to the TSC and the need to plan an alternate route to the TSC.
After the delayed activation, the facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emeraency duties. authorities, and responsibilities.
The facility was provfded with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff.
Briefings of the TSC staff were frequent and consistent with the changes fn plant status related emergency conditions.
Site accountability, when requested.
was accanplfshcd within 30 mfnutcs which is within the accepted time aufdance.
The delayed activation finding will be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-335, 389/89-31-03:
Develop alternate personnel access route to the TSC to ensure tiaely activation.
Operations Support Center - The inspector observed that followfng the request for actfvation, personnel responded prowptly to staff the facility.
An inspector observed that three response teais werc delayed in perforifna their requested functfon due to tcae Newbers'espiratory qualifications difficulties.
The following exaaples support this finding:
An electrician respondfna to Breaker t20302 at about 0930 was not respirator qualified resulting in a delay of approximately 30 minutes for response.
Two maintenance personnel, an I 5 C technician, and an HP Technfcfan responding as a
team at about 0545 were not respiratory qualified resulting in a delayed response.
These findings will be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-335,389/89-31-04:
Failure to provide respiratory qua1ffed emeraency response team personnel for recovery and reentry teaas.
Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF was activated at the Site Area Emeraency classification.
The facility staff were famflfar with their emergency duties, authoritfes, and emergency responsibilities.
The EOF was provided with adequate equipment to support the assigned staf Violat1ons or deviations were not fdentfffed.
9.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessfnq and monitor.inq actual or potential offsite consequences of a radfoloofcal emergency condition were fn use as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(9).
Paragraph IV.S of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NURE6-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program 1ncluded an engfneerfno assessment of plant status, damaqe caused by the simulated events',
and an assessment of the radiological hazard to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Onsite and offs1te radiological environmental monitorina teams were dispatched to determine the level of rad1oactivity fn those areas within the influence of the simulated plume.
Radiological effluent data was received and reviewed in the TSC.
'-
10.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Pub11c Educat1on and Information (82301)
This area was observed to assure that information concerning the sflolated emeraency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated fn Section 11.6 of NURE6-0654.
Emerqency News Center - The ENC was activated at the Sfte Area Emergency classification.
The ENC personnel were prestaged to allow for a sore expeditious activation and to allow for a longer manning of this facility.
The facility staff were familiar with'heir emergency duties and responsibilities.
The ENC was 'provided with adequate equipment to support the assigned staff.
News releases were t1mel'y, correct and adequate to describe the simulated plant casualty.
Press briefings were conducted, usinq actual media to effect realfsm.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Exercise Critique {82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomfnqs identified as part of the exercise.
were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14).
Paraqraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CRF 50, and specific guidance promulgated fn Section II.N of NUREG>>065 The licensee conducted a series of post-exercise critiqves on January 2i, and January 25, 1990.
Crftiques were held with players, controllers, and manaaement.
The management critique was attended by exercise controllers, observers, and NRC representatives.
Findings fdentffied during thc exercfse and plans for. corrective action were discussed.
L1censee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies and planned fmprovement items.
The conduct of the crftfquc was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidel1nes cited above.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
12.
Action on Previous Inspector Ffndinqs (92701)
{Closed) IFI 50-335, 389/89-15-01:
Improve inter-ERF coanunications to ensure OSC awareness of Control Room deployment of operator(s)
to 1 vestigate equipment status durfnq accident conditions.
The inspector nves g
observed inter-ERF coaeunfcations during the exercise and deemed them adequate.
(Closed)
IFI 50-335, 389/89-16-02:
Ensure periodic briefing of offsite radiological monitoring teams on plant and casualty status.
The 1nspector observed TSC/Radiologfcal Honftorfna Team radio coaeunfcatfons and deemed the briefings adequate.
14.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and ffndfngs were suaearfzed on January 25, 1990, with those persons identified fn Paragraph 1 above.
The Inspector described thc areas inspected and discussed fn detafl the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary fnformatfon fs not contained fn this report.
Dissenting coaeents were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Descrf tfon and Reference 50-335, 389/89-31-01 IFI - Failure to follow procedural guidance for followup message preparations and transmfssions
{Paragraph 7).
50-335, 389/89-31-02 IFI - Failure to disseminate information to governmental agencies about low level radiological releases associated with a plant casualty event (Paragraph 7).
50-335, 389/89-31-03 50-335, 389/89-31-04 IFI - Develop alternate personnel access routes to the TSC to ensure timely activation (Paraaraph S.b).
IFI - Failure to provide respiratory qualified emeraency response team personnel for recovery and reentry teams (Paragraph S.c).
I
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