IR 05000335/1989015
| ML17223A218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1989 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223A217 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-89-15, 50-389-89-15, NUDOCS 8907130024 | |
| Download: ML17223A218 (30) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 JUN 28 1989 Report'os.:
50-335/89-15 and 50-389/89-15 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
L'ucie 1 and
Inspection Condo 'd" ay
6, 1989 Inspector:
A. L.
Cun ng am License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Date Signed Approved by:
W.
H. Rankin, C ief Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards 4-a-Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of the annual radiological emergency response exercise.
The full participation exercise commenced at 7:30 a.m.
on May 24, 1989.
The exercise was terminated at 4:00 p.m.
on the above referenced date.
The medical emergency and fire drills were performed as integral parts of the exercise.
Offsite support and resources were used in performance of the medical emergency, offsite radiological monitoring, and communications drills.
The status of outstanding emergency preparedness open items was reviewed.
A detailed evaluation of the St. Lucie dose assessment program was performed.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
The exercise was fully successful, and the licensee demonstrated the capability to effectively assess, control, and mitigate the postulated casualty presented in the exercise scenario.
Additionally,,onsite and offsite protective action recommendations were promptly made and determined to be consistent with the Emergency Plan, respective procedures, and prevailing radiological conditions.
Exercise objectives were fully implemented.
Review and evaluation of the dose assessment program disclosed no findings.
Two concerns were identified and tracked-as inspector followup items, namely:
(1) improved inter-ERF communications required to ensure Operations Support Center awareness of deployment of operations personnel to investigate equipment status during 8907130024 S90628 PDR ADOCIi 05000335 A
accident conditions",
and (2) ensure periodic updating of offsite radiological monitoring teams regarding plant and casualty statu REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- P. Bailey, Corporate Health Physicist
- G. Boissy, Plant Manager
- H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
- J. Hayes, Nuclear Energy Services Manager
- G. LaGarde, Emergency Planner (Turkey Point)
- L. Large, Health Physics Operation Assistant Supervisor
- C. Leppla, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor
- J. Maisler, Emergency Planning Manager
- S. Mathavan, Independent Safety Engineering Group
- L. McCaughlin, Engineering Supervisor
- D. Miller, Corporate Emergency Planning
- B. Parks, guality Assurance Supervisor
- D. Sager, Site Vice President
- T. Vogan, Engineering Project Manager
- J. Walker, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- W. White, Security Supervisor r
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- S. Elrod.
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions.
While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organizatio ~.g ~
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'a t4 The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided all required information to the State, counties, local governments, and Federal agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercise.
The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel through use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
Neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and players was observed.
The scenarios developed for the medical emergency and fire drills were reviewed in detail, and determined to be adequate.
Both drills fully integrated the required response activities of licensee and offsite support groups including effective management of combined resources, where applicable.
The scope and objectives of the subject drills were met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
,This area was observed to assure that pi imary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(1),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
Discussions with licensee representatives and a detail review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Required staffing and specific assignment of responsibility at these facilities were consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and respective implementing procedures.
The Emergency News Center (ENC) was activated during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant 'o
CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E
to.
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
( 1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspector 'observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined,'nd that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift and available on-shift personnel.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon commencement of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Nanager following declaration of the Alert emerge'ncy classification.
Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization, State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654; and guidance developed in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was promptly used to identify and properly classify the initiating emergency event and escalate the casualty to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was properly used and was consistent with the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.
The system was observed to be adequate for classification of the simulated casualty events.
The emergency procedures provided for initial a'nd continuing mitigating actions during the simulated casualty.
No violations or deviations were identifie Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to ensure that procedures were established by the licensee for notification of State and local response organizations, and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages was disseminated to these organizations.
This area was further observed to ensure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(5),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedure's were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization, if required.
Inspection also disclosed that the licensee consistently implemented prompt notification of the State and counties within the 15-minute time regime following declaration of each emergency classification during the exercise.
Periodic updating of the State and counties regarding plant status via telephone and hard copy was also consistently implemented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to ensure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, and EOF),
the licensee and offsite response organizations, and the offsite radiological monitoring teams and the EOF.
The inspector also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.
Evaluation of inter-ERF communications disclosed, however, that the OSC was not informed of the Control Room's deployment of operations personnel to determine the status of plant equipment on two occasions involving the surge tank, and switch gear 4160, respectively.
This concern was discussed in detail with cognizant licensee representatives prior to and during the exit interview, and will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI).
No dissenting comments were expressed by the licensee regarding this finding.
IFI 50-335, 389/89-15-01:
Improved communications required to ensure OSC awareness of deployment of operations personnel investigating plant equipment statu An additional concern regarding communications addressed periodic updating-of offsite radiological monitoring teams regarding plant and casualty status during the exercise.
It was observed in the TSC and EOF that respective offsite communicators did not inform the teams of plant status, including the prevailing emergency classification and changes thereof throughout the exercise.
This concern was discussed with cognizant licensee representatives prior to and during the exit interview'nd will be tracked as an IFI.
No dissenting comments were expressed by the licensee regarding this item of concern.
IFI 50-335, 389/89-15-02:
Ensure periodic updates of offsite radiological monitoring teams addressing plant and casualty status during exercises.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(8),, Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section I.H of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities and use of equipment therein.
Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room, TSC, OSC, and EOF.
a
~
Control Room Unit 1 Control Room was provided for the exercise Shift Supervisor and his staff.
Required communications equipment, Control Room procedures and documents were readily available.
The inspector observed that, following review and analysis of the sequence of emergency events, Control Room operations personnel promptly initiated required responses to the simulated casualty.
Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for the orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room Operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and
'declare the proper emergency classification.
The staff also demonstrated the capability to consistently and effectively assess the. initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions in a
timely manner.
It was noted that a detailed log of'Control Room activities was maintained by the Shift Supervisor throughout the exercise.
The Shift Supervisor demonstrated effective management and control of the facility and staff during the exercise.
b.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was promptly staffed
.and activated following declaration of the Alert'.
An inspector observed that reentry teams were promptly assembled; briefed, and dispatched.
A health physics (HP) technician accompanied each team.
The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
During operations of the facility, radio)ogical habitability was routinely monitored.
The OSC Supervisor establ,ished and maintained required management and control of the facility.
The facility staff was periodically updated regarding plant status.
The supervisor also assured that investigation and repair teams were thoroughly briefed regarding their tasks prior to deployment to accident areas.
During the exercise, inspection disclosed the concern identified in Paragraph
addressing the requirement for improved coomunications with the OSC regarding deployment of personnel into the plant by the Control Room staff during the simulated casualty.
C.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was promptly staffed and activated following declaration of the Alert.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities.
The TSC was provided with necessary equipment, procedures, and documents required for support of the assigned staff and continued mitigation of the postulated casualty.
During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as required.
Status boards and related visual aids were strategically located to tacilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
Status boards were maintained by-communicators assigned to the facility.
Inspection also disclosed the following additional findings, namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem-solving exercises; (2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Coordinator was definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) periodic briefings of the TSC staff by the Emergency Coordinator were frequent, and consistent with changes in plant
"
status and related emergency conditions; (5) accountability, including identification of missing personnel, was readily implemented within the required time regime and was consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise; and (6)
TSC controllers
were effective in identifying minor scenario problems, and interacted with players without prompting.
The TSC dose assessment group demonstrated proficiency in manual and computerized assessment methodologies.
Contact between the assessment group and offsite monitoring teams were routinely maintained.
Offsite dose assessment and dose projections were consistent with the offsite radiological data provided, and were performed in a timely manner.
Results provided by the TSC dose assessment group were incorporated into offsite followup notification messages.
The dose assessment staff demonstrated a significant commitment to training throughout the exercise.
Additionally, facility access and contamination cont'rol were consistently maintained throughout the exercise.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was promptly staffed and activated following declaration of the Site Area Emergency.
The Recovery Nanager was promptly and effectively briefed by the Emergency Coordinator regarding plant status and the prevailing status of the casualty.
It was observed, however, that the Emergency Coordinator failed to inform the Recovery Nanager of the protective action recommendation implemented in response to the radiological release attending the Site Area Emergency.
The licensee promptly identified this item.
Accordingly, the Recovery Nanager immediately convened a meeting of his staff and representatives of the counties, State, and Governor's office to discuss protective action recommendations consistent with this phase of the casualty.
Although the final recommendation to evacuate the two mile radius of the plant and shelter five miles down-wind was in full agreement with that provided by the TSC, the prompt response of the Recovery Nanager provided an effective and comprehensive drill in protective action response and recommendations.
The licensee documented this finding as an exercise action item requiring detailed review and followup.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(9),
Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II..I of NUREG-0654.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel directly resulting from the casualty.
During the exercise, accident assessment teams functioned effectively in analyzing plant status and providing recommendations to the Emergency Coordinator
regarding the following:
(1) mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment; (2) prevention and/or control of radioactive releases; and (3) prompt termination of emergency conditions.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements.
Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.
Radiological effluent data provided. by inplant and offsite monitoring teams were received in the TSC and EOF where dose calculations were computed and factored into the exercise.
All resultant data were consistent with projected scenario parameters.
Offsite monitoring teams were observed and evaluated by the NRC during this exercise.
Team members were fully cognizant of their duties.and responsibilities.
Each team promptly and effectively responded to required guidance and direction given by the TSC and EOF Offsite Team Coordinators.
The inspector observed that the TSC and EOF Field Team Coordinators frequently briefed and updated the monitoring teams on periodic meteorological changes and plant release data.
The inspector observed however, that the offsite monitoring teams were 'not briefed regarding plant and casualty status as discussed in Paragraph 7, above.
Dose assessment, including source term, meteorology, and calculational methology (Class-A Dose Assessment Model, and EPIP Manual Method), were reviewed in detail.
Dose assessment/projection programs and calculational methodologies are generic to the Turkey Point and St.
Lucie plants.
Consistent with the detailed evaluation of the subject program performed during the Turkey Point ERF Appraisal (NRC Report 50-250, 251/88-01),
review of the St.
Lucie dose assessment program disclosed that corrective actions and improvements implemented in response to the referenced appraisal were reflected in the St.
Lucie program.
No addditional findings were identified (refer to Turkey Point ERF appraisal follow-up inspection Nos.
50-250, 251/89-08).
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Measures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective actions, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654.
The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the inspector.
For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant and offsite protective measures were reviewed and implemented where required.
Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the accident conditions postulated during the exercise.
Protective action recommendations were also consistent with the facility Radiological
Emergency Plan and respective procedures.
Paragraph 8.d above, addresses protective action recommendations regarding releases associated with the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether methods for controlling radiological exposures during an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and whether these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
recommendations pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(ll),
and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers, and conducting periodic radiological surveys in each emergency response facility.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions taken.
Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment were available for use as required.
HP control of radiation exposure, contamination, and access to radiation areas was determined to be adequate.
The HP Supervisor was observed to thoroughly brief OSC survey, investigative, and repair teams prior to their deployment into radiation controlled areas.
Dosimetry was available and effectively used.
High-range dosimeters were also available, if needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determined whether information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
Inspection included observation of several press briefings, review of press releases issued throughout the exercise, and review and discussion of the licensee s rumor control program.
Inspection disclosed that operation of the ENC was consistent with the Emergency Plan and respective implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Status of Previous Emergency Preparedness Findings a.
(Closed)
IFI 50-335, 389/88-22-01:
Ensure that damage assessment is conducted and documented following fire drill, ~P,g ek,
~ ~ 4,
The licensee fully demonstrated the capability to assess and document damage incurred following the fire drill conducted during this exercise.
b.
(Closed)
IFI 50-335, 389/89-31-02:
Implementing a
program for periodically testing the off-shift augmentation capability of the emergency response organization.
Inspection disclosed that an off-shift augumentation drill was conducted to assess the response capability of the emergency response organization.
The subject drill was fully successful.
Selected organization personnel contacted and response thereto was consistent with the site Emergency Plan and respective implementing procedures regarding projected site arrival time and assumption of assigned emergency tasks.
14.
Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether deficiencies, weaknesses and required improvement items identified during the exercise were brought to management's attention and documented for corrective action pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E
to
CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
The licensee conducted a players'ritique in each emergency facility immediately followi.ng termination of the exercise.
A comprehensive Controller/Evaluator critique was convened at 8:30 a.m.
on May 25, 1989.
The Licensee/NRC critique was conducted at 1:30 p.m.,
on the above date with those persons listed in Paragraph 1, above.
The licensee's critique was detailed and documented those items requiring review and corrective action.
Following the licensee's critique, the NRC inspector described the areas evaluated and discussed in detail the inspection results contained in this report.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Item No.
50-335, 389/89-15-01 I FI Descri tion and Reference Improve inter-ERF communications to ensure OSC awareness of Control Room deployment of operator(s)
to investigate plant equipment status during accident conditions.
50-335, 389/89-15-02 IFI Ensure periodic briefing of offsite radiological monitoring teams on plant and casualty statu.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The inspector attended the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV)
critique of offsite exercise activities conducted by Martin, Saint Lucie, and Indian River counties, and elements of the State of Florida emergency response organization.
The State participated only to the extent necessary to support the counties implementation of the scope and objectives of the offsite exercise.
The FEMA final report will be forwarded to the licensee by separate correspondence.
The public meeting addressing the onsite and offsite exercises scheduled for 12:30 p.m.
on May,25, 1989, was cancelled for lack of attendance of news media representatives and members of the general publi Sco e
a Ob'ect've The 1989 Evaluated Exercise for the Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant will involve offsite (State and County) participation.
The exercise is to be conducted during normal working hours and will depict a radiological emergency occurring at Unit 2.
Emergency response actions during the simulated emergency will include, recognition and classification of emergency conditions, assessment of on-site/offsite radiological consequences, alert/notification and mobilization of emergency'esponse organizations and the general public (simulated), activation/operation of emergency response facilities and equipment, implementation of in-plant corrective actions, recommendation/implementation of on-site and offsite protective actions, preparation of messages, reports, and record keeping, and downgrade and recovery/reentry discussions.
The following drills are incorporated as part of the exercise:
a.
Communications Drill b. Medical Drill c. Fire Drill d. Radiological Monitoring Drill The Objectives are included'n the following pages.
4.1 Scope and Ob)ectives FLORIDA POMER fc LZQHT COMPANY ST.
LUCZE EVALUATED EXERCZSE OMECTZVES May 24, 1989 a 0 b.
Demonstrate the ability to promptly alert, notify, and mobilize FPL Emergency Response Personnel.
Demonstrate the ability to promptly notify and communicate information to NRC, State, and local authorities.
2 ~
3 ~
b.
C ~
Demonstrate the ability to staff the Technical Support Center (TSC),
the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
and the Emergency News Center (ENC).
Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC, OSC, EOF, and ENC.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of designated emergency response equipment.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment.
a ~
b.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command and control over the emergency response activities conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.
Provide the opportunity for State and Local Governments to participate and interact in a simulated nuclear emergency.
EP1:12
Rev. 3/1/89 Page
A.
Ge C ~
d 1 (cont'd)
Demonstrate the adequacy of oper. tional interfaces with Offsite Emergency Response Agencies.
Demonstrate the ability to gather, assess, and disseminate information to the public and governmental officials regarding the status of the emergency conditions and the status of emergency response activities within regulatory defined time limitations.
4.
5.
a ~
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to analyze current plant conditions, their potential consequences, and provide recommendations for mitigating actions.
a ~
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information regarding off-site radiological consequences between radiological assessment personnel stationed at the TSC and the EOP.
6.
'a ~
b.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately control radiation exposure to on-site emergency workers.
Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Coordinator and/or Recovery Manager to determine Protective Action Recommendations for the public, as appropriate to the emergency condition.
7 ~
a.
Provide the opportunity to train alternate members of the FPL Emergency Response Organization (both onsite and offsite).
b.
Exhibit the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness training program in a practical demonstration.
EP1:12
Rev. 3/1/89 Page
A.
(cont'd)
c."
Demonstrate the effectiveness of actions taken to correct past identified weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program.
d.
Demonstrate the ability of participants and controller/evaluators to evaluate and critique exercise performance.
V
'a ~
b.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities from the Nuclear Plant Supervisor to designated senior plant management.
Demonstrate the ability of each facilitymanager to periodically inform facilitypersonnel of the status of the emergency situation and plant conditions.
2 ~
c.
Demonstrate the ability to promptly and accurately transfer information between emergency response facilities.
d.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC and OSC to coordinate the deployment of emergency teams.
e.
Demonstrate the ability of emergency teams to respond to and treat contaminated and injured personnel.
C ~
Demonstrate the ability of the Nuclear Plant Supervisor/Emergency Coordinator to classify an emergency condition.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to support the Control Room efforts to identify the probable cause of an accident, mitigate the consequences of that accident, and place the affected unit in a safe, stable condition.
Demonstrate that damage assessment is conducted and documented following response to a fire.
EP1: 12
Rev. 3/1/89 Page
B.
S c
c 'v (cont'd)
~
sess a ~
b.
Demonstrate the ability of the on-site survey team personnel to efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other prescribed on-site and in-plant radiological monitor'ing activities.
Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments and projections of on-site and off-site radiological conditions to support the formulation of protective action recommendations.
c ~
Demonstrate the capability to draw or analyze samples drawn from the in-plant normal and/or post-accident sampling systems, and assess the resultant data.
4 ~
t t'v a ~
b.
c ~
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement on-site protective action measures in a timely manner.
Demonstrate a
representative evacuation and subsequent accountability of onsite personnel.
Demonstrate the ability to account for all on-site personnel within approximately 30 minutes after a site evacuation has been initiated.
C.
S Ce 1 ~
a ~
b.
Demonstrate real-time activation of the Emergency Operations Facility.
Note that ENC will be staged at Juno so no real-time response (from Miami) will be required.
Demonstrate that adequate communications exist, between FPL and offsite agency emergency facilities.
EP1:12
Rev. 3/1/89 Page
C.
~
(cont')
a.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of procedurally defined responsibilities from the Emergency Coordinator to the Recovery Manager.
3 ~
a 0 Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to support the on-site efforts to identify the cause of an accident, mitigate the consequences of that incident, and place the affected unit in a safe, stable condition.
4 ~
Demonstrate offsite environmental surveillance and dose assessment.
b.
Performance of offsite dose calculations will be demonstrated.
5 ~
C ~
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel.
a ~
b.
Demonstrate that )oint FPL/Government Agency decisions, regarding protective action recommendations for the general public within the EPZ, can be made in a timely manner.
Demonstrate that protective action recommendations can be communicated to State and local authorities within regulatory time constraints.
6.
a.
Demonstrate the ability to cooWdinate the preparation, review and release of public information with State and local government agencies as appropriate.
Provide accurate, clear, and timely information releases to the news media.
EP1: 12
Rev. 3/1/89 Page
C.
(cont'd)
7 ~
a.
Demonstrate care and treatment oC 'one/or more contaminated/ingured nuclear plant personnel.
D.
S Real time activation oi'he Emergency News Center Corporate Communications personnel will not be demonstrated.
Corporate Communications will, however, be positioned at the Juno Beach Facilit QFs'StTE.
Pl&aucg GOALS AND OBJECTIVES LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PARTIAL PARTICIPATION EXERCISE May 24, 1989 The following goals and objectives reflect appropriate staffing by the State of Florida.
The licensee's Emergency Operations Facility will be staffed by the Governor's Authorized Representative and the Public Information Officer located at the Emergency News Center.
The exercise will demonstrate emergency response and communications capabilities among state and local governments, and the licensee.
Goals To evaluate portions of the Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants and confirm its adequacy for response to an emergency situation at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant.
Specific portions of the plan to be addressed are:
A.
Annex R - St. Lucie Site Plan B.
Annex B - Emergency Response Organizations and Responsibilities C.
Annex C - Direction and Control D.
Annex D - Emergency Classification System E.
Annex E - Notification and Activation F.
Annex F - Emergency Communications G.
Annex G - Public Information H.
Annex H Emergency Facilities I.
Annex I - Accident Assessment J.
Annex J - Radiological Exposure Control K.
Annex K Protective Response Ob 'ectives The following objectives will be demonstrated by indicated agencies during the exercise.
l.
Emer enc Classification Levels - (St. Lucie
& Martin counties, DEM, DHRS
Mobilization of Emer enc Personnel - (St. Lucie, Martin
& Indian Raver Counties, DEM, DHRS 3.
Direction 'and Control - (St ~ Lucie, Martin & Indian Raver counties, DEM, DHRS)
r 4.
Communications.
-. (St. Lucie, Martin & Indian River coun-ties, DEM, DHRS)
5.
Facilities E ui ment and Dis la s - (St. Lucie, Martin
&
Indian River counties, DEM 6.
Emer enc Worker Ex osure Control - (St. Lucie, Martin
&
Indian River counties, DHRS 7.
Field Radiolo ical Monitorin - Ambient Radiation Y ~
8.
Field Radiolo ical Monitorin - Airborne Iodine 9.. Field Radiolo ical Monitorin - Particulate Activit DHRS 10.
Plume Dose Pro'ection - (DHRS)
11.
Plume Protective Action Decisionmakin
- (St. I,ucie
&
Martxn counties, DEM, DHRS 12.
Alert, Notification and Emer enc Information - Initial Alert and Nota xcatxon -
St. Lucre
& Martxn counties 13.
Alert, Notification and Emer enc Information - Public Instructions -
St. Lucre
& Mart n counties 14.
Alert, Notification and Emer enc Information - Media-St. Lucre, Martxn
& In zan R ver count es, DEM 15.
Alert, Notification and Emer en Information - Rumor Control -
St. Lucre
& Martxn count es 16.
Use of KI - (DEM, DHRS)
18.
Im lementation of Protective Actions Plume EPZ-St.
Luc e
& Martxn counties, DEM 19.
Xm lementation of Protective Actions - Evacuation of Schools -
St. Lucre County 20.
Traf ic Control - (St. Lucie
& Martin counties)
21.
Relocation Centers Re istration, Monitorin
,
and Decontamination -
Indian River County
22.
Relocation Centers - Con re ate Care - (Indian.River Coi;nty 25.
Da 'ontamination - (St. Lucie, Martin
& Indian River 31.
Recover
, Reentr and Relocation '- Total Po ulation Ex osure Estimate St. Lucre
& Martxn counties 32.
Recover
, Reentr and Relocation - Determination of A
ro rxate. Measures -
St. Lucre
& Martxn counties, DEM, DHRS 33.
Recover
, Reentr and Relocation - Im lementation - (St.
Lucre
& Martxn counties, DEM, DHRS 35.
Evacuation of On-Site Personnel - (St. Lucie County
&
1989 EVALUATED EXERCISE ST.
LUCIE PLANT MAY 24, 1989 Initial Conditions:
Unit 2 has been operating at 100 percent rated power for 99 days.
The following item's are of interest:
0
0 2A auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump is out of service to replace the mechanical seal.
2B high pressure safety injection (HPSI)
pump is operating on mini-flow recirculation for monthly surveillance test.
2C charging pump is out of service to replace a cracked cylinder block.
The pump is disassembled.
Motor operated Valve Nos.
V-1476 and V-1477 are closed due to excessive seat leakage through solenoid valve Nos.
V-1474, and V-1475.
2C component cooling water pump is out of service to repair the motor. The motor has been removed and shipped to Tampa.
1B/2B startup transformer is out of service for outage work. Expected completion date is May 31, 1989.
NOTE: During this exercise only, dial 464-1001 instead of 911 for all exercise related events. If a real emergency should arise, then dial 911.
Unit 1 is in day 12 of a
scheduled
day outage.
The upper internals lifting device is scheduled to be installed this shift.
Meteorological Information:
A weak cold front, associated with a dissipating tropical wave, has passed through the area.
Forecast calls for mostly cloudy conditions with a 60 percent chance of rain.
High temperature expected to be in the upper 80's to low 90's.
Wind expected to be out of the North to Northeast at 5 to 10 miles per hour with gusts up to 20 miles per hour in thunderstorms.
System Information:
Peak demand is expected in the 9,000 to 10,500 Mwe range today.
Both Riviera units are out of service resulting in low voltage conditions in the West Palm Beach service area.
Grass fires are reported out of control along the Florida Turnpike, near the 500,000 Volt transmission line corridor North of Midway substation, between mile markers 176 and 18 :00 A.M.
1989 EVALUATED EXERCISE ST.
LJCIE PLANT MAY"24, 1989 Exercises commences.
8:10 A.M.
8:20 A.M.
8:40 A.M.
8:45 A.M.
8:54 A.M.
8:55 A.M.
Senior Nuclear Plant Operator (SNPO) notifies the control room that a gross failure of the mechanical seal on high pressure safety injection (HPSI)
pump No. 2B has occurred.
The seal has blown apart, water is spraying all over the room, and the HPSI pump was shut down locally because of severe pump vibration.
The nuclear operator trainee, who was taking vibration measurements on the pump at the time of the mechanical seal failure, is lying on the floor with apparent severe injuries.
The SNPO requests that the first aid/decontamination team be dispatched immediately and recommends that off-site medical assistance be requested.
Nuclear plant supervisor (NPS)
calls 464-1001 (instead of 911)
to request off-site medical assistance to stabilize and transport a contaminated injured person to Lawnwood Hospital.
Emergency vehicle leaves site for Lawnwood Hospital.
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared by this time, by the Emergency Coordinator, due to transport a
confirmed contaminated injured individual from the site to an,offsite medical facility'for treatment.
Control room receives notification that operators on Unit No.
1 executed a switching order, at 7:00 A.M., to open switch nos.
8G48 and 8G50 for a
Transmission
& Distribution (T&D) crew, working in the switchyard, to replace five (5) existing oil circuit breakers (OCB), including OCB No. 8W49, with Mitsubishi OCBs in accordance with Plant Change/Modification (PCM) 42-188D.
The control room receives an audible indication of a fire detection alarm 2.01.22.
9:05 A.M.
The Senior Nuclear Plant Operator notifies the control room of a fire in the No.
2A emergency Diesel-generator room.
NOTE: This has the potential to affect a safety system.
9: 10 A.M.
~
~
911 to request off-site fire assistanc EVALUATED EXERCISE ST.
LUCIE PLANT MAY 24, 1983 Contaminated injured individual arrives at Lawnwood Hospital.
Simulated offsite fire support arrives at No.
2A Emergency Diesel-generator building.
ALERT should be declared by this time, by the Emergency Coordinator, due to an uncontrolled fire potentially affecting safety systems and requiring off-site support.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Operations Support Center (OSC) activation should be initiated by this time.
Fire in the No.
2A emergency Diesel-generator room is out. Simulated off-site fire support is released.
Control room receives report of extensive damage to the No.
2A emergency Diesel and generator.
NOTE:
Load reduction may be started, switch from unit auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer may be attempted, or the start of 2B Emergency Diesel-generator may be attempted, if NPS has information to conclude that he has no operable HPSI pumps at this time.
Control room receives indications that a reactor coolant system (RCS) leak, greater than 50 gpm, is in progress.
Containment gas monitor, containment particulate monitor, and affected containment area radiation monitors show increasing activity levels.
The containment sump level indicator indicates increasing level.
NOTE: Source of leak is a field weld (heat affected zone)
in the No.
2A shutdown cooling (SDC) system suction line connection to the RCS (hot leg).
Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center (OSC)
should be operational by this time.
Personnel error, by TED crew working in the switchyard, results in a Unit No.
2 generator trip when OCB 8W52 is opened instead of OCB 8W4 a., ~ ~
~0,
~
I 1989 EVALUATED EXERCISE ST.
LUCIE PLANT MAY 24, 1989 Reactor is tripped (if not previously tripped)
by thermal margin/low pressure (>1900 psia)
when RCS leak rate increases to 500-600 gpm.
Safety injection system (SIS)
is actuated by low pressurizer pressure (1600 psia).
Containment is isolated by safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).
Power is lost to both of the 4160 Volt safety buses, Nos.
2A3 and 2B3, when the dead bus, fast transfer to startup transformer, did not occur following the turbine-generator trip.
If once-through cooling is attempted (due to the loss of the HPSI pumps),
using pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) No. V-1477, the breaker to motor operated block valve No. V-1475 (upstream of PORV V-1477), trips after being reset.
The control room receives indication of a ground condition following the trip of the motor operated PORV block valve breaker.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared by this time by the Emergency Coordinator due to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), with makeup rate greater than capacity of charging pumps (132 gpm), indicated by loss of RCS pressure and loss of subcooling margin.
Emergency Operations Facility activation should be initiated by this time.
Control room indications show reactor core is being uncovered:
Hydrogen in containment Containment pressure and temperature increases to >
4 psig and >212 F
Containment area radiation monitor(s)
(ARM)
off-scale high Containment high range radiation monitor(s)
show indication of increased activity.
(CET)
show greater than 1200 F
1989 EVALUATED EXERCISE ST.
LUCIE PLANT MAY 24, 1989 NOTE:
GENERAL EMERGENCY may be declarea about this time by the Emergency Coordinator due to Loss of two (2) of three (3) fission product barriers with potential loss of the third (any two of the following exist and the third is imminent):
2)
3)
Severe fuel clad damage, ancn, Loss of coolant accident or Tube rupture on unisolible steam generator, and Containment integrity breached.
Security reports site accountability completed.
Power is restored to 4160 Volt bus 2A3 following completion of cross-tie connection with Unit No.
1A startup transformer.
High pressure safety injection pump No.
2A starts and delivers emergency core cooling, water to the reactor.
Emergency Operations Facility should be operational by this time.
Control room receives indication of an effluent
. release from the containment shown by increasing plant vent monitor activity levels.
GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared by this time, if not previously declared, by the Emergency Coordinator due to the loss of three fission product barriers.
1) Severe fuel clad damage, and 2)
a loss of coolant accident, and 3) containment integrity breached.
Control room receives alarm on annunciator panel LA indicating low level in component cooling water (CCW) surge tank compartment A.
Control room receives report that the low level alarm is valid, but no -leakage is seen in the CCW surge tank room.
The CCW makeup valve is reported to be wide open, but makeup flow just barely keeps up with the CCW leakage.
Operations Support Center (OSC) dispatches a repair team to investigate and take corrective actio EVALUATED EXERCISE ST.
LUCIE PLANT MAY 24, 1989 Control room receives alarms, on Annunciator T panel J, indicating Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC):
Channel A subcooled margin low, Channel A reactor vessel low, Channel A.reactor core exit temperature - high, and Channel A trouble.
Control room receives report that 125V DC breaker 2-61106, normal power supply to the qualified safety panel display system (QSPDS), is tripped and cannot be reset.
Further, an attempt to manually transfer to the alternate power supply using the static transfer switch was unsuccessful.
The Operations Support Center (OSC)
dispatches a
repair team to investigate and take corrective action.
Release from containment is terminated.
The control room receives an audible indication of fire detection alarm 2.02.22.
Control room receives report from the 2B Emergency Diesel-generator building (2B DGB) that the local graphic panel indicates a Fire Protection System Alarm. Further, the control piping, on the 2B DGB sprinkler system is broken and is spraying water into the yard.
NOTE: This causes a loss of the fire suppression system in the 2B DGB.
The Operations Support Center (OSC)
dispatches a
repair team to investigate and take corrective action.
Plant continues to cool down to cold shutdown condition.
Support groups continue evaluation of event and monitoring of plant conditions.
Exercise terminated.