IR 05000335/1989005
| ML17222A748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1989 |
| From: | Blake J, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17222A747 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-89-05, 50-335-89-5, 50-389-89-05, 50-389-89-5, NUDOCS 8904180166 | |
| Download: ML17222A748 (13) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/89-05-and 50-389/89-05 Licensee:
Florida 'Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:
-Februar 14,
21-24, and March 1-3, 1989 Inspector:
H.
Ec omos Approved by:
a
, Chic Mat ial and Processes Section En 1ne, ing Branch Division of Reactor Safety at igned C'>
ate igne Scope:
SUMMARY This routine, announced inspec6on was in the areas of Unit-2 refueling outages inservice inspection (ISI) activities including eddy-current (EC), of steam generators tubes, ultrasonic examination (UT) of reactor pressure vessel (RPY)
welds and resistance temperature detector (RTD) instrument nozzle replacement, coordinated and supervised NDE VAN activities conducted between February
and MIarch 3, 1989.
Administrative and worl procedure used to control the activities inspected were consistent with code and regulatory requirements.
Work was being performed by personnel sufficiently trained for their assigned tasks.
Management was actively involved in the administration of the ISI and modification activities.
The licensee appeared to be adequately staffed to handled the workload of this out'age.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Two new inspector followup items were identified relative to personnel policy and procedural matters, paragraph 3.a and 3.b 8<y04)80166 Sg000335 90403 P DR IIIIDOCH 0
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G. Boissy, Plant Manager G. Boyers, EC Coordinator
- F. Carr, NDE Supervisor K. Getty, Asst.
ISI Coordinator K. Hughes, Sr., Civil Engineer
- S. Sienkiewics, ISI Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Other Organizations Combustion Engineering, Nuclear Power Systems J.
D. Ford, Manager, Field guality Operations P. Reynolds, Task Manager J.
F. Sikorski, Senior gA Engineer Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)
R. Fougerousse, Project Manager F.
C.
H. Mengden, III, Field Team Supervisor NRC Resident Inspectors
- M. Scott, Resident Inspector ST Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Independent Verification of License Nondestructive Examination by NRC's NDE-Van Personnel In a continuing effort to monitor, by independent verification, licensee nondestructive examination (NDE) programs, the NRC maintains a vehicle (van), equipped with NDE instruments and materials, which it uses to carry out this objective.
St.
Lucie was selected for.independent measurement verification during this refueling outage.
The inspector was assigned the responsibility for coordinating and supervising this activity which took place between February
and March 3, 1989.
The work performed and the results achieved are documented in Report 50-335,-389/89-0.
Observation of ISI Work Activities Unit 2 (73753)
a
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Eddy Current (EC) Examination of Steam Generator Tubes ISI activities during the outage included eddy current examination of
"A" and
"B" Steam Generators (S/Gs).
ASNE Code Section XI (80W80)
with Code Case 401-1, Eddy Current Examination Section XI Division 1, were identified as the applicable code and regulatory requirements.
The above code case, permits digitized collection and storage of eddy current test data and periodic calibration of the analog elements of the digital'collection and storage equipment.
Data acquisition was being performed by Combustion Engineering (CE) under contract with the licensee.
Data Analysis was performed by Zetec, CE and licensee personnel.
Approved FPL procedure NDE 1,3 Revision 2,
"Eddy Current Examination of non Ferromagnetic Tubing with Nulti Frequency Techniques NI2-18,"
and related references were governing site documents for this work effort.
Examination of S/G tubes was being performed using a multifrequency technique in conjunction with the computerized NIZ-18 Examination System to analyze for tube integrity.
Discussions with the licensee's cognizant engineer disclosed that as of Narch 1, 1989 examination results were.as follows.
Tubes Examined Tubes Analyzed/
Evaluated S/G "A" 8427 8427 S/G II8 II 8417 8417 Tubes with 40Ã-49K through wall degradation Tubes with Loose Part Indication Tubes with 50$ -59K through wall degradation At this time the inspector selected tape cassette AC064, S/G "A" and BC103 S/G
"B" for review, to ascertain equipment operation, examination technique and documentation of results.
In addition the inspector reviewed system calibrations performed at the beginning and end of these tapes using calibration standards PSL-1-2 and PSL-1-4 respectively.
Other areas reviewed included probe type and identification, probe travel speed during examination, tube location verification and fixture location verification.
guality records reviewed for completeness and accuracy were as follows:
2-gA-101 Revision 6.AI-1 Zetec, Personnel qualification and Certification Procedure
JNS-f19.3 Revision
FPL, NDE Personnel gualification and Certification Eddy Current Calibration Standard S/N - PSL-1-2
- PSL-1-4 3/4
"OD x 0.048" wall, Inconel-600 3/4
"OD x 0.048" wall, Inconel-600, Eddy Current Equipment/Instruments Calibration Records MIZ-18A RDAU S/N - 046 S/N -
124 S/N - 130 S/N -
137 4-19-88 5-18-88 5-18-88 5-18-88 Personnel qualification Records -
EC FPL G. L. Boyers W.
K. Heise W.
K. Jordan A. Montallbano Jr.
J.
C, Johnson E.
Lake Combustion Engineer R. Hastings C.
F.
Despaux D. I. Blazewski R. Tobin Zetec Level II, Analyst Level II, Analyst Level II, Analyst Level II, Analyst Level II, Data Acquistion, Bobbin Coil Level II, Data Acquistion, Bobbin Coil Level I, Data Acquistion Level I, Data Acquistion Level I, Data Acquistion Level II, Data Acquistion D. J.
Calendar W. A. Gray Level III A Data Analyst Level III A Data Analyst Within these areas, the inspector noted that procedure Z-gA-101 Revision 6 in the Zetec gA Manual, required Zetec employees to submit to a psychological examination once every ten years.
Contrary to this requirement, the inspector noted that 1975 was indicated as the last date
'when one of the examiners had submitted to a psychological test.
This discrepancy was communicated to the licensee who contacted Zetec for an explanation.
Zetec informed the licensee that the subject procedure had been revised and the psychological examination is now performed only at the time of employment.
The licensee stated that Zetec was sending a copy of the revised procedure for incorporation in Zetec's gA Manual on file.
The inspector identified an inspector followup item (IFI) to ensure that an adequate review of the revised
procedure is performed during a subsequent inspection.
This item is documented as IFI 335/89-05-01 Update Zetec QA Procedure Z-QA-101 Rev.
1 to the Latest Revision.
Ultrasonic Examination of, Reactor Pressure -Vessel (RPV)
Welds with Mechanical Remote Control Equipment At the time of this inspection the licensee had defueled the RPV and was in the processes of performing the ten (10) year, ultrasonic examination of RPV and nozzle welds as required by applicable parts of ASME Code Section XI and V,
and regulatory requirements, (i.e.,
Regulatory Guide 1. 150, Rev.
1, Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Vessel Welds During Preservice and 'Inservice Examinations).
The examination
'as being performed by SwRI using their procedures which had been reviewed and approved by the licensee.
SwRI procedure reviewed for code/regulatory compliance and technical contents, including basic calibration block reflector location/size i.e. side-drilled holes, notches, frequency of system calibration, recording criteria, examination areas including near 'surface, scari overlaps, scanning speed, recording, sizing and evaluation of indication.
The procedures reviewed were as follows:
SwRI-NDT-700-8 Rev.
Mechanized Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Pressure Piping Welds SwRI-NDT-700-11 Rev.
Mechanized Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Vessel greater than 2"
in Thickness In order to facilitate the RPV examination, SwRI established two bases of operation/stations; one situated outside containment, staffed with a level II examiner(s)
to observe real-time scanning results on UT instruments and, another station - a console center, on the 62 foot Elevation near the pressurizer missile shield.
The console center was staffed with an operator whose function was to index the computer which runs the mechanized UT equipment and to take care of problems as they occur through manual manipulation of the equipment.
On February 23, 1989 the inspector entered the containment building to observe ISI and modification activities of interest, including the ongoing UT examination of the RPV.
Upon approaching the console center, the inspector observed that the'perator.
was experiencing some difficulty staying awake at a time when the mechanized tool was scanning the RPY inlet nozzle at the 60'zimuth, otherwise identified as scan number 176 on the computer program.
The inspector stood by the console and continued to observed the scan to its completion.
At that time the operator indexed the computer to run scan number 178 identified as inlet nozzle at the 240'zimuth.
The inspector approached the operator, obtained some scan related data, noted his name and left the area after watching scan number 178 for a
short period of time.
Following this observation, the inspector contacted the licensee's ISI coordinator and communicated what had.
been observed.
Following a brief discussion, he (FPL's ISI coordinator)
summoned the SMRI project manager and informed him of the aforementioned incident.
During this meeting the inspector-
'scertained that 1)
FPL Policy Statement to all site personnel, dated June 18, 1987 prohibits'ndividuals from sleeping within the, plant
'oundaries at any time, including break and lunch times,.2) SwRI's work schedule provided for two twelve ( 12) hour shifts with one hour overlap for a total of thirteen (13) hours a day, seven days a week, 3) there were no provisions for scheduled breaks during working hours except for a 30 minute lunch break.
In discussing this incident with the aforementioned personnel, the inspector stated that based on these working conditions, (thermally hot work area)
and the nature of the job (monotonous/tedious, heavily dressed with protective clothing) it was not surprising that the operator was experiencing these kind of difficulties.
Therefore, the inspector stated, that the subject incident was not so much the fault of the operator but rather, a
problem directly related to work policy practices established by SwRI management.
The inspector stated that because the RPV examination was in progress, immediate short term corrective action would have to be implemented which should be followed by long term corrective measures that would prevent the recurrence of similar incidents.
Accordingly, the licensee imposed a
15 minute break for every two hours of work to be taken by the console operator beginning with 17:30 hours on February 23, 1989.
An Inter-Office correspondence issued by the ISI Coordinator dated February 24, 1989 formalizes this short term corrective action.
This memo also stated that subject operator was no longer allowed on site and that this type of behavior was not tolerated at the St. Lucie Plant under any circumstances, Moreover, in response to the inspector's request for timely corrective action, the SwRI Field Supervisor issued a
memorandum to the licensee's Plant Manager, dated March 2, 1989 describing the status of SwRI short and long term corrective action.
This memorandum is provided as an attachment to this Report.
This matter was discussed in detail with Regional Management on February 29, 1989 and it was decided that an inspector followup item be identified to keep track of the proposed short/long term corrective actions.
This matter was identified as IFI 389/89-05-02, Corrective Actions to Prevent SwRI-Staff From Inattentiveness on the Job.
On March I, 1989 following the incident the inspector visited the SwRI trailer,,situated outside the containment structure, to observe the on-going UT examination of the RPV.
At the. time of the visit, examination of the lower shell vertical weld at the 225'zimuth, identified as 101-142c was in progress.
The weld was being scanned with four different transducers, 0', 45', 60'nd 57'.
The inspector discussed the examination with the level II examiner on
duty and reviewed calibration sheets 570042-46 and EDAS calibration sheet 139014.
Laser disk 7A and video tape No.
40 were being used to document examination results.
T Exam An l e s
Discussions with SWRI management relative to the progress of the inspection, disclosed that the examination of welds scheduled for this outage was about complete.
Indications recorded on examination number 2,
4 and 5 - weld 101-151/bottom head dome to peel segment, were going to be re-examined for further analysis.
All other examinations have revealed either no recordable indications or indications resulting from geometry.
Geometric indications recorded to date are as follows:
Weld No.
Geometrical Reflector 201-141 103-121A 103-121D 201-128A 201-128D RC-121-6 45/60
45
45
Outside sur'face taper Support lug 9 180 Support lug 8 180 Support lug 8 180 Support lug 8 180 Longseam'surface crown Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Pressurizer and RCS Instrument Nozzle Replacement Unit-2, (37700B)
Six instrument nozzles at St. Lucie Unit 2, located in the reactor coolant system (RCS)
were found to be susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC).
One of the nozzles is a level sensing nozzle on the lower shell of the pressurizer and the other five are, resistance temperature detector
!RTD) nozzles in the primary pipe hot legs.
Because of the radioactive environment and the original internal weld design, the licensee/CE is replacing the pressurizer and hot leg RTD nozzles from the outside of the pressurizer/pipe.
The new design allows the weld joint to be located on the outside surface and provides for a field welded inconel weld buildup pad to be fabricated at each of the pressurizer/pipe penetration sites.
Following welding and stress relief, each pad is bored
'o permit the installation of an inconel sleeve, which is used protect the carbon steel vessel/pipe from the corrosive effects of berated water.
The sleeve is expansion rolled into the vessel/pipe wall and seal welded to the vessel/pipe clad surface.
To perform this work effort, the licensee contracted Combustion Engineering Power System Group, identified as the Contractor, under purchased order (PO),
B88633-90059 dated July 12, 1988.
Under this PO, all work was to be qualified and performed per ASME Code Section XI, 1980 Winter '80 addenda requirements.
ASME Code Case-N-432, Repair Welding Using Automatic or Machine Gas Tungsten-ARC Welding (GTAW)
.
Temperbead Technique was implemented for the weld buildup pad fabrication.
Construction Code, ASME Section III (71W72)
was identified as applicable to this work effort.
Under the aforementioned PO, the contractor also
provided craft labor, training, supervision, and gC inspection.
The entire activity was under the control of a licensee approved gA program.
Within these areas, the inspector reviewed the following documents.
FQD 89-09 Rev.
gI 10-PR/PSL-8 Rev.
EP-71372-100 Rev.
PCYi 091-288 Supplement
DSG-88-283 Nuclear gA Plan Rev.
Control of Repairs and Replacement Procedure for Removal and Installation of one Replacement Pressurizer Nozzle RCS Hot Leg Nozzle Replacement Site Engineering Package PCM-090-288 Rev.
Pressurizer Nozzle Replacement Weld Procedures and Specifications GTAA - 1.43-925 Rev.
0 10/ll/88 GTAA 3.43 - 926 Rev., 0 10/10/88 GTA 43.43 - 904 Rev.
1 12/6/88 GTAA 43.43 - 927 Rev.
1 1/13/88 Replacement Material
'Nozzles
'Nozzle Sleeves Consumables
'Filler Metal PO¹ 48-82433, C15035-37300 Part Nos.
772-104-Rl through
Material:
2 3/4"d Bar Stock SB-166 Annealed to SB-166-PO¹ 49-82010 Code ¹J-8700-1, PC 144-,01 Drug ¹D-9417-C088-0193 and Drug ¹D-9417.-C088-144-2 Material:
1 1/2 d Bar Stock, Heat ¹NX5300HG PO¹ 48-87004 Ht¹ NX3528D Size
.035" dia'meter Welders, whose qualifications were reviewed were identified by the following symbols, TCC9848, RP4532, TFG3992; RDY9349 DLJ0521 and LBL9016 In addition, the inspector reviewed, nozzle
"A" f'ield traveler No. ¹616599-001 Rev, 0 to ascertain whether in-process gC inspections including specified hold-points, nondestructive examinations, preheat, interpass temperature and post-weld thermal treatment had been performed and documented as required.
In process welding was observed to ascertain
whether welding procedure parameters were being, adhered to, appr oved materials were in use, welding equipment and temperature recorders were working properly and in calibration.
The inspector checked-completed and inprocess weld buildup pads for physical'ppearance and workmanship quality, and interviewed welding machine operators to test their knowledge of the operation.
Field welds were being fabricated with the automatic gas tungsten arc (GTA) welding process, using the Dimetric Gold Track power source equipment.
Within the area inspected no violations or deviations were identified;-
4.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 3, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph
~
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Two inspector followup items ( IFI) were identified.
IFI 335/89-05-01, Update Zetec QA Procedure, Z-QA-101 Rev.
6 to the Latest Revision; Paragraph 3.a.
IFI 335/89-05-02, Corrective Actions to Prevent SwRI Staff from Inattentiveness on the Job, Paragraph 3.b.
Attachment
ATTACHMENT MEMORANDUM March 2, 198~
TO:
Nr. Gill Boissy St. Lucie Plant Nanager c/o Scott Sienkiewic".
ISI Coordinator FROM:
Fred Nengden SwRI Field Supervisor SUBJECT:
Status of SwRI Corrective Action Following the verbal report by Nr. Nick Economos, NRC Representative, that an SwRI staff member was nodding off in the
'St.
Luci e Power Plant "contai nment building during the reactor vessel ISI on February 23, SwRI has implemented short and long term corrective actions.
In response to a request by Nr.
Economos for a preliminary written status of the corrective action being taken concerning this incident, this report is submitted to you.
Short Term'esponse A mandatory 15 minute break at 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> interval policy was initiated.at about 19:88 on February 23.
All SwRI personnel from both shifts were individually informed of this policy by 28: ~8 on February 2i.
On Feb 2, the SwRI staf f member was told not to report. for work on Day Shi ft of Feb.
24.
SwRI management in San Antonio was informed of the reported incident before midnight on Feb. 2i.
4 ~
(FPL then deni ed the SwRI staf f membel access to si te on Feb.
24. )
Anticipating this possibility, SwRI management insured continued, uninterrupted success of the job by having a replacement staff member available and in Florida before midnight that same day, Feb.
24.
The SwRI on site supervisor held a meeting with all SwRI team members at 28: 88 on Feb
~
24 to rei terate the pol i cy to be as follows:
Personnel working in containment, will take a break or be relieved every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for 15 minutes.
This is a
mandatory brea Attachment b
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Per sonnel on s i te wi 11 repor t draws:. ness to the shi ft supervi or at any time and wi 1 1 be relieved or take a
break.
C ~
Personnel will be observed far even, the appearance of being asleep.
6.
Mrs David Rosow, Acting Director, and Mr.
Amos Holt, Vice President, met with the SwRI team an locations on Feb.
and discussed the events and policies being enacted by SwRI to preclude a recurrence of this type.
7.
Mr. Rosow, Mr. Holt, the on site Project Engineer, and the Field Team Supervisor met with Mr. Bill Boissy, St. Lucie Plant Manager, on March 1 to assure him of SwRI's continuing support of St. Liicie Plant policies and to identify short term and long term action being taken by SwRI.
8.
Since enacting the mandatory break policy at St. Lucie, the following act,ion has been taken on site:
The SwRI Supervisor and 'Project Engineer have monitored the frequency of breaks/rel i ef of the personnel working in containment.
I am conf ident that the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> break interval is being adhered to on both shifts.
b.
The SwRI supervisor has formally reminded each crew member at every shift change of the break policy and of the incr eased survei1 lance by the SwRI supervisor and by FPL for evidence of fatigue or sleepiness.
C ~
The SwRI supervisor has performed randomly timed and unannounced tours of the work areas and have found no evidence of fatigue problems.
Long Term Action Long Term Action under considerati on by SwRI management is the possibility of fully remoting the operation of the PaR Device Scanner such that physically inactive tasks are not performed in the hot and noisy environment of the containment.
SwRI management will review the work enviranment of this crew position (and others as appropriate)
with human factors engineering experts to determine the steps which can be taken to assist personnel who necessarily work in harsh conditions.
Emphasis will be placed on activities which require mental alertness combined. with minimal physical activity over long periods of tim Attachment
SwF'I mar agement i.s continuing to review other possible actions and will report any additional findings as we discussed during our meeting of March l.
Frederick C.H.
gden III SwRI Field Team Supervisor