IR 05000327/1990011
| ML20042F153 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1990 |
| From: | Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042F152 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-90-11, 50-328-90-11, NUDOCS 9005070291 | |
| Download: ML20042F153 (17) | |
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UNITES STATES
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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y*
- REGloN 11-
g 101 MARIETT/< STREET,N.W.
ATLANT A, GEORot A 30323 -
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Report Nos.:
50-327/90-11abd50-328/90-11 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
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6N 38A Lookout Place
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1101 Market Street
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Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
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Docket Nos.:
50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facilit'y Name:
Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Inspection. Conducted:
March 6, 1990 thru April 5, 1990 Inspector:
f Md 24 MJ O K. J6nison,'Se or/Re'sident-In spector
'Date Signed _
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Inspectors:
P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
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D. Loveless, Resident Inspector.
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Approved by:
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L. F Watson, Chief, Project Section 1 Dake Signed
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TVA Projects Division,
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Summary Scope:
This announced inspection involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors Y
in the area of operational safety verification including -control room
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observations, operations performance, system - li neup s, radiation protection, i
safeguards, and housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included maintenance observations, surveillance testing observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of events, review of licensee identified. items,-
and review of inspector follow-up items.
Results:
No violations, deviations, unresolved items * or inspector follow-up items were identified.
One non-cited violation was identified:
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NCV 327, 328/90-11-01, Inadecuate Breaker Testing under SI-258.1
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9005070291 000426
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PDR ADOCK 05000327 Q
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Three events occurred during the inspection period and were reviewed by the
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inspectors:
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i Containment Vent Isolation on Unit 2 (paragraph _8 b).
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i NOVE on a security-event,,(paragraph 8.c).
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NOVE on a contaminated individual transported offsite (paragraph j
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8.d).
The areas of Operations, Maintenance, and Surveillance were adequate and fully-
capable to support current plant operations.
The observed activities of the
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control room operators were professional and well executed,
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' Unresolved items are matter's fo,
.L, t information is required y determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
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REPORT _DET ILS.:
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Persons-Contacted Licensee Emp'loyees J.Bynum,VicePresident, Nuclear. Power; Production W. By~rd, Acting Site Director
- C. Vondra, Plant Manager-
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T.'Arney, Quality Control Manager
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- R. Beecken~, Maintenance Manager
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- L. Bush,' Acting Maintenance Manager
- M. Burzynski,.' Site Licensing Manager
- M, Cooper,-Compliance. Licensing 1 Manager 0, Craven, Supervisor. Instrumentation and' Control
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"J.: Gates, Technical. Support Manager J. Holland, Corrective. Action Program Manager
- W. Lagergren Jr.,.0perations Superintendent
- M. Lorek, Operations Manager
- R. Lumpkin,. Site QualityfAssurance Manager
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'R.-Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor R. Proffitt, Licensing Engineer:
R. Rogers, Supervisor, Engineering. Support Section M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls-Manager
' pencer, Licensing Engineer
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Whittemore, Licensing Engineer
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NRC Employees-
- L. J, Watson, Chief,. Project Section 1 d:
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- Attended exit. interview
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Acronyms and initialisms used. in this report are : listed in the: last paragraph, 2.
Operational SafetyEVerification '(71707)-
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Control Room Observations i
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pectors conducted - dis::ussions with control room ~ operators,-
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verit, ed that proper. control room staffing.wasimaintained,i verified.
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j operator attentiveness was. commensurate with the plant ' configuration '-
and plant activities in progress, and with_ on going controlaroom -
operations.
The operators were observed adhering J to appropriate,
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approved procedures, for the.on going (activities.'
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The inspector also verified that the licensee was operating the plant r
in a normal plant configuration as required by TS and when abnormal I
conditions existed, that the operators were complying with the appropriate LC0 action statements.
The inspector verified that RCS leak rate calculations were performed and that-leakage rates were within the TS limits.
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The inspectors observed instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities and verified the status of selected control room annunciators to ensure that control room operators understood = the status of the plant. Panel indications were reviewed for the nuclear instruments, the. emergency power sources, the safety parameter display system and the radiation monitors to ensure operability and operation within TS limits.
No violations or deviations were observed.
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Control Room Logs-j
The inspectors observed control room operations and reviewed'
I applicable logs including the shift logs, operating orders, night
order book, clearance hold order book, and configuration log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activities.
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TACF log was reviewed to verify that the use of jumpers and lif ted leads causing equipment to be inoperable was clearly noted and a
understood.
The licensee is actively pursuing correction to
conditions requiring TACFs.
No issues were identified with these j
specific logs.
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Plant secondary-side chemistry reports were reviewed' and the
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inspector verified that primary plant chemistry was within TS limits.
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in aCdition, the implementation of the licensee's sampling program was observed.
Plant specific monitoring systems including seismic,
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meteorological and fire detection indications were reviewed for
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operability. A review of surveillance records and tagout logs was
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performed to confirm the operability of the RPS.
I No violations or deviations were observed.
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ECCS System Alignment
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the ' following
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safety-related system on Units 1 and 2 to verify operability, flow
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path, heat sink, water supply, power supply, and proper valve and
breaker alignment:
j Component Cooling Water System - Train C l
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In addition, the inspectors verifieJ that a selected portion of the
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containment isolation lineup was correct.
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No deviations or violations were identified.
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Plant Tours Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine
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buildings, and exterior areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, control of ignition.
q sources, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, missile hazards and plant
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housekeeping and cleanliness conditions.
The plant was observed-to-be clean and in adequate condition.
The inspectors verified that-
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maintenance work ~ orders had been ' submitted as required -and - that
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followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by:
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the licensee.
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The inspector visually inspected safety-related pumps and valves for
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No violations or deviations were observed, e.
Radiation Protection The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation
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of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs were-
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reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the
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activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable RWPs.
Workers were observed for. proper - frisking upon exiting.
i contaminated areas and the radiologically controlled area. Selected radiation protection instruments werd verified operable and
calibration frequencies were reviewed. The following RWP was reviewed I
in detail:
RWP 90-2-00001, Unit 2 Ice Condenser Inspection f.
Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct
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of daily activities including: protected and vital area access
controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors;-
badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols ~ ar,J compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and protected and vital area barrier integrity _.- 'The inspectors verified
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-4 interfaces between the security organization and both operations and maintenance.
Specifically, the Resident Inspectors:
(1) interviewed ino1viduals with security concerns (2) visited central and secondary alarm stations (3) verified protection of safeguards information The inspectors reviewed a security related event' involving a March 2, 1990 search of-a visitor. The inspectors determined that the searcn I
was. performed in accordance with the site security-plan and that no
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safety-significant - issue existed.
However,' the inspector also determined that the site security procedures, pertaining to search-
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requirements were not metc This. issue was discussed with the site-Security Manager, who had implemented a review and, adequate corrective action prior to the inspector identifying the issue.. This issue was reviewed by an NRC Region.II security specialist and will s
be documented in NRC Inspection Report 327, 328/90-15.
No violations or deviations were identified.
No trends were identified.in the operational safety verification area.
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l General material conditions in the plant were adequate.
The number of'
control room maintenance and modification items was decreasing slowly.
Radiation protection and security were adequate to continue two unit operations.
3.
Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)
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Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillance-of safety-related systems and components-was being conducteo-in accordance with TS requirements.
The inspectors verified that:
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test. instrumentation was calibrated;1LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria' requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual-directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were prcperly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and.
system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests,. the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The following activities were observed / -<iewed with no deficiencies identified except as noted:
a.
SI-258.1, Testin.g of Molded Case and Lower Voltage Containment Penetration Circuit Breakers.
The purpose of this SI was to perform instantaneous and overload testing of safety related breakers. Duriag the performance of ghis-SI, the inspector noted the following:
(1) The acceptance criteria cited in step 6.4 of the data sheet differed with that cited on page 5-of the SI, with respect to 15 jl l
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amp breakers.
The technicians were aware ~ of this iifference, stated that a CAQR existed,. and when questioned stated that'it
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was acceptable to perform-the test with ; an outstanding-- CAQR
because the SI was on their work schedule.
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loe technicians erroneously determined that the' SI ' acceptance-criteria were met. even though an instantaneous. reset was-not.
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obtained on a tri'pped breaker-(3) The SI did not' ss the current at which the' breakers were to be:
tested or the_ method in which to increase the current when a-reset was.not obtained.
Li-(4) The'SI did not direct;the technician to re perform theitest at a
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higher amperage following:a f ailure to_ obtain ar reset. ~ However,
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the technicians were performing l multiple tests to obtain what
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they thought-were acceptable results.'
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When these issues were : brought - to theo attention of the ' SOS,. he _
J immediately stopped the breaker testing and interviewed the involved technicians and managers.. On _ March n 20, 3990, the Elc#trical-
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Maintenance Supervisor' determined-that no operability issues existed-
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and that-a procedure change was neces~sary to ensure adequate control--
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change form'(ICF)'to SI-258.1 was issued and the operabilityfof thel breaker reset functionLfor previously-_ tested breakers was: determined.~
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The inspector determined-that these corrective actions!weref adequate,
,e This violation was 'not cited because - the criteria; specified in
Section V. A.
of the Enforcement Policy - were,sati sfied.' Thi s is identified as non-cited violation (NCV) 327,l328/90-11-01,_Inadea w c-Breaker Testing under SI-258.1,' Because corrective acM on co-clete and no further NRC review is required,JNCV<327, 328/90.
ciosed, b.
SI-26.1, Loss of Offsite Power with SafetyLInjection.
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The purpose of this SI was to perform a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. endurance run of_the-selected emergency diesel generators (EDG)._ During the1 performance of this SI, the inspector noted-that common annunciator, GEN-1A-A
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High Temperature, was alarmed on common-alarm paneliO-M-26. When
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this was discussed with the AVO responsible for' takinL EDG shift performance data and the 505,: the inspector determined that each,
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individual was aware of-the alarm and that the SOS had directed that
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local compensatory readings be taken. The alarm was the result of a-cylinder temperature reading / recording' failure d_escribed in WR B781479.
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SI-108.1, Ice Condenser-Irtermediate._ Deck Doors.
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SI-20, Containment Refueling Canal Drains; y
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TI-18, cadiation Monitoring.
This technical instruction was reviewed to determine if a recent change (ICF 90-0129), which raised the alarm setpoint from 10% to 40%
of TS limits, was adequately. implemented.
The inspector had no gp further questions.
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SI-82-2, Functional Test For Radiation Monitoring,
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SI-83.2.112A, Channel Calibration of Containment Building Upper Compartment Particulate Air Monitor, h.
51-32, Component Cooling Water Valves.
No trends _ were identified in the area of surveillance _ performance-during this inspection period.
The area of surveillance' scheduling ~ and management was observed to be adequate.
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Monthly Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
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Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory. guides, industry c(des and standards, and in conformance with TSs.
The following' items were considered during this review:
LCOs_ were met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components were operable; appiovals were obtained prior to init16 ting the'
work; activities were. accomplished using approved procedures 1and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control _ the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and tho repair records accurately reflected the activities; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points -were established where required and were observed;- fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contrr; tor force activities-were ~ controlled in.
accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The following work regeests and work plans (WP) were reviewed:
WR B258812, Vital Inverter 1-I Transfer S.. itch.
The purpose of this WP was to repair a transfer switch referenced on
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TVA drawings-45N709-4 and 45N706-1.
The material condition and its:
impact on safe dJal ur b operations was described in CAQR SQP 900120.
The-licensee concluded the risk of a seismic ev'
was sufficiently low as to indicate that it was acceptable 'for ti-plant to cortinue to operate with the switch in the degraded condition.
Although not i
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clearly discussed _in-the CAQR, subtier documents and activities support the determination that the transfer switch was capable of performing its intended function subject to some seismic limitations, j
The licensee agreed to revise the CAQR to substantiate their
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i-i The licensee later determined that two npply :< ires were incorrectly.
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of these wires could haya caustd the degradation-of the switch. The y'
licensee swappedi he wires to correct this problem.' The inspector
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had no further questions.
a WR B792480, Repair RM-90-99.
WR 3258824, Repair RM-90-112.
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I WR B260699, Repair RPI 0- 14.
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q WP 1516, Containment Isolation Valve Indication.
WP 1443, SSPS rJS Median Signal and Functional Test, a
No violations or deviations were identified in the area of Maintenance.
5.
Site Quality Assurance Activities in Support of Operations (71707)
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The following QA surveillances were reviewed by the inspector:
QSQ-M-90-0247, Preventive Maintenance QSQ-M-90-0243, Eagle 21 QSQ-M-90-0225, Vital Batteries QSQ-M-90-0222, Balance of Plant Welds
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This surveillance identified a condition that was previously
identified by the NRC on safety related welds 'n 1988..The condition
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idantified was that no interpass weld temperatures-were being taken j
or recorded. The weldsiwere being performed by contract-welders end
the contractor had failed to measura any interpass weld temperatures on work performed since March 4, 1990. The licensee issued CAQR SQQ
' j 900150 to resclve this issue.
The inspector had no furthe l
questions.
050-M-90-2019, ERCW TACF This surveillance identified a - temporary alteration that was got'.
i controlled in accordance with AI-9; Temporary Alterations. CAQR 3QQ
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900137-was issued to resolve this-issue. -The: inspector. had. no,
further questions.
QSQ-M-90-0200, Sequoyah Procedure Upgrade Program Based on the QA areas of concentration, the_ comments and COTS discussions.
i? the reports,- and the two technical findings identified above, cit-appeared tht the-quality of the QA surveillances continued to: improve-ande provided technically valid support to the ^ ef forts. of f lineE management during this outage.
6.
NRC Inspector Follow-up Items, ~ Unresolved Items, Violationsf (92701, 92702)
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(Closed) IFI 327,'326 d9-29-09, ASOS Relief..
The in'pector reviewed'a Sequoyah Final Event Report-11-90-003, concerning s
the relief of-the Unit 2 ASOS by the SOS on December 21, 1989. The' report.
was prepared by the Sequoyah Operations Manager--aad. Operations Superintendent.
The report : was clear, identified -several = contributing
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root causes for the event, and implemented adequate corrective actions.
q IFI 327, 328/89.-29-09 is closed.
-(Closed) IFI"327, 328/89-12-03, RCS Identified Leakage.
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This IFI identified problems the_ licensee experienced during afsearch for an RCS leak into the PRT. At the -time -of the sleak, -the; licensee? did ' not -
have a drawing or listing of all potential cleak sources to-the PRT, and was consequently-unable to determine if the leakage assumed' as Identified was in fact from a known, analyzed RCS leakage path; Since the incident ~
described in IR 327, 328/89-12, both an engineering: drawing and a listing of leak sources -to the PRT have been generated by DNE.
TLis item is closed.
(Closed) URI 227, 328/89-25-05, Waived QC Hold Points.
This URI addressed-QC inspectiun activities that were waived to support a
non-emergency schedule driven requests. This was discussed with u1e Site-QA Manager on December 29, 1989, who implemented immediate corrective action. The inspc.: tor. determined that the graded QA approach was not
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prematurely employed, that there were no other waived inspections of.this i
type and that there was no safetyJ significance: associated with waiving -
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.URI 327, 328/89-29-05 is closed.
-1 (Closed) URI 327, 328/89-12-04, AFW Pump Packing'.
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This URI addressed two WR activities related to the replacement of (FW.-
pump packing.
The inspectar reviewed WRs B762254 and 8780979. and d;
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determined that the post-maintenance tests and maintenance. activities were:
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_The inspector had no:furtheriquestions.
i URI 327, 328/89-12-04 is closed.
(Closed) IFI 327, 328/88-54-04,- Fire M Brigade Portable : Communications--
Problems.
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k This-item identified problems with the-portable radios-usedf by-. fire-brigade members during an observedidrill.. The licensee initiatedza: Design
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Change Request; DCR 2019, to_ replace the present radiossand repeaters with
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upgraded models and applied to the FCC-forca _ dedicated frequency,;
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d (Closed)LIFI 327, 328/88-54-06,... Procedure Revision - for SI-233.4 L for~
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Appendia 3 Raceway Fire Barriers.
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' This item was identified as a procedure discrepancy 1during NRC rinspection" 327, 328/88-54. The_ licensee responded by placingian AdministrativeLHold y
on the procedure, which requires correction of the discrepancy spriors to-
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L the next use.
The next use _-of SI-233.4 is scheduled duringLthe present--
' refueling outage, prior to entering Mode 4
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i This: item is closed.
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Licensee Event Report Followup:(92700)-
l The following_ LERs were -reviewed and closed.
The'. inspector verified that:-
a reporting requirements had been_ met; causes. had been identified;
corrective actions appeared ' appropriate; -generic applicability-had been
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considered; the LER forms were completed; 'no unreviewed' safety questions -
were involved; and violations of : regulations: or Technical: Specifications had been identified.
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UNIT 1
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327/89-28, Missing Access Cover On.An ABGTS Duct.
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e 327/89-32, Failure lo Perform a Surveil. lance Requirement Within The
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Specified Time Interval' Because of Inadequate. DeletionLofJ Procedural Step During Procedure Revision.
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327/8S-36, Diesei Generator Inoperable Because"of a Surveillance Run Time.Less Than the kequiredu60. Minutes; a
327/90-01, Essential Raw Cooling Water Valves Servicing' Safety-related
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Equipment Not Verified-to be in the Correct Position at the-
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328/89-01, Reactor Trip signals From Electromagnetic Interference.
328/89-07, Failure to Maintain Redundant Control Power Supplies to the i
Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Number 4 Breaker and the-Unit
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'i Board Normt' Supply Breaker Penetration Protection Device.
328/89-09, Failure To Determine Ice Bed Temperatures Every Twelve l
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1 328/89-34, CVI-During Head Vent Valve Replacement.
8.
Event Follow-up (93702)
a.
On March 15, 1990, Sequoyah Unit I commenced a reactor shutdown from i
approximately 83% power to start the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage.
The outage was expected to be approximately 64 days.
The inspector verified that NRC commitments for the Unit.1 Cycle 4 outage were included in the schedule.
In addition.the outage includes the removal of the BIT and UHI, and installation of an updated feedwater.
control / reactor protection system modification (Eagle 21).
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b.
On March 26, 1990, Sequoyah Unit 2 experienced' a containment i
ventilation i solation (CVI).
Several other similar events have-L recently occurred and are identified below:
March 17, 1990, CVI, Unit 2, PRO 2-90-031
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March 16, 1990, CVI, Unit 2, PRO 2-90-027 l
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March 13, 1990, CVI, Unit 2, PRO 2-90-025
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March 1, 1990, CVI, Unit 2, PRO 2-90-024 j
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March 4, 1990, CVI, Unit 2, PR0 2-90-021 February 11, 1990, CVI, Unit 1.-PRO 2-90-014
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ESF actuations, in the form of ventilation isolations, have been a
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long standing issue at Sequoyah (approximately 50- since -1984). Each of the recent CVIs were described in an AI-12, Corrective Action, accepted administrative program (i.e.
PRO).
In addition, 'LERs i
2-90-005, 006, and 007 were written to address generic
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considerations. Finally, the licensee initiated an action plan which included the LERs and PR0s.
c.
On March 22, 1990, at 7:20 p.m.. the licensee declared a Notification-i of Unusual Event. The NOUE was declared based upon a potential for a~
i security threat and is described in a licensee-event investigation report.
The licensee terminated the NOUE at 9:25 p.m., having identified no safety. impact on either unit. -The inspector reviewed
the licensee's immediate actions which appeared to be adequate. This event will be reviewed by an NRC Region 11 security specialist and documented NRC Inspection Report 327, 328/90-15.
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On Farch 23, 1990, at 2:40 a.m., the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event. The NOUE was declared based upe. 50.72.a.1.'i and
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11L 50.72.b.2.v, because a medical condition required the' transportation of an individual-to an offsite medical facility._ A craf tsman got an irradiated sliver ic,dged in one' finger..He was~ transported,2with an accompanying HP. technician, to-North Park-Hospital,. where;the sliver was removed and retained.
The count rate on -the sliver - was.
approximately 120 cpm.
The individual was released...sent home-and.
will receive. a L whole body, count-- upon-return to the site.. The-licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 3:40 a.m.-
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On March 27, 1990, at approximately) 12:10 p.m.,- Unit 11 entered--
Mode 6..
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10 CFR 21 and Other Technical Issues a.
Review of'VT-4, Nondestructive-Visual Examination VT-4 addresses,=in'part, the inspection of snubbers,Las wcs intendedl a
to. satisfy the ASME, Section-XI, requirement assuring < the free movement of snubbers.
VT-4 does not scall for' stroking the - snubber
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which was discussed with' the licensee' and PRD SQP-90-0159P - was.
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initiated to resolve' the adequacy of the snubber 1 inspections. LThe
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- urrent snubber-testing program was inspected by; an1NRC Region
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mechnical specialist as documented. in : Inspection Report 327,-
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328/89-04 The program was determined to be;" conservative and exceed a d
the Techn; cal Specification-requirements-in several areas."
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licensee's corrective actions under tha above PRD' appeared to be adequate and the inspector had no further' questions.
b.
Non-Code Repairs on E'tCW Piping
a In January 1988, TVA submitted a corrective action plan by!1etter to.
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the NRC, in which they proposed the use of. temporary scab plates on certain ERCW piping in an attempt'to stop through wall 11eakage from the ERCW system.
The NRC accepted this code relief proposal and s
determined that the MIC program-was accept,.ble ~ based on a ~ long term j
commitment to : replace.the piping as -documented Ein a -letter
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(Kingsley/ Black) dated August 3,1989, RIMS A02 890807 013. By the j
close of this inspection period, the licensee had: replaced al_1 but-j one scab plE.te with new ERCW piping. The; inspector-had,no further'
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questions, c.
Cotter Pin From a Clevis Type Support, j
q The licensee did not treat a broken cotter pin as a service induced.
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flaw :and did not inspect other pumps with the same arrangement-to determine if similar failures had occurred. This issue was discussed with the licensee by the-inspector and the licensee initiated PRD
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SQP-90-0159P to evaluate this previous. TVA interpretation-of what0
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constitutes a service induced flaw.
The inspector had no.further-(
questions, y
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.d.
10 CFR 21 P21-89-19, Dresser Pump Pressure. Reducing Sleeve This report addressed the catastrophic failure of surface hardened pressure reducing sleeves.
The failure would be in the form of a brittle crack failure that may result in excessive vibration and/or pump seizure.
Failures would occur within the first hour of. pump operation.
This issue was received by the TVA NER process and resolved within two days. TVA determined that all applicable pumps had run in excess of the one hour and did not have the subject surface hardened pressure reducing sleeve. Some of the suspect sleeves were found in power-stores and removed, The inspector had no'further questions.
P21-89-19 is closed.
e.
10 CFR 21 P21-90-04, Rosemont Model 710 Trip / Calibration Units ar.J pg 414 E/F Resistance Bridges This report addressed the possibility of premature long term degradation of certain components. The degradation was' based on test
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data and no actual failures were identified by.the manufacturer.
J
This issue was received by the - TVA NER process-and was resolved I
within 17 days.
TVA determined - that this model of -Rosemount transmitter was not used at the Sequoyah site. The inspector had no further questions.
P21-90-04 is closed.
i 10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 5,1990, with-those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Senior. Resident Inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail' the inspection findings listed below. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as propr-ietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
Inspection Findings:
No viciations, deviations, unresolved items or inspector follow-up
items were identiod.
One non-cited violation was identified:
NCV 327, 328/90-11-01, Inadequate Breaker Testing under SI-258.1 i
(paragraph 3.a).
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Three events occurred during the inspection period and were reviewed by the inspectors:
Containment Vent Isolations on Unit 2 (paragraph 8.b).
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NOUE on a Security event (paragraph 8,c).
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NOUE on a contaminated individual trar sported of f site (paragraph
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S.d).
During the. reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the l
Acting Site Director, Plant Manager and: other managers concerning inspection findings.
11.
Li st r F Acronyms and Initialisms ABGTL-Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System-
!
ABI A2.Tiary Building Isolation
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ABSCE-Auxilicry Building Secondary Containment Enclosure APW Auxiliary Feedwater
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AI Administrative Instruction
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i A01'
Abnormal Operating Instruction
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AUD Auxiliary Unit Operator
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ASOS -
Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor
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ASTM -
American Society of Testing and Materials
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BIT Boron Injection Tank
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BFN Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
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C&A Control and Auxiliary Buildings
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CAQR -
Conditions Adverse to Quality Report j
j CCS Component Cooling Water System
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CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump
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CCTS -
Corporate Commitment Tracking System l
CFR -
Code of Federal Regulations COPS -
Cold Overpressure Protection System j
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COTS -
Correct On the Spot
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CSSC -
Critical Structures, Systems and Components
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CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System l
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Containnier.t Ventilation Isolation
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DC Direct Current
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DCN Design Change Notice
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ONE Division of Nuclear Engineering
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ECN Engineering Change Notice
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ECCS -
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
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EI Emergency. Instructions
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ENS -
Emergency Notification System
E0P -
Emergency Operating Procedure i
EO Emergency Operating Instruction
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i ERCW -
Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature
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FCV Flow Control Valve-
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W FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report
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i GUC General Design Criteria
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G01 General Operating Instruction
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-GL Generic Letter
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HVAC -
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning HIC Hand-operated Indicating Controller
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H0 Hold Order E
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HP Health Physics
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ICF Instruction Change For...
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IDI -
Independent Design Inspection
IN NRC Information Notice i
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IFI Inspector Followup Item
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IM Instrument Maintenance
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IMI Instrument Maintenance Instruction K
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IR
Inspection Report
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KVA
Kilovolt-Amp
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KW
Kilowatt
l
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KV
Kilovolt
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LER
Licensee Event Report
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LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
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LIV -
Licensee Identified Violation
LOCA -
Loss of Coolant Accident
Main Control Room
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MI
Maintenance Instruction
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Maintenance Report-
MSIV -
i
NB
NRC Bulletin
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NQAM -
Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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OSLA -
Operations Section Letter - Administrative
OSLT -
Operations Section Letter - Training
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Office of Special Projects
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Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints
Preventive Maintenance
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Parts Per Million
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Post Modification Test
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PORC -
Plant Operations Review Committee
PORS -
Plant Operation Review Staff
Problem Reporting Document
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PRO
Potentially Reportable Occurrence
,
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Quality Assprance
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Quality Control
RCA -
Radiation Control Area
RCDT -
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
Reactor Coolant Pump
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Reactcr Coolant System
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Regulatory Guide
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RHR -
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Radiation Monitor
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Reactor Operator
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Rod Position Indication
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Revolutions Per Minute
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. Resistivity Temperature Device Detector
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Radiation Work Permit
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RWST -
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Safety Evaluation Report
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S1
Surveillance Instruction
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SMI
Special Maintenance Instruction
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SCI
System Operating Instructions
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SOS
Shift Operating Supervisor
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SOM -
Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance
SQRT --
Seismic Qaalification Review Team
SR
Surveillance Requirements
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Senior Reactor Operator
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SSOMI-
Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection
SSOE -
Safety System Quality Evaluation
SSPS -
Solid State Drotection System
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Special Test Instruction
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TACF -
Temporary Alteration Control Form
.I
TAVE -
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature
i
TDAFW-
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
TI
Technical Instruction
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TREF -
Reference Temperature
TROI -
Tracking Open Items
TS
Technical Specifications
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. Tennessee Valley Authority
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UHI
Upper Head Injection
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UO
Unit Operator
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Unresolved Item
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USQD -
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination
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VDC
Volts Direct Current
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VAC
Volts Alternating Current
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WCG
Work Control Group
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WP
Work Plan
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Work Request
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