IR 05000327/1990003
| ML20012C391 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1990 |
| From: | Jenison K, Linda Watson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012C387 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-90-03, 50-327-90-3, 50-328-90-03, 50-328-90-3, NUDOCS 9003210179 | |
| Download: ML20012C391 (22) | |
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9'o NUcL5AR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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Report Nos.: 50-327/90-03 and 50-328/90-03 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.:
DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name:
Sequcyah I and 2 Inspecti x Conducten-knuary 5,.1990 thru February 5, 1990 Lead Inspector:
MGd O 4/.Jdet. /pt 4/6ko
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K.Je:ison,@niorResidptInspector D#te Signed Inspectors:
P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector D. Loveless, Resident inspector Approved by:
4 9 M4b J!/V '/o L. J. Watson (/ Chief, Project Section 1 Ddte Signed TVA Projects Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SUMMARY Scope:
This announced inspection involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors in the area of operational safety verification including control room observations, operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, safeguards, and housekeeping inspections.
Other areas inspected included maintenance observations, surveillance testing observations,. review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up items.
Results:
The initial response of Sequoyah's upper management to potential conditions adverse to quality was generally excellent.
Examples included diesel generator fuel quality and head vent temperature issues described in paragraph 9.
Followup and extended corrective actions by the licensee appeared to be slow although it was apparent that management was involved in trying to improve the corrective action program's responsiveness.
Maintenance activities were generally good.
No programmatic problems were identified as a result of the minor issues that were identified. The areas of 9003210179 900314 l
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PDR ADOCK 05000327
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Operations, HP,- Security and Surveillance were adequate and fully capable of supporting current plant operations.
Several potential programmatic problems were identified during this inspection including administrative-program trending, (paragraph 6)
invalidation of corrective action program issues-(paragraph 2 9 and 9.a) and control of vendor contracts, manuals, and drawings 1(paragraph 4).
Each of these issues was covered by a licensee corrective action document and initial-corrective actions.
No violations were identified.
Two unresolved items * were identified:
URI 327,328/90-03-01, MOD Switching Affecting Control Room Annunciators, paragraph 2.d URI 327,328/90-03-05, Trending, paragraph 6-Two noncited violations were identified:
NCV 327,328/90-03-03, Caution Orders, paragraph 2.h NCV 327,328/90-03-02, Boric Acid Evaporator : Vendor Manual Acceptance Criteria and Drawing, paragraph 4 Two inspector followup items were identified:
-IFl 327,328/90-03-04, Fire Pump Test Deviation, paragraph 3-IFl 327,328/90-03-06, Long Term Cooldown Corrective-Action paragraph 6
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- Unresolved items are matters which more information is required to determine whether they 'are acceptable or may involve ' violations or deviations.
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REPORT DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- J. Bynum, Vice President, Nuclear Power Production
- C. Vondra, Plant Manager T..Arney, Quality Control Manager
- R. Beecken, Maintenance Manager L. Bush, Acting Maintenance Manager
- M. Burzynski, Site Licensing Manager M. Cooper, Compliance Licensing Manager D. Craven, Supervisor Instrumentation and Control J. Gates Technical Support Manager J. Holland, Corrective Action Program Manager
- W. Lagergren, Jr., Operations Superintendent M. Lorek, Operations Manager
- R. Lumpkin, Site Quality Manager R. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor R. Proffitt Licensing Engineer
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R. Rogers, Supervisor Engineering Support Section M. Sullivan, Radiological Controls Manager S. Spencer, Licensing Engineer
- C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer r
- Attended exit interview
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Acronyms and initialisms used. in this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Control Room Observations
The-inspectors conducted discussions with control' room operators, verified that proper control room staffing was maintained, verified that access to the control room was properly controlled, and that operator behavior was commensurate with the plant configuration-and
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plant activities 'in progress, and with' on-going control room operations.
The operators were observed adhering to appropriate, j
approved procedures, including Emergency Operating Procedures, for the on-going activities.
Additionally, the frequency of visits to the control room by upper management was observed for adequacy.
The inspector also verified that the licensee was operating the plant in a normal plant configuration-as required by TS and when abnormal conditions existed, that the operators were complying 'with the -
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appropriate LCO action statements.
The-inspector verified that leak rate calculations were performed and that leakage rates were within the TS limits.
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The inspectors observed instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities and verified the status of selected control room annunciators to ensure that control room operators understood the status of the plant. Panel indications were reviewed for the nuclear instruments, the emergency power sources, the safety parameter display system and the radiation monitors to ensure operability and operation within TS limits.
No violations or deviations were observed.
b.
Control Room Logs The inspectors observed control room operations and reviewed applicable logs including the shift logs, operating orders, night order book, clearance hold order book, configuration log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activities. The TACF log was reviewed to verify that the use of jumpers and lifted leads causing equipment to be inoperable was clearly noted and understood.
The licensee is actively pursuing correction to conditions requiring TACFs. No issues were identified with these specific ~ logs.
Plant chemistry reports were reviewed to confirm steam generator tube integrity in the secondary and to verify that primary plant chemistry was within TS limits.
In addition, the implementation of the licensee's sampling program was observed.
Plant specific monitoring systems including seismic, meteorological and fire detection indications were reviewed for operability.
A review of surveillance records and tagout logs was performed to confirm the operability of the RPS.
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No violations or deviations were observed.
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ECCS System Alignment
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safety-related systems on Units 1 and 2 to verify operability, flow l
path, heat sink, water supply, power supply, and proper valve and breaker alignment:
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l Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
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Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
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l In addition, the inspectors verified that a selected portion of the
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l containment isolation lineup was correct.
No deviations or violations were identifie F
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d.
Plant Tours 1.
Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings, and exterior areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, control of ignition sources, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, missile hazards and plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions.
The plant was observed to be clean and in adequate condition.
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inspector visually inspected the major components for leakage and any general condition that might prevent fulfilling their functional requirements.
The inspector observed shift turnovers and determined that necessary information concerning the plant systems status was addressed.
2.
During a plant tour on January 25, 1990.-the inspector was made
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aware of electrical switching being performed on motor operated disconnects (MOD) by a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO).
The SR0 was controlling these activities from the control room and failed to notify either the Unit 1 or Unit 2 operators or the SOS that switching activities were being performed. The static that resulted from the operation of the disconnects caused some of the common alarm and unit specific annunciators to alarm.
Operator reaction was quick and adequate.
The same switching activity was repeated by the SR0 without notifying the unit operators even after a discussion of the initial event with the S0S, A third switching evolution was conducted after notifying the unit operators.
The inspector discussed these events-with the SOS and with the Sequoyah Operations Support Manager (who
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was in the control room at the time of-the switching activities).
The inspector was informed this condition had existed for a long time and that site Engineering was aware of the effect of switching operations on the control room annunciators.
These_ events were discussed later with the site Project Engineer, who was not aware of the plant conditions or events.
The inspector discussed the event with each of the three Sequoyah managers mentioned above and questioned whether any operability issues existed.
During the three switching activities each succeeding performance resulted in a lesser number of annunciators affected.
One operator stated that this was expected because of the affect on station electrical ground.
The inspector questioned whether this ground property would affect sensitive reactor protection instrumentation during individual discussions with each of the above managers.
On January 26, 1990, the inspector discussed the issue with the Plant Manager.
He was unaware of the previous night's events.
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He imediately, initiated a CAQR to evaluate the MOD initiated annunciator alarms.
The inspector had the remaining questions:
What caused the annunciator alarms?-
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Could the activation of the annunciator alarms affect
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the orderly operation of the two units?
If so, why were these activities not formally controlled?
Was the station electrical ground affected by MOD
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activities and/or was there an adverse impact on the operability of reactor protection instrumentation?
Did *,ne three line managers take adequate corrective
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actions in accordance with AI-12 part III, Corrective Actions, when they were made aware of the issues and-questioned about the impact of the switching operations?
These issues will be tracked as unresolved item URI 327,328/90-03-01, MOD Switching Affecting Control Room Annunciators.
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No violations or deviations were observed.
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Radiation Protection l
l The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation of radiation protection controls.
On a regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the
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activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable
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RWPs.
Workers were observed for proper frisking upon exiting
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contaminated areas and the radiologically controlled area.
Selected radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were reviewed.
The following RWPs were i
reviewed in detail:
RWP 90-00026, Boric Acid Evaporator
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RWP 90-00046, Spent Fuel Pit f.
Safeguards Inspection (1)
In the course of the monthly activities, the-inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in.the conduct of daily activities including: protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel and packages;
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escorting of visitors; badge issuance and retrieval; and patrols and compensatory posts.
(2) The inspectors observed protected area lighting, and protected and vital areas barrier integrity.
The inspectors verified interfaces between the security organization and both operations and maintenance.
The Resident Inspectors also visited the central alarm station, and verified protection of safeguards information.
(3) The inspectors reviewed an event that occurred on January 11, 1990.
This event involved a prank performed at the 690 level entrance to the vital area and is described in Security Event Report 20, dated January 11, 1990.
This event was also described in TVA memo (Kelley/ Harding) dated January 12, 1990.
This issue was reviewed during a security inspection which occurred the week of January 29, 1990 and is addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-327, 328/90-05.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Conditions Adverse to Quality (1) The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions on outstanding CAQR issues.
During this inspection period the licensee had a relatively large number of late CAQ resolutions (approximately 90).
Management effort was apparent during this resolution activity.
Of the items reviewed, each was found to have been identified by the licensee with immediate corrective action and operability determination in place.
For those issues that
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required long term corrective action the licensee routinely extended completion dates and was making slow progress.
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(2) On January 31, 1990, the inspector attended a meeting conducted by the acting Site Director with the plant' staff to discuss, among other things, the corrective action process.
Approximately twenty of these meetings were held and staff comments were recorded.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the following documents to determine if " invalid CAQRs" constituted a programmatic problem:
SQA 89 001, Invalid CAQRs CHS 88 0070, Invalid CAQRs l
On February 2,1990, the inspector had a discussion with the interim Site Director, the Site QA Manager, the Manager of the Employee Concerns Program and others. Topics discussed included the above mentioned interim Site Director meetings, invalidated
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CAQRs, and the effectiveness of the line management in i
receiving, evaluating and resolving possible conditions adverse to quality.
The conclusion of the meeting was that TVA would
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examine the invalidation process and would discuss with the NRC, at a later date, the results of the acting Site Director / employee meetings, h.
Clearance Orders The inspector reviewed the following clearance orders.
No discrepancies were identified, except as noted:
Caution Order 2-90-005 FS-30-201, 669 Pipe Chase Coolers.
The inspector reviewed this caution order and determined that it_was used to control configuration of the activation switches on the 669 Pipe Chase Coolers. Use of a caution order to control plant configuration is prohibited by AI-3, Clearance Procedure.
The issue was addressed by-CAQR SQP 880017.
However, the alignment change implemented by the caution order was not given an adequate safety evaluation.
Finally, the CAQR required operations personnel to perform compensatory actions which were not controlled in accordance with Sequoyah administrative instructions.
These issues were discussed with the Operations Superintendent, Operations Manager, and Compliance Licensing Manager on January 23, 1990.
The licensee took adequate immediate corrective action to ensure operability of -tl.e-components and issued CAQR SQP 900048 to resolve long term and generic issues.
This violation was not cited because the criteria specified in -Section V. A. of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This is identified as noncited violation NCV 327,328/90-03-03, Caution Orders, and-is considered closed.
Hold Order 1-90-015, FCV 77-228.
While reviewing this Hold Order, the inspector identified an error in the configuration of FCV 77-150.
The Hold Order required a position of Off and the controller for the valve was in the Run position.
The licensee
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No operability or. safety issues were identified.
Hold Order 1-90-059, FCV 62-54.
No violations or deviations were identified.
No trends were identified in the operational safety verification area.
t General conditions in the plant were adequate.
Radiation protection and security are adequate to continue two unit operations.
3.
SurveillanceObservationsandReview(61726)
Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirement '
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The inspectors verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the -
testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspector
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verified that testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by
qualified individuals.
The following activities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies identified except as noted:
SI 298.11, Calibration and Functional Test of the Condensate Storage Header Pressure Switches to Auxiliary Feedwater System SI 137.2, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory SI 78, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration l
SI 186, Locked Valve Position Verification SI 137.1, Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Measurement SI 180, Fire Pump Start Test.
This SI resulted in a test deviation
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of 150 psid.
The licensee made an initial determination that the operability of the components was not affected.
This item will be tracked as IFI 327,328/90-03-04, Fire Pump Test Deviation, and will be reviewed for adequate corrective action.
SI 7 Electrical Power Systems - Diesel l
No trends were identified in the area of surveillance performance during this inspection period.
Those surveillance activities observed were performed in an adequate manner.
The area of surveillance scheduling and management was observed to be adequate and improving.
The tracking and trending of SI test deficiencies appeared to be a problem as described in URI 327,328/90-03-05, Trending, paragraph 6.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observations and Review (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with T.S.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; redundant components were operable; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the l
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activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair records accurately reflected the activities; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were' controlled in accordance with the approved QA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The following work requests were reviewed:
WR B758078, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Flow Transmitter 1-FT-3-163A.
(See comment on WR B793427 below).
WR B793427, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Flow Transmitter 1-FT-3-163B.
The work performed under this WR, and the work instructions were essentially the same as those for WR B758078. The PMT acceptance criteria for the two activities were different.
One WR required a loop calibration and one required a channel check.
When the actual work performed was reviewed it was determined that both WRs had channel checks and loop calibrations performed.
Therefore no operability issues existed.
However, a minor Work-Control job planning weakness was identified because the two PMTs cited different acceptance criteria for work instructions with nearly identical work.
WR B754795, Boric Acid Evaporator.
While inspecting this activity the following documents were reviewed:
MI 6.3.1. Tube Replacement for Boric Acid Evaporator.
ICF 89-870 for MI 6.3.1, changed the acceptance criteria of WR B754795 from a double wall criteria to a single wall criteria.
The criteria were changed because of a failed tube caused by an inadequate maintenance activity.
MI 6.15. Tightening Bolted Joints M and Al 9, Tightening, Inspection and Documentation of Bolted.
Connections M and Al 11, Fabrication, Installation, and Documentation of Supports TVA Contract 83667B l
Drawings 1-5-8, and 9 WR 792012, Boric Acid Evaporator Cooler
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The inspector determined that the original acceptance criteria of WR B754795 were inadequate in that it cited only the TVA contract and was not specific.
The contract did not have plant specific acceptance requirements in it.
In addition, the drawings under which work was performed were "for information only" drawings and were not validated.
When this was discussed with the Maintenance Superintendent he stated that both issues had been identified in a generic manner.
The licensee had initiated a CAQR to resolve the generic issues.
This violation was not cited because the criteria specified in Section V.G. of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This is identified as NCV 327,328/90-03-02 Boric Acid Evaporator Vendor Manual Acceptance Criteria and Drawings, and is considered closed.
WR B252761, Spent Fuel Pit WR B795001, Spare Reactor Coolant Pump WR B760884, Flow Indicator Cover Plate Leaking WR B781437, #3 Heater Drain Tank i
In the area of maintenance, a problem was identified in the area of vendor contract, drawing, and activity control, however, the licensee is addressing these issues in its corrective action program.
For those activities inspected and reviewed during this inspection period, work instructions and performance were generally good.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Site Quality Assurance Activities in Support of Operations (71707)
The inspector discussed site QA involvement in plant activities, with the
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Site Quality Surveillance Manager and reviewed a sample of QA surveillance l
activities.
The following QA surveillances were reviewed:
QSQ-M-90-0074, Waste Decay Tank
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QSQ-S-89-1210, Gamma Spectroscopy'
i QSQ-M-90-0003, TACF 1-89-73-400 QSQ-M-90-0051, BIT QSQ-M-89-1321, 1-RM-90-0404 QSQ-M-90-0044, SI-207 QSQ-M-90-0036,WP1215-01 QSQ-M-89-1391,NPRDS
The findings of the above surveillance appeared to be appropriately
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resolved.
The inspector had no further question *
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6.
NRC Inspector Follow-up Items, Unresolved Items, Violations (92701, 92702)
(Closed)IFI 327,328/89-29-08, Primary and Secondary Maintenance NRC Inspection Report 327,328/89-29, identified several unit transients, including a reactor trip and two turbine runbacks, related to secondary plant material conditions.
These conditions together with specific questions on certain WR activities were identified as IFI 327,32E/89-29-08.
These issues were discussed with the Superintendent of Maintenance and the System Engineering Manager during a discussion of a subsequent unit transient that occurred on January 10, 1990. This conversation took place on January 22, 1990, and concluded the inspector's review' of secondary plant related unit transients, a
Based on a review of available material and the above discussions, the inspector concluded that the potential causes of the secondary plant material condition related unit transients have been well defined by the licensee.
Initial corrective actions were taken and appeared to be adequate.
Long term corrective actions have been identified and if
accomplished should eliminate the causes of the type of unit transients recently experienced.
These include design changes on the feedwater control systems and improved maintenance practices on steam generator, feedwater, and condensate level control valves.
The inspector had no
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further questions.
IFI 327,328/89-29-08 is closed.
(Closed) LIV 327,328/88-49-02, Inadequate Maintenance Activities
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The licensee identified that the maintenance activities associated with I
replacing the diaphragm on valve 1-FCV-62-70 were inadequate and resulted in diaphragm failure, valve closure, and isolation of the normal RCS letdown flowpath.
The licensee investigation revealed that four other i
similar failures for this brand of valve had occurred recently.
A detailed procedure is being prepared for maintenance associated with l
removal and replacement of this particular brand of air ' operator.
i This item was tracked for the completion of all licensee corrective actions.
The inspector reviewed the new revision of MI-11.4, Maintenance of CSSC valves, and found that it acceptably corrected this problem.
The inspector had no further questions.
LIV 327,328/88-49-02 is closed.
(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-50-01, Failure to Correct Previous VIO 87-30-01 (Lack of Control Over Plant Evolutions, System and Equipment Status for Radwaste Area.)
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The licensee was cited for the lack of control over the evolutions and equipment in the radwaste system with the following examples being noted:
Multiple evolutions were performed outside of approved plant
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procedures ring spent resin transfers from January 11-19, 1989; Known inadequate drawings were utilized - affecting procedural
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controls of the temporary resin interface valve; and Known design deficiencies were not corrected - causing recurring
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radiation hot spots in excess of one Rem per hour to be created.
The licensee responded by stating that the root cause of the three examples identified in this violation and general findings in the inspection report was a lack of upper level management attention in the area of the Water and Waste Processing Group (WWPG).
The licensee discussed the following corrective actions:
WWPG management will walk their spaces, observe work in
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progress, and continually stress compliance with procedures.
An indepth training program for WWPG employees will be
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established and conducted including system design and use as well as the need for strict adherence to procedures.
A review of both outstanding and cancelled DCRs related to the_
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radiological waste processing system will be performed to reevaluate the need and impact on operation.
S01-77.3, Waste Disposal-System, will be revised to_ reflect the
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permanent valve by July 8, 1989.
The inspector reviewed each of these areas and found that the implementation of the corrective actions was adequate.
This item is closed.
(Closed) URI 327,328/88-50-02, Trending Within the Administrative Control Programs and the Appropriate Thresholds for Entering the CAQR Process This URI was written to examine the trending programs within the Administrative Control Programs (ACP) of AI-12 to determine if adequate trending was being performed.
The ACP3 were initiated as part of the CAQR process in September, 1988.
Therefore, very little trend information was available at the time of the December 1988 inspection.
Several programs had also not been established.
The inspector noted that QA was involved in the development and standardization of the trending programs.
The inspector reviewed the trending processes of twelve ACP's and
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determined that the programs appeared to be adequately identifying and documenting adverse trends and issuing CAQR's as necessary, with the following exceptions:
Potential Reportable Occurrences
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Drawing Discrepancies
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Test Deficiencies
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The inspector will review these trending programs and determine compliance with Al-12 and the specific associated standard.
This item will be tracked as URI 327,328/90-03-05, Trending.
URI 327,328/88-50-02 is closed.
(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-55-01, Post Trip Cooldown Review The licensee proposed a series of corrective actions.
By letter dated i
April 14,1989, the NRC requested that the licensee provide a letter to the NRC staff, within 30 days of the completion of the corrective actions, stating that it had implemented the commitments in the areas of post-trip review, LER review, control and review of vendor documents, and review of emergency operating procedures and the additional longer-term corrective
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actions.
The initial corrective actions associated with the issue are complete and-
are considered adequate.
The inspection and closure of the remaining
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corrective actions (hardware modifications) will be reviewed as part of 1l IFI 327,328/90-03-06, Long Term Cooldown Corrective Action.
Violation 327,328/88-55-01 is closed.
(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-35-01, Failure to Follow 50.59, Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action, Failure to Have an Adequate Post' Trip Review -
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This item was issued as part of the Escalated Enforcement / Civil Penalty
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package with VIO 327,328/88-55-01 as discussed above.
Therefore the closure of this issue will also be addressed under IFI 327,328/90-03-06.
VIO 327,328/88-35-01 is administratively closed.
(Closed) VIO 327,328/88-34-04, Late Reporting of NOVE on High RCS Leak Rate.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken by the licensee to correct and prevent recurrence of this specific violation and found them to be acceptable.
Review of the overall issue concerning proper implementation of IP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Logic, is the
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subject of another violation and will be completed under VIO 327,328/89-25-04 which is a similar violation.
This violation is administratively closed.
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8.
Licensee Event Report followup (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed and closed.
The inspector verified that:
reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the LER forms were completed; no unreviewed safety questions were involved; and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identified.
UNIT 1 (Closed) LER 327/88-042, Inadvertent Entry Into LC0 3.0.3 When Main Steam Flow Channel Was Not Declared Inoperable Upon Failure Of. Channel Check Criteria Due To Inattention To Detail At approximately 11:00 a.m. on November 3,1988, SI-2, Shif t Log, was performed and showed that 1-FI-1-10A, Loop 2 Main Steam Flow Indicator, was outside the operability criteria for its channel check requiring entry into LC0 3.3.2.1.
This entry was not.made and the appropriate, actions were not taken placing the unit inadvertently in LCO 3.0.3.
At approximately 4:11 p.m. that afternoon the oncoming shift Unit Operator noted the error.
By 5:05 p.m., LC0 3.3.2.1 action requirements were met.
The licensee counseled the individuals involved, and reviewed the event with the operations shift personnel to reemphasize the importance of attention to detail.
A training letter was issued discussing the event.
Additionally a note was added to SI-2 referring attention directly to the acceptance criteria at the bottom of the page.
The inspector had no further questions.
LER 327/88-042 is closed.
9.
Technical Issue Resolution (93702)
a.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Tubing The inspector reviewed an issue involving the receipt and use of grade B steel tubing supplied to TVA by the Jones and Laughlin Company. The inspector reviewed the following documents:
Nonconforming Material Report on Order 900082-17
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Order 900082-17
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CAQR SQP890249
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Employee Concern Program Report ECP-87-SQ-510 Employee Concern Program Report ECP-86-SQ-253
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The Nonconforming Material Report on Order 900082-17 rejected the material because it did not meet the required yield stress of grade B material.
The specific material in question was later used in a class A application for which it did meet the design yield stress requirements.
However, the remaining material was not restamped and may have been issued as Class B material in other applications.
This issue was evaluated in ECP-86-SQ-510 and resulted in CAQR SQP890249.
However, the CAQR was determined. to be invalid and escalated for
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second level management review. During the second level management
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review the issue was again determined to not be valid, but certain corrective actions were required. The corrective actions were transferred to CAQR 870236.
Upon reviewing CAQR 870236, the inspector determined that the question of other uses of the questionable Heat Lots identified in SQP 890249 was not addressed..
The licensee committed in the NRC exit meeting conducted on February 5,1990, to address the other possible uses of these questionable Heat Lots in CAQR 870236.
The licensee's immediate corrective actions appeared to be adequate.
The licensee committed to complete a review of other possible uses and will track the issue in CAQR 870236.
The inspector discussed the issue of invalidated CAQRs with the previous Site Qualit,v Manager and was informed that Quality Assurance had performed an audit (SQA 890001) of invalidated CAQRs.
This audit identified weaknesses in the resolution of invalidated CAQRs. These weaknesses were discussed with the interim Site Director on February 2,1990, as discussed in paragraph 2.g of this report.
b.
ASME Section XI Surveillance Activities The inspector reviewed certain testing activities following the transfer of program responsibility from the Mechanical Testing Section to Operations and Systems Engineering.
The inspector determined that although the training and turnover.' process had weaknesses, the current Systems Engineer _ing organization-was supplying adequate support for the testing. - The inspector also reviewed a licensee investigation conducted by Operations of the
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training and performance of the ASME Section XI program testing. The investigation identified several technical and training related problems but concluded that the current system of performance and-training was adequate.
The investigation also recommended an action plan to the Operations Superintendent.
The licensee had not-implemented the corrective action at the time of the inspection.
No specific technical or safety issues were identified by the inspector which did not have an associated Sequoyah corrective action item.
The ASME Section XI-program will be the subject of a. future
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inspection.
The licensee stated at the exit that this area would be given additional management attention.
Therefore, the inspector had no further questions.
c.
Radiological Waste Organization Changes i
The inspector reviewed the performance of-the current Radiological Waste (Radwaste) Organization.
Interviews with the current managers of liquid and solid Radwaste sections were conducted and a search was conducted for adverse trends covering the period June to December 1989,
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No adverse trends in safety, operations or management were identified. One issue resulting from the contamination of a Radwaste worker was identified.
The Radwaste worker was contaminated on December 24, 1989, during the search for missing special nuclear material.
The missing special nuclear material.was previously identified in a TVA letter to the NRC dated October 31, 1986. As a result of this most recent search TVA management determined that the missing special nuclear material was. not stored in a specific high radiation waste storage area as previously surmised and reported to the NRC.
When the inspector became aware that the special nuclear material was-not located in the high radiation storage area he discussed the issue with the Sequoyah Plant Manager _and the Sequoyah Compliance Licensing Supervisor.
In addition the inspector reviewed the following documents:
PR0 1-86-302
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TVAletter(Gridley/ Grace)datedOctober 31, 1986, RIMS
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L44 861031 816 Deficiency Report SQ-DR-86-236R, dated November 13, 1986
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NRC Inspection Report 327,328/86-63
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TVA letter (Gridley/ Grace) dated January 8, 1987, RIMS
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L44 870108 804
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LER 327/86056 TVA letter (Gridley/Ebneter) dated March 23, 1987, RIMS
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L44 870323 808 TVA letter (Ray /NRC) dated January 31, 1990, RIMS,
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S10900130864 In the October 31, 1986 letter referenced above, the licensee stated that:
" Documentation exists which provides SQN plant management with a high degree of confidence that the remaining 11 detectors are in the high-level radwaste storage area".
In the January 8,1987 TVA letter referenced above, the' licensee stated that all special nuclear material was located and its location documented with the exception of 11 incore detectors.
The licensee also stated:
" Documentation exists showing the transfer of these 11 incore detectors to radwaste.
The 11 incore detectors are believed to be in the high-level radwaste storage area, although their exact location has not been determined."
TVA further stated in a March 23, 1987 letter referenced above that
"Because the physical location of 11 incore moveable detectors could
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not be verified, they have been documented as lost by the SNM custodian and removed from the TI-101 inventory requirements."
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Following the March 23, 1987 letter, the licensee continued to search the high-level radwaste storage area for the missing 11 incore detectors.
This search was completed on December 24, 1989, and no incore detectors were located.
The licensee reported the completion of the search in a January 31, 1990 letter.
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d.
Configuration Control and Drawing Maintenance The inspector reviewed recent changes to the drawing change control program.
Included in this review were:
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TVA letter (Gridley/NRC) dated April 1,1987, RIMS L44 870401 811 Administrative Instruction AI-19, Modifications
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Approximately 50 control room primary drawings
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TVA committed in the above referenced letter to maintain control room primary drawing configuration status by using a " red-line" process on the drawing copies kept in the control room until the changes were incorporated on the drawings, in accordance with AI-19.
Within the sample inspected, no drawings were identified that were currently
" red-lined".
When questioned about the lack of " red lined" drawings the Compliance Licensing Manager pointed out that.the current AI-19 revision required that the control room primary drawings be permanently updated prior to returning the affected system to an operable status. The inspector identified no systems with inoperable status because of outstanding drawing changes.
The inspector reviewed a related issue involving the maintenance of weld maps as QA records.
This issue was being resolved by the licensee under CAQR SQQ 900054, 10.
EventFollow-up(93702)
a.
On January 10, 1990, at 7:32 p.m., Sequoyah Unit 1 experienced a turbine generator runback to 80% power.
The cause of the turbine generator runback was a secondary valve failure which bypassed feedwater heater flow back to the main condenser.
In addition, the unit received a low-low rod insertion limit alarm and an axial delta flux alarm.
The appropriate LCOs were entered;- adequate initial corrective action was taken; and the unit was returned to full power.
This issue was discussed with the Superintendent of Maintenance and the System Engineering Manager during a discussion of secondary plant material condition. The conversation took place on January 22, 1990,
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37-and concluded the inspector's review of secondary plant transients (see section 6 of this report, IFI 327,328/89-29-08).
b.
Sequoyah Unit I continued to experience an increase in RCS vent tail pipe temperature of approximately one degree F per day.
The licensee expected that some time after the close of this inspection report, that head vent leakage may start to significantly affect RCS leakage.
To this end the licensee planned and performed certain maintenance activi ties.-
Management control over the technical aspects of this issue appeared to be very strong.
c.
On February 2,1990, the licensee was presented with the possibility that approximately 140 thousand gallons of diesel generator fuel was not useable. The licensee took quick corrective action and performed several different samples of the suspect fuel.
The licensee.
determined, after the first set of supplementary samples, that seven day operability of the diesels as required by TS was not affected.
The inspector was reviewing subsequent sample data at the close of
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this inspection period.
11.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 5,1990,
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with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The Senior Resident
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Inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any of the material reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. -The Vice President, Nuclear Power Production, committed in this NRC exit meeting, to address the other possible uses of two questionable heat lots of piping material, discussed in paragraph 9.a, during the resolution of CAQR 870236.
Inspection Findings:
No violations were identified.
Two unresolved items were identified:
URI 327,328/90-03-01, MOD Switching Affecting Control Room Annunciators, paragraph 2.d URI 327,328/90-03-05, Trending, paragraph 6
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Two noncited violations were identified:
NCV 327,328/90-03-03, Caution Orders, paragraph 2.h NCV 327,328/90-03-02, Boric Acid Evaporator Vendor Manual Acceptance Criteria and Drawings, paragraph 4
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Two inspector followup items were identified:
IFI 327,328/90-03-04, Fire Pump Test Deviation, paragraph 3 IFI 327,328/90-03-06, Long Term Cooldown Corrective Action, paragraph 6 During the reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the acting Site Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning-inspection findings.
12.
List of Acronyms and Initialisms ABGTS-Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Auxiliary Building Isolation ABI
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ABSCE-Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure Auxiliary Feedwater AFW
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Administrative Instruction AI
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A01 Abnormal Operating Instruction
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AVO Auxiliary Unit Operator
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AS0S -
Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor ASTM -
American Society of Testing and Materials BIT Boron Injection Tank
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DFN Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
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Control and Auxiliary Buildings C&A
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CAQR -
Conditions Adverse to Quality Report CCS Component Cooling Water System
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CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump
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CCTS -
Corporate Commitment Tracking System CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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COPS -
Cold Overpressure Protection System CS Containment Spray
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CSSC -
Critical Structures, Systems and Components CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System CVI Containment Ventilation Isolation
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DC Direct Current
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DCN Design Change Notice
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DG Diesel Generator
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DNE Division of Nuclear Engineering
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ECN Engineering Change Notice
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ECCS -
Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
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EI Emergency Instructions
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ENS Emergency Notification System
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E0P Emergency Operating Procedure
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E0 Emergency Operating Instruction
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ERCW -
Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature
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FCV Flow Control Valve
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FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report
General Design Criteria
GDC
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General Operating Instruction
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G01
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Generic Letter
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HVAC -
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
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Hand-operated Indicating Controller HIC
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Hold Order H0
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t Health Physics
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ICF. -
Instruction Change Form
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Independent Design Inspection IDI
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NRC Information Notice
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Inspector Followup Item IFI
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IM Instrument Maintenance
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IMI Instrument Maintenance Instruction
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IR-Inspection Report-
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KVA Kilovolt-Amp
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KW Kilowatt
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KV Kilovolt
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LER' -
Licensee Event Report LC0 Limiting Condition for Operation-
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LIV Licensee Identified Violation
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LOCA -
Loss of Coolant Accident Main Control Room MCR
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MI Maintenance Instruction
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MR Maintenance Report
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MSIV -
NB NRC Bulletin
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NQAM -
Nuclear Quality-Assurance Manual NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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OSLA -
Operations Section Letter - Administrative OSLT -
Operations Section Letter - Training OSP Office of Special Projects
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PLS Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints PM Preventive Maintenance-
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PPM Parts Per Million
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PMT Post Modification Test
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PORC --
Plant Operations Review Committee P0RS -
Plant Operation Review Staff PRD Problem Reporting Document
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PRO Potentially Reportable Occurrence
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Quality Assurance QC Quality Control
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RCA Radiation Control Area
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RCDT -
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank-RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
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RG Regulatory Guide
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RM Radiation Monitor
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Reactor Operator R0
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RPI Rod Position Indication
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RPM Revolutions Per Minute
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Resistivity Temperature Device Detector RTD
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Radiation Work Permit RWP
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RWST -
Refueling Water Storage Tank Safety Evaluation Report SER
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Surveillance Instruction SI
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Special Maintenance Instruction SMI
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System Operating Instructions S01
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Shift Operating Supervisor SOS
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Sequoyah Standard Practice Maintenance SQM
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SQRT -
Seismic Qualification Review Team.
Surveillance Requirements SR
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Senior Reactor Operator SR0
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SS0MI-Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection SSQE -
Safety System Quality Evaluation SSPS -
Solid State Protection System Shift Technical Advisor.
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Special Test Instruction STI
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.TACF -
Temporary Alteration Control Form TAVE -
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature TDAFW-Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TI Technical Instruction
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TREF -
Reference Temperature TROI -
Tracking Open Items Technical Specifications
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TS
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Tennessee Valley Authority
'j TVA
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UHI Upper Head Injection i
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U0 Unit Operator
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URI Unresolved Item
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USQD -
Unreviewed Safety Question Determination.
VDC Volts' Direct Current
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'VAC Volts Alternating Current
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WCG Work Control Group
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WP Work Plan
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WR Work Request
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