IR 05000327/1986064
| ML20212B905 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1986 |
| From: | Decker T, Kreh J, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212B853 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-86-64, 50-328-86-64, NUDOCS 8612290341 | |
| Download: ML20212B905 (22) | |
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p3 tefoq'o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11.
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' 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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DEC.19 1996
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REportNos.: 50-327/86-64 and 50-328/86-64
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I Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
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6N38 A Lookout Place
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1101 Market Street
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Chattanooga, TN. 37402-2801
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Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79
Facility Name: Sequoyah 1 and 2 i
Inspection Conducted: ov ber 17-20,~1986
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. Inspector:-
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/.skhd W. M. Sar r g
Date Signed
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J..L. Kreh
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Accompanying Personnel:
K. M. Clark A. K. Loposer (Comex)
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M. I. Good (Comex)
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. H Munson (Battelle)
b Approved.by:
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T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date Signed j
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY
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Scope:- Routine, announced. inspection of the annual Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Emergency Exercise involving observations by_ five NRC representatives of key emergency organization functions and locations during the exercise, i
Results:
Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or
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deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager
- J. D. Osborne, Manager of ALARA
- F. J. Spivey, Jr., Outage Section Supervisor
- A. Schenk, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
- T. H. Youngblood, REP Coordinator
- C. G. Robertson, Director, Nuclear Services
- C. G. Hudson,. Chief, Rad Health J. Barker, Manager, Rad Control T. Adkins, Program Manager W. R. Ramsey, Maintenance Planning Manager F. W. Reimann, Site Director Staff R. E. Garrison, Asst. Chief, Public Safety J. Blankenship, Manager, Info Services F. Mashburn, Nuclear Engineer, Site Licensing D. E. Crawley, Radiological Field Operations Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors K. Jenison P. Harmon
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 30, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensco Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
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portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's emergency plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario developed for this exercise wcs adequate to exercise the onsite emergency organizations consistent with the licensee's scope and objectives.
The scenario also provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies for their participation in the exercise.
Although, controller instructions were a part of the exercise scenario, they were not adhered to on numerous occasions.
Controller instructions state
...the participants are expected to cbtain information through their own
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organization and exercise their own judgement in determining response actions and resolving problems..."
Contrary to this guidance, controllers made the following comments to players:
"Is anyone going to check the normal power supply?"; "Make your normal red phone notifications and specify
'This is a drill'."; and "We have MET data when you need it.".
This controller prompting of player response was noted as an exercise weakness during the critique (50-327/86-64-01, 50-328/86-64-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Onsite Emergency Organization (32301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization.
The on-duty Shift Engineer assumed the duties of Site Emergency Director promptly upon the initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Plant Manager.
Following his relief, the Site Emergency Director (SED)
relocated to the Technical Support Center (TSC) to direct assigned activities which include such functions as control room operations, technical assessment, accident mitigation analysis, onsite radiation surveys, and dose tracking for site personnel. An inspector noted that the SED was without communication after relocating to the TSC.
This situation continued for over ten minutes before the TSC communications were functional.
This failure of the SED to be able to direct assigneo activities or even be knowledgeable of changing conditions for ten minutes after assuming responsibilities as SED was identified as an exercise weakness (50-327/86-64-02, 50-328/86-64-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A and II.B.
The inspectors verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the emergency organization.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (0SC), and the Central Emergency Command Center (CECC).
At each of these centers, the assigned responsibilities of emergency staff personnel appeared to be consistent with the licensee's emergency plan.
a.
Control Room - A supplemental Control Room shift had been designated as player personnel for the exercise.
This initially caused some confusion as the on-shift personnel began assisting the players.
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Licensee controllers promptly corrected this situation by requiring the player shift to stop requesting or accepting assistance from the on-duty shift.
The Control Room shift players responded quickly in classifying the simulated accident conditions; however, the shift engineer clerk was not notified and instructed to initiate notifications until nine minutes after the classification.
It was also noted that the emergency condition was not announced over the public address system by the SE's clerk as required by Implementing Procedure-7 (IP-7).
The failure to use the public address system to inform personnel onsite of emergency conditions and to provide for a
more timely staffing of the emergency response organization was identified as an exercise weakness (50-327/86-64-03, 50-328/86-64-03).
An inspector later observed that the Control Room dispatched a team into the plant without coordinating with the TSC and the OSC.
This failure to coordinate Control Room activities with the SED in the TSC was identified as an inspector followup item (50-327/86-64-04, l
50-328/86-64-04).
b.
Technical Support Center - The TSC was declared activated some 45 minutes after the Alert had been declared. Because this was a " work hours" drill and the responding emergency organization personnel were onsite, this was considered as excessive.
The delay also created l
confusion in that the CECC was manned and declared operational four minutes prior to the TSC. This prevented the licensee from meeting one of its CECC objectives:
demonstrating the precise and clear transfer
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of responsibilities from the TSC staff to the CECC staff.
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Operations Support Center - The OSC was staffed and consisted of six l
designated areas as defined in IP-7, " Activation of the Operations Support Center."
An inspector noted that the OSC was well organized and managed by an OSC Coordinator; however, it was noted that the procedure did not identify the OSC Coordinator position and his
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Although no negative effects were noted, the E
inspector observed that the OSC teams did not have any radio
communications with the OSC.
Provisions for continuous or periodic w
communications with a dispatched OSC team would be desirable in a
rapidly progressing accident sequence.
The inspector also noted that
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the health physics support to the OSC teams would not have been
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available during a significant period when the health physics personnel
in the HP Lab exiled themselves due to high radiation levels in the
turbine building.
The need for an alternate location, from which to
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provide necessary HP support, should high rariiation levels prevent
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operation from the HP Lab was identified as an inspector followup item (50-327/86-64-05,50-328/86-64-05).
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Central Emergency Control Center - The licensee promptly established d
its offsite emergency organization at its CECC in Chattanooga, TN. The
CECC appeared to be adequately staffed and equipped to direct and
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coordinate the overall TVA response to the emergency condition and perform assigned functions such as offsite radiological monitoring and y
dose assessment, public information, State and local government i
coordination, and plant assessment.
The inspector noted weak and
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intermittent communications with the offsite monitoring teams early in
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the exercise because of radio problems.
The inspector also observed that the CECC Director and his staff were not aware of the series of
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pre-determined precautionary measures taken by the State Comission of
Agriculture upon declaration of a Site Area Emergency, even though these actions had been coordinated by and agreed to by TVA. The ra d f
for the CECC Director and staff to be aware of expected protective
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action / precautionary measures previously coordinated with TVA and to be
taken by the State in the event of a radiological accident was
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identified as an inspector followup item (50-327/86-54-06,
'E 50-328/86-64-06),
j No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and j
effectively using assistance resources had been made and that other
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organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV. A. and j
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
g State and local staff could have been acccmmodaSd at the (CECC).
The licensee had made arrangements for requesting assistance resources and the l
assistance was identified and supported by appropriate letters of agreement.
a No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Emergencj Classification System (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by
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10:CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific r
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
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Ar. inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect bs' stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the implementing sk pro;edures.
The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of 1k the simulated accident.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
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Th e area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and E
cergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages
to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early Ep-notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been
- r-established as required by 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
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An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been
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established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations.
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However, an inspector noted that the initial report from the licensee to the NRC sas incorrect.
Specifically, the notification was made from the Control J.
Room 50 minutes after the declaration of an Alert based on the loss of all annunciators for more than 15 minutes.
The NRC was notified that a
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Notification of Unusual Event had been declared based on the loss of (
anntnciators.
This failure to provide a complete and accurate report to the
NRC wa; identified as an exercise weakness (50-327/86-64-07,
-d 50-328/36-64-07).
An inspector also noted that the licensee's implementing procedures for emergency classifications did not adequately provide for the
- 4 transition to a higher level of classification in the purpose statements of the procedures.
This exercise weakness was also identified by the licensee
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fo* corrective action (50-327/86-64-08, 50-328/86-64-08).
10. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt
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communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
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Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in Ni! REG-0654,Section II.F.
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Comunications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and
g heween the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were adequate with the exception of the early lock-out of the
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TSC telephones that resulted in the SED being unable to communicate.
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No. violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Public Education and Information (82301)
This ' area was observed to determine that idformation concerning the simulated emergency had been made available for-dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.0, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section'II.G.'
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Information was provided to the media' and the public in advance of the exercise.
The licensee established its Joint Information Center and provided accurate and timely press releases that were properly coordinated.
Some initial delay.was observed in distributing the first news release
.within the news center due to equipment problems; however, the problems were promptly corrected.
A rumor control program 'was - in place and operated effectively with the exception that erroneous information indicating a General Emergency declaration was not coordinated in.a timely manner with the State.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
- This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency. facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E,'and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H. '
The emergency response facilities were activated and promptly staffed during the exercise.
The facilities appeared to be adequately equipped to support the emergency response.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.48(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Dose assessment activities were conducted by the CECC staff and coordinated with the State. During the exercise, the CECC plant assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the TSC and the CECC Plant Assessment Manager concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to the plant equipment, to prevent release of radioacthe materials, and to terminate the emergency conditions.
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14. Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential -personnel,- were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
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An inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures
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for fonnulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations
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within the ten-mile EPZ.
The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteria and notifications were made to the appropriate State and local authorities within the 15-minute criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Exercise Critique (82301)
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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses
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noted in the licensee's emergency response organizations were formally
presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific
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criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
A formal licensee critique of the emergency exercise was held on November 20, 1986, with exercise controllers, key exercise participants,
licensee management, and NRC personnel attending. The licensee's critique was adequate and identified some 15 items for followup.
Following the
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licensee critique, the NRC inspector provided preliminary findings observed during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
16.
Inspector Followup (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-327/85-07-02:
More technical information needed for State evaluation.
No adverse comments were noted regarding the technical information provided to support the State's evaluation.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-327/85-41-01:
Failure to adequately document completion of drills during the annual emergency exercise.
The scenario documented drills being conducted during the 1986 emergency exercise.
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17. Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
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Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and Scenario Timeline
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT RADI@ LOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN (REP) EXERCISE The 1986 SQN REP exercise will be a full-scale exercise requiring full participation by TVA, State, and local emergency response agencies.
Exercise Goals The TVA goals for the 1986 SQN exercise are as follows:
1.
To allow plant and offsite personnel to test and practice their response capability in accordance with the SQN REP and REP implementing procedures to protect plant personnel and the general public as appropriate.
2.
To ensure that deficiencies observed in previous exercises have been corrected.
3.
To identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of improvement or revision.
, Exercise Objectives General Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize TVA emergency response personnel in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to activate TVA emergency centers in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment and the adequacy of the communications systems.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager
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to maintain command and control over all emergency response activities conducted from his facility throughout the excrcise.
S.
Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and/or problem
. solving capabilities of emergency response personnel.
6.
Demonstrate that timely and accurate information can be supplied to the State on a frequent basis.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively generate protective action recommendations.
Specific Objectives A.
Control Room Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Site Emergency Director (Shift Engineer) to classify an emergency condition in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement protective action measures in a timely manner.
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Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Engineer to periodically inform Control Room personnel of the status of the emergency situation and the plant conditions.
5.
Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to make a timely determination of the cause of an incident and perform mitigating actions to place the unit in a safe, stable condition.
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B.
Technical Support Center (TSC) Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the TSC emergency response personnel in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the TSC in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate that effective command and control occurs in the TSC.
4.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff.
5.
Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and problem solving capabilities of the TSC staff.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to support the Control Room staff's effort to identify the cause of the incident, mitigate the consequences of the incident and place the unit in a safe, stable condition.
7.
Demonstrate the proficiency of the Site Emergency Director in
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the TSC to classify an emergency condition.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to account for site personnel in a timely manner.
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Demonstrate the ability to fonnulate and implement onsite protective' actions in a timely manner.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions to support the formulation of protective action recommendations.
11.
Demonstrate the ability to assess information available from the containment and effluent high-level radiation n.onitoring systems and respond accordingly.
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12.
Demonstrate the timely updating of TSC status boards.
C.
Operations Support Centers (OSC) Objectives 1.
Denionstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the OSC emergency response personnel in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the OSC in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to initiate and coordinate activities in an efficient and timely manner.
4.
Demonstrate that OSC teams are thoroughly briefed on plant conditions before being dispatched.
5.
Demonstrate that adequate health physics support is provided to OSC teams.
6.
Demonstrate that OSC team leaders provide effective command and control.
7.
Demonstrate that adequate communications are maintained between OSC teams and the OSC.
8.
Demonstrate that there is a timely and efficient transfer of information between the OSC and the TSC.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain and to analyze samples drawn from the inplant normal or post-accident sampling systems.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate inplant health physics surveys in a timely manner.
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11.
Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of onsite
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emergency workers.
12.
Demonstrate that a plant environmental monitoring team can be dispatched in a timely and efficient manner.
13.
Demonstrate the timely updating of OSC status boards.
D.
Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Objectives 1.
Demonstrate that the Operations Duty Specialist makes the initial notification to the State in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the CECC emergency response personnel in a timely manner.
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Demonstrate the ability to activate the CECC in a timely manner.
4.
Demonstrate that the CECC Director makes a clear announcement when he determines the CECC operational.
5.
Demonstrate that effective command and control occurs in the CECC.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively call upon and utilize TVA corporate or outside support organizations when required.
7.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the TSC staff to the CECC staff.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain vendor and other outside resources as required.
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9.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to direct and coordinate the deployment of Radiological Monitoring Teams in a timely manner.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to perform dose assessment activities in a timely manner.
11.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate TVA dose assessment activities with those conducted by the State.
12.
Demonstrate the ability of the dose assessment team to obtain, analyze, and use plant radiological condition information to produce dose assessments and to formulate timely protective action recommendations.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to inform, update, and coordinate with State Radiological Health personnel regarding meteorological and dose assessment information in a timely manner.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to inform and update itMCC emergency response personnel regarding the status of an emergency condition in a timely manner.
15.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC plant assessment team to analyze current plant conditions, icentify projected trends and potential consequences.
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16.
Demonstrate a timely and accurate flow of information from the TSC staff to the CECC assessment teams.
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17.
Demonstrate the ability of the Core Damage Assessment Team to generate source term information in a timely manner.
18.
Demonstrate a timely and effective flow of information between CECC radiological and plant assessment teams.
19.
Demonstrate that protective action recommendations are made by use of the Protective Action Guide (PAG) logic F.iagram.
20.
Demonstrate the timely updating of CECC status boards.
21.
Demonstrate that protective action recommendations are provided to the State in a timely and clear manner.
22.
Demonstrate that proper security is established for the CECC.
23.
Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of offsite and/or onsite conditior.s ta support the formulation of protective action recommendations.
24.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively function in the new CECC.
25.
Demonstrate the ability to alert Federal and industrial emergency contacts in a timely manner.
E.
Environs Assessment Activities 1.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate Radiological Monitoring Teams in conjunction with the State at the Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC).
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the Radiological Monitoring Teams to
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efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other prescribed radiological monitoring activities.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the monitoring teams to follow contamination control procedures.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of offsite emergency workers.
5.
Demonstrate effective command and control of radiological monitoring activities from the plant, RMCC, and/or CECC as appropriate.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize Division of Field Operations response teams to obtain river water samples and transfer them to a suitable location for analysis.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of Field Team members to use effective dress-out techniques using C-zone clothing under field conditions.
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F.
Public Information Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively function in the new Joint Information Center (JIC) facility.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate a rumor control center with the Citizen's Action Line.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to produc'e a news release from the CECC every two hours.
4.
Determine the time required to functionally staff the Public Information component of the CECC.
G.
Connunications Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the REP notification procedure throughout the notification chain, beginning at the SQN Control Room and extending to State and local authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the plant and the CECC.
3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the CECC and the State EOC.
4.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the CECC and the JIC.
5.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between the CECC and the RMCC.
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6.
Demonstrate the adequacy of radios in the monitoring vans, at Lovell Field (RMCC), at the CECC, and at the SQN TSC.
7.
Demonstrate the adequacy of Field Operations radio communications.
H.
Exercise Operation Objectives 1.
provide specific and measurabic objectives for the exercise.
2.
Improve centroller and evaluator performance through an increased level of training.
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3.
provide additional information in the scenario package, i.e.,
Public Information messages, meteorological data, and evaluation i
forms.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately perform post-exercise critiques to determine any areas requiring additional capability i
improvement.
5.
All participating personnel will know the date of the exercice but not its starting time or duration.
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6.
Participating personnel and radiological monitoring vans from Muscle Shoals will be prestaga4 in Chattanooga.
7.
Participating personnel from Knoxville and equipment will be prestaged for the JIC.
8.
Provide training for new CECC personnel I.
Drills That Will Be Conducted 1.
One annual plant radiological monitoring drill.
2.
One semiannual plant health physics drill.
3.
One annual radiochemistry drill.
4.
One quarterly communications drill.
5.
One annual plant communications drill.
6.
One annual offsite environs monitoring drill.
7.
One semiannual CECC dose assessment drill.
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J.
Areas Not to be Demonstrated 1.
Ingestion pathway activities.
2.
Onsite and offsite recovery and reentry.
3.
Fire drill activities.
4.
Medical drill activities.
0202E
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R;vicien 5 N:v. 17, 1986 SEQUOYAH RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (REP) EXERCISE
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SCENARIO TIMELINE Initial Conditions:
Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.
(EOL; steady state power for last 60 days)
Reactor coolant system activity is 0.38 uci/gm Dose Equivalent I-131.
Auxiliary feedwater pump 1A-A tagged out for motor bearing replacement.
Steam Generator #3 has a small tube leak of less than 0.2 spm.
PZR PORV block valve FCV-68-332 in closed due to excessive leakage through PCV-68-340.
C2 waterbox is being drained to inspect the tube sheet.
Maintenance power supply to the annunciator equipment is tagged out to reroute the cables.
(Panel M-7, A Rack, Breaker 1).
Unit 2 in Mode 5 for a turbine outage.
0800 High vibrati'on annunciator alarms and loose parts T = + 00:00 hrs monitor alarms for reactor coolant pump #3 and vibration is due to part of the impeller breaking off.
ASE or STA sent to auxiliary
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instrument room to investigate.
0805 Central Annunciation power to'the main control room is T = + 00:05 hrs lost.
An Assistant Shift Engineer is sent to investigate.
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0810 The Assistant Shift Engineer reports the T = + 00:10 hrs annunciator inverter output breaker has tripped and will not reset; it appears to be a
problem internal to the breaker. Assistance of Electrical maintenance is requested.
0816 The Shift Engineer should declare an ALERT based T = + 00:16 hrs.
on the annunciators being out for greater than 15 minutes.
0845 The electricians confirm the breaker has internal T = 00:45 hrs damage an will have to be replaced.
A replacement breaker is not available onsite, but one is available at Watts Bar.
Repair time will be approximately 2 - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
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-2-0910 Operators notice the count rate increasing on T = + 01:10 hrs gross failed fuel monitor and letdown monitor 1-RE-90-104.
Increase in the reactor coolant system activity is due to fuel damage from the loose part in the reactor coolant system.
0955 Increasing radiation level indicated on the T = 01:55 hrs condenser air exhaust monitor.
Shift Engineer requests Health Physics to survey the main steam lines in the turbine building and the Chem lab to take samples from the steam generators.
1000 The turbine building Assistant Unit Operator T = + O2:00 hrs reports a large water leak in the vicinity of the steam generator blowdown heat exchanger.
Investigation reveals the blowdown line has broken just down stream of the second stage heat exchanger.
Radioactive water is spilled on to the turbine building floor.
1005 Operators terminate the turbine building leak by T = + O2:05 hrs closing the steam generator blowdown valves.
l However, an undetermined amount of 11guld
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release has taken place via the turbine building drains.
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l 1015 Health Physics inforre the Shift Engineer that
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T = + O2:15 hrs they can't determine which steam generator has
the leak by monitoring the steam lines.
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1030 Reactor coolant pump #3, seal #1, fails
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T = + O2:30 hrs catastrophically. The instrument line to l
PI-62-65 ruptures.
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The auxiliary building Assistant Unit Operator I
notifies the control room he sees water leaking from the area of the seal return filter.
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i radiological release to the environs now occurs via the auxiliary building vent.
Operators start a power reduction in order to remove reactor coolant pump #3 f rom service.
Site Emergency Director should declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on a plant transient in progress with the annunciators out of service.
1100 Unit 1 is offline (hot stand by).
Reactor T = + 03:00 hrs coolant pump #3 secured. Operators isolate leak and terminate the release to the aux building.
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-3-1150 It is determined to cool down the reactor coolant T = + C3:50 hrs system to Mode 5 in order to repair the seal on reactor coolant pump #3.
When the steam dump control switches are placed to " BYPASS INTERLOCK", malfunction occurs in the control circuit which makes the dumps inoperable.
1200 Operators block the steam dump system and start a T = + 04:00 hrs cooldown using the steam generator power operated relief valves.
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Annunciator power is restcced.
Annunciators are back in service.
1218 Chem Lab informs the Shift Engineer that they T = + 04:18 hrs have determined that the #3 steam generator has the leak.
1222 Shift Engineer orders the operators to isolate T = + 04:22 hrs steam generator #3 following procedure.
1225 A massive tube rupture occurs in steam generator T = + 04:25 hrs
- 3.
Pressure and level rise rapidly as the reactor coolant system inventory flows into the steam generator.
The power operated relief valve opens and sticks in that position resulting in a radiological release to the environs.
1226 Safety injection occurs on pressurizer low T = + 04: 26 hrs pressure.
Charging pump flow via the boron injection tank is very low due to blockage by boric acid accumulation at the boric acid
accumulation injection tank discharge.
Safety injection pump 1A-A fails to start (electrical fault).
Safety injection pump 1B-B shows no flow (stuck check valve).
Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump fails to come up to speed due to binding linkage on trip and throttle valve. Auxiliary feedwater pump 1B-B starts and supplies water to steam generator #4.
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-4-1230 Site Emergency Director should declare a GENERAL T = + 04:30 hrs EMERGENCY based on a known loss of coolant accident with failure of emergency core cooling system to perform leading to severe core damage.
1235 1 B-B Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump trips T = + 04:35 hrs (electrical fault).
1245 Attempts to manually isolate the steam generator (
T = + 04:45 hrs power operated relief valve are unsuccessful.
1300 Inadequate core cooling is experienced resulting T = & 05:00 hrs in clad damage and increased radiological releases.
Any attempts to start RCPs fail.
Pressurizer power operated relief valve 68-334 is opened to increase depressurization in an attempt to reduce the release and start RMR injection.
Pressurizer power operated relief valve opens only 25 percent and sticks open. Block valve FCV 68-333 will not close due to a broken wire at the fuse block.
1330 Reactor coolant system pressure is reduced to the T = + 05:30 hrs point at which residual heat removal begins to inject and the core is reflooded. However.
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extensive core damage had occurred due to voiding
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resulting in the release of large amounts of radioactivity.
1400 The pressurizer power operated relief valve block T = + 06:00 hrs valve is repaired and closed.
1545 The pressure within S/G #3 has reduced and the T = + 07:45 hrs power operated relief valve reseats and the release is terminated.
1600 Exercise is terminated.
T = + 08:00 hrs TCB 11-03-86 1482E
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Warrative Summary At 7:45 a.m.-(Central Time), initial exercise conditions are established as follows: Unit 1 is at 100 percent power with a small tube leak (less than Technical Specification limit) in Steam Generator #3.
Auxiliacy Feedwater Pump 1A-A is tagged out for motor bearing repla:e.nent but it is expected that the pump will be restored to operable status within the action statement time requirement. Also, pressurizer PORY Block Valve FCV-68-332 is isolated due to excessive PORV seat leakage. The alternate power supply to the annunciator inverter is tagged out for rerouting of cables.
Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
At 8:00 a.m., the alarm printer indicates high vibration for Reactor Coolant Pump #3.
Increased vibration is the result of impeller breakage.
The debris from the broken impeller also causes fuel damage which leads to increasing RCS activity.
The normal supply breaker for annunciator power trips automatically due to internal breaker defects resulting in the loss of all main control room annunciators. Follow-up investigation indicates that a replacement breaker will have to be obtained from Watts Bar and total out-of-service time for the annunciators will be 2 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
An ALERT is declared within 15 minutes of the determination that MCR annunciator loss will be for greater than 15 minutes.
ALERT declaration is expected to take place between 8:16 and 8:45 a.m.
At 1000 a.m., a rupture in the steam generator blowdown line upstream of 1-FCV-15-43 causes the spill of radioactive water (due to tube leak) onto the turbine building floor. A liquid release to the environs takes place via the turbine building sump to the discharge canal between approximately 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.
At 10:30 a.m., Reactor Coolant Pump #3 experiences a catastrophic failure of its #1 seal. High pressure reactor coolant flows with little
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resistance to the seal water return line of the CVCS system. As the return line is pressurized, Relief Valve 62-636 fails to open to relieve the pressure.
As a result, the instrument line to PI-62-65 (located in the Auxiliary Building) becomes overpressurized and ruptures. This event leads to the release of radioactivity to the environs via the Auxiliary
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Building Emergency Cas Treatment System and the Stack.
A Site Area Emergency is declared at approximately 10:45 a.m. based on a plant transient in progress with the annunciators out of service. After the RCP seal failure event is diagnosed, a rapid reactor shutdown is initiated. At 11:00 a.m.
Unit 1 is taken offline.
RCP #3 is secured.
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Operator actions have also isolated the release pathway from the Reactor l
Coolant system thus terminating the release averages to the environs.
l This release is below minimum detectible limits for the environmental monitoring teams.
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-2-After 11:00 a.m., the tube leak in Steam Generator #3 worsens.
RCS cooldown is initiated. At 12:25 p.m., the tube leak within Steam Generator #3 deteriorates into a massive multiple tube rupture.
Rapid RCS depressurization is experienced as RCS inventory flows into the steam generator.
The power operated relief valve (PORV) for the steam generator opens in response to the pressure increase to relieve steam to the atmosphere. However, the PORV fails to close when pressure falls below its setpoint (i.e., valve fails in the "open" position).
The pathway for radiological release is now established.
As the tube rupture occurs, a safety injection signal is generated.
However, a combination of equipment failures (blockage at the Boron Injection Tank, SI Pump IA-A electrical failure, and SI Pump IB-B check valve (failure) prevents the injection of needed SI flow into the core.
The turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump also does not come up to speed.
Only the motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump starts up to supply water to Steam Generator #4.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared based on a known loss of coolant accident with failure of emergency core cooling system.
With the loss of RCS inventory and reduced heat removal capacity of the steam generators, inadequate core cooling conditions are experienced at 1:00 p.m.
Fuel damage occurs leading to the release of large amounts of radioactivity to the environs.
At 1:30 p.m., RCS pressure has been reduced to the point at which the Residual Heat Removal pumps begin to inject sufficient water for. core cooling. Core cooling is established shortly thereafter. However, the release to the environs conttoues.
At 3:45 p.m., the PORV for Steam Generator #3 reseats and the release is terminated.
1782E TEA:JME 11/12/86
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