IR 05000324/1981020
| ML20032B659 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1981 |
| From: | Garner L, Dante Johnson, Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032B653 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-81-20, 50-325-81-20, NUDOCS 8111050779 | |
| Download: ML20032B659 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION 11
Q 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
%*****o Report Nos. 50-324/81-20 and 50-325/81-20 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street-Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name: Brunswick Docket Nos. 50-324 and 50-325 License Nos. DPR-62 aad DPR-71 Inspection at Brunswick Site near Wilmington, NC
!r6u 98/N Inspectors:
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D. F. Johnson, Senifor Resident Inspector
/ Dat'e Signed C W,
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L. W. Garner, Resident Inspector-
' ' Date Signed Approved by:
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(f/b>/87 C. Julian,(Acting Section Chief, RRPI Div.
' Date Signed SUt1 MARY Inspection on July 15 - August 15, 1981 Areas Inspected This inspection involved 159 resident inspector hours on site in the areas of j
operational safety verification; review of operational events; review of periodic
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reports; followup on licensee event reports; plant tours;' observation of emer-(
gency drill table top sessions; follow-up on previous inspection findings; review I
and audit of on-site safety committee meeting; and independent inspection efforts.
Resul ts l
Of the 9 areas inspected, 3 vwlations were identified.
(Failure to follow procedures, paragraph 9, failure to review temporary changes within Technical i.
Specification time frame, paragraph 13; personnel error resulting in unsampled release, paragraph 11.)
8111050779 811026 PDR ADOCK 05000324 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees A. Bishop Engineering Supervisor G. bishop, Project Engineer
- S. Bohanan, Principal Specialist Regulatory Compliance J. Boone, Project Engineer
- J. Brown, fianager, Operations J. Cook, E & RC Foreman
- C. Dietz, General Manager, Brunswick J. Dinnette, liechanical Maintenance Supervisor B. Furr, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- M. Hill, Maintenance Manager
- ii. Long, Manager, Special Projects
- K.11artin, NPED
- R. Morgan, Plant Operations Manager
- D. Novotny, Regulatory Specialist
- G. Oliver E & RC fianager
- A. Padgett, Assistant to General Manager G. Peeler, Shift Operating Supervisor
. R. Poulk, Regulatory Specialist
- S. Thorndyke, Training Supervisor W. Triplett, Administrative Manager L. Tripp, RC Supervisor
- K. Tucker, Technical and Administrative Manager
- J. Waldorf, NPED Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators and engineering staff personnel.
NRC Personnel
- P. Bemis, Reactor Inspector
- L. Garner, Resident Inspector, Brunswick
- D. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, Brunswick
- C. Julian, Acting Section Chief, Div. of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection
- W. Orders, Resident Inspector, Oconee
- P. Skinner, Reactor Inspector.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 14, 1981, with those persans indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Meetings were also held with
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-y senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope ano findings.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings.
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(Glosed) Inspector follow-up item (325/31i 2-01, 324/81-02-03). The
inspector reviewed Radiation Control and Test Procedure No.4150 " General D
Lead Shielding Criteria" and verified that the licensee has established
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controls to ensure lead shielding is properly hung on piping and supports.
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4.
Reportable Occurrences
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The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) were reviewed to determine
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if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The deter-
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mination included adequacy of event. description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative' safety
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significance of each event. Additiona.'l inplant reviews and discussions with '
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plant personnel, as appropriate, were cunducted for those reports indicated,
4 by an asterisk.
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- u Unit 1 P',,
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Supplement 1-80-57 (3L)
Standby Liquid Contbol (SL'C) Relief Valve 1 C41-F0298
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D did not lift.
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1-81-11 (3L)
Recirculation Sample Intoard Isolstita Valve 1-832-F019, Model T36D-18., leakage.
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Fire Hose Station,1-RB-20, inoperable.
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1-81-55 (3L)
Control Rod 22-0/, no RTGB position indication at notch positions "44", "45" and "48" and no " full out" indit ation on RTGB.
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1-81-56 (3L)
1A RHRSW Pump experienced vibration in excess of normal and-e declared inoperable.
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2-81-55 (3L)
Lockout Relay shorted, tripping No.1 Diesel Generator.
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2-81-59 (IT)
F020-A Valve in shut position with nodeiswitch 'ircqtartd6 'c
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"A" Loop of LPCI inoperable
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- 2-81-60 (3L)
Reactor scram occurred due to failed Main Steam Line Iso-lation Valve (MSIV) on "C" Main Steam Lir.e.
2-81-62 (3L)
Control Rod 14-27 did not have " Full-in" position indication lights lit while fully inserted.
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2-81-63 0Q" Durinf Reactor startup following scram from 9% power,
Reactor Coolant ktivity exceeded Technical Specification limit.
2-81-64 (3L)
Contrb 'Rud 34-19 had continuous " Full-in" RTGB position g
indicationTregardless?of actual rod position.
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MSIV Disk Separation *
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Investigations W'd the: closures 6f MSIVs revealed that MSIV B21-F022C s
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failedfdue?'o separation of the stem-disk from the stem and MSIV B21-F0220 f
failed due to separation offhe main ' disk from the piston. The separations resulted when threaded conne!6tions failed.
Inspections of.the valve com-
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ponents and a reviewafMhe o'perational history of other MSIV failures
reported in previously :;ubmitted LER's indicate the separations resulted (
from an unknown combimtion of poor thread engagement, poor assembly M.
methods, loose clearances,ynd relaxation of the pin and seating surfaces.
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4T Together, they lead to a lois of pt31oad, unthreading, and/or straight
? x separation. However, it is wspected that the s3paration is aggravated by h3 '2~
flow instabilities arising frW the close connection of pipe run elbows to fy j the inlet of the inboard MSih as shown by the predominance in inboard valve failures.
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For either type separation, it was determined that the main disk will drop
, sinto'the body seat as has been found in past MSIV failures. The closing of
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'Nhe main disk will severely reduce main steam line flow through the affected
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c 4~ ' 3 7 steam line, shifting some of the flow to the other lines and creating a
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s yessure increase in. the reactor. This creates a noticeable mismatch between, the flog in the affected steam line, the other steam lines, and the
on the deactbricon, e. to the side-by-side arrangement of these flow indicators feedwater linep.- d i
+b t ol panel and the range of the indicators. The pressure AJ-
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]F g,' C 4Ypd# crpths= a Nadtor pner spike and a reactor level drop due to void Mllh)se. These~ are obvious to the operator and in cases where the reactor J Js'at a substantial pouer level, as in the case of the F022C closure, the reactor scrams. When a separation occurs during the performance of PT's
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s An which cycle the MSIVs, which happened in the case of the F022D failure to
h reopen, the operators are monitoring the steam line flows durino these tests
'!w to verify their satisfactory performance so an abnormal condition is
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promptly detected. The MSIVs on the affected steam line are then closed in accordance with the requirements of technical specifications. Since the main disk and stem disk will seat af ter either type of separation, there will be no flow through the affected valve.
However, seat leakage may increase throug? it because of loss of some of the guidance for seating the main disk 0.
stem-disk.
To date, with the exception of one case, all MSIV failures have been inboard valves, indicating a possible link with flow instabilities from the inlet steam line elbow which exists only on the inner valves.
The one case of an (
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outboatd valve failure is thought to be due to improper pinning from an earlier disassembly.
As a result, a failure is mostly likely.to occur on an s
inboard MSIV and the probability of the failure on an outboard valve is very small.
Since the operation 7r. failure of one MSIV will not affect the other, the outboard MSIV can be counted upon for achieving' full isolation in-the event the inboard valve suffers a disk separation.. The failed valve,
itself would nearly achieve the desired isolation although the leakage may be greater than normal.
The valve vendor perfonned an evaluation to determine if the increased clearance found on some of the valve components affected the ability of the MSIVs to perform as required by the GE specifications and as assummed in the accident analyses.
The evaluation determined that code allowable stresses are not exceeded and the valves will function as required; therefore, they still meet the design requirements.
An evaluation by CP&L and tne-valve vendor of these two failures as well as the other 11SIV failures experienced in the past concludes that an MSIV separation on a steam line can be identified and promptly isolated as i
required by technical specifications and that the MSIVs can be counted on to l
function properly.
In order to return F022C and F0220 to service and ensure their reliable operation, the following actions were or will be taken:
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a.
The stem and stem disk threaded connections were matched to ensure proper alignment.
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The number of stem to stem disk pins was increased from two to three and the pin engagement, length, and diameter increased.
c.
The number of disk to piston pins was increased from one to two and the pin engagement and length were increased.
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Verification and QC checks were added to ensure proper pin engagement, e.
An evaluation of the failed pieces will be perfonned.
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Both valves were local leak rate tested.
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As a result of this event, the remaining MSIVs on Unit No. 2 will be inspected and modified as required during the next refueling outage. The
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Unit No.1 MSIVs are presently being inspected and current plans are to complete any required modifications during the current Unit No.1 outage.
Although it is felt that the changes implemented into the design of the MSIVs will greatly improie their reliability, further investigation into improvements in MSIV design and operation to prevent any future events will continue.
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6.
Overexposure of Worker On July 17, 1981, at approximately 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, a worker received a whole body dose of 4.212 mill f rem when working on the backwash receiver tank resin transfer line. This is a violation of 10 CFR 20, Section 101, in that during any calendar quarter, the total occupation dose to the whole body shall not exceed 3 rems This matter was investigated by Region II radia-tion specialists and the results of this investigation are detailed in I & E 50-324/ 1-16 and 50-325/81-16.
Inspection Report
7.
flain Turbine Bearing Damage
During a turbine startup of Unit 1 on July 10, 1981, the turbine tripped due
to low lubricating oil pressure. The low oil pressure was detennined to be
caused by a check valve not seating in the main oil pump supply system.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the lubricating oil contained foreign
material.
Based on this, the licensee elected to inspect the turbine bearings
for any possible damage.
The licensee has inspected all of the bearings which support the turbine /
generator shaft.
Three turbine bearings and two generator bearings have
exhibited moderate degrees of damage.
Repairs to these components required
refurbishment at a vendor's service shop.
The check valve on the discharge of one of the turbine oil pumps was dis-
covered during the inspection outage to have been improperly assembled at
some earlier time.
Reassembly of the valve internals resulted in a physical
binding of the check valve in an open position when the oil pump was shut
down. This permitted reverse flow through this pump, but lube oil was
provided by other redundant backup oil pumps. This condition does not
appear to have contributed to any of the bearing damage indications observed
thus far, but investigation is continuing.
This valve has been disassembled
and the internal interference removed.
Minor wear was noted on the generator hydrogen seals which will be refur-
bished or replaced prior to resuming system operation. The turbine thrust
bearing also incurred minor wear and required refurbishing. Total inspec-
tion of this component has not been completed at this time.
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Damage to the turbine and generator bearing appears to have resulted from
metal particles in the turbine lubrication system.
Investigation of the
source of these particles is continuing.
Extensive investigative efforts are proceeding in parallel with the turbine /
generator bearing inspections to ensure that no additional damage has
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incurred. A complete flush and cleaning of the lube oil system is 'n
progress.
The resident inspectors are followina the progress of the
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licensee's investigation. The lice'see's scheduled completion date is
September 25, 1981.
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8.
Emergency Planning -
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Coordination with Offsite Agencies
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The inspector verified by discussions with licensee management and
inspection.of applicable records and procedures, that the licensee is
maintaining the contacts and coordination with the offsite support
agencies as described in the facility's emergency plan and procedures.
b.
Facilities, Equipnent and Procedures
The following areas were inspectec:
Emergency control centers identified in the plan are equipped as
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stated in the plan or precedures.and specified equipment is
available and operable.
Emergency communications equipment specified in the plan and
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procedures are available and operable.
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c.
Tests and Drills
The inspector observed the response by the licensee organization during
scheduled drills conducted on the following dates: July 8. July 14,
July 31 and August 10, 1981.
The following items were inspected:
The licensee's organization responded in accordance with approved
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procedures and plans.
The response appeared orderly, timely and coordinated.
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Designated personnel were assigned to evaluate the response of the
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licensee's organization.
Critiques were held shortly following the drills.
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The results of the drills and licensee's self-evaluation were
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documented and reviewed by licensee management.
flo violations were identified.
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9.
Emergency Instruction EI-29 Review
On May 27,1981, EI-29, Plant Shutdown from Outside Control Room, was
reviewed with a reactor operator.
The following was observed.
a.
Copies of EI-29 available at the remote shutdown panel, were revision
7, not revision 8.
The Operations Manager indicated that no one had
the assigned responsibility to place revisions at this location.
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Revision 8 has been placed at the panel and responsibility assigned. 'This
-is a violation (324/81-20-01.)
b.
.Two annunciator plates were missing and been replaced.
c.
Headsets required to be at panel per section 1.1 are kept in' the shift
operating supervisor's desk drawer.
d.
Instruments B21-LI-3330 and B21-TI-3333, which are referenced in EI29,
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are not in service.
Purchase Order Specification No. 9527-01-252-5,
Appendix A, list these as spares. A plant modification No.79-103, has
been issued to connect a transmitter to B21-LI-3330.
e.
HPCI turbine trip indication light, referenced per 4.7.1, does not
exist on panel.
f.
Control rod drive pump A and B start /stop local control switch, is not
labeled.
The licensee has committed i.o correct these itet.s
Items c. through f. are inspector follow-up items (324/81-20-02).
10.
Inadvertent Core Spray Initiations
On July 17, 1981, with Unit 1 in shutdown, DC panel 3A was de-energized
while ground hunting. As a result,
"A" core spray. injected into the vessel
increasing level fro.n 189" to 240 before being menually shutdown.
HPCI also
received an initiation signal and all four diesel generators started.
On July 28, 1981, core spray "A" loop again injected into the vessel while
Unit 1 was shutdown, as a result of de-energizing a different DC circuit
during ground hunting. Vessel level increased from 187 to 210".
All four
diesel generators also started.
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Both incidents involved de-energizing circuits associated with newly
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installed analog equipment. Testing has demons trated that de-energizing or
energizing the control power to the analog circuit, results in a relatively
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slow voltage transient out of the affected power supply.
This voltage
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transient provides sufficient time for the circuit to sense a low current
output from the level transmitters, i.e., a
false low vessel level.
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results in a core spray loop initiation, start of the four diesel generators
and possibility of HPCI, RCIC and RHR LPCI mode initiations depending upon
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activation times of the associated circuit components. The licensee has
discontinued de-energizing these circuits during ground hunting while the
problem is being studied. An outside consultant has been contracted to
provide a solution to prevent recurrence.
This is an inspector followup
item 50-325/81-20-01. Analog equipment will not be installed in Unit 2
until the next refueling outage, i.e., spring of 1982.
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11. Uncontrolled Release of Liquid Waste
On August 6,1981, the "A" flonr drain sample tank (FDST) was recirculated,
sampled and a release form issued to radwaste for the release of FDST A".
The gross activity of tank "A" was 3 x 10 -5 uc/ml. At 1152 hours0.0133 days <br />0.32 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.38336e-4 months <br />, the
radwaste shift foreman m'staker.ly opened the release valve on the "B" FDST.
At 1154 hours0.0134 days <br />0.321 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.39097e-4 months <br /> he realized his error and secured the inadvertent release from
the "B" FDST. Approximately 1.5% (300 gallons) was released from the "B"
FDST. This personnel error resulted in an uncontrolled t elease of radio-
active liquid waste.
The release from the "B" FDST was monitored and
recorded by the installed liquid effluent continuous monitor. The "B"
FDST
was recirculated and sampled with the following results.
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Gross Activity,1.6 x 10-5 uc/ml (before dillution)
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Gross Activity, 8.25 x10-9 uc/ml (after dillution)
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Primary Nuclides present were Cr
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and La
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Activities of the above nuclides were all below 10 CFR 20 MPC
The release of the "B" FDST without prior sampling for gross activity is a
violation of Technical Specifications, Appendix B, Section 3.5.1.b.
(50-325/81-20-02 and 50-324/81-20-03).
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Review of Periodic Reports
The inspector reviewed the following licensee Report
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Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units flos.1 and 2, Monthly Operations
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Report for June,1981.
The inspector verified that the information reported by the licensee is
technically adequate and satisfied applicable reporting requirements estab-
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lished in 10 CFil 50, and Technical Specifications.
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The inspector had no further questions in this area.
No violations were
identified.
13. Onsite Review Committees
The inspectors attended the regular monthly Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
(PNSC) fleeting and several special PNSC meetings conducted during the period
of July 15 through lagust 15, 1981.
The inspectors verified the following items:
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tieetings were conducted in accordance with Technical Specification
requirements regarding quorum membership, review process, frequency and
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personnel qualifications;
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Meeting minutes were reviewed to confirm that decisions / recommendations
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were reflected and follow-up of corrective actions were completed.
Review of PNSC minutes81-196, indicates that Temporary Revision, dated
6-20-81 to PT-A3, Revision 0, took over 14 days for PNSC review. The review
occurred on July 6, 1981.
PNSC minutes81-201, dated July 16, 1981, documented approval of Revision 14
to OP-50.1. A temporary change requesting a permanent revision had been
issued on June 29, 1981.
Technical Specifications 6.8.3 requires review by PNSC within 14 days.
Failure to review temporary revisions within 14 days is a violation.
(50-325/81-20-03 and 50-324/81-20-04).
14. Plant Transients
During the period of this report, a follow-up on plant transients was
conducted to detemine the cause; ensure that safety systems and componenets
functioned as required; corrective actions were adequate; and the plant was
maintained in a safe condition,
a.
On July 11, 1981, while Unit 2 was at 55% power, a moisture separator
level high alarm was received. This was imediately followed by a
turbine trip and reactor scram due to the load reject.
Investigation
revealed a malfunctioning switch in the drain line from the moisture
separator had caused improper drainage from the separator.
The inspector had no further questions relative to this event.
b.
On August 4,1981, Unit 2 experienced a reactor scram and a rapid
depressurization from 1040 to 325 psig.
The major sequence of events
is as follows:
1930 Auxiliary operator opens valve 2-CW-V9 instead of 1-CW-V9.
Low condenser vacuum alam is received.
Recirculation pumps are
manually run back to approximately 28% speed lowering reactor
power from 94% to approximately 53%.
1934 Steam air ejectors "A" and "B"
trip.
"B" returned to service.
"A" first stage steam valve will not open.
1942 Begin driving control rods in to lower power.
1947 Turbine trips on low condenser vacuum.
Reactor scrams on load
reject.
1948 Receive Group I Isolation.
1951 Reset Group I isolation.
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2005 Reactor pressure 1020 psig and increasing.
2009 B21-F013B, safety releif valve, manually opened at 1040 psig.
Fails to close at 900 psig in response to manual close signal.
2012 Low service water suction pressure prevents starting 2A loop RHR
service water pumps.
2016 Reactor pressure 450 psig. HPCI and RCIC receive initiation
signal. Operator manually opens E41-F006, HPCI injection valve.
2020 B21-F013B closes at approximately 325 psig.
Water level was recovered and the reactor pressure was controlled using a
bypass valve and the main condenser. The safety relief valve was repaired
in accordance with commitments made in response to I & E Bulletin 80-25.
fianual opening of E-41-F006 was deemed as unnecessary. The operator
apparently became anxious and opened the valve before the nomal delay was
completed. This incident is being reviewed by inspectors from Region II
and their results will be documented in Inspection Report 81-19.
The event was witnessed by the resident inspector.
Further investigation of the July 2,1981 scram has revealed that. the
reactor scram was due to APR!! High Flux trip and not reactor low water level, as
reported in I&E.
Inspection Report 324/81-14.
15.
Review of Plant Operations
a.
The inspector reviewed plant operations through direct inspections and
observations throughout the reporting period.
The following areas were
inspected.
(1) Control Room
(2) Service Building
(3) Reactor Buildings
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(4) Diesel Generator Rooms
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Control Points
Site Perimeter
b.
The following determinations were made:
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lionitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected
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instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within
Technical Specification limits.
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Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were
in the position or condition required by Technical Sepcifications
for the applicable plant mode. This verification was control
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board indicatio, _.
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Radiation Controls. The inspector verified by observation that
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control point procedures and posting requirements were being
followed. The in:pector identified no failure to properly post
radiation and high radiation -areas.
Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to plant
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housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory conditions.
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Fluid leaks. No fluid leaks were' observed which had not been
identified by station personnel and for which corrective action
had not been initiated, as necessary.
Control room annunciators.
Selected lit annunciators were
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discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons
for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was
being taken.
By observation during the inspection period, the inspectue
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verified the control room manning requirements of 10_ CFR 50.54(k)
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and the Technical Specifications were being met.
In addition, the
inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of
system status was maintained. The inspector periodically
questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant
conditions.
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Technical Specifications. Through log review and dv.ct obser-
vation during tours, the inspector verified compliance with
selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for
Operation.
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Security. During the course these inspections,- observations
relative to protected and vital ~ area security were made, including
access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging.
No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
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No violations were identified in the area.
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