IR 05000324/1981028
| ML20039B744 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1981 |
| From: | Hosey C, Wray J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039B707 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-81-28, 50-325-81-28, NUDOCS 8112230510 | |
| Download: ML20039B744 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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REGION 11
o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 l
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Report Nos. 50-325/81-28 and 50-324/81-28 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name: ' Brunswick 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Inspection at Brunswick site near Southport, North Carolina Inspector: '
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s-R. Wray
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Approved by:
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C. M. Hossy, Actingj Section Chief Oste Signed j
Technical Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division SUMMARY Inspection on September 21-25, 1981
Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup actions to the Health Physics Appraisal, radioactive waste management and gaseous radioactivity releases.
Results In the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in two areas, two violations were identified in the other area (inadequate procedure and failure to appropriately review and approve a temporary change to a proce-dure).
8112230510 811210 PDR ADOCK 05000 G
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. R. Dietz, General Manager R. E. Morgan, Plant Operations Manager
- G. J. Oliver, Environmental and Radiation Control Manager R. Mayton, Corporate Health Physicist
- R. F. Queener, Projact Specialist, Radiation Control
- L. F. Tripp, Radiation Control Supervisor R. D. Pasteur, Environmental.ca Chemistry Supervisor
- C. F. Blackman, Shif t Operatiag St aervisor, Radwaste
- F. R. Coleman, Director QA/QL J. L. Kiser, ALARA Specialist
- C. S. Bohanon, Regulatory Specialist R. M. Poulk, Regulatory Specialist
- Attended c interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 25, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The General Manager acknowledged the violations and committed to strengthening this area.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (80-45-22):
Failure to. conduct adequate airborne radioactivity surveys. The irspector reviewed the location or air samples taken at the respirator cleaning area and the small tool decontamination area and concluded that they appear to be representative of worker breathing zone. A licensee representative stated that a supply of lapel air samplers have ' arrived and evaluations for their potential future use wili be conducted.
The inspector reviewed air sample records and noted increased use of high volume air samples for breathing ;one requirements.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Violation (80-45-23): Failure to follow procedures for contamina-tion control. The inspector reviewed records of increased surveys in the clean areas and buildings of the plant and outside the protectt d area and had no comments.
The inspector conducted an independent raviation and contamination survey of the ciean areas around the plant and uncovered no article greater than plant limits. The inspector observed the new clean laundry monitoring station which ensures that all protective clothing issued for use is less than the appropriate procedural limi.
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Unresolved-Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Action on Previcus Inspector Follow-up Items
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(Closed) (80-45-01): Reporting level of the RPM function. Although the RPM organizationally reports to the plant operations manager, a direct line of
communication to the ' General Manager, when necessary, is evident.
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most' technical managers report to the-plant operations manager, the
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inspector concluded that this position functions similar to an assistant t-plant manager and had no further questions.
(Closed) (80-45-02): Equitable distribution of qualified senior technicians
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according to functional areas. The inspector reviewed the radiation control organization's manpower resources and concluded that tne distribution of qualified technicians in the various functional areas - appeared to be adequate to support normal operations.
(Closed) (80-45-03): Radiation control first line supervisory to worker ratio. The inspector reviewed the radiation control organization and noted
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that an increase in plant technician hiring has resulted in'more qualified technicians for on-the-job coverage, more supervisory level individuals at-the foreman-positions, and less contract health physics technicians onsite.
- The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) (80-45-19): Establishment of a quantitative respirator fit system.
The inspector reviewed a work authorization form authorizing the purchase of l
a quantitative respirat.ar fit booth. The. equipment is scheduled to arrive.
onsite in October. The inspector had no further comments or questions at.
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j this time.
(Closed) (80-45-25):
Control of contamination at the Radwaste Buildi.ig dock. The inspector verified that the portable demineralization system was removed from the area just inside the Radwaste Building at the loading dock.
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Since the major soucce of activity for potential spills at the loading dock area has been removed, the inspector stated that this item is closed.
I (Closed) (80-45-26):
Maintaining filter systems -in optimum working condition. The inspector reviewed records and verified that differential pressure, flow rate, ambient temperature, temperature alarms, and humidity are being monitored routinely by auxiliary operators. During tours of the
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reactor buildings, the inspector observed that these parameters for each standby gas treatment unit were within acceptable tolerance.
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(Closed) (8C-45-27):
Ensuring proper face velocity across chemistry
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laboratory hoods. The inspector observed position marks for chem lab and i
remote sample sink hoods used to ensure -that the hoods ~are at a position which will result in the proper face exhaust velocity and verified that~all hoods are properly positioned. The inspector had no further questions.
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(Closed) (80-45-29):
Mixing of seawater inleakage with contaminated systems. The General Manager stated that sump pumps have been instal. led to reduce the potential for seawater. inleakage to the radwaste system. The inspector noted from records that no significant-inleakage has occurred even during a severe storm which hit.the Southport area recently. The redesigned
.radwaste system scheduled for completion in 1983 should provide a final
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solution. The inspector had no further questions.
6.
Radioactive Waste Management a.
The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the. contamination of five workers on August 9, 1981, with spent resin. sludge.
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licensee was attempting to transfer the sludge from the waste collector tank to the unit 2 phase separator.
A special mechanical jumper procedure (OG-8 C-81-13) was established to perform the activity. The procedure called for a heavy 3 inch rubber hose to be connected to the waste condensate pump suction strainer and a sandpiper pump which discharged through another 3 inch hose to the condensate sludge pump suction strainer on the unit.2 condensate phase separator. An operator was required to be positioned near the sandpiper when in use to monitor
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for leakage and judge pump performance. The procedure called for water to be added to the waste collector tank as necessary to continue sludge flow.
Seven workers were in the general area on the south end of the minus 3 level of the Radwaste Building when the transfer began.
'A licensee.
representative stated that almost.instantly after_ the sandpiper. pump was started, the discharge hose burst.
Four workers were in the immediate vicinity of the pump. Three others, including a radiation control technician, were outside-the high radiation area rope approxi-mately five feet away.. Five of these ' individuals were sprayed with'the.
spent resin sludge, the maximum contamination was ' initially 50,000
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counts per minute (cpm) from a RM-14/HP-210 frisker on a worker's-head and shoulders and 5,000 - 10,000 cpm on his face and. head.
After three showers and spot decontamination these levels decreased to less than 200 cpm above background exceot for the area around the worker's left ear which read - approximately 8,000 cpm.
An. offsite medical physician was called in to assist in further decontamination since the sludge was acidic.
The physician flushed a resin bead from the worker's left ear canal after which radiation levels decreased to less than 200 cpm above background.
The sandpiper pump was disconnected and.the release of resin was terminated in less than one minute. All decontamination activities were completed within four -hours.
The inspector reviewed exposure calculations performed by the licensee based on contamination levels, time duration of contamination and conversion factors of dose rate per contamination level obtained from a publication from Los Alamos
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Naticnal Laboratory. The total skin dose commitment appears to be less
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than 10 mrem. Whole body counts and nasal _ smears were taken immedi-ately of all affected workers.
Results of these analyses -indicated that no internal exposure limits were exceeded. A maximum external exposure as determined by self-reading pocket and thermoluminescent dosineters was less than 80 mrem. The inspector acknowledged that the fast and apparently efficient actions by responsible health -physics personr.el were instrumental in not allowing the situation to become worse than it had.
The inspector interviewed radwaste operations personnel. A licensee representative stated that at the time of the accident, the unit 2 phase separator valve, to which the sandpiper pump was discharging, was
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plugged.. A simple test from the radwaste control room ~could have verified this fact. In any event, procedure OG-8 C-81-13 should not have required rubber hose for the transfer of radi_oactive spent resin without some form of pressure relief as the sandpiper pump is~a
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positive displacement pump. The procedure also did not require flow verification prior to transferring resin. The procedure-was reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) and approved in accordance with plant Technical Specifications. The procedure was not reviewed by-an ALARA specialist nor a QA representative.
Technical Specification 6.8.1. requires _that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities and procedures recommended in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, November _-
197;.
Appendix _A to the guide lists procedures for control of-radioactivity in. liquid _radwaste systems. The inspector stated that procedure OG-8 C-81-13 was inadequate because it did not contain sufficient precautions, prerequisites, directions, and acceptance criteria to control a transfer of spent resin sludge without a release of radioactivity and subsequent contamination of personnel. This'is a violation (81-28-01).
b.
The inspector reviewed other procedures and temporary changes of procedures in the OG-8, " Guidelines for Preparation of Mechanical-Jumper Procedure" series. On June 26, 1981, procedure OG-8 C-81-9,
" Low Quality Liquid Waste -Processing" was approved by PNSC.
On-July 27,1981, a temporary change to OG-8 C-81-9 was written to install blank flanges on the resin transfer line to ensure' isolation from the affected condensate system. The temporary change was not reviewed by the PNSC nor approved by the General Manager as of' September 25, 1981.
A licensee representative stated that the flange was in place ~at.least through August.
Technical Specification 6.8.3 -requires temporary changes to procedures be reviewed by PNSC and approved by the General Manager within-14 days of implementation. -The inspector stated tha't this is a violation (81-28-02).
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The inspector discussed methods.of radwaste reduction with cognizant
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licensee representatives. The licensee has installed an inclined plate separator for processing sludges and is expected to have a. reverse osmosis (RO) ~ unit operable shortly. Their 50 gpm concentrator which is.
now in repair is expected back in service by February 1982.
The
. reduced inleakage of seawater to.the radwaste system due to the use of
. sump pumps, the operability of the inclined plate separator and. the i,
potential benefits expected in processing capability from the R0 unit permitted the licensee to remove its portable demineralization processing system which provided approximatley 25% of the solid radwaste shipped last year. Sorting of' trash and use of a new comactor.
with compaction ratios of four to six times previously obtainable have reduced the dry solid radwaste collected. A licensee representative stated that an average of 21,000. cubic feet per month (CF/M) was shipped last year. The above mentioned efforts have resulted in a 60%
reduction in solid waste shipped in July and August. The inspector had no further questions.
7.
Radioactive Waste Shipments
a.
The inspector reviewed the shipping documents for radwaste shipment 81-545, two hundred cubic feet of dewatered powdex resin in a Type B
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j 14-195H cask. The shipment contained 58.5 curies of transport groups III and IV isotopes. Radiation and contamination surveys indicated no values. greater than NRC or DOT limits. The inspector had-no further questions.
b.
The inspector, accompanied by licensee representatives, opened 12 containers of compacted trash packaged and ready for shipment to Barnwell, SC for burial. No free. standing liquid was evident.
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radiological problems were encountered.
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The licensee utilizes an offsite contractor to ' launder protective c.
clothing. During prior inspections, clean protective clothing above i
plant radiation and contamination levels has been. identified in unrestricted areas. As a result, the licensee surveys all laundered
protective clothing to ensure no limit is exceeded prior to issuance
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for use.
The monitoring system utilizes sodium iodide detectors and a conveyor belt to ensure reproducible geometry.
The inspector had no further questions on protective clothing monitoring
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for radiation and contamination.
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8.
Gaseous Effluents On June 17, 1981, the stack radiation monitor alarmed indicating 'an unusually high gaseous release rate. The inspector reviewed ~the circum-stances surrounding the event. The cause of the spiked increase in release-rate appears to have been an increase in power level from approximately 80%
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to 967. during the time in question. At no time were instantaneous Technical Specification release limits exceeded. The inspector was infor led that the stack alarm setpoint was requested to be changed when unit 2 began startup as permitted by Technical Specifications. The setpoint was not changed resulting in an alarm when the power level was increased. However, calcula-tions based on air ejector samples did not substantiate the release rate indicated by the stack monitor. Subsequent investigation revealed that the stack flow rate meter was not calibrated properly.
The licensee has repaired the flow rate meter and reset the stack alarm setpoint.
No Technical Specification release limit was exceeded.
The inspector had no further questions.
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