IR 05000324/1981027

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IE Insp Repts 50-324/81-27 & 50-325/81-27 on 810915-1015.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Review of Operational Events & Surveillance Activities
ML20033D177
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  
Issue date: 10/30/1981
From: Garner L, Dante Johnson, Julian C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20033D174 List:
References
50-324-81-27, 50-325-81-27, NUDOCS 8112070335
Download: ML20033D177 (11)
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

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REGION 11

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101 WARIETrA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 r

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Weport Nos. 50-324/81-27 and 50-325/81-27 Liceews:

Carolina Power and Light Ca;any 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Facility Name: Brunn. ick Docket Nos. 50-324 and 50-325 License Nos. DPR-C2 and DPR-71 Inspection at Brunswick site near WJimington, N. C.

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Inspecto -

W D. F. Johnson, Senior ResJdert 1nspector Date Signed Inspector:

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L. W. Garner, Resident Inspector Dhte Signed Approved by:

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C. Julian',/ Acting Section Chief, Division of Dtte Sitned

~ Res1.1 ant and Reactor Projects Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on September 15 - October 15, 1981 Areas Inspected This inspection _ involved 166 inspector-hours or site in the areas of operational safety verification; review of operational events; followup on licensee event-

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reports; plant' tours; followup on previous' inspection findings; surveillance activities; spent fuel shipping. activities; and independent inspection efforts.

Results Of the 8 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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8112070335 ei1030S PDRADOCK05000g n

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DETAILS l

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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees A. Bishop, Engineering Supervisor

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G. Bishop, Project Engineer

  • S. Bohanan, Principal Specialist Regulatory Compliance

L J. Boone, Project Engineer-J. Cook, E & RC Foreman C. Dietz, General Manager, Brunswick J. Dinnette, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

- E. Enzor, I & C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor M. Hill, Maintenance Manager R. Knoble, Management of Operations Subunit M. Long, Manager, Special Projects

  • R. Morgan, Plant Operations Manager
  • D. Novotny, Regulatory Specialist-G. 011ver E & RC Manager

A. Padgett, Assistant to General Manager I-G. Peeler, Shift Operating Supervisor I

R. Poulk, Regulatory Specialist

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W. Triplett, Administrative Manager L. Tripp,' RC Supervisor.

W. Tucker, Technical and Administrative Manager l{

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators and engineering staff personnel.

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NRC Resident Inspector

  • L. W.' Garner

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  • Attended exit interview.

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Exit' Interview f

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The inspection scope. and. findings' were: summarized on October 9,1981,- with

those persons indicated.in paragraph 1.above.. Meetings. were also: held with -

fsenior facility management periodically during the course _ of this; inspection

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to ' discuss the ; inspection scope.and. findings.

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- 3.. iLicensee Action'on' Previous ' Inspection' Findings

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(CLOSED) L ' Violation,(324/81-14-04). - As' a result of an ; operator error, a limiting, cordition for' operation was exceeded.jAppropri. ate disciplinary -

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, action was taken byEtheilicensee with the individuals! involved in the event.

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A review of this event was conducted for all cognizant personnel to prevent recurrence. GP-1 (plant startup procedure), was revised to include more definitive startup prerequisites to preclude recurrence of this event.

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Reportable Occurrences The below listed licensee Event Reports (LER's) were reviewed to determine if the inforeation provided met NRC reporting requirements.

The determi-nation included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional in-plant reviews and discussions with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk. LER's-indicated with a double asterisk, remain open for one or more of the following reasons.

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A supplemental report is required.

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Items of work committed to for preventing recurrence, have not been completed, c.

A Plant Modification is required.

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Equipment requires qualification per IEB 79-01B.

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A Technical Specification change is required.

Unit I

  • 1-79-74 (3)

Resin Injection / Reactor scram.

  • 1-81-28 (3L) Reactor Instrumentation Valve, X68C, declared in-operable.
  • 1-81-39 (3L) No.1 Diesel Generator failed to synchronize and declared inoperable 1-81-57 (3L) High Chloride concentration Water in.the RWCU System return the' reactor.
    • 1-79-97 (3L) Diesel Generator Local Manual Operation.
    • 1-80-59 (IT) Peaking. Factor error.
    • 1-80-61 (IT) CRD Piping Support testing.
    • 1-81-14 (3L) Suppression Pool-Level exceeded specification.

-**k-81-34 (IT) HPCI Pipe Supports damage.

    • 1-81-45--(3L) MSIV Stem-Disc separation.

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Unit 2

  • 2-80-44 (3L) SRfl Position Indications incorrect.
  • 2-80-46 (IT)

Field Splices, per IEB-79-01B, not environmentally qualified.

  • 2-80-47 (IT) Non-qualified Splices on SRV.
  • 2-80-51 (3L)

Radiation lionitor, 2-CAC-AT-1264, declared inoperable.

  • 2-80-54 (3L)

Failure Turbine Control Valve Relay.

  • 2-80-67 (3L)

Failure RCIC Injection Valve.

  • 2-80-69 (3L)

Failure RCIC Flow Indication.

& Supplement

& Supplement insufficient Nitrogen.

  • 2-80-82 (3L) Coolant activity exceeded Technical. Specification limit.

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  • 2-80-94 (3L) Primarj Containment Atmospheric Monitor, 2-CAC-ATH-1263,

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incorrect indications

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inoperable.

  • 2-80-99 (3L) Priiaary Containment Atmospheric fionitor.

2-CAC-AT-1263, l

erratic indication l

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-tripped.

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  • 2-80-105(3L)

"A" TIP Ball Valve, declared-inoperable.

  • 2-80-109 (3L)

Primary Containment Atmospheric Monitor, 2-CAC-AT-1259.

tripped.

  • 2-80_-110_ (3L) Control _ Room Habitability requirements not adherred to.

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  • 2-80-113 ;(3L) CAC Isolation Valve 2-CAC-V48, declared inoperable.
  • 2-80-116 (3L) ADS Pressure Switch, 2-E11-PS-N010A, out of calibration.

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Hydrogen Analyzer Transmitter no output signal.

  • 2-81-02 (3L)

Vacuum Breaker X-18A, Position Limit Switches problem.

  • 2-81-03 (3L) Suppression Pool Level exceeded specifications.
  • 2-81-04 (3L)

IRM failures.

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  • 2-81-09 (4T) Liquid Radwaste Flowrate exceeded maximum.
  • 2-81-11 (3L) Supression Pool Level exceeded specifications.
  • 2-81-13 (3L) HPCI Suction Valve, F004, Motor Failed.

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  • 2-81-15 (3L)

Reactor Low Level Switch, 2-821-LIS-N031D-3, inaccurate calibration.

j 2-CAC-ATH-1263-2, Tubing deteriorated.

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2-CAC-ATH-1259-2, low ' indication J

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  • 2-81-32 (3L) No. 3 Diesel Generator, declared inoperable.

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  • 2-81-56 (IT) CRD Pipe Support-failed Seismic -Analysis.

2-81-73 (3L)

Indication for RCIC System Steam Line. area ambient temperature Switch 2-E51-TS-N603A,' Model;No. 86PTGF, failed downscale.

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L 2-81-80 (3L) Trimary. Containment Atmospheric 0xygen Analyzer,'.

p 2-CAC-AT-1259-2, incperable.

    • 2-80-68' (3L)

Inoperable' HPCI Control Valve 2E41-V9.

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    • 2-80-73 (3L) Primary Containment Atmospheric 0xygen Analyzer 2-CAC-ATH-1259-2, low sample flow problem.
    • 2-80-84 (3L)

Inoperable CAD Tank Valves, 2-CAC-FCV-2717 and 2720.

    • 2-80-90 (3L)

Inoperable Control Rod 34-23.

    • 2-80-97 (3L) Suppression Pool Level exceeded maximum.
    • 2-80-114 (3L)

Reactor Low Water Level Switch, 2B21-LIS-N0310-3, out of calibration.

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    • 2-80-121 (3L) Reactor Water Level Transmitter, 2-B21-LT-N026A, out of calibration.
    • 2-81-06 (3L)

MSIV F028C Stem-Disc Separation.

    • 2-81-22 (3L) CAC Suppression Pool Level Indicator, 2-CAC-LI-2601-3, erratic indication of level.
    • 2-81-47 (3L) Torus Oxygen Concentration exceeded limit.
    • 2-81-69 (3L) No. 4 Diesel Generator failed to load.
    • 2-81-82 (3L) Suppression Pool Level exceeded specifications due failed open HPCI System flinimum Flow Valve, 2-E41-F012.'

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.y 5.

. Transportation of Irradiated Fuel

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On October 2,1981, the: licensee (General Electric) shipped eight irradiated fuel rods taken from a. fuel bundle in the spent storage rack at the Carolina Poer and Light Brunswick. facility. -The fuel rods will undergo destructive

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. testing and examination 'at a test. facility..

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The inspector verified the following by inspection of the transport vehicle

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-and discussions held with 1icensee personnel ~ and the. driver and escort of

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the vehicle.

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i In addition to the driver, the shipment was accompained by an escort in

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the transportation vehicle;

The transport vehicle was equipped with immobilization features;

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The transport vehicle was equipped with required communication

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equipment, and the driver and escort received instructions that status j

calls be made as required -(every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />);

i The licensee notified NRC in advance of the shipment;.

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The planned routes avoid -heavily. populated areas;-

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At least one escort will maintain surveillance over the_ transport

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vehicle at all stops'.

The shipment is scheduled. without unnecessary..

intermediate stops..

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The. inspector had no further questions in this area.

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Survey of land Fill Area -

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l A radiation survey was performed to ascertain if any radioactive: material:

was presentL in the subject.. land fill area after extensive decontamination.

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. as completed. including-the removal and relocation of. large piles.'of ear thi ?

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l The inspector witnessed the survey and reviewed the preliminary data which -

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indicated background radiation ' levels throughout the entire 7 area, i

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The 1icensee is' preparing a -detailed _ report on the above findings. whichLwill l

. include ~ specific levels -of radiation. detected, zoned areas'.of the;sur.vey, etc.

This. report will, be submitted to the NRCLfor further evaluation. -

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.The inspector'had'.no further questions in thisfarea at this time.;

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7. -. QA~ Final Document Review

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,0n April 113,1981,) PT.19.6.1, Safety-Related' Snubber Functional Testing,' was

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completed' iUnit~ 2. ;0n : June 13,1981, _after. approximately one-week;of(

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review, which identified documentation problems on 9 snubbers, QA personnel sent a request for additional information to maintenance.

On September 14, maintenance indicated that the request records on 4 of these could not be found.

Non-conformation Report R-81-003, was issued that day. Drywell snubbers 2E11-90SS277 nd 2PS-3722A were identified as having no documen-tation of the rebuilt test results.

The Regulatory Compliance group received the report on September 16, and informed operations of the problem.

An LC0 requiring the unit to be in hot shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, was initiated. On September 17, sufficient documentation was located to provide a high degree of confidence that these 4 snubbers were, in fact, opertional, and the LC0 was cancelled.

Licensee review of the origination and resolution of Non-conformance Report R-81-003, revealed several weaknesses.

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Final documents, e.g., completed trouble tickets, periodic tests, tend to be held awaiting supervisory review till the end of an outage. This sometimes results in QA not receiving the documents for review until several months have elapsed.

b.

QA personnel used three piece memorandum forms to request additional information, if such was required, to determine whether or not a non-conformance actually existed.

No response time or formal tracing of these forms were established.

Recent changes to the QA procedure QCP 101, have established a new form and a log book to track them.

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Personnel occasionally allow mitigating circumstances to downgrade the significance of available documentation which indicates that equipment cddressed in Technical Specifications may not be capable of performing its design function if final test data is missing.

The licensee is evaluating remedies to the above-mentioned items.

This is an Inspector Followup Item 324,325/81-27-01.

A related event is Inspector Fallowup Item 324, 325/79-08-01.

Followup of this item will be incorporated into 81-27-01.

Item 324, 325/79-08-01 is closed.

8.

Flooding in RHR and HPCI Rooms

On October 7, 1981, Unit 2 experienced a spill of an estimated 32,000 gallons of brackish service water into the RHR and HPCI rooms. At 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />, annunciator 'HPCI Logic Power Failure' was received. At this time, an auxiliary operator in the reactor building reported to the control room that a temporry jumper on the 2A RHR service water pump motor cooler return line had blown off. The motor was subsequently stopped, thereby eecuring the leak. The break occurred on the 50' elevation and water flowed down onto the 20' level -and finally onto'the -17' level which contains the ECCS

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equipment rooms. fleasurements indicated the presence of 2" in the south RHR room, 8" in the HPCI room and 6" in the north RHR room. All equipment important to safety is located at least 12" above the floor. The water level-did not raise high enough to initiate the flooding alarms.

However, the water running down from above did cause several grounds in the HPCI

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control circuits.

HPCI was isolated by the control operator at 0615 hour0.00712 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.340075e-4 months <br />s-because of the alarms being received.

All other ECCS systems remained

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operational. The _ spilled water is being transferred to the radwaste tunnel

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where it will be diluted prior to processing through radwaste.

Preliminary investigation. indicates that a shift foreman's clearance _was removed from a valve,.thereby allowing the 2C RBCCW heat exchanger to be

placed in service.

The pressurization of the heat exchanger inlet water box by the service water system caused a back pressure of.approximately 5 to 10 psig.

This resulted in the ils inch temporary flexible hose sliding off the:

end of-the pipe. The hose had been secured in place by radiator type hose

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cl amps'.

The temporary jumper was installed as part of plant modification 79-232M.

The associated safety analysis had addressed the integrity of the flexible

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hose. The modification package specifies that the 'C' heat exchanger not be placed in service while the temporary piping is. installed and that clearance be placed on critical valves. When the. shift foreman accepted the clear--

ance, he failed to make note in the clearance comment section that this was

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associated with a plant modification. Later, another shift foreman" lifted

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the clearance.

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The licensee has _ connitted to expedite completion of the modification.

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Anticipate completion is December 1,1981. The modification was finished on

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Unit 1 earlier without incident. The. licensee is evaluating control of -

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clearances, and use-of temporary flexible. hoses to preclude reoccurrence.

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l This is an Inspector Followup Item 324/81-27-02.-

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Review of Plant: Operations-

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The inspector reviewed _ plant operations _through direct inspections and i :

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inspected.

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The' following. areas _ were )

observations thraughout the reporting' period.

f f2) Service' Building 1); Control-Room-

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Reactor Buildings-(4)- Diesel. Generator. Rooms (5)

Control. Points.

-(6) Site Perimeter

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Turbine. Building

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The following determinations were made.

Monitoring instrumentation. The inspector verified that selected

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instruments were functional and demostrated parameters within Technical Specification limits.

Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were

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in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mode. This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve position (Safe-guards Systems).

Radiation Controls. The inspector verified by observation that

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control point procedures and posting requirements were being followed. The inspector identified no failure to properly post radiation and high radiation areas.

Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations relative to plant

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housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory conditions.

Fluid leaks. No fluid leaks were observed which had not been

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identified by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessary.

Piping vibration.

No excessive piping vibrations were observed

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and no adverse conditions were noted.

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Control roan annunciators.

Selected lit annunciators were discussed with c.ontrol room operators to verify that the reason for them~were understood and corrective action, if required, was being -taken.

By frequent observation through-out the inspection period,- the

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inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and the Technical Specifications were being met.

In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. ~ The inspector peri-odically questioned'. shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.

Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct obser-

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vations during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Opera tion.

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Security. During the course of these inspections, observations

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relative to protected and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging.

No notable conditions were identified.

No violations were identified in these areas.

10. Plant Transients Following the outage for repair of the turbine bearings, Unit 1 was returned to power on September 22, 1981. On September 24, 1981, with reactor power at 15%, a faulty moisture separator trip switch initiated a turbine trip but no reactor scram occurred, however, tripping of the turbine also caused all four diesels to start. The unit operator noticed that D. G. No. 4 took approximately 25 seconds to start.

Investigation could determine no specific cause. However, a subsequent starting problem with this same diesel has occurred. Trouble shooting indicates that the long startir; times may have resulted from a broken lead in the starting circuit. This is to be reveiwed as part of the LER 2-81-73 review.

On October 1,1981, at 1522 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.79121e-4 months <br />, Unit I reactor scrammed from 82% power.

Investigation revealed that a power load imbalance had initiated a turbine trip and fast closure of the turbine control valves had resulted in the reactor trip.

Probable cause was momentary power reduction on the grid.

It is believed that the Unit 1 turbine protective circuitry was n' ore sensitive than normal to power fluctuations because a jumper had been ir; stalled in the circuitry to bypass a malfunctioning pressure sensor. A General Electric approved modification was made to the circuit to closer approximate normal operation. The replacement part is expected to be on site in mid-October.

The unit returned to service October 3.

The inspector had no further questions.

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