IR 05000324/1981024
| ML20033D295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1981 |
| From: | Garner L, Dante Johnson, Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033D278 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-81-24, 50-325-81-24, NUDOCS 8112070503 | |
| Download: ML20033D295 (12) | |
Text
.
..
..
/
'o, UNITED STATES E
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,
o
m REGION 11
o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
i l
l t
j Report Nos. 50-324/81-24 and 50-325/81-24 Licensee: Carolina Power.<.d Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, N. C. 27602 Facility Name: Brunswick Docket Nos. 50-324 and 50-325 License Nos. DPR-62 and DPR-71 i
l Inspection at Brunswick site near Wilmington, N. C.
Inspectors:
N/'7/F1 D. F. Johnson, Senior Resident inspector Date Signed hb ie/c/s'I l
m j
L. W. Garner, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
CS -
/MS/f/
C. Julian/ Acting, Section ChirI, Division of Bate Signed l
Resider i and Reactor Project h.spection l
SulV1ARY Inspection on August 15 - September 15, 1981 l
Areas Insp r ed l
This inspection involved 170 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas o.f
'
operational safety verfication; review of operational events; review of perit;iic reports; followup on licensee event reports; plant ours; participation in emergency drill; followup or previous inspution findings; review and audit of onsite safety committee meetings; and independent inspection efforts.
Rasults l
Of the 9 areas inspected, one vic:ation sas identified.
(Failure to adhere to a Technical Specification limiting condition for operation and its associated action statements, paragraph 5.)
.
81120*/0503 811112 tDR AD3CK 05000324
G PDR
...
..
DETAILS-1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees A. Bishop, Engineering Supervisor G. Bishop, Project Engineer
- S. Bohanan, Principal Specialist Regulatory Compliance J. Boone, Project Engineer
- J. Brown, fianager, Operations
- C. Dietz, General fianager, Brunswick J. Dimmette, itechanical !!aintenance Supervisor
- E. Enzor, I & C/ Electrical l'aintenance Supervisor
- H. Hill, Maintenance Manager M. Long, Manager, Special Projects
- R. Long, fianager, Special Projects
- R. Morgan, Plant Operations Manager D. Novotny, Regulatory Specialist G. Oliver, E&RC Manager A. Padgett, Assistant to General Manager G. Peeler, Shift Operating Supervisor
- R. Poulk, Regulatory Specialist W. Triplett, Administrative Manager L. Tripp, RC Supervisor W. Tucker, Technical and Administrative Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators and engineering staff personnel.
- Attended exit interview
,
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 15, 1981, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. Meetings were also held with senior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Infraction 50-324/78-15-01.
This item dealt with an employee being improperly dressed for a posted radiation control area. The inspector reviewed the CP&L response letter dated August 18, 1978.
The corrective action taken appeared adequate. This item is closed.
(Closed) Infraction 50-324/78-17-01. This item dealt with examples of personnel not following health physics procedures. The inspector reviewed the CP&L response letter of September 20, 1978. The corrective actions reported appeared adequate. This item is close _
_
- _ _ _ -
..
..
(Closed)
Deficiency 50-325/79-35-02. This item concerned the failure of personnel to use an adequate procedure when valving in a reactor vessel level instrument after a plant modification. The inspector reviewed the licensee's November 16, 1979 response letter and internal corrective action correspondence. The instrument was modified to make it consistent with the other level instrumentation. The periodic tests involved with this instru-mentation were revised to provide procedural steps for removing from and returning to service. Modifications procedures were revised to prevent plant modifications being placed in service prior to implementation of adequate procedures. Additionally, a review / revision of Maintenance In-structions to ensure conformance with ANSI N18.7-1972 was conducted in 1980.
This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Unresolved 50-325/79-33-01. This item dealt with the licensee's operation with a misoriented fuel bundle which may have resulted in a violation of maximum linear heat eneration rate. The inspector reviewed CP&L LER 1-79-062 and a CP&L memt -.ndum dated November 16, 1979.
Using GE computer calculations and the fuei performance tapes from the period in question, bundle LJO 197 at location 29-10 was determined not to have exceeded the technical specification limit. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-324/77-11-03.
This item dealt with the installation of alarms on HPCI doors.
The HPCI doors now alarm on the RTGB to warn of an open door, because this area is protected by a carbon dioxide flood system for fire protection. The annunciator procedures are imple-mented for the alarms. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-324/78-11-01.
This item dealt with a-review of snubber visual inspection results. This and other snubber issues are discussed in inspection report 50-324/81-04. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-324/78-33-01.
This item dealt with a re-inspection of the housekeeping of the refueling floor.
Corrective action on this item was implemented during the 1978 refueling outage. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-324/78-33-02.
This item dealt with re-inspection of refueling controls. Corrective action was taken during the 1978 refueling outage. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)' Inspector Followup Item 50-324/78-33-03.
This item dealt with re-inspection cf radiation survey postings during the 1978 refueling outage.
Inspection of this item is done continuously. This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Open item 50-324/78-15-02. This item dealt with procedural changet 1eeded to adequately document modifications affecting fire barrir-penetration seals. The inspector reviewed licensee changes to Fire -
Protection Procedure - 8 and reviewed the existing Plant Modification Procedure, ENP-3. These' procedures appear to adequately cover the previous-concerns.
This item is closed.
.
m
.
.
.,
..
KLOSED) Open Item 50-324/78-07-03 and 50-325/78-07-03.
This item dealt with periodic test (PT's) that did not require a reviewer sign-off. The inspector reviewed the specific PT's and inspected a sampling of other PT's to see if a reviewer's signature and date were required.
The inspector noted no descrepancies. This item is closed.
'
(CLOSED) Open Item 50-324/77-25-05.
This item declt with the inspector's concerns on snubber lockup and bleed ranges and acceptance criteria. This item is reviewed in inspection report 50-324/81-04.
Due to the information in that report, this item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-324/79-35-01 and 50-325/79-36-01.
This item involved the need for the licensee to revise radioactive waste shipment procedures to preclude violation of D0T requirements.
RC&T procedure 0510 was reviewed. This procedure requires surveying and recording of shipment
,
radiation levels and removable of external contaufnation.
A cask shipment checkoff sheet is alsu utilized which requires RC&T personnel to sign-off applicable responsibilities. The procedures appear adequate, and this item is closed.
i (Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 50-325/79-08-03.
This item concerned the need for the licensee to include a tightness check of snubber threaded
fasteners on the snubber visual checklist. The inspector reviewed periodic test PT 19.6,0, Visual Inspection of Snubbers on Safety Related Systems.
The inspector confirmed that this test checks the tightness of snubber bolts, clamps, and jam nuts. This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Open Item 50-324/79-32-01. This item concerned having high radiation alarms for RBCCW dnd service water on the same annunciator. A plant modification was performed in 1980 to separate the alarm to individual annunciator windows. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-324/79-15-01 and 50-325/79-15-01. This item concerned the need for the licensee to correct procedural errors which resulted in an attempt to load test a diesel generator off a dead battery supply to diesel control power. The inspector reviewed periodic test PT-17.4 anti Operations Work Procedure 51/1.
These procedures require that when a battery is load ' discharge tested, the diesel control power switch is aligned to the availeble alternate battery pcwer source. This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Open Item 50-325/79-35-03.
This item concerned a containment penetration eleci.rical box whose cover was left open following a plant modification. The licensee corrected the discrepancy and provided house-keeping guidance and a requirement for supervisor plant tours in the plant operating manual.
This event was also used as an input to training for maintenance personnel. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-324/77-11-01. This item concerned
- cracking _on the control rod drive collet retainer tube, as identified by
..
.
General Electric _ (GE) in Service Information Letter No.139.
The inspector reviewed the GE discussions and recommended actions to ascertain that plant safety was maintained. A review of CP&L's Technical Specification 4.1.3.1, Periodic Test 14.1, and Maintenance Instruction -16, determined that they appeared adequate to identify collet cracks so that the tube could be replaced as necessary. This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-325/79-33-02. This item dealt with reviewing the licensee's corrective action on an instance of loading a fuel bundle in an incorrect orientation.
The inspector reviewed CP&L LER 1-79-062 for proposed corrective action and reviewed fuel bundling procedures FH-11 and FH-11A.
It appears that adequate corrective action has been implemented by the licensee.
This item is closed.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Iten 50-324/77-II-02.
This item required a
review of the results of examinations of Cycle 2 failed fuel bundles.
The inspector reviewed General Electric Report NEDM-23804 of March,1978. The inspector had no further questions.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 50-325/79-08-02. This item concerned incorporating inspector comments on preventing high flux scrams on startups.
The inspector reviewed plant General Procedures, Operating Procedures, and Emergency Instructions. All concerns appeared to be covered.
This item is closed.
4.
Reportable Occurrences The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The deter-mination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken
or planned, existence of potential generic problems'and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional in-plant reviews and discussions with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk.
,
Unit 1
- 1-79-062 (IT) Refueling records indicated that Bundle LJO 197 was moved during 1979 refueling outage from Position 33-02 to 29-10, with no change required.
1-80-83 (3L)
Failure of Containment Atmospheric Monitor Oxygen Analyzer 1-CAC-ATH-1259-2.
1-80-90 (3L)
Failure of Containment Atmospheric Monitor Oxygen Analyzer 1-CAC-ATH-1259-2.
Supplement (3L) Procedural inadequacy with regard to control rod 1-81-13 withdrawal patter f
..
..
Supplement (3L)
Inadvertent isolation of reactor level instruments 1-81-16 resulted in a reactor trip.
Supplement (3L) Main S: ram Line Differential Pressure Switch found 1-81-22 out of calibration due to instrument drift.
1-81-48 (3L) Failure of Operations Shift Foreman _to recognize an LC0 condition.
1-81-58 (3L) Unit No.1 Valves 1-CAC-V16 and V17, Auto-Open Actuation Switches, (1) 2-CAC-P0 S-4222 and 4223, out of calibration.
Unit 2
2-79-03 Supplement (3L) 2B RHR Heat Exchanger Rib Plate partially buckled.
2-80-03 Supplement (3L)
"A" RHR pressure sensing line cracked.
2-80-75 Supplement (3L) Containment Atmospheric Monitoring Flow Problem.
2-80-80
- 2-81-66 (3L) No. 2 Diesel Generator tripped and locked out due to ' jacket water temperature exceeding trip set point.
Supplement (3L) No. 2 Diesel Generator tripped and locked out due to jacket 2-81-66 water temperature exceeding trip set point but still
,
available to perform design function..
2-81-70 (3L) RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply Inboard Isolation Valve, 2-E11-F009, would not open from the RTGB.
2-81-71 (3L) Blockage in Instrument Transmitter, 2-CAC-LT-2602, Water Supply Throttle Valve, caused erroneous level indication.
2-81-74 (3L)
Fire Hose Stations RW-50 and 51, Model No. S-A-F-1, located on -3' elevation of Radwaste Building, it.vporable.
-
2-81-75 (3L) Temperature Recorder 2-CAC-TR-778, Model No. 551, located on Remote Shutdown Panel, out of calibration.
2-81-76 (IT) Safety Relief Valve, 2-B21-F0138, Model No. 67, failed to manually close or automatically rese.
.
.
..
_
. _. __
..
.
_ _ _ _.
_ _
_
..
..
,
l l
l 2-81-78 (3L)
"A" RHR SW Subsystem Pumps unable to start due to Pump Suction Header Low Pressure Lockout Signal from switch 2-SW-PS-1175, Model No. D2T-M150-SS.
2-81-81 (3L) Automatic initiation of HPCI and RCIC with a stuck open Safety Relief Valve F013B (reported in LER 2-81-76),
average torus temperature exceeded 120F.
2-81-85 (3L) Rod 26-11 did not have RTGB position indication at Position
'
"47".
2-81-86 (3L) Hydraulic Snubber 2-SW-142SS75,tiodel No. HSSA-10, declared inoperable.
2-81-87 (3L) Primary Containment Atmospheric 0xygen Analyzer, 2-CAC-AT-1259-2, !!odel No. F3M3, out. of calibration and
!-
became inoperable.
2-81-88 (3L) Primary Containment Atmospheric 0xygen Analyzer, 2-CAC-AT-1263, Model No. F3M3, inoperable.
2-81-89 (3L) Primary Containment Atmospheric 0xygen Analyzer 2-CAC-AT1263-2, Model No. F3M3, out of calibration.
,
.
2-81-90 (3L) Suppression Chamber Water Level Indicator, 2-CAC-LI-2601-3, Model No. BQ15221, out of calibration.-
- 2-81-65 (IT) Differential Temperature Switch, E51-DTS-N6040, inoperable.
5.
Failure to Adhere to Technical Specification 3.3.2, Limiting Condition for Operation and its Associated Action Statement.
Technical Specification 3.3.2 requires that isolation instruments-in Table 3.3.2.1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values listed in the trip setpoint column of the table.
Table 3.3.2.1, Note C, requires that with only one channel per trip system, an inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition _when this would cause the trip function to occur.
In these cases the inoperable-channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or the ACTION'
required by Table 3.3.2.1 for that trip function shall be taken.
l ACTION statement from Table 3.3.2.1 states; "Close the affected system isolation valves and declare the affected _ system inoperable."
Additionally, ACTION statement b. of Technical Specification 3.3.2 states;
- With the -requirements for the minimum _ number of 0PERABLE channels not
"
satisified for one trip system, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour."
'
!
_
,
S
- T
.
_
_.. _ _
.
.
_
_
_
_. _ _ _
_.
_.
._
..
.1
i
!
!
While performing surveillance testing on the HPCI steam line temperature switches. it was discovered that the HPCI steam line area differential
temperature switch C51-DTS-N604D could not be calibrated. At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, a trouble ticket to have the instrument repaired was written by the technician
>
performing the calibration and taken to the' Shift Foreman to have it as-
,'
j signed'a number.
The. Shift Foreman assigned a number to the trouble ticket j
and set it aside to be reviewed later. The technician informed the Shift n
Foreman that an unusual problem associated with the surveillance existed and
that the testing was secured until the instrument could be repaired.
He-left the' instrument in test to indicate that HPCI was out of service until j.
the temperature instrument could be repaired and the surveillance testing
'
completed.
i At 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> during shift turnover, the oncoming Shift Foreman noted that
'
j HPCI was in test and assumed that t5e surveillance testing was still in
progress. At approximately 1915 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.286575e-4 months <br />, while reviewing and processing the trouble tickets not processed by the day shift, the Shift Foreman found the
trouble ticket on E51-dTS-N604D. Following a review of technical specifi-
,
cations, the HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable.
,
i An investigation of these events was performed to determine the cause or
causes of exceeding both the action statements of Table 3.3.2.1 and the'
'
associated action statement of Section 3.3.2.
The inspector noted that no
.
mechanism, other than oral communication, is available for ensuring. that
Technical Specification requirements are met. The results of interviews with applicable licensee personnel and review of-records indicate that the
,
j root cause of the event was personnel error, in that the Shift Foreman, while being adequately informed of the situation, did rot take proper action
i to ensure adherence to Technical Specification requirements.
.
. '
l This is a violation of Technical Specification, Section 3.3.2. (50-324/"
81-24-01).
i f
6.
Contamination of Personnel
)
On ' September 9,1981, at approximately 1940 hours0.0225 days <br />0.539 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.3817e-4 months <br /> when transferring a resin ~
slurry from the waste collecting tank to the waste sludge tank in the
.
radwaste building, the hose' carrying the liquid slurry ruptured spraying three workers. A health physics technician was 'also contaminated when he
~went to assist the' wor.kers. All contaminated individuals immediately went
-
j to an emergency shower located in the_' area, removed their contaminated'
clothing and showered.
'
.Three individuals had external contamination of 1,000 to 2,500 cpm. - They; were successfully decontaminated with one snower to less than 200 cpm
!
(normal background level)._ The fourth! individual was contaminated to 50,000 cpm on the chest and shoulders =and 10,000 cpm on;the :faceiand head. -After
~ four successive showers, he was; decontaminated to less than 200 cpm with the
}'
exception of 3,000 cpm around.'one ear.
.
~
!.
,.A,'e-,-.-
- =
,-s
4-
,
s e A
,. -,.
~t y
aem.
,
'
-i,
_
..
..
!
i
.
A physician was called in to examine the individual due to exposure to the l
eyes and ears of an acidic solution contained in the slurry, and to assist in decontamination of :.he individual's ear. The physician flushed the ear and subsequent surveys were less than 200 cpm.
All contaminated personal clothing was bagged and brought to the personnel decon station in the service building. All other materials were contained in the radwaste building.
No releases to the environment occurred.
,
l The licensee notified the resident inspector at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> on September 10,
,
1981, and also notified the NRC Operations. Center via the emergency notifi-cation system (red phone) pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Section 72.(a).(10).
The inspector's investigation of this incident and subsequent findings are
,
as follcws:
--
Radioactive Work Permit (RWP) No. 909-27 was issued for the transfer of the resin slurry that clearly indicated personnel entry requirements,
,
I protective equipment and recent survey resul ts of the area including
!
surface contamination and airborne radiation levels; Workers in the area wore protective clothing and personal dosimetry as i
--
required by the RWP; Adequate radiation survey instruments were available;
--
Posting, step off pads and roped off areas were in accordance wtth
--
approved RC&T procedures; Health Physics personnel wre present in the work area;
--
Workers were aware of and understood the work conditions as stated on
--
l the RWP;
--
The decontamination of personnel was performed expeditiously, ade-quately, and in accordance with accepted radiological controls.
The inspector had no further questions relative to this event.
7..
Emergency Drill
,
The licensee conducted a full scale emergency drill on August 13-through August 18, 1981, that involved active participation and ' coordination with
'
applicable faval, state and local ~ agencies. The results of this drill
,
will be pre. -
ed in detail in NRC Inspection Report 50-324/81-17 and
-
50-325/81-i.
.
..
..
'
j
'8.
Inadvertent Core Spray Initiation At approximately 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> on September 11, 1981, with Unit 1 in shutdown, a half scram, a half Group I isolation occurred with associated starting of s
the "A" core spray pump and diesel generators. The cause of the event was determined to be a high voltage spike on the DC bus when an equalizing l
charge was started on the battery, which resulted in de-anergizing circuits associated with newly installed analog equipment. Two similar events are described in NRC Inspection Report 50-324/81-20 and 50-325/31-20, para-graph 10, Inspector Followup Item 50-325/81-20-01.
The licensee is imple-
<
menting administrative controls to prevent recurrence.
i 9.
Review of Periodic P.eports The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Report.
l Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units Nos.1 and 2, fionthly Operation
--
'
Report for August,1981.
The inspector verified that the information reported by the licensee is
l technically adequate and satisfies applicable reporting requirements estab-lished in 10 CFR 50, and Technical Specifications.
!
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
No violations were identif ted.
l l
10.
Onsite Review Committees The inspectors atteMed the regular monthly Plant Nuclear Safety Comittee
,
l (PNSC) fleeting and several special PNSC meetings conducted during the period of August 15 through September 15, 1981.
l l
'
The inspectors verified the following item:
Meetings were conducted in accordance with To:5nical Specification
--
requirements regarding quorom membership, re?tew process, frequency and personnel qualifications; I
' 1eeting minutes were reviewed to confirm that decisions / recommendations
--
were reflected and follow-up of corrective actions were completed.
No violations were identified.
,
-
,
...
...
.
11.
Review of Plant Operations a.
The inspector reviewed plant operations through direct inspections and observations throughout the reporting period.
The following areas were inspected.
(1)
Control Room (2) Service Building (3)
Reactor Buildings (4) Diesel Generator Rooms (5)
Control Points (6) Site Perimeter (7) Service Water Building (8) Drywell (9) Turbine Building b.
The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation:
The inspector verified that selected
--
instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limits.
Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were
--
in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mode. This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve position (Safe-guard Systems).
Radiation controls. The inspector verified by observation that
--
control point procedures and posting requirements were being followed..The inspector identified no failure to properly post radiation and high radiation areas.
Plant housekeeping conditions. Unit 1 RHR pump room was found to
--
have paper and cloth debris on the. floor.
Safetyrelated cable tray 41Q/CB contain metal debris on September 12, 1981. The licensee has removed these items.
Fluid Leaks. No fluid leaks were observed which had not been
--
identified by station personnel.
Corrective action of excess leakage from RHR booster pump 18 is being discussed with the-licensee.
This is an inspector Followup Item (325/81-24-01).
Safety Related Snubber 1E11-5SS402 was found severely corroded.
The licensee identified two other snubbers,1E11-113SS410 and 1E11-6SS404, which were also rusted. These have been removed for repair.
Initial investigation indicates.that apparently sea water
.
..
..
..
came in contact with these snubbers during recent maintenance on the overhead RHR room cooler. The apparent failure of maintenance personnel to adequately protect safety related equipment during maintenance is an unresolved item (325/81-24-02).
Control room annunciators. Selected lit annunciators were
--
discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and correccive action, if required, was acing taken.
By observation during the inspection period, the inspector
--
verified the control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k)
and the Technical Specificat.ans were being met.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspector periodically questiened shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.
--
Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct obser-vation during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Security. During the course of these inspections, observations
--
relative to protected and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging.
No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.