IR 05000324/1981006
| ML19347E582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1981 |
| From: | Dante Johnson, Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347E578 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-81-06, 50-324-81-6, 50-325-81-06, 50-325-81-6, NUDOCS 8105130069 | |
| Download: ML19347E582 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES r' 8 "
I, NUCLEAR REGULATGRY COMMISSION V)n t
REGION ll Q
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30393
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Report Nos. 50-324/81-06 and 50-325/81-06 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name: Brunswick
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Docket Nos. 50-324 and 50-325 License Nos. DPR-62 and DPR-71 Inspection at Brunswick site near Wilmington, North Carolina d N 6/,Y Inspector:
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D. F. JohnstA, Senior Reff dent Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
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C. Julian,O'cting Chief, RRPI Section 1C Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on February 1, - March 15,1981 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 132 resident inspector hours on site in the areas of plant operations; operational safety verification; observation of
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phy'sical security; review of operational events: review of monthly reports; followup on Licensee Event Reports (Lers); plant tours; licensee action on previous inspection findings; radiation protection; reactive inspection effort relative to results from functional tests of hyoraulic snubbers; and independent inspection efforts.
Results Of the 11 areas inspected, no violation was identified in 10 areas; one violation was found in one area (Failure to follow maintenance procedures, paragraph 7).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Allen, QA Supervisor A. Bishop, Project Engineer G. Bishnp, Project Engineer J. Brown, Manager, Operations
- C. Dietz, General Manager, Brunswick M. Hill, Maintenance Manager
- R. Morgan, Plant Operations Manager D. Novotny, Security Specialist G. Oliver, E & RC Manager A. Padgett, Director of Nuclear Safety R. Pasteur, E&C Supervisor
- R.Poulk, Regulatory Specialist W. Triplett, Administrative Supervisor
- W. Tucker, Technical and Administrative Manager L. Wagoner, Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators and security force members.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized an March 13, 1981, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee representatives acknowledged their ve.derstanding of the findings.
Meetings were also held with renior facility management periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and fiadings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Violation (324/80-05-01) failure to follow procedures for main-
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tenance performed on electrical equipment. The licensee provided retraining to all cognizant individuals on the necessity of taking clearances to de-energize electrical circuits, when possible, prior to performing maintenance.
In addition, all existing preventive and recurring corrective maintenance procedures were revised for full compliance with ANSI N18.7-1976. The inspector verified by review on a sampling basis, that the above maintenance procedure <, series M.I.10 and M.I.16 have been revised for conformance with the format and content as described in ANSI 18.7-1976.
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(Closed) Violation (324/80-08-01) failure to promptly and adequately account for all personnel during a local evacuation of the reactor building. The licensee has revised Security Instruction SI-18 to require a roll call print-out within five minutes of a vital area evacuation and every five minutes thereafter until all personnel are accounted for.
RC&T is to be kept informed of the accountability status. Modifications80-061 for Unit 1 and 80-059 for Unit 2 to install additional speakers in areas to assure 100%
plant audibility, were completed on June 26, 1980 and June 2, 1980, respectively. Modifications80-060 for Unit 2 and 80-062 for Unit I which cause the alarms to be broadcast at the maximum speaker volume, independent of local speaker volume control, were completed on January 1,1981.
(Closed) Violation (324/80-37-01) failure to have adequate procedures for completing and verifying required valve alignment for safety related systems. The licensee revised station operating procedures to include in all valve lineups of safety related systems, double verification of valve positions. Operating Instruction 01-13 " Valve Lineup Position Verification" was revised to include the following instructions:
Proper method of checking valve position;
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Procedures to be followed in the event exceptions, such as clearance tags, are encountered; Method of performing double verification;
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How to verify position of lucked valves;
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Who can and cannot perform valva lineups.
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Individuals were instructed in the revisions to training instruction TI-104
"Related Technical Training and On the Job Training for Auxiliary Operators" relative to ensuring proper valve lineup verification.
The inspector had no furtner questions in this area.
4.
Unresolved Items U,1 resolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violattens or devia-tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 6.
5.
Review of Plant Operations a.
The inspector reviewed plant operations through direct inspections and observations throughout the reporting period. The following areas were inspected.
(1) Control Room
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(2) Service Building (3) Reactor Buildings (4) Diesel Generator Rooms (5) Control Points (6) Site Perimeter b.
The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected
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instruments were functional and demonst ated parameters within Technical Specification limits.
Valve positions. The inspector verified that selected valves were
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in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mode. This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve position (Safeguards Systems).
Radiation Controls.
The inspector verified by observation that
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control point procedures and posting requirements were being followed.
The inspector identified no failures to properly post radiation and high radiation areas.
Plant housekeeping conditions.
Observations relative to plant
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housekeeing identified no unsatisfactory conditions.
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Fluid leaks.
No fluid leaks were observed which had not been identified'by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessary.
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Piping vibration. No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were noted.
Control room annunciators.
Selected lit annunciators were
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discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
R fer to paragraph 6, below for more details.
t By frequent observation through-out the inspection period, the
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inspector verified tnat control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and the Technical Specifications were being met. In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their aware-ness of plant conditions
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Technical Specifications.
Through log review and direct observ-ations during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Opera-tio,
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Security. During the course of these inspections,
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observations relative to protected and vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging. No notable conditions were identified.
No violations were identified in this area.
6.
Control Room Annunciators On March 10 and 11, a sample of lit annunciators in the Unit I control room were reviewed with operating personnel.
The following are findings associated with those discussions.
a.
'HPCI valve mtr. overload had been alarming since 1-20-80. As a result, other HPCI valve motors associated with this alarm have been unmonitored.
The licensee corrected this problem on 3/10/80.
The licensee has committed to make changes to prevent recurrence on this and other applicable safety related annunciators, by April 10, 1981.
This is an unresolved item (325/81-06-02).
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'UPS pwr. conv. pri. trouble', ' Scram valve pit air hdr. lo pres. ' and
' Fuel pool cooling' annunciators are known to be alarming due to design deficiencies.
The licensee is currently evaluating these. This is a Inspector Followup Item IFI (325/81-06-03).
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'HPCI pump vac. tk. lvl. lo', 'RCIC bar cond. vac. tk. lvl. lo' and
'Batt rm. 2A vent fan trip' have been in an alarm condition since 10-27-80, 8-27-80 and 10-7-80, respectively. These are functioning as required to reflect plant conditions. The licensee has no system for the operators to readily verify that appropriate actions have been taken or ascertain the current status of such alarming annunciators.
The licensee has committed to develop an aid to enhance the operators awareness of annunciator status. This is an IFI (325/81-06-04).
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'DG # storage tk. lv1. high' is being used to 'ndicate when filling operation is complete.
'Radwaste eff. rad. HiMP ' is being used to ensure the liquid radwaste discharge valves receive a continuous close signal. Use of annunciator circuits for other than design purposes is being discussed with the licensee.
This is an IFI (324/81-06-01,
325/81-06-05).
The licensee has committed to make an evaluation in the Unit 1 and 2 control room to determine applicability of the above findings to other lit annunciators and take corrective action, as necessary. This is an IFI (324/81-06-02, 325/81-06-06).
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The licensee has committed to place increased priority on the program to extinguish lit annunciators. This program has removed 36 annunciators from this category since October 1379.
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h.
Reportable Occurrences The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determi-nation included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence or potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional in plant reviews and discussions with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk.
Unit 1 1-80-68
"A" RBM High Flow Trip setpoint conservative 1-80-71 CAC monitor isolation valves closed 1-80-77 Snubber 1-E41-2SS105 not connected to pipe clamp 1-80-86 LHGR greater than 13.4 KW/FT 1-80-89 Snubber 1-SW-142SS169 fails to lock up 1-80-91
"B" RBM power supply defective 1-81-03 Rod 26-35 Full in indication malfunctions 1-81-04 Rod 26-07 fails to select 1-81-05 20' secondary containment personnel lock gasket broken 1-81-06 1-CAC-ATH-1259-2 out of calibration 1-81-08 Airlock leakage greater than - 5 SCFH specified rate 1-81-15 RBM Failed during withdrawal functional test
- 1-81-19 Failure to follow appropriate maintenance procedure 1-81-21 Accumulators 46-15, 30-07 internal leakage detectors inoperable 1-81-23 1-CAC-ATH-1259 monitor failed Unit 2 2-80-55 IEB 79-02 anchor bo't testing not done on CRD piping 2-89-56 AC ripples in 100 '/JC to IRM B, C, D, F cause abnormal readings 2-80-75
"A" RHR pressure sensing line cracked 2-80-83 Rx b1dg. structural steel beam has cracked weld 2-80-89 Control bldg. 2B emergency recir. fan fails to start 2-80-98 RCIC steam isolation valve packing failed
- 2-80-101 RCIC tripped due to high exhaust steam pressure 2-80-103 Technician shorts recir. pump 2A loop circuitry
- 2-80-106 HPCI tripped on high exhaust steam pressure
- 2-80-107 Removal of shutdown cooling capability
2-80-108 D/W equipment drain square root converter out of calibration 2-80-111 Coolant activity exceeds 0.2 uci/gr I-131 dose equivalent
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- 2-80-112 Shutdown of all service water systems 2-80-115 Coolant conductivity exceeds 2 umho/cm2 2-81-01 HPCI.nitiation setpoint non conservative 2-81-05 20' secondary containment personnel door seal damaged t
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2-81-07
"B" RPS channel relay coil fails 2-81-08 Rod 46-11 fails to select 2-81-10
"A" RHR service water inop. valve 2-SW-V101 failed 2-81-20 Rx pres. indicator malfunctions 2-81-25 10 CRD vent line supports fail seismic reanalysis LER 2-80-101-3L During performance of a periodic test on November 15, 1980, the RCIC turbine tripped due to high turbine exhaust prersure. A similar event occurred on Unit 1 in October 1979. The cause of the turbine trip was attributed to the swing check valve on the exhaust line failing in the closed position.
Inspection of the valve revealed that the disk stem had broken allowing the disc to fall and isolate flow. An engineering evaluation is being performed by the licensee to determine the possibility for modifying or replacing the valve with one of different design to preclude recurrence of this event.
This is an inspector follow-up item pending resolution of the licensee's review (324/81-06-03).
LER 2-80-106-IT Following a reator trip on low water level o-Jecember 26, 1980, the HPCI system started on low level 2 auto initiation
- t tripped immediately from a high steam line exhaust pressure signal.
Investigation determined that a water hammer occurred that resulteo in high steam line exhaust pressure.
The cause of the water hammer was attributed to condensate water in the inlet steam line that backed up from a filled drain pot on the inlet steam line. Three snubbers on the line were found physically damaged and, of the remaining snubbers, four were found inoperable. The damaged snybbers were replaced and the inoperable snubbers were repaired and functionally tested.
Due to failures of the drain pot level switch to function and open the drain valve, a plant modification was made in February, 1980 to replace this switch but, due to hardware problems with the new instrumentation, the automatic drain function of the switch was removed.
This necessitated manual draining periodically by the operators in accordance with require-ments set forth in the control operators daily surveillance report.
The amount and periodicity of manual draining was apparently not sufficient, therefore, to prevent recurrence, manual draining frequency has been changed to twice per shift, and to drain until a temperature increase is noted in the reactor building equipment drain tank. This temperature increase will indicate that the drain pot is empty. The licensee plans
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.ed outage to obtain a permanent resolution of the problem.
The HPCI turbine and associated piping were inspected, made operational and vibration tests were performed. All tests were satisfactory.
This is an inspector follow-up item pending completion of licensee's actions (324/81-06-04).
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LER's 2-80-107 3L and 2-80-112 IT On December 9,1980, the conventional and nuclear service water systems were secured to repair an unisolable check valve. (This is a violation. Refer to IE inspection report 324/81-02, paragraph 7).
LER 1-81-19 3L On February 4,1981, during the performance of routine surveillance on the primary containment post accident radiation monitor,1-CAC-Al-1262, it was discovered that the photohelic unit was removed. The containment isolation valves were immediately closed and deactivated, because removal of this component opened up a direct flow path from the drywell to the reactor building.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the cause of this event was failure to follow appropriate maintenance pro;:edures in not establishing proper clearances and controls when performing maintenance activities on Q-listed i teras.
This failure to follow procedures is a Violation (325/81-06-01).
The review of LER's has revealed the following generic deficiencies (1)
LER's do act always contain all the pertinent details (2) LER's do not always address corrective action to prevent recurrence, and (3) LER's do not always define a date for final resolution. This subject has been discussed with Licensee Management. The licensee has committed to inprove the quality of his LER's. The licensee has held a training session for all staff members involved with LER preparation.
Future LER's will be reviewed for progress in this area. This is an inspector follow-up item (324/81-06-05, 325/81-06-07).
8.
Review of Periodic Reports The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Report.
-- Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units Nos.1 and 2, Monthlv Operation Report for January 1981.
The inspector verified that the information reported by the licensee is technically adequate and satisfies applicable reporting requirements estab-lished in 10 CFR 50, and Technical Specifications.
The inspector has no further questions in this area.
No violations were identified.
9.
Plant Transients During the period of this report a follow-up on plant transients was conducted to determined the cause; ensure that safety systems and components functioned as required; corrective actions were adequate; and the plant was maintained in a safe condition.
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a.
On February 12, 1981, while Unit I was at 70% power, the reactor scranmed following a low condenser vacuum turbine trip. Backwashing of the traveling screens had been discontinued to allow dumping the fish basket. Because one screen had a broken drive chain and two others had motors which would not turn, the high differential pressure across the remaining screen required that circulating water (cw) flow be reduced before initiating backwashing.
Shutdown of (cw) pump D caused a low condenser vacuum spike which tripped the turbine.
The inspector had no further questions relative to this event.
b.
On February 24,1981,,he Unit 2 reactor was manually scrammedfrom 1.5%
power after three group 4 control rod scrams, The first group 4 scram of 33 rods occurred at 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br /> while PT 1.5.2P was in progress causing a half scram on
"B" RPS. Reactor power decreasea from 7% to 1.5% and the half scram on "B" was reset by the operator. Subsequent investigation revealed that the K14C contact in control rod group 4 "A" RPS channel had failed open. However, before the contact problem could be corrected, IRM
"D" on "B" RPS drifted upscale casuing the same 33 rods to receive a scram signal.
"B" RPS was manually reset and immediately another partial scram signal was received when IRM
"D" again went upscale. The operator then initiated a manual scram.
The upscaling of IRM "D" was attributed to cold water introduction while feeding the vessel with FW-110 valve in manual control.
All control rods performed satisfactorily.
The inspector had no further questions relative to this event, c.
On February 26,1981, Unit 2 reactor was tripped from 46%. Prior to the scram, several half scrams had been received on
"B" RPS.
The Megawatt chart on Unit 2 showed downward spikes from 325 mw to 60 mw.
Unit 1 Megawatt chart showed much smaller spikes. The spikes on Unit I were determined to be grid reflections.
The cause of the spikes on Unit 2 has not been determined. A GE representative monitored the performance of the generator during the subsequent startup.
An EHC specialist has also been consulted. No recurrence of spikes has been noted.
The inspector had no further questions relative to this event.
d.
On March 5,1981, Unit 2 was being shutdown (See 9.e) when the addition of cold water caused a high flux scram. The reactor was at 1.2% power with "B" RFP controlling in auto. Reactor level increased till the RFP tripped.
RCIC was initiated to control level.
When an attempt was made to substitute
"B" RFP for RCI, cold water injection caused a high flux scram.
The inspector had no further questions relative to this event.
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e.
On March 5,1981, shutdown of Unit 2 was initiated to inspect and repair snubbers on safety -related systems.
Surveillance functional testing had indicated a failure rate cf 20%. Testing of all snubbers outside the drywell and a sample of those inside is in progress. Unit 2 will not be restarted until this testing is complete, evaluation of the drywell sample is complete, and appropriate repairs are made.
Pl10-11-81-20 was issued on March 5, 1981. A press release was made by the licensee on March 6, 1981.
Further details are provided in IE inspection report 50-324/81-04.
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