IR 05000324/1979017
| ML19225B286 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1979 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19225B269 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-79-17, 50-325-79-17, NUDOCS 7907240452 | |
| Download: ML19225B286 (12) | |
Text
4 UNITED STATES p* #f %g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[
o,,
REGION ll
{
} c) ( g g
- " '
g 101 M ARIETT A STRE ET, N.W.
-- o
'o E
[
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30303
.....
Report Nos. 325/79-17 and 324/79-17 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street
'
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Facility Name:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit Nos. I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Inspection at Brunswick site near Southport, North Carolina Inspector:
[ #gg g4/90 W.
. Miller d r.
/
Date Signed fj-/79 Approved by.
u
@p,Section Chief, RCES Branch 17 ate Signed
,
C.
r SL?fMARY Inspection on April 16 - 20, 1979
,
Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours on site in the area of fire protection / prevention.
Results Of the area inspected, two apparent items of noncompliance were found (Infraction - non-functional fire barriers (Paragrapas 5.a(3), 5.c(4) and 5.f(3)), Infraction - Sprinkler system out of service (Paragraph 5(e)(1)) and one apparent deviation - failure to meet commitments for completion of fire protection modifications (Paragraph 5)).
'. -
368 244
.
'
79072@o W
,
.
M
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- A. C. To11ison, Jr., Plant Manager
- J. M. Brown, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
- W. M. Tucker, Technical and Administrative Superintendent
- D. N. Allen, QA Supervisor
- J. M. Waldorf, Project Engineer
- W. L. Triplett, Engineer Supervisor
- R.
E. Porterfield, Senior Engineer
- M. Macon, Engineer A. Gambhir, Engineer
- R. M. Poulk, NRC Coordinator R. J. Groover, Construction Manager Other Organizations
- T. L. Sarner, Fire Support Group, Maintenance Inc.
- Attendec exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 20, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The noncompliance, devia-tion and unresolved items were discussed in detail.
Mr. To11ison advised that these items would be reviewed and appropriate action taken.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected 4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about vhich more information is required to
'ietermine whether they are acceptable or may in 'olve noncompliance or ceviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph 5.
5.
Fire Protection / Prevention This inspection evaluated the licensee corrective action on the fire
,
protection modification and improvement commitments made to the NRC.
'
-
The Fire I rotection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for this facility dated November 22, 1977, with Supplement No. I dated April 6, 1979, 368 245
.
.
-2-licensee's letter GD-79-705 of March 15, 1979 with Attachments 1 through 4 Amendment Nos.
11 and 23 to License No. DPR-71 and Amendment Nos. 3l and 47 to License No. DPR-62 were used in this evaluation.
These documents described the fire protection modifications and improve-ments required and date of implementati'..
Unless stated otherwise, the improvements were to be completed prior to the start up of Unit No. I and/or Unit No. 2 The startup date for Unit I was April 13, 1979 with the startup date for Unit 2 scheduled for May 1979.
This report will address only those items inspected which were completed or required to be completed as of April 20, 19:9. The remaining items will be inspected and evaluated at a latter ; ate.
The sections in the SEP..hich discuss the modifications are noted in parentheses following each item.
a.
Control Building (1) Additional fire detectors had been installed throughout the control building, including the main control cabinets in the control room. Fire alarm bells and pull stations had also been added.
However, detectors had not been provided for a
-
small equipment room at the 70 foot elevetion. Refer to Section 5.f (1) of this report for a gen ::1 description of the fire detection alarm systems.
(3...*)
(2) The PVC coated conduit in the north cable accessway at 23 and 49 foot elevations had been coated with a flame retardant material.
(3.1.2)
'3) The installation of the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier between the redundant safe shutdown system circuits in the north cable accessway at the 23 foot elevation had not been completed and the limiting condition for operation (LCO) requirement of the Technical Specifications had not been established. The failure to establish an "LC0" for this non-functional fire barrier was identified to the licensee as Noncompliance Item 324/79-17-01 and 325/79-17-01, " Nonfunctional Fire Barrier Penetrations".
This is an infraction.
(3.1.1 and 5.6.1).
(4) The fire doors in the north and south stairways had been installed. However, the doors in the south stairway were found blocked in the open position by temp:rary wiring. The Technical Specifications requirements for limiting condition for operation had been established for these non-functional
'
..
(3.1.7)
.
(
368 246
-
.
-3-(5) A new 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire door in an approved frame had not been provided in the door opening between the two cable spreading The opening contained a 3-hour inoperative fire door rooms.
in a non-fire rated frame. The licensee's failure to upgrade this installation does not conform to the commitment to the hTC. However, the failure to establish a limiting condition for operation as required by the Technical Specifications was identified to the licensee as another example cf Noncompliance Item 324/79-17-01 and 325/79-17-01.
(3.1.7)
(6) The cables and PVC conduit in the cable spreading rooms for Units 1 and 2 had been coated with a fire retardant coating.
(3.1.2)
(7) Three hour fire doors and frames had been provided between the Unit 1 battery rooms and between the battery rooms and the Unit I cable spreading room. However, the hardware for the doors between battery room IB and the cable spreading room was not installed and these doors are inoperative. A limiting condition for operation was not established. The incomplete fire door installation was a failure to meet a commitment to the Commission. However, the failure to establish a limiting condition of operation was identified to the licensee as another example of Noncompliance Item 324/79-17-01 and 325/79-17-01.
(3.1.7)
(8) One safety division of battery. cables had been rerouted out of the cable spreading room.
(3.1.24)
(9) The floor hatch in the northwest corner of Unit 1 portion or the control room had been coated with pyrocrete to provide a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier between the cable spreading room and the control room.
(5.4.6)
b.
Service Water Building (1) Curbs to limit the spread of oil and metal barriers to prevent flame impingement on adjacent equipment in the event o. a pump fire had been pravided.
(3.1.9)
(2) An int erior standpipe hose system had been provided.
This system is supplied from a normally closed 6-inch deluge valve and is maintained wet by means of a 2-inch by pass around the valve. The deluge valve is activated by the building smoke detector system.
(3.1.3)
'
(3) An oil separator had been provided on the drainage system.
(5.7)
368 247
.
..
-4-(4)
Battery powered emergency lighting units had been provided at the 20 foot elevation of the structure.
(3.1.35)
c.
Diesel Generator Building (1) The stairways from the 23 foot elevation to the (-) 2 foot elevation had been enclosed at the 23 foot elevation with a 3-hour fire rated enclosure.
(3.1.1)
(2) Additional smoke detectors had been provided and fire alarm bells and pull stations had been provided throughout the building. Refer to paragraph 5.f.(1) for additional informa-tion on the plant's fire detector installations.
(3.1.4 and 5.8.6)
(3) Spray shields had been provided over switchgear and other electrical equipment in the building for protection against water damage in the event of the operation of the water suppression system.
(3.1.28)
(4) Three hour fire doors and frames had been provided for the fire barriers between each diesel generator. However, most of these doors were found blocked in the open position without the establishment of a limiting condition for operation.
These non-functional fire barrier penetrations were identified to the licensee as another example of Noncompliance Item 324/79-17-01 and 325/79-17-01.
(3.1.7)
(5) The electrical box penetrating the fire wall between two diesel generators and the electrical wiring and piping in the generator and tank bunker rooms had been enclosed and/or coated with a three-hour fire rated material.
(3.1.1)
(6) The diesel exhaust silencers had been relocated from the fan room to the roof of the building.
(3.1.14)
(7) The oil retainer system for the oil bath air intake filters was not installed. This is a failure to meet a commitment with the NRC and was identified to the licensee as Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03 " Failure to Meet Fire Protection Modification Commitments to the NRC.
(3.1.27)
(8) Rolling type fire doors had been provided in the four recircu-lation air openings in the fan room from the generator rooms.
.. ',
However, these systems did not appear to be arranged for automatic operation in the event of heat or fire within the exhaust plenum.
Pending further review of the design documents and additional evaluation of the installation, this item will 368 248
-
..
.
-5-
,
be carried as Inspector Followup Item 324/79-17-04 and 325/79-17-04 " Fire Damper Installation for Recirculating Air System for Diesel Generator Building".
(3.1.6).
(9) Fire dampers were installed in the duct penetrations from the fan room to other adjacent areas.
(3.1.6)
(10) The door between each tank bunker had been made gas tight.
(3.1.15)
(11) Gas tight seals were provided for the pipe and trench pene-trations in the tank bunker walls.
(3.1.16)
(12) The steel roof supports for the tank bunkers were coated with a material to provide a three hour fire rating.
(3.1.2)
(13) A roof manhole had been provided for each tank bunker for use as a firefighting access in the event of fire.
(3.1.22)
(14) A ccabination smoke and varor removal system has been provided for each tank bunker. However, the system does not appear to be arranged to exhaust air rom the floor level as is normally t
required for beneath grade level areas containing heavier than air vapors. The licensee is to reevaluate the design and installation of this ventilation system.
Pending further evaluation this item will be carried as Unresolved Item 324/79-17-05 and 325/79-17-05 ". Tank Bunker Smoke and Vapor Removal System".
(3.1.22)
d.
Reactor Building - Unit 1 (1) Additional detector had been installed throughout the reactor building. Refer to Section 5.f(1) of this report for additional information on the fire detection systems.
(3.1.4)
(2) A three hour fire rated structure had been erected on the 80 foot elevation for the storage of water treatment chemicals.
This structure is also provided with fire detectors.
(3.1.18)
(3) A metal flammable liquid storage cabinet was provided on the 117 foot elevation for the storage of combustible liquids.
(3.1.18)
(4) Paddle type water flow switches were installed for the deluge systems protecting the standby gas treatment systems. The ase
'
of this type water flow alarm device in a deluge system is
',
.
susceptible to damage and is not permitted by Section 3-16.3 of NFPA-13, " Sprinkler Systems". This item was identified to
&
J 368 247
_
.
.
.
-6-the licensee as a failure to comply with the commitments to the NRC and is another example of Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03 (CPSL letter of 6/23//7).
e.
Water Treatment (Fire Pump) Building (1) A wet pipe automatic sprinkler system has been installed.
'
However, the installation of this system did not meet the criteria of NFPA-13 The sprinkler heads were installed from 2 to 3 feet beneath the roof deck whereas section 4-3 of NFPA-13 requires that sprinklers for this type construction be installed no lower than 12 inches beneath the roof deck.
This was identified to the licensee as a failure to amply with commitments to the Commission and is another example of Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03.
(3.1.11)
Also, this sprinkler system was found out of service and thus inoperative. The exterior post indicator valve controlling the water supply to the system and the control valve beneath the alarm valve were both found in the closed position.
The Technical Specifications (Provision 3.7.7.2) require this sprinkler system to be operable at all times, or that a limiting condition for operation consisting of a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment be established.
The failure to maintain this system in service or e-tablish the appropriate limiting condition for operation as required by the Technical Specifications was identified to the licensee as Noncompliacce Item 324/79-17-02 and 325/79-17-02, " Water Treatment Building Sprinkler System Inoperative". This non-compliance is an infraction.
(2) Metal flame impingement barriers had been provided between the two fire pumps and between the fire pumps and pump controllers.
(4.3.1.(2))
(3) A masonry, three hour fire rated wall had been errected between the water treatment building and the diesel tank for the fire p ump.
(4.3.1.(2))
(4) A redundant pressure sensing line to each fire pump controller from the discharge header of the fire pumps had not been provided. Two connections were provided to the discharge header but only a single line extends to the controllers (CP&L letter of 12/16/77). For multiple pumps, NFPA-20, " Centrifugal
,,e Fire Pumps" requires an independent pressure censing line from the discharge heaaer of the pump to each fire pump controller.
'
This item was identified to the licensee as a failure to meet commitments made to the Commission and is another exsmple of Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03.
(4.3.1.(2))
_
e h
.
.
-7-(5) A valve had been installed in the piping between the two fire pumps to prevent loss of both pumps in the event of a single piping failure.
(4.3.1(2))
(6) A remote fire pump running and trouble alarm panel had been provided in the control room.
(4.3.1.(2)
(7) A flow switch and shut off valve have been provided in the fuel line to the diesel fire pump and are arranged to auto-matically close in the event of a rupture in the supply line.
(4.3.1.(2))
f.
General Plant Areas (1) Many of the fire detector installations throughout the plant do not fully comply with the criteria of NFPA-72D, " Proprietary Signaling Systems" and NFPA-72-E, " Automatic 'Jetectors" due to excessive spacing between detectors, detectors not properly located, obstructions to the detectors by machanical and electrical equipment and inadequate er excessive coverage per detector.
These items were addre: sed in the SER and the licensee proposed to provide additional datectors. Additional detectors were actually m-vided; however, the installation of the additional detectors m
some areas did not bring the former substandard systems into <ompliance with the criteria of KFPA-72E and many of the new systems did not adhere to the design and installation criteria of NFPA-72E. For example, Section 4-4.5 of NFPA-72E requires that smoke detectors in building with hirh ceiling be installed alternately at two levels; one half at ceiling level and the other half at least three feet below the ceiling level to help assure proper operation due to probable stratification of the smoke particles.
However, the new detectorn provided for the 117 foot elevation of the Unit I reactor building, which has a ceiling height of 63 feet, are all installed adjacent to the ceiling.
This same problem, althought not as severe as this location, also exists in other plant structures which have high ceilings.
The failure by the licensee to modify all of the fire detection
'
systems to meet the applicable guides, codes or standards which are approved,by the NRC and are the accepted industry practice does not conform to commitments made to the Commission.
.'
This was identified to the licensee as another example of
,
Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03.
(3.1.4)
.
368 251
.
.
-
.
-8-(1) The linen type fire house at the interior hose stations had been replaced with industrial type, lined fire hose.
Practi-cally all of the former hose racks had been replaced with bose reels.
Isolation valves and hose connections (2 1/2-inch)
have been provided to the building etandpipe systems.
(3.1.20 and 3.1.29)
(3) To assure that the fire doors in the fire barrier protecting safety-related areas throughout the plant were maintained in the correct position, the licensee agreed to provide, prior to the end of the refueling outage, supervised locking and/or alarming for approximately 67 fire doors in low traffic areas and to provide periodic inspection for approximately 11 addi-tional fire doors. The alarm panel for the fire doors was to be located in the control room. The installation of the alarm panel was found incomplete and will not be operational before early summer 1979.
(4.9.2)
Also, approximately 50% of the fire doors were found to be nonfunctional due to doors being blocked in the open position by temporary wiring, piring, hose and other construction materials; damaged door nardware (i.e.
closers, latches and hinges); doors tied or blocked in the open position; and/or
-
existing doors being repaired or replaced.
Prior to April 17 a limiting condition for operation ("LC0") had only been established for 5 non-functional fire barriers. However, the licensee advised that an "LC0".had been established for all non-functional fire doors in fire barriers by April 20, 1979.
The Technical Specifications (Provision 3.7.8) require all penetration fire barriers to be fonctional or if not functional a limiting condition for operation consisting of a continutus fire watch or verification of the operability of the fira detection systems on each side of the fire barrier (s) be established. The failure to maintain the fire barriers functional or establish the appropriate "LC0" as required by the T -knical Specifications was identified to the licensee as anothei example of Noncompliance Item 324/79-17-01 and 325/79-17-01.
The Technical Specifications for fire barrier penetrations at this facility do not establish the maximum length of time that a fire barrier penetration can remain non-functions.
This item will be carried as Inspector Follow-up Items 324/79-17-06 and 325/79-17-06, " Evaluation of Technical Specification for Fire Barrier Penetration", pending further review by NRC/NRR.
,,,
(4) Fire alarm bells had been installed for each fire alarm nr detection system.
(3.1.13)
368 252
.
.
.
,
-9-(5) A new alarm panel which utilizes a unique audible sound for alarm notification had been provided for receipt of alarms from the fire alarm and protection systems.
This panel contained the same features as the former control panel in that the circuits from each cf the local panels to the control room panel are not supervised and the control panel utilizes equipment and circuitry which has not been tested by a recognized testing laboratory for fire protective signaling system use.
(3.1.13) (4.2)
(6) The licensee proposed te initiate a program to control the position of the fire protection systems control valves by means of locks, seals and periodic inspections. This program was to be completed prior to the end of the refueling outage.
A plant procedure describing these requirements had been prepared but had not been approved by management. Most of the exterior post indicator valves were found locked in correct position but the following interior control valves to the systems were neither sealed nor locked:
fire pump control valves, fire protection water tank, fuel oil suppl.y line to diesel fire pump and deluge systems to Unit I standby gas treatment system. The licensee advised that all control valves to operable systems were locked in the correct position as of April 20, 1979. The failure to fully implement a program of locking and/or sealing fire protection control valves in the correct position is a failure to meet a commitment to the NRC and was identified to the 1icensee as another example of Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03.
(3.1.20)
(4.3.l(3))
(6) The fire protection water distribution system had been extended to the service water intake structure and a fire hydrant had been provided adjacent to this structucc. Ilowever, a fire hose and equipment house was not provided for this hydrant.
Thc failure to provide the hydrant hose house prior to the end of the refueling outage for Unit 1 is a failure to meet a commitment to the NRC and was identified to the licensee as another example of Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03.
(3.1.8)
(8) The licensee was found utilizing combustible wood scaffolding in buildings containing safety-related systems. Normal industry practice is to utilize only noncombustible or fire retardant treated wood scaffolding in the maintanence and construction
...
of neulear power plants.
The licensee's procedures for the control of combustible materials did not address combustible
'
368 253
'
--
__
__
.
,
-10-
.
scaffolding. This item was identified to the licensee as Unresolved Item 324/79-17-08 and 325/79-17-08, " Combustible Scaffolding", pending further evaluation by the licensee and h3C.
(9) The number of fire extinguishers provided for the basement of the diesel generator building, control room and cable spreading and battery rooms for Unit I do not meet the minimum number, spacing and/or installation requirements of bTPA-10, " Portable Fire Extir',uishers".
The licensee advised that additional extinguishers had been ordered but not received.
Ilowever, the lack of adequate and properly installed extinguishers in the areas is a failure to meet a commitmeut to the Commission and was identified to the licensee as another example of Deviation 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03.
(3.1.12)
(10) The vents from the 1400-gallon diesel fuel day tanks beneath each diesel generator terminated within the diesel generator Section 2-4.2 of NFPA-30, " Flammable and Combustible room.
Liquids Code", requires this type vent to terminate outside the building. The failure to provide these day tanks with the required vents is a failure to meet a commitment with the Cocunission and is another example of Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03, " Diesel Generator Day Tank Vents".
(11) The standpipe system for the reactor building contains a normally closed valve which must be manually operated by electrical circuitry from one activation device within the control room. This arrangement does not comply with the design and installation criteria of NFPA-?4, " Standpipe and liose Systems" and reduces the fire protection reliability of the system, but is in accordance with the guidance of the SER (4.3.1.(4)).
This item was identified to the licensee as Inspector Follow-up Item 324/79-17-08 and 325/79-17-09, " Fire Protection Standpipe System Evaluation" pending further evaluation by NRC/NRR.
g.
Fire Fighting / Brigade Equipment (1) The portable smoke exhausters required for use in removing smoke from cable tunnels and other areas had not been provided.
liowever, an electric and gasoline engine driven smoke ejector were reported by the licensee to be on order. The failure to provide this equipment prior to the end of the refueling outage for Unit I was a failure to meet a commitment to the
.
,,.
Commission and was identified to the licensee as another
'
example of Deviation Item 324/79-17-03 and 325/79-17-03.
(3.1.22)
,
'
.
,
.
'
-11-
.
(2) Portable hand lights and sound-powered headsets v-:re provided for the fire brigade.
(3.1.17) (3.1.32)
?/n r-e JUO J ')
/
. ' ',
li s
_.
-