IR 05000324/1979026

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IE Insp Repts 50-324/79-26 & 50-325/79-27 on 790726-27.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Concrete Expansion Anchor Installation
ML19275A377
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/16/1979
From: Herdt A, Modenos L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19275A374 List:
References
50-324-79-26, 50-325-79-27, NUDOCS 7910040198
Download: ML19275A377 (3)


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Report Nos. 50-325/79-27 and 50-324/79-26 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Co.

411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Facility Name: Brunswick Steam Plant, Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 InspectedatBrunswiyknearSout) port,NorthCarolina Inspected by:

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A THerdt, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspected on July 26-27, 1979 Areas Inspected This special, unannounced inspection involved 19 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of concrete expansion anchor installation.

Results No items of noncomplinace or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • A. C. Tollison, Plant Manager
  • B. Poulk, NRC Coordinator Plant Other Organizations
  • J. Ramsey, Engineer, United Engineering NRC Resident Inspector
  • J. E. Ouzts
  • Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 27, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

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Concrete Expansion Anchors In response to IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L)

submitted their response to the bulletin on July 12, 1979. The respcase was reviewed by IE: Region II with the subsequent inspection of'the site to verify their data. It was determined that their data revealed an incomplete engineering analysis and inaccurate results.

The inaccurate results were identified when minimum thread engagement and dimension from top of shell to cone for self drilling expansion anchors was

, recorded during inspection without any further analysis of that data. The special test procedure SP 79-22 " Inspection and Testing Procedure for Concrete Expansion Anchors" Rev. 3 was reviewed and was found to be inade-quate in defining acceptance criteria for minimum thread engagement and top of shell to cone dimension for self drilling anchors.

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The following supports were identified, where questionable data was not evaluated for possible failures:

Unit 1 Unit 2 1E11-14FS-2 2E11-2SS396 1E11-89SS461 2G41-A5PG142 1E11-71PG589 2E11-37A90 1E11-71PG588 2G41-59PG161 1E11-71PG181 2G41-12PG3 IE11-2PG134 2E51-42SS74 1E11-47SS224 2E51-40SS84 1E21-39SS109 2E11-89PG207 IE21-40SS107 2E11-71SS393 The inspection procedure also required clarification for wedge type anchors, how embedment depth would be determined.

CP&L agreed to revise their procedure to include acceptance criteria for thread engagement and clarify information needed for wedge type anchors.

The inspection and test program identified 86 supports for Unit 1 and 89 supports for Unit 2.

These numbers appeared to Le relatively small. A random inspection of residual heat removal support drawings of Unit 1, verified that the plant had a major number of welded supports and the supports identified with expansion anchors seemed accurate.

During the exit interview on July 27, 1979, CP&L was informed that they must establish their acceptance criteria and re-evaluate their data by July 30, 1979, arrive at a new rate of failure and submit a supplemental response to IE Bulletin.

On July 30, 1979 CP&L called Region II and informed us of their findings of 11.8% rate of failure of Unit I and 13.3% rate of failure of Unit 2.

They committed to increace testing to 100 percent by August 31, 1979 and would be able to accomplish this while the plants were operating. A supplemental response would be sent by August 10, 1979 clarifying the questions and items brought up by the NRC inspector.

This IE Bulletin 79-02 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and evaluated by the hTC.

No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

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