IR 05000324/1979029

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE Insp Repts 50-324/79-29 & 50-325/79-30 on 790702-27. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Have Adequate Procedure to Return Recirculation Loop to Svc.Omission Resulted in Unit 1 Trip
ML19253C500
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/18/1979
From: Kellogg P, Ouzts J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19253C492 List:
References
50-324-79-29, 50-325-79-30, NUDOCS 7912050641
Download: ML19253C500 (6)


Text

.

.

.

  1. pn Raouq'o, UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,

e

,

g a

REGION il

o 101 MARIETTA sT., N.W SUITE 3100 b

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 g.....o

.

Report Nos. 50-325/79-30, and 50-324/79-30 Licensee:

Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Facility Name: Brunswick, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-325, and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Inspection at Brunswi

'te ar uthport, North Carolina Inspector:

/_.

'7 /

2f"

-

v J. E. 0" " "

-

" " //

Dat4( Si ded Approved by:

  1. /f f

P. J.p)ffggcS)

Chief, RONS Branch DatfSign6d

~r v y

-

SUMMARY Inspection on July 2-27, 197?

Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 44 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, radiation protection, physical protec-tion, quality assurance program, organization and administration and maintenance.

Results Of the six areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in five areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction - Failure to have an adequhte procedure to return a recircu-lation loop to service that resulted in Unit #1 trip).

1504 055

_

7'll 2 050 y,l

.

.

.

.

.

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

-

Licensee Employees

  • A. C. To11ison, Plant Manager
  • J. M. Brown, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
  • C. Gibson, Acting Administrative and Technical Superintendent

'

  • R. Porterfield, Project Engineer
  • R Poulk, NRC Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operatoc=,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

Other Organizations Mayor's Office,Southport, North Carolina Police Chief, Southport, North Carolina Brunswick County Manager, Bolivia, I?arth Carolina Brunswick County Sheriff's Office, Boliva, North Carolina Brunswick County Library, Public Document Room, Southport, North Carolina

  • Attended one or more exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 13, 20, and 27, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

The licensee acknowledged the item of noncompliance as discussed in Paragraph 12 of these details.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during,this inspection.

5.

Plant Operations The inspector conducted tours nf accessible plant operating areas, reviewea operating documents and followed up on abnormal events as follows:

_

Reviewed reactor operator's logs to insure they s.re properly filled a.

out and signed.

1504 056

.

O

..

.

.

.

-2-b.

Reviewed auxiliary operator's logs to insure they were properly filled out and signed.

Reviewed shift supervisor's logs to insure that entries' involving c.

abnormal conditions were being properly entered in sufficient detail.

d.

Reviewed logs to insure that entries were being reviewed by management.

Reviewed jumper lor, to insure bypasses were not in conflict with e.

Technical Specifications.

'

f.

Reviewed status of limiting conditions for operations (LCO's) with operators.

g.

Inspected control boards for the status of safety systems.

h.

Reviewed with the operators the status of lighted annunciators.

i.

Inspected status of tags on control board to insure that position indication lights were not obscured.

j.

During tours of the control room observed that stations were adequate-ly manned in conformance with the established requirements.

k.

Toured plant areas to insure that proper housekeeping and cleanliness was being maintained and that combustible materials were not present.

1.

Inspected interior of cabinets for fire hazards and the status of fire doors and fire fighting equipment.

Observed one shift turnover to insure that the occoming shift was m.

properly briefed in accordance with aporoved procedures.

Observed the collection and analysis of a reactor coolant sample.

n.

Followed up on unusual events and reportable occurrences.

o.

6.

Radiation Protection During this period of inspection the inspector made frequent tours of the plant to insure that radiological control requirements were being followed and that radioactive waste was being handled and stored properly.

7.

Physical Protection

_ The inspector made frequent tours of the protection physical barriers and inspected protected areas and security records as follows:

Gates and doors to and in protected areas were closed and locked or a.

attended.

1504 057

.

.

.

.

-3-

-

b.

Barrier fences enclosing protected areas were in a condition to pre-vent entry into the area.

Isolation zones were free of obstructions and unauthorized objects.

c.

d.

Compensatory measures were implemented where equipment failure or inpairment existed.

Verified by actual witnessing, the licensee's security forces response e.

to an intrusion alarm.

f.

Performed a sample review of security guards markmanship qualification records.

g.

Witnessed security searches and badging at entrance to controlled area to insure that these were in accordance with security plan.

8.

Quality Assurance Program Changes to the licensee's quality assurance program was discussed with the quality assurance supervisor to verify that any changes were in accordance with his established program and applicable codes standards and regulatory guides. No changes to the program were reported for the period of this report.

9.

Organization and Administration The inspector discussed organizational changes with members of management to verify that:

The licensee's onsite organizational structure is as described in the a.

technical specification.

b.

Qualification levels of persons filling new positions are in conformance with applicable codes, standards and technical specifications.

Organizational changes had been reported to the Nuclear Regulatory c.

Commission.

The following organizational changes were reported during this reporting period:

/

E. K. Enzor was moved from the position of Administrative Supervisor a.

to Maintenance Supervisor (I&C).

_ b.

G. T. Milligan was moved from the position of Supervisor Maintenance (I&C) to Engineering Supervisor.

W. L. Triplett was moved from the position of Engineering Supervisor t,

to the position of Administrative Supervisor.

1504 058

.

.

,

.

-4-

-

d.

C. Gibson temporarily replaces W. M. Tucker as Technical and Adminis-trative Superintendent, while W. M. Tucker is undergoing senior reactor operator training.

J.DavisandJ.Demmettearetemporarilyassumingthedi$tiesofmain-e.

tenance supervisor (mechanical) while V. Wagoner who regularly fills this position is undergoing senior reactor operator training.

10.

Maintenance The inspector witnessed the overhaul of a main service water pump to insure that:

a.

Administrative approvals were obtained and controls were established for performing the work.

b.

Maintenance was acccmplished using an approved and technically ade-quate procedure.

Testing was performed at the completion of the maintenance.

c.

d.

Quality control records were available for the maintenance being performed.

Maintenance was accomplished by technically qualified personnel.

e.

11.

Acceptance Criteria The inspector used one or more of the following sources of acceptance criteria for evaluating the above areas inspected:

a.

Technical Specifications b.

ANSI N45.2.3 (1971)

,

c.

ANSI N18.7 (1972)

d.

Regulatory Guides Quality Assurance Program e.

f.

Security Plan 12.

Results During the inspection of the areas discuaed in this report the following discrepancies were identified and reviewed hith the licensee. The one item of noncommpliance was acknowledged by the licensee.

During the inspection of the protective area barrier fence an unused a.

camera tower was observed to be located within the minimum allowed

-

distance from the outside of the fence within the switchyard. The licensee was questioned regarding the closeness of this tower to the barrier fence. He later reported that it would be removed.

1504 059

-

,.

.

-5-

,

b.

During the inspection of the protective area barrier fence several washouts, one with a clearance of approximately one foot, were observ-ed under the fence. These findings were reported to the licensee and he had repairs made to close these openings.

-

Wile observing the drawing of a reactor coolant sample for Unit No.

c.

1, excessive coolant was observed on the floor of the sample station at the 50 foot level in the reactor building. This leakage was coming from a sample line to a conductivity cell which had been removed for repairs. This was brought to the attention of the licensee and was cited as a similar problem as water on the floor of the pump room. The licensee agreed to take action to reduce leakage in tr1se areas and minimize the collection of water on the floors.

d.

Wile observing the analysis of reactor coolant for iodine, a review of the procedure in use, Chemistry Procedure 4085, revealed that reference was made to a Figure (4085-1) for determining the accepta-bility of the test results. A referral to this Figure showed that it had been deleted from the procedure. This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the licensee, and he immediately initiated a change to the procedure to have the correct acceptance criteria referenced.

During an inspection of the reactor buildings loose gear such as pipe e.

fitting, bolts, gas bottle caps, etc., were observed to be stored near the four way valves for the CRD hydraulic control units. This gear had the potential of damaging the open wiring to the valve solenoids.

Compressed gas bottles were also found secured to unsupported safety instrument sensing line tubing.

These conditions were brought to the attention of management who had the problems immediately corrected.

f.

During an inspection of the auxiliary operators log for Unit No. 2, the log for the 16-20 shift on July 9, 1979 was not filled out and signed. The log had not been reviewed and initiated by the shift supervisor. These discrepancies were discussed with management and they reported that the individuals responsible would be counseled on the importance of maintaining a complete and correct log.

g.

Lubricating oil leakage was found in pipe trenches and recesses for piping in the diesel building. Also oil drain lines from the engine bed plates were backed up and not allowing drainage. These conditions had existed from a previous inspection, during which they were identified to the licensee. Licensee management inspected these areas and agreed to immediately take corrective action to have these conditions corrected.

h.

It was noted that the use of yellow poly bags were still being used to contain non-radioactive waste. This was brought to the attention of the licensee during an earlier inspection. The licensee produced a

--

memorandum to all plant personnel prohibiting the use of yellow poly bags, except for radioactive waste. The licensee reported that future purcLase of yellow poly bags would be stamped with "For Radioactive Material Use Only".

1504 060

.

.

-

.

.

'

-6-i.

Excessive quantities of low level radioactive waste was observed to be stored outside the diesel and auxiliary buildings. This waste was contained in 100 cubic feet metal burial containers. These containers were not rain water tight and rain water could leak onto the waste then to the ground through drains. This situation was discussed with the licensee who reported that an abnormal amount of waste had accumu-lated during the five month outage and plant modifications in progress.

They were making every effort to have their vendor pick up the waste for transfer to burial.

In the meantime the licensee had taped down the container covers to reduce the possibility of rain water leakage, and had stacked the containers to reduce the exposure to rainwater.

j.

The condition of hardware on fire doors and the markings on the doors continues to be a problem. Also the long periods of time some docrs are maintained under LCO conditions is considered unacceptable. The licensee reported that this was due to the pulling of cabling and removing of piping for the fire protection system that required these doors to be opened. He expects these problems will be solved when current modifications are complete and a program for upgrading the condition of the doors can be initiated. The inspector will closely monitor the progress of work in this area.

k.

A review of the conditions associated with a reactor trip on July 18, 1979 when Unit No. I recirculation loop "B" was being returned to service, revealed that an apparent too fast opening of the pump dis-charge valve resulted in a power increase that caused the reactor to trip on " upscale" APRM. The instructions and precautions in operating procedure OP-2, were apparently not sufficiently consertative to limit the power transient and thus preclude reactor trip. ANSI N18.7 (1972),

Section 5.3 states, " Limitations on the parameters being controlled and appropriate corrective measures to return the parameter to the normal band should be specified". These requirements have been imple-mented by the licensee in the " Procedures Preparation Manual" Section 3.

As a result of his actions, the licensee was in noncompliance for failure to have an adequate procedure to limit the power transient.

This is an infraction.

1504 061

-

_