IR 05000324/1979036
| ML19256F229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1979 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Ouzts J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256F224 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-79-36, 50-325-79-37, NUDOCS 7912180343 | |
| Download: ML19256F229 (6) | |
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 s
Report Nos. 50-325/79-37 and 50-324/79-36 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina Facility Name: Brunswick, Units I and 2 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Inspection at:
Brunswick site near Southport, North Carolina
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Inspector:
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J. E. Ouzts Date Signed
Accompanying Pe'; sonne)i Rone
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Approved by:
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P. J.,
g'shuu/ Unlet, RONS Branch Dats Signed Dates of Inspection: August 31 - September 28, 1979 Areas Inspected This rout".ne unannounced inspection involved 39 inspector-hours onsite for Unit No. 2 in the areas of plant operations, radiation protection, Quality Assurance program, organization and administration, core power distribution, Licensee Event Followup and onsite hurricane coverage.
Results Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- A. C. Tollison, Plant Manager
- J. M. Brown, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
- C. R. Gibson, Acting Administrative and Technical Superintendent J. A. Kaham, RC&T Foreman
- J. L. Kiser, RC&T Engineer
- J. L. McKnight, RC&T Foreman
- R. Poulk, NRC Coordinator S. E. Thorndyke, Operating Supervisor
- L. F. Tripp, Acting E&RC Supervisor J. Walker, Sr. Industrial Security Specialist E. B. Wilson, Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included 3 technicians, 6 operators, 3 mechanics, 6 security force members and 3 office personnel.
Other Organizations a.
Meeting with Brunswick County Commissioners to discuss establishment of an NRC Resident Inspector's office at the Brunswick Plant.
b.
Interview with Teknekron representatives on Resident Inspector and
. Performance Appraisal Team programs.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 7, 14 and 28, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected 4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector conducted tours of plant areas, reviewed operating documents and followed up on abnormal events as follows:
Reviewed operations logs to insure that they were properly kept, signed a.
and reviewed.
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b.
Reviewed the status of limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) with the operators.
Inspected the control boards for the status of safety systems.
c.
d.
Reviewed with the operators the cause for energized annunciators and corrective action being taken.
Inspected the status of component tags on the control boards to insure e.
that indicating lights and component status was not obscured.
f.
During tours of the control room, observed that stations were manned in accordance with established requirements.
g.
Toured the emergency diesel generator building to insure that the diesels were in a condition for automatic starting, and that the local alarm panels were clear of alarms.
h.
Toured plant areas to insure that proper housekeeping and cleanliness were being maintained and that combustible materials were not present in unauthorized areas.
i.
Inspected the interior of electrical and control panels for fire hazards and inspected the status of fire doors and fire fighting equipment.
j.
Observed shift turnovers to insure that the oncoming shift was properly briefed on the status of the plant.
k.
Followed up on Unit I loop "B" recirculation-flow-controller oscellation problem.
6.
Radiation Protection During the period of inspection, the inspector made frequent tours of the plant to insure that radiological control requirements were being followed.
Radiation control areas were inspected for the proper handling and storage of radioactive waste and contaminated materials, and for the posting of proper warning and caution signs.
Reviewed the procedures for and records of radioactive effluent releases.
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7.
Physical Protection The inspector made frequent tours of the physical protection barriers, inspected protected areas and witnessed qualification testing as follows:
a.
Gates and doors to protected areas were closed and locked or were attended.
b.
Barrier fences enclosing protected areas were in a condition to prevent entry into the area.
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c.
Isolation zones were free of obstruction an unauthorized objects.
d.
Compensatory measures were implemented where equipment failures or impairment existed.
e.
Witnessca et2rity searches and badging at the entrance to the control area to in. ore that they were bieng performed in accordance with the security plan.
f.
Witnessed the small arms qualification firing for five security guards.
8.
Quality Assurance Program The quality assurance program was discussed with the licensee's management to verify that any changes to the program were in accordance with his established program and applicable codes, standards and regulatory guides.
No changes to the program were reported for the period of this report.
9.
Organization and Administration The inspector discussed organizational changes with members of management to verify that:
a.
The licensee's onsite organizational structure is as described in the Technical Specifications.
b.
Qualification levels of persons filling new positions are in confor-mance with applicable codes, standards and Technical Specifications.
Organizational changes had been reported to the Nuclear Regulatory c.
Commission.
No organizational changes were reported for the period of this report.
10.
Core Power Distribution The inspector reviewed selective periodic test results for PT 1.11
" Core Performance Check", for Units 1 and 2.
These data were reviewed to verify that:
Linear heat generation rates (LGHR) were within Technical Specifica-a.
tion limits.
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b.
Core maximum peaking factor (CMPF) was below the design factor for the fuel being used, and the APRM setpoints were adjusted as required, and by the amounts specified in the Technical Specification.
Minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) and average planar linear heat c.
generation rate (APLHGR) are within Technical Specifications for locations covered by the data revieweo.
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11.
Hurricane Coverage At 1800 on September 4, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> NRC inspector watch was established at the Brunswick plant with the aid of a regional inspector dispatched to the site.
This watch was continued through the day shift on September 5, 1979.
12.
Acceptance Criteria The inspector used one or more of the following sources of Acceptance Criteria for evaluating the above areas inspected:
a.
10 CFR 50, Appendix "B" b.
10 CFR 20 c.
Technical Specifications d.
ANSI N45.2.3 (1971)
e.
ANSI N18.7 (1973)
f.
Regulatory Guides g.
Site Security Plans h.
Quality Assurance Program 13.
Results of Inspection During the period of inspection no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. A number of items of concern were observed and brought to the attention of the licensee for correction.
These items and the licensee's responses are identified as follows:
In the area of radiological control, the following unsatisfactory a.
practices were noted:
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An area outisde the auxiliary building loading dock, designated as a high radiation area, had no instruction posted for radiation monitoring requirements. The licensee corrected the problem by removing the high level radioactive waste tc an area where proper signs were posted.
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Five gallon containers of reactor coolant were found setting open on the floor of Unit I reactor building near the control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic units. The source of the water was from venting the CRDs, and should have been emptied into the radwaste drains immediately following the venting operations. When brought to the attention of the operation supervisors, they had these i
containers emptied, and would instruct the operators to immedi-ately empty any reactor coolant vented from the CRDs following the venting operations.
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A contractor employee was observed to be transporting a heavy poly bag of radioactive waste by dragging it across the Unit I reactor building floor. The licensee's established method of transporting radioactive waste of this type is by drum loaded on a conveyor. When this observation was brought to the attention of the licensee, he immediately notified his contractors to 1608 007
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instruct their employees in the correct method to use in trans-porting radioactive waste that cannot be carried by hand.
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An abnormal concentration of contaminated equipment and loose gear has been stored in the southwest corner of the reactor building 2, at the 20 ft. level, since the last refueling outage.
Licensee management agreed to cleanup this aree and relocate the equipment to a better controlled area.
b.
In the area of operations the following conditions were noted:
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An erratic recirculation flow controller has required that the scoop tube for Unit I loop "B" be operated in the " lock out" position.
In this mode the recirculation flow r:in-back feature is inoperative and, in the event runback is called for, the operator must manually runback flow.
The licensee plans to call in a manufacturer's representative to help solve the problem.
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Certain local annunciator alarms have existed at the local emergency diesel generator 1 and 2 panels without corrective action being taken. For example, " Low Jacket Water Level", "High Starting Air Pressure" and "High Level in Fuel Tank",
These alarms were brought to the attention of licensee management who had the " Low Jacket Water Level" alarm immediately corrected.
The "High Starting Air Pressure" appears to be a setpoint adjust-ment problem, which will be investigated.
The cause of the High Fuel Tank Level" is also being investigated.
In the area of fire protection the following condition was noted:
c.
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Fire door 112 in the passageway between unit 1 and Unit 2 cable spreading rooms is under LCO, but does not have a Work Permit posted on the door. This Work Permit is required to be posted at the location of the LCO, and specifies the Technical Specifica-tion's requirements that must be met.
A Work Permit had beec posted but had inadvertently torn down. The licensee agreed to investigate this LC0 to determine if it was still in effect and replace the Work Permit if it was.
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