IR 05000313/1988015

Insp Repts 50-313/88-15 & 50-368/88-15 on 880501-31. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Status, Operational Safety Verification,Maint & Surveillance,Plant Startup Testing & Event Followup

ML20196K340
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	06/27/1988
From:	Chamberlain D, Haag R, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196K272	List: IR 05000313/1988015 ML20196K268 ML20196K410
References
50-313-88-15, 50-368-88-15, NUDOCS 8807060577
Download: ML20196K340 (10)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:- -- - - 7,7

 ,

c

.
 '
..  .
, - Persons Contacted J. Levine, Executive Director, AN0 Site Operations
    ~
~
 ' *B. Baker, Plant Modifications Manager
 'A.-Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent-
'
 *E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical Support

'

'

L ' Gulick,. Unit 2 Operations Superintendent C. Halbert,-Engineering Supervisor

 .H. Hollis,' Security Superintendent D. Howard, Licensing Manager-
 *L. Humphrey, General' Manager, Nuclear Quality  _ .

G. Kendrick, Instrumentation and Controls Maintenance Superintendent

 *R. Lane, Engineering-Manager
 *D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor A. McGregor, Engineering Services Supervisor J. McWilliams, Maintenance. Manager
 *P. Michalk, Licensing Engineer

< 'V.;Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent F. Philpot, Reactor Engineer-D. Provencher, Quality Assurance Supervisor - S. Quennoz, General Manager P. Rogers, Special Projects Coordinator C. Taylor, Unit 2 Operations Technical Support Supervisor-L. Taylor,'Special Projects Coordinator J. Teeter, Operations Technical Support

 *J. Vandergrift, 0)erctions Manager
 *J. Waxenfelter, Slift Maintenance Superintendent
 *Present-at exit intervie The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel,' including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.

- Plant Status (Units I and 2) Unit 1 operated at near 80 percent power throughout the month of May 198 At the beginning of May 1988, Unit 2 was ending its sixth refueling outage. Criticality was reached on May 7, but one control element assembly (CEA) was found to be uncoupled so the unit was returned to Mode 6 for recoupling that CEA. Criticality was reached again on May 18. On May.25, power was reduced to replace a failed excore nuclear detector. The unit was placed on line on May 26~an'! vas at 100 percent power at the end of the mont . - - - - - .

      ,

'. ;.

 ,
.

4-3. Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2) (71707, 71709, and 71881) The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The NRC inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The NRC inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The NRC inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of plant activitie The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of units to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibration. The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions during the tour The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) system to verify operability. The walkdown was conducted using Procedure 2104.36, Attachments A and B and PalD M-2217. The deficiencies listed below were identified during the walkdow These items did not directly effect system operability, however, several items have the potential to impact system operabilit * Manual Valves 2ED-45, 46, 47, and 48 were locked in the correct position but the procedure did not require these valves to be locke The licensee has determined these valves are not required to be locked. The locks will be remove * Valves 2ED-2B and 2ED-10188 had packing leakage. Job requests were subsequently issued by the licensee for repai The handle on Valve 2ED-2918 turned freely on stem without affecting valve position. The handle on Valve 2ED-1019B was broken. The licensee subsequently submitted job requests to correct these deficiencie Procedure 2104.36, Attachment B, incorrectly provides descriptions for Valves 2ED-2823 and 2826 as "2PSHL-2823-1 Isolation" and

"2PSHL-2826-1 Isolation," respectively. The licensee is revising the procedure to provide the correct description Procedure 2104.36, Attachment B, does not indicate a required position for Valve 2ED-1030. The NRC inspector verified that the actual closed position was the desired valve position. The licensee is revising the procedure to provide the valve positio Two flexible hoses which connect the piping from Expansion Tank 2T82A to the suction piping of the Jacket Water Pump 2P-168A and the Air Cooler Coolant Pump 2P-172A were crimpe The reduction in the flew

_ h

, .. , .
.

<

area' caused-by the crimps and any res'ulting effects on system performance were concerns expressed by the NRC inspector. The licensee. subsequently submitted a job request to replace the flexible hose * ' -Two' plugs' required to.be installed in drain lines were missing. For EDG No.1 the drain line drains the jacket coolant system and the air cooler coolant heat exchanger. The drain line for EDG No. 2 serves the matching components. Tha requirement to install these plugs resulted from corrective action to a previous problem in which the heat exchanger drain valves were found partially open and the EDG cooling water system drained to floor drain. Procedure 2104.36,

 "Emergency Diesel Generator 0perations," requires the installation of these plugs. The most recent valve lineups for EDG Nos. 1 and 2 were completed March 17 and April 6, 1988, respectively. The NRC inspector notifiea the licensee of the missing plugs and subsequent action was taken to install the plugs. Failure to install plugs ia drain lines for EDG Nos.1.and 2 ~is an apparent violation (368/8815-01).

The NRC inspectors-also conducted reduced scope walkdowns of the Unit I low. pressure injection and service water systems. The components inspected during these walkdowns were those indicated by probabilistic risk analysis as having a significant effect on system operability. No system operability discrepancies were_ identified during these walkdown While conducting a plant tour on May 5, 1988, the NRC inspector observed a large plastic bag taped to the wall in the Unit i upper south piping penetration ro_om. The' bag was approximately half filled with miscellaneous debris generated by a work or cleanup activity. The NRC inspector verified the debris in the bag as combustibles with an estimated weight.in excess of 10 pounds. The room was unoccupied by licensee personnel at the time of the observation. The licensee prcmptly removed

- the combustibles from the room following notification by the NRC inspector. In response to inquiries by the NRC inspectors the licensee was unable to identify any recent work activities having been performed in the room. The presence of combustibles in the upper south piping penetration room is an apparent violation of Procedure 1000.47, Control of Combustibles (313/8815-01). This procedure imposes a 5-pound limit for transient combustibles in the upper south piping penetration room. This apparent violation is similar to a recent violation (368/8801-01) in which an NRC inspector observed unattended combustibles in excess of procedural limits in Unit 2 north diesel generator roo These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specification, (TS), 10 CFR, and administrative procedure ,
*
., :.- :
 . . ,

i

L

 '4 . Monthly Surveill'ance Observation Units 1 and 2) (61726)

i The NRC inspector observed the TS required surveillance testing on the various components listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was. calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components.were. accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, test results were reviewed.by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies' identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The NRC inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities: Monthly test of Emergency Feedwater Pump P7A (Procedure 1106.06,

 '

SupplementII)

 *

Calibration of power range linear amplifier (Procedure 1304.032, Job Order 756589) Testing of Neutron Flux Monitor Startup Channels 1 and 2

,  (Procedure 2304.145, Job Order 756385)

Control Element Assembly (CEA) Repatch Verification (Procedure 2304.02, Job Order 757258). This test verified proper reconnection of the power and position indication cabling for each CEA and completed the 18-month Channel. Functional Test of the CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter * Monthly test of Channel A of reactor protection system (Procedure 1304.37, Job Order 756051) Weekly surveillance of Unit 1 offsite power undervoltage and protective. relaying interlocks and circuitry (Procedure 1307.44) Monthly battery charger rotation and test (Procedure 1107.01, Supplement 1). During this test, control room Alarm K01-86 did not annunciate. This alarm indicates battery bus trouble such as low voltage. Job Order 804791 was prepared 'o investigate the proble Weekly fire pump test (Procedure 1104.32, Supplement 8) Monthly diesel fire pump test (Procedure 1104.32, Supplement 2) No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2) (62703) Station maintenance activities for safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes or standards; and in conformance with TS __

* '
..

G . . t l 2 The'following. items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components .or, systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service;-quality control records were mainta_ined; activities were' accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to . ensure that priority is assigned to safety-relato equipment maintenance < which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

 *

Calibration of Controller'2 HIC-4817A for Letdown Throttle Control Valve 2CV-4817 (Procedure 2304.119, Job Order 757136). The initial attempt to calibrate the controller was unsuccessful.due to the output bias adjustment on the controller not being properly set. The I&C technici a as aware of the bias adjustment but not of the proper adjustment setting required for the calibration. Procedure 2304.119,

 "Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Surveillance Test" provides instructions for calibrating the controller but does not mention the otitput bias adjustment. The licensee is revising this procedure to provide specific instruction for setting the output bias adjustment when calibrating controller 2 HIC-4817 * -Preventive maintenance on service water and hydrogen purge valve located in Unit I lower south piping room (Proctdure 1411.001, Job Order 755913)
 *

Seat SW-1Aleakage repairs and 1B (Job on757895 Orders Service Water and Pump) Discharge Check Valves 755335

 *

Troubleshooting Y-28 inverter (Job Order 757552)

 * Preventive maintenance on CV-2869 in the emergency feedwater system (JobOrder 757381, Procedure 1412.01)

Post installation testing of Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve 2CV-1001 (Job Order 747299). The NRC inspector witnessed the valve stroke testing. The valve position signal was initiated from the control room and locally from the electro-pneumatic converter. The correct valve position was verified to match the associated valve position signa .The NRC inspector followed up on maintenance for Unit 2, EDG No. During a previous NRC inspection (March 7-11), NRC inspectors observed a fire at EDG No. 2 exhaust header. The fire resulted from lube oil leakage

' '
.. :. , .

.

at an' exhaust header joint and the subsequent ignition of the oi Exhaust header fires have been a recurring problem for EDG No. 2 with corrective action not.providing a long-term solution. Recent engineering analysis provided a: recommendation to install shims in the bottom of the . gasket groove, thus providing additional compression of the vendor L_ , supplied gasket. During outage maintenance on EDG No. 2, 0.030-inch thick copper shims were installed behind the spiral wound gaskets. Since installation of the copper shims, EDG No. 2 has had 14 successful runs-with no reports of an exhaust header fir . Contro1' Element Assembly Drop Time Testing (Unit 2) (93702)

 .While performing CEA drop time testing as required by TS 3/4.1.3.4 the licensee discovered that 17 CEAs exceeded the 3.0 seconds drop time saecified by TS 3.1.3.4. A new method was used for' drop time testing w1ich involved dropping all 81 CEAs simultaneously. The previous test method involved dropping each CEA individually. On May 5, 1988, the licensee submitted a request for a temporary waiver of compliance from TS 3/4.1.3.4. In the request the licensee stated that the actual physical drop time of CEAs had not increased from previous acceptable drop time
 ' tests. The increase in'the measured drop time was attributed to an
 . additional time delay factor of approximately 0.25 seconds associated with the electromagnetic decay.of multiple. control element drive mechanism coils compared-to the decayitime of an individual coil. The request for a waiver of compliance was granted May 6,'1988. The licensee submitted a request for an emergency license amendment to TS 3.1.3.4 for an increased CEA drop time of 3.2 seconds on May 9, 1988. Amendment No. 84 to the facility operating license was issued on May 16, 1988, to increase the maximum allowed drop time for CEAs from 3.0 to 3.2 second Due,to removal of the reactor vessel head to facilitate recoupling CEA 8 (discussed in paragraph 6), the licensee was. required to reperform the CEA drop time test. The NRC inspector observed portions of the CEA drop time test that was conducted per Procedure 2302.046. The same method of dropping all 81 CEAs was used, however, alternate data points were used in calculating the delay time to provide a more accurate measuremen The NRC inspector reviewed the completed test data (visicorder tapes and computer printouts) to verify that the data was interpreted correctl No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup of Onsite Event (Unit 2) (93702)

On May 7, 1988, while performing CEA coupling verification, the licensee discovered that CEA 8 of Group 2 was not coupled. The coupling verification test was conducted by inserting each CEA individually and observing a change in reactivity. When CEA 8 was inserted no reactivity change occurred, but normal responses were obtained for all other CEA To accomplish coupling inspection and to recouple CEA 8, the reactor

%
'. .-..- .
 .
*

. u 9 vessel head was remove Visual inspection,of the coupling. halves on the , CEA and control rod extension shaft revealed only minor damage _to the coupling mechanism on the extension shaft.. The lower section of the extention rod was replaced. While.recoupling CEA 8 the Combustion Engineering-representative performing the work also inspected the

. extension shafts for the remaining CEAs to verify proper coupling. Height measurements of. the extension rod for CEA 8 were also taken to verify proper coupling. .The subsequent test of inserting each CEA individually and observing reactivity changes was successfu No violations or deviations were identifie . Inoperable Charging Pumps (Unit 2)(93702)

On May 4, 1988, with the unit in hot standby, all three charging pumps were inoperable at various times between 10:10 a.m. and 12:20 p.m. due to gas binding of the pumps and associated system piping. The gas binding occurred after the volume control tank (VCT) was pumped dry due to erroneous indication of VCT water level. The system was returned to normal operation by 3:30 The licensee determined that the erroneous VCT level was caused by a leak on a threaded fitting on one of the two VCT level transmitters which allowed the' common reference leg for the transmitters to drai The licensee's investigation of this event found that the transmitter with the leaking fitting (2LT-4857) had been replaced during the recent refueling outage. An inservice leak test was not specified or performed following this change. They also found that the design change did not specify the use of thread sealant on the threaded fittings. The licensee determined the root cause of the event to be an inadequate design of the VCT water level instrumentation. This design al10wed a single failure to affect both water level indications due to the use of a common reference le Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee included:

'

The system was filled and vented, restoring the operability of the charging pumps and the boric acid flow path * The leaking fitting on 2LT-4857 was repaire * The two charging pumps which were operated while gas bound were teste A plant design detail drawing was revised to provide details on fitting installation, use of thread sealant, and inservice leak test I

q L..:... . [ l' 10 o

A memorandum was issued to maintenance personnel to emphasize the importance of-using thread sealants on instrument fitting ' Other recently installed instrumentation transmitters were inspected and threaded connections were disconnected and reconnected using thread sealan * An abnormal operating procedure was~ prepared and implemented to cover loss of charging event * Procedures for design changes are being revised to provide better guidance on fitting assembly, thread sealants, and inservice leak testin * A design change is being. developed to provide independent reference-legs.for the VCT level instruments. This change is to be installed

 ~during the first outage of' sufficient duration after development of the modification packag A similar design change is planned for the Unit 1 makeup tank level
 '

instrumentatio The licensee's failure to maintain at least one charging pump operable in Mode 3 is a violation of.TS 3.1.2.4. (368/8815-02). The associated inoperability of boron injection flow paths this causes is also a violation of TS 3.1.2.2. This event was discussed in Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-008. This LER discussed the event causes and corrective actions. No further written response to this violation is require Followup and closecut of this violation will be performed in conjunction , with LER 88-00 . Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with Mr. E. C. Ewing, General Manager, Plant Support, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of the inspectio At this meeting, the inspectors sumarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.

l t- }}