IR 05000312/1981015
| ML19350E936 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1981 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E906 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-81-15, NUDOCS 8106230672 | |
| Download: ML19350E936 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCI.*.*\\R RECUL\\ TORY CC:CiISSIC:t OFFICE OF I::SPECTIC t A!;D E!!TCRCE.'.r.!.T REC 10:1 Y
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R: port No.
50-312/81-15
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D:cket No.
50-312
_ I.tcense No.
OPR-54 safeguards croup I.icensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830
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Sacramento, California 95813
- Tccility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1
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Inspection at: Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection conducted: April 1 - 30, 1981 Inspectors:
(j,g p, f(f/
HbveN.Cakteh,"SeniorResidentInspector G
Dice signed
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S'. /4 E /
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Jofn 0 @ ien,OJnlt Mesident Inspector U Date signed Data Signed
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Approved By:
p,/g/
G.hwetzgActigbiefReactorProjectsSection U Date signed Su mary:
- 2, Reactor Operations Projects Insoection between Acril 1 - 30, 1981 (Recort No. 50-312/81-15) Areas
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Inspected: Routine inspection of long - term shut down activities; monthly maintenance observations; monthly surveillance ovservations, surveillance of pipe support and restraint systems; review of plant operations; followup on Headquarters requests; followup on Regional requests; LER followup; followup on significant events and independent inspection effort. The inspection activities involved 225 inspector-hours by the Resident Inspectors.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, one' item of noncompliance was identified (paragraph 7).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Rodgriquez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- P. Oubre', Plant Superintendent
'#D. Blachly, Operating Supervisor N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor D. Cass, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance Engineering Technician
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor D. Elliott, Quality Assurance Engineer
- H. Heckert,. Engineering Technician
- J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer F. Kellie, Plant Chemist V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer
- R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor R. Moore, SMUD Special Agent
- M. Oren, SMUD Nuclear Engineer
- T. Perry, On-site Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. Price, Surveillance Coordinator S. Sutter, Quality Assurance Engineer L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director
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T. Singer, SMUD Inspector B. Stiver, Mechanical Engineer J. Sullivan, Quality Assurance Engineer T. Tucker, Outage Coordinator
- D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor B. Wichert, Mechanical Engineer W. Wilson, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant
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The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations, and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on April 9, 1981.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on May 4, 1981.
2.
Insoection During Long Term Shutdown i
The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The inspectors verified that surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accom-plished, reviewed tagout records, and verified containment integrity was maintained as required by the technical specification. Tours of the reactor containment and auxiliary building areas were made to assess equipment and plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had
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been initiated for equipment.in need of; maintenance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potentialffire hazards
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and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector-by observation and direct interview. verified that'the physical security
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plan was being-implemented in accordance_ with the station _ security plan.',
The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls and verified the implementation _of radioactive waste system controls.
No_ items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 3.
' Maintenance'
The1 inspector observed portions of.the maintenance activities listed below and. verified work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and by qualified personnel.
Date Work Request No.
Component 4/1/81 WR'54484 SFV - 53504 Repair (LLRT)
"A" HPI L. O. Cooler (NSRW)
4/29/81 LWR 48407 P 210 0 Seal Replacement 4/19/81 WR 57333 Diesel Air Start Pressure Transmitter Various WR's Balancing of Reactor Coolant Pumps C and D
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Various WR's Hydrosetting of PSV 21506 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 4.
Surveillance The inspector observed portions of the below listed surveillance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were-consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments, and administrative controls; that minimum crew requirements were met; that test' prerequisites were completed;.that _
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special test equipment was calibrated and in service; that the required data were recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and, that the test results were adequate.
-Date Observed Procedure Number Component 4/20/81 STP 101 Makeup Pump Special Test w/ cooling secured 4/24/81 I 108 A RPS Channel A Surveillance 4/4/81-SP 201.03B Motor Driven Fire Pump 4/29/81 SP 201.03B Diesel Driven Fire Pump f
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-3-Date Observed Procedure Number Component Various SP 203-02 A-J Monthly HPI Tests 4/21/81 SP 203.05A~
Quarterly DHR System A Loop 4/21/81 SP 203.07A NSRW A 4/20/81 SP 204.030 Monthly Reactor Bldg. Spray 4/20/81 SP 204.07 Reactor Bldg. Spray Leakage 4/22/81 SP 205.07 Monthly CCW Valve Stroke Times 4/29/81 SP 208.03 Control Rod Program Verification 4/28/81 SP 210.018 P-319 Auxiliary Feed Pump 4/29/81 SP 210.llA Quarterly Conc. Boric Acid System, Pump Surveillance 4/29/81 SP 210.11B Conc. Boric Ac.id System Refueling Check Valve Surveillance No items of noncompliance and deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems During the month of April, 1981, the Unit Resident Inspector accompanied the licensee's Quality Control inspectors during a portion of the surveillance inspection of hydraulic snubbers.ind rigid pipe supports. The inspector verified that the inspections were conducted in accordance with the applicable inspection procedures, that the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that test results conformed with technical specification requirements, and that all deficiencies identi-fied during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel. Due to failures of three hydraulic snubbers during this-inspection, the next required inspection interval has been re uced to d
four months, plus or minus 25% per technical specification 4.14.1.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Plant Operations - Routine During the month of April, 1981, the inspectors reviewed the following activities:
a.
Review and Audits-On April 9,1981, the inspector sat in on a safety review committee meeting (MSRC). The inspector verified that provisions of the technical specfications dealing with membership. review process, frequency and qualifications were met. The inspector also verified that decisions made were reflected in the meeting minutes and that proposed correc-tive actions were taken.
b.
Fire Brigade Training The inspector witnessed portions of the Fire Brigade training performed during this report period.
The inspector verified that the assigned fire brigades demonstrated the ability to use the fire control equipment
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-4-to put out various type A and B fires, and that the safety precautions of applicable training procedures were followed.
c.
.The resident inspectors visited the emergency offsite facilities (E0F's) at the California Fire Academy in Ione, California, the Herald Fire Station in Herald,. California and the proposed EOF at the Galt (California) Civic Center. The inspectors verified that the agencies involved were familiar with their roles in the emergency plan. The equipment described in the emergency plan to be located at these facilities has been procured, but has not yet been stored in the proper locations. Since the plan has recently undergone a major revision (April 1, 1981), the Resident Inspectors will inspect the EOF equipment storage in the future. _ It was also noted that the NRC emergency notification circuit (ENS) phones and Health Physics Network phones were not yet installed at the E0F's. The appropriate NRC officials have been made aware of the latter item.
d.
Zero Power Testing The Inspector observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conduct 2d discussions with Control Room Operators during reactor plant startup and zero power testing on April 27-28, 1981.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. The Inspector verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequcte procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that the limiting conditions for operations were met, that the test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirments and that they were reviewed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup on Un' resolved Items
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Item 81-12-05 (CLOSED) High Pressure Injection Pumps (HPI) Ooerability Test On March 18, 1981, the licensee provided notification to the NRC of a condition involving the possible inoperability of the high pressure injection (HPI) pumps. The pumps' lube oil coolers supplied by the safety-related Nuclear Service Raw Water (NSRW) system were significantly plugged. This item was previously discussed in inspection report 50-312/
81-12. As part of the NRC review of this matter the licensee committed to perform a test of the Makeup pump (a redundant HPI pump) without lube oil cooling. The licen'see first ran the test on April 20, 1981, but the test was secured after 25 minutes when the auxiliary lube oil pump failed to
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i-5-automatically start upon receipt of a low oil pressure signal. On April 22, 1981, after evaluating the viscosity properties of the oil used in the
.HPI and Makeup pumps and the proper operation of the auxiliary lube oil pump, another test was run.
In this test the Makeup Pump was operated for two hours and two minutes, at which time the maximum bearing temperature exceeded 200 F, Tenperature data indicated that bearing and lube oil
temperatureshadalmoststabilizedatthispoint(ghehighestbearing temperature was increasing at a rate of about 0.25 F/ min.).
Region V performed a qualitative review of the results of this test.
Based on this review, Region V concluded that had an accident occurred, accompanied by a loss-of-offsite electrical power, the HPI pumps probably could have accomplished their intended safety function even with the degree of clogging which was discovered in the safety-related lube oil coolers.
Accordingly, Region V further concluded that although the HPI pumps were not inoperable due to the extensive clogging of the safety-related lube oil coolers, the margin of safety for operation of the pumps was singifi-cantly degraded.
In investigating the reason for the development of this degraded condition, the surveillance the inspectors determined that the licensee was not performing (4) and tests in aco rdance with the requirements of 10 CFP. 50.55a (g)
Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Specifically, it was determined that for the period from October 18, 1979 (when these require-ments became effective) to April 3,1981, the licensee's surveillance testing of the HPI and Makeup pumps did not include measurement of a stable bearing i
temperature as required by ASME Section XI, Subsection IWP-3500(b).
In addition, the tests were conducted using non-safety related component cool-ing water for lube oil cooling rather than the safety-related Nuclear Service Raw Water system. Accordingly, the test did not determine the operability of the safety-related lube oil cooling subsystem, but only that of the non-safety-related subsystem. The non-safety related subsystem, would not be available following an accident involving a coincident loss of offsite electrical power.
Therefore, the procedure did not appear to meet the intent of ASME Sectien XI, Subsection IWP-1100 which discusses the testing of pumps provided with an emergency power source. Failure to conduct these surveillance tests in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) and Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is an item of apparent noncompliance (81-15-02).
8.
Followup on Headquarter's Requests a.
Reload Report for Cycle 5 During this report period, personnel from NRC Headquarters in Washington, D. C., requested supplementary information concerning the licensee's
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-6-reload report for Cycle 5.
The licensee and the Resident Inspectors provided the requested information. NRR issued license Amendment No. 33 on April 23, 1981. This Amendment authorized operation of Rancho Seco during Cycle 5.
b.
Dif-Action Plan Verification Previous inspection reports 50-312/80-17, 80-20, 80-23, 80-29, 80-35, 81-07, and 81-12 document various actions taken by the Sacramento Municipal-Utility District to comply with " Category A" items in NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 lessons Learned Task Force Station Report and Short-Term-Recommendations," and NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."
This paragraph documents an inspection preformed of licensee actions regarding an Action Plan requirement due in 1981.
The inspection result that follows is perceded by the applicable NUREG-0737 paragrcph number.
II.B.4 Training for Mitigation of Core Damage The Inspector detqrmined that the requirement to implement training for mitigating core damage by April 1, 1981 had been met by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District as committed in a J. J. Mattimoe (SMUD) letter to Mr. Reid (NRC) dated January 16, 1981. The licensee has engaged General Physics Inc. to assist in preparing the training program and training materials, and to assist in conducting onsite training. Lesson plans and tests have been completed for the train-ing program. Training has started, but little of the required 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of training has been completed. Completion of training is required by October 1, 1981.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup on Regional Requests During this report period, personnel form the Region V office of the NRC in Walnut Creek, California requested information from the Resident Inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning:
(a) Reload Report for Cycle 5.
(b)
Nuclear Service Electrical Building construction activities.
(c) local leak rate testing of the reactor building penetrations.
In response to this request the Resident Inspector witnessed portions of the local leak rate testing of Reactor Building penetration No. 34 and the compartment and 0-ring tests of the Reactor Building personnel hatch.
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-7-(d) Followup of significant events.
(e) Heating and ventilation deficiences.
(f) High Pressure Injection pump testing.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
- 10. Licensee Event' Report Followup The Resident Inspectors were informed by the licensee of the following Licensee Event. Reports.
Inspection will be performed upon receipt of the written reports.
81-21 (OPEN) Failure of SFV-25003 to Open Electrically 80-22 (OPEN) Failure of Hydraulic Snubbers 80-23 (OPEN) Procedural Violation that Resulted in Uncontrolled Filling of Emergency Sump 80-24 (OPEN) Failure of Pressurizer Liquid Sample Valve SFV-70001 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11. Followup on Significant Events a.
Emergency Sump Filling On April 19, 1981, while the plant was shutdown for refueling, about
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4500 gallons of reactor coolant was released from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to the Reactor Building emergency sump.
At approximately 3:30 P.M. on this date the operators had placed the "A" train of Decay Heat Removal System (OHS), into operation and were securing the "B" train of the DHS. This operation was being performed to allow Surveillance testing of the Decay Heat Removal pump section valve from the Emergency Sump (HV-26106). This motor-operated valve is used for long-term emergency cooling for Post-LOCA conditions.
The surveillance stroking of this valve required that the normal DHS suction valve (OHS-002) be shut.
The Shift Supervisor ordered an Auxiliary Operator to shut DHS-00'2, and the Control Room Operator to review the surveillance procedure.
The Control Room Operator cleared the normal shutdown clearance tags for HV-26106 and racked in the breaker for power to the motor operator of HV-26106. The Control Room Operator paged the Auxiliary Operator and received the report that the manual valve OHS-002 was "almost shut" He then opened HV-26106, and almost immediately saw RCS pressure t
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and the pressurizer level startTdropping. With HV-26106 half open, he stopped operation of the valve and commenced. increased makeup flow to the RCS. Within minutes pressurizer level.and RCS pressure were restored.. During this transient, RCS pressure dropped from 230 psig to a minimum of 90 psig before being restored.
It appears
.the' Auxiliary Operator completed-closing DHS-002 soon after the transient began, and thereby secured flow from the RCS to the_ emergency sump. The incore thermocouples and DHS cooler inlet and outlet temperatures were monitored but no changes were noted. Air monitors
'for the Reactor Building atmosphere indicated particulate and gaseous.
activity increased slightly, but did not reach any alarm points and returned to normal readings within minutes. A review of level in-dications of various drain tanks and direct observations inside the Reactor Building indicated that approximately 4500 gallons had entered the Emergency sump, and that no other drain tanks or sumps were involved.
Prior to returning to normal operation, the water in the emergency sump was pumped to the waste disposal system, and surveillance testing of HV-26106 was completed.
The licensee is scheduled to report this item to the NRC in a written report by May 19,1981.(LER-80-23).
12.
Independent Inspection Effort Discussions were held between the Resident Inspectors and operations, security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they
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may'have which' are related to nuclear safety. These discussions will continue as a standard practice.
On numerous occasions during this report period, the Resident Inspectors attended outage status meetings. These meetings were held by the Outage Coordinator to provide all disciplines onsite with a update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
The following independent inspection effort was performed during the month of. April, 1981:
(a) Tours The inspectors toured external portions of the plant including the areas around the spray ponds, cooling towers and radwaste storage areas.
(b) Followup on Heating and Air Conditioning Concerns On-April 13, 1981, the Region V duty officer received a call from a contract engineer with SMUD. This engineer voiced some concerns on the application of ANSI N509-1980, " Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components," and ANSI N510-1980, " Testing of Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems," to the design and testing of Rancho Seco's heating
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b and air conditioning systems. On April 14, 1981 an investigative team from NRC Region V visited the Rancho Seco site, and along with one of the resident inspector:, reviewed the engineer's concerns.
Since the licensee had not been contacted by the individual, and these standards were not in existence when the plant was designed and built, the contract engineer decided not to submit his concerns as an allega-tion to the NRC.
In compliance with licensee procedures, the contract engineer has since submitted his concerns to the-licensee management in the form of Non-Conforming Reports (NCR's). The Resident Inspector will followup on the licensee's disposition of these NCR's (81-15-01).
The contract engineer's concerr.s and appropriate NCR numbers are shown below:
Concern Systems Affected*
(NCR#)
1.
Fire protection should A
(S-2329)
include a 40 square mesh B
(O;341)
cloth.(0.0ll inch wire)
at least 4 feet upstream of-a i4 EPA filter face in an accessible location for inspection and ease of cleaning. This is to arrest sparks in the event of fire. No spark arrestors are installed.
2.
Lucts are not fitted A
(S-2337)
with lighting and a switch B
(S-2342)
near entry to the duct C
(S-2343)
housings.
(ANSI N 509-1980)
3.
Filter unit housings A-(S-2332)
should have suitable B
(S-2350)
valved or sealable C
(S-2351)
floor drains. None installed. (ANSI N509-1980).
4.
Filter unit housing A
(S-2333)
should have door with B
(S-2348)
inspection windows, C
(S-2349)
none are installed.
(ANSI N509-1980)
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Electric heaters are A
(S-2335)
not ~ installed upstream-B
.(S-2345)
of charcoal filters to control humidity of air entering char-
-coal beds. (ANSI N509-1980)
6.
Each item powered or A
(S-2334)
controlled electronically B-(S-2347)
such as a fan motor valve, damper operator, fire protection devices, solenoid valves should have status indication for.the ener ized mode. (ANSI N509-
.1980 7.
-Existing charcoal has not been C
(S-2338)
replaced since 1971 according to tags on absorber cells.
~8.
Backdraft prevention dampers A
(S-2331)
not installed are required for Class A and B and leakage Class I,~II as shown on Table 5.2 of ANSI N509-1980.
9.
Permanently installed service A
(S-2336)
gallery with fixed ladder for B
(S-2344)
filter banks greater than 3 high or AACC CS-8 absorber cells 9 high are not installed.
(Section 5.6.1 ANSI N509-1980)
10.
Principle structure of frame-A (S-2330)
holders.for both HEPA and B
,S-2340)
charcoal absorber cells.not installed as recommended in Oakridge National labortory study (ORNL-NSIC-55) and
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ANSI N509-1981, 11.
ANSI N509-1981 requires HEPA.
A (S-2345)
filters used in ESF systems shall have steel sides.
Filters for the control room ventilation have wooden sides.
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- Note: Systems'affected code:
A -' Fuel Rad Waste and Hood Exhaust B - Purge Exhaust (R.B. and Aux. Building)
C - Reactor Building Cooling Units (normal and emergency)
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13. Exit Ir'cerview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 4. 1981.
.They summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The-licensee acknowledged _the inspector's comments.
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