IR 05000312/1981012
| ML19345H487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1981 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B, Obrien J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H485 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-81-12, NUDOCS 8105200411 | |
| Download: ML19345H487 (16) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
50-312/81-12 Report No.
DPR-54 50-312 License No.
Safeguards Group Docket No.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District Licensee:
P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Rancho Seco Unit 1 Facility Name:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection at:
March 1-31, 1981 Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
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k nrve L. Cante/ Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
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%pJohf0'Brien, Uni /ResidentInspector Date Signed 3 /\\
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Approved By:
B.H.Faulkenberry.ChiefTeactor@ojectsSection
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- 2, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Summary:
Inspection between March 1-31, 1981 (Report No. 50-312/81-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of long-term shutdown activities; monthly main-tenance observations; monthly surveillance observations; spent fuel pool activities; followup on Headquarters requests; review of plant operations; LER followup; followup on significant events; and, in-dependent inspection effort. The inspection activities involved 130 inspector-hours by the Resident Inspectors.
Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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8105200@/.,
RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted (3)
J. Mattimoe, Chief Nuclear Engineer and Assistant General Manager (1,3)
R. Rodgriquez, Manager, Nuclear Operations (1,2,3) P. Oubre', Plant Superintendent (2)
D. Blachly, Operating Supervisor N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor D. Cass, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (2)
Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance Engineering Technician (3)
R. Colombo, Technical Assistant (1,2)
G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor B. Daniels, Supervising Electrical Engineer D. Elliott, Quality Assurance Engineer D. Gardiner, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant (1,2)
H. Heckert, Engineering Technician J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer F. Kellie, Plant Chemist V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer (2)
R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor R. Moore, SMUD Special Agent (1,2)
T. Perry, On-site Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Raasch, Manager of Generation Engineering Department (1)
S. Rutter, Quality Assurance Engineer
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(2,3)
L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director T. Singer, SMUD Inspector B. Stiver, Mechanical Engineer J. Sullivan, Quality Assurance Engineer T. Tucker, Outage Coordinator (1)
J. Uhl, Mechanical Engineer (1,2)
D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor B. Wichert, Mechanical Engineer W. Wilson, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, inslucing members of the engineering, maintenance, operations,
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and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
(1) Denotes those attending the Exit Interviews on March 13, 1981 (2) Denotes those attending the Exit Interviews on March 31, 1981 (3) Denotes those attending the Special Meeting on March 27, 1981 Also in attendence at this special meeting were the following NRC (Region l
Vpersonnel):
l J. Crews, Acting Division Director, RPPEI G. Zwetzig, Acting Section Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2 i
I H. Canter, Senior Resident Inspector J. O'Brien, Unit Resident Inspector I
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2.
Inspection During Long 'Tenn Shutdown The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors verified that surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accom-plished, reviewed tagout records, and verified containment integrity was maintained as required by the technical specification. Tours of the
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reactor containment and auxiliary building areas were made to: assess equipment and plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector, by observation and direct intervi us verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls and verified:
the implementation of radioactive waste system controls and that there were no conflicts with technical specifications.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Modifications The inspectors observed portions of the modification activities listed below and verified, on a sampling basis, that the work was accomplished in accor-dance with design specifications by qualified personnel.
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a.
Installation of cable trays in east 4160 Volt Switchgear Room.
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Nuclear Service Electrical Buildings (NSEB) construction arid auxiliary building connections to the NSEB.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance l
l The inspector observed portions of the below listed surveillance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures and that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements, l
licensee commitments, and administrative controls, that minimum crew requirements were met, that test prerequisites were completed, that the
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required data were recorded for final review and analysis, and that the test results were adequate, a.
SP 211.05 (on 3-27-81): Nonnal Reactor Building Cooling Filter Tests l
(E&F).
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b.
SP 201.10A (on 3-27-81): Safety System Hydraulic Snubber Inspection (Partial).
No items cf noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
Spent Fuel Pool Activities The following documents relating to spent fuel pool activities were examined:
a.
Technical Specification 3.8, Fuel Loading and Refueling.
b.
STP 227, Refueling Rancho Seco for Cycle 5.
c.
AP16, Control and Accountability for SNM.
d.
A13, Fuel Handling.
e.
B8, Refueling Equipment Checks.
The inspectors determined that these procedures contained provisions for limiting the number of fu?1 assemblies that could be out of safe geometry locations at the same time, provisions for verifying proper operation of crane interlocks, provision; for verifying proper ventilation system oper-ation, provisions for verifying that minimum water level requirements were monitored during fuel handling operations, and other appropriate provisions.
The inspector dist.ussed fuel handling activities with licensee personnel, and verified by direct observation that the spent fuel pool water level was higher than the minimum level established by approved procedures, that the spent fuel pool ventilation system was maintaining the building at a negative pressure and on a sampling basis, that other activities were in confomance with technical specification requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Follow-up on Headquarters Requests Thermal Cycles Received by HPI Nozzles During this report period, personnel from NRC Headquarters in Washington, D.C. requested infomation regarding the number of themal cycles that the high pressure injection nozzles on the reactor vessel received since the plant went into operation in 1974. This information was obtained and transmitted to the requestors.
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l TMI Action Plan Verification Previous inspection reports 50-312/80-17, 80-20, 80-23, 80-29, 80-35
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and 81-07 document various actions taken by the Sacramento Utility l
District to comply with " Category A" items in NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Station Report and Short Tem Recormlendations",
NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements".
l This paragraph documents inspections, perfomed during this period, of licensee actions regarding administrative controls / procedures, staffing and plant in response to Action Plan Requirements due in 1980 and early 1981.
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_4 The inspection results that follow are preceded by the applicable NUREG-0737 paragraph numbers.
I. C.6 Verify ~ Correct ~ Performance ~of' Operating' Activities'(0 pen-Unresolved Item 81-07-03).
The inspectors determined that Revision 3 to Administrative Procedure 4;
" Administrative Clearance Procedure", dated January 12, 1981, now addresses dual verification of valve, instrument and control alignmeat.
Components listed in the " Return to SFAS Standby" sections of the following procedures are to be verified as correctly positioned by two individuals when estab-lishing a clearance for either maintenance er testing. These are the same components and procedures which require dual verification for valve, instru-ment and control lineups as discussed in IE Report 50-312/81-07, paragraph 9.
Dual verifications are not required when the Reactor Coolant System temperature is less than 200 F.
(1) High Pressure Injection (HPI) A.15 (2) Low Pressure Injection (LPI) A.8 (3) Core Flood (CES) A.4 (4) Reactor Building Emergency Cooling (HVS) A.14 (5) Reactor Building Isolation A.70, SP 214.03 (6) Reactor Building Spray (CBS) A.7 (7) Nuclear Raw Water (NRW) A.25 (8) Nuclear Cooling Water (NSW) A.24 (9) Diesel Generators (DGS) A.31 For maintenance, dual verification will be accomplished by having two operators sign the " DANGER DO NOT OPERATE" tag under the words " Attached By".
In addition, each operator will sign the " DANGER TAG CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION" in the " Attached By" section. For testing, dual verifica-tion will be accomplished by having both operators sign the " TESTING" tag under the " Attached By" section. There do not appear to be requirements, however, for dual verification of removal of clearance and test tags.
Upon satisfactory completion of testing, the Shift Supervisor will have the clearance tags for testing removed and the maintenance clearance tags replaced, if applicable. The Shift Supervisor will then return the Clear-ance Authorization hard copy to the person in charge of the test, if applicable. Because dual verification for removal of tags is not provided prior to return-to-service of equipment important to safety, this item (81-07-03) will remain unresolved.
It is noted that NUREG-0737 does allow functional testing as an alternate to the above return-to-service requirement, as long as it can be performed without compromising plant safety, and can prove that all equipment valves, and switches involved in the activity are correctly aligned. A licensee representative said that the licensee would look into this issu.
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- 5-II.D.3 Direct Indication of PORV and SV's (0 pen-Followup Item 80-23-02)
This item was originally described in NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations," paragraph 2.1.
3.a.
In Inspection Reports 50-312/80-23 and 80-29, the inspector discussed the lack of documentation supporting the environmental and seismic qualifi-cation of the acoustical ~ monitoring system used to monitor the position of the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) and the Pressurizer Safety Valves (SV's). This system was installed and made operational in June, 1980. The system consists of a Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC) 1414 Valve Flow Monitoring System (VFMS).
The inspector examined TEC repcrt number 517-TR-03, " Qualification Test Report for Environmental and Seismic Testing of the TEC," dated, December 29, 1980. This report shows the VFMS to be seismically qualified, but not completely environmentally qualified. The report states in Section 8 that the requirements of the Qualification Plan (517-TR-01) were met for aging, and irradiation and seismic testing per ANSI /IEEE 323-1974 and 344-1975. The accelerometers, connectors, and model 424-C2 and 273-C2 cables functioned following the LOCA/MSLB transient tests; however, the TEC Model 500/501 charge converter did not function following the second simulated LOCA/MSLB transient.
The report concludes that the VFMS can be designated Class LE if:
All connectors between the accelerometer and the charge
converter are safety wired.
- TEC Model 424-C2 or 273-C2 cables are used..
The charge converter is removed from the containment
or the LOCA/MSLB transient is not considered part of the VFMS operational environment.
A licensee representative stated that the connections will be safety wired,
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the proper coaxial cable (N420ft.) will be ordered and installed, and the charge converter will be moved outside of the containment. The work will not be performed until the 1982 refueling outage.
Item 80-23-02 will remain open pending satisfactory environmental qualifi-cation of the TEC-VFMS.
7.
Review of Plant Operations During the month of March, 1981 the inspector reviewed the following act-
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ivities:
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Security The inspector verified by observations and discussion with six individuals that acceptable scores were achieved during the conduct of weapons qualifi-cation and physical fitness tests. A training lecture was also observed.
Nc items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Emergency Preparedness The inspectors visited several onsite and offsite emergency facilities and verified that the cognizant individuals were familiar with their roles in the emergency plan.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
LER Followup
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LER 80-5- (Closed) West Perimeter TLD Readings Exceeded (Note: This item was incorrectly noted as OPEN in Inspection Report 50-312/81-04, paragraph 7).
LER 81-16 (0 pen) Iron Oxide Corrosion in All High Pressure Injection Lube Oil Coolers This 24-hour report was made to the Region V office of the NRC on March 18, 1981. The fourteen day followup report is due for submittal on or about April 1, 1981. The details of the event as known at the close of this report period are given in paragraph 9.b.
9.
Followup on Significant Events I
a.
Reactor Building Evacuation (Closed)
On March 16 and 17, 1981, access to the Reactor Building was restricted due to the licensee's response to various~ instrument readings in the Control Room. The instruments in question were RI5001 A&B which normally sample the reactor building atmosphere for particulate and gaseous rad-ioactivity.
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The plant status at midnight an March 16, 1981 was shutdown (since January 31.1981), refueling operations were complete, the reactor vessel head was in place, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) filling procedure was on hold, the "B" decay heat system was in operation to the RCS, a Reactor Building purge (#81-6) was in progress, and the contents of the "C" Waste Gas Decay Tank were being released through the auxiliary building stack. The "C" Waste Gas Decay Tank contents
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-7-were being discharged to permit a scheduled 10-year inservice inspec-2x10gfthetank.uCi/cc),Kr-85(1.06x10-yasreportedtocontainXe-133(j.
tion The "C" tank u Ci/cc) and Xe-131m (2.98x10- u Ci/cc. The release was begun on March 14, 1981 at a rate of about 1 cfm.
At 0913, on March 16, nitrogen had been applied to the Pressurizer; at 09?8, filling of the RCS vas resumed at about 60 gpm via the
"A" DHR pe.np; at 0940 the Auxiliary Building exhaust blowers tripped off; and, at approximately 0950, the reactor building gas monitor RI5001B initiated an alarm and terminated Reactor Building purge.
(The alarm point is 15,000 cpm). At this point the Control Room called on Health Physics (HP) technicians to evaluate the alarm. At 0955 a HP technician responded to the Control Room and noted the gas monitor (RIS00LB) peak-ing at about 80,000 cpm.
Based on the assumption that the sample point for RI5001B had shifted automatically to the Reactor Building when purge was terminated and that the monitor was accurately assessing activity in the Reactor Building (later shown to be incorrect), the evacuation of the Reactor
Building was ordered at 1027 on March 16, 1981. Bece.use there was no immediate concern that excessive radiation levels were present in the reactor building, the evacuation was handled in a manner which did not allow release of the containment atmosphere to the environs. The NRC was informed at this time. The monitor reading was seen to drop too slowly to permit immediate restart of the purge. While RIS00LB was indicating a high reading, a parallel monitor RIS001E (the new high range post-TMI gas monitoring channel for the Reactor Building), was reading background level. By 1103, the RIS00IB gas monitor reading had dropped to the point that purge could be reestablished. Switching the sam, ling point from the Reactor Building to the purge duct, however, did not affect the gas channel -aading. Several gas samples were taken and counted in the first hour. The Region V Mobile Laboratory was at the site during this event, and the NRC Laboratory Technician ana-lyzed a Reactor Building gas sample in parallel with the licensee.
The NRC results agreed with those of the licensee indicating the Re-actor Building atmosphere did not appear to contain contaminants above
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l tne background levels normally seen.
Over the ner.t several hours, it was not clear why RI5001B was showing
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gas activities as high as 21 times MPC, while Reactor' Building grab samples during the same period were showing no significant gas activity.
During the evening of March 16, 1981 and the morning of Marca 17, 1981, each time the Waste Gas Header radiation Monitor (RIS003) reached the alarm point and stopped the purge, a sudden increase in RIS00IB, the Reactor Building Purge Monitor, was noted.
peak in RIS00IB caused
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I the ReactorLBuilding purge fans to automatically stop. Each time this occurred, the Health Physics department restricted access to the Reactor Building and took grab samples with.the same-results as before - minimum detectable activity.
F In the course of obtaining grab samples, a technician noted a plastic cap inserted in the sample inlet pipe and removed it. It was at this point that the licensee concluded that an undertermined pathway existed'
which allowed radioactive gas to enter RIS001.
It also appeared highly
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likely that the Waste Gas Header and the Hydrogen Purge System inter-connections were involved.
On the morning of March 17, 1981, licensee Health Physics personnel in-spected the actual piping and valve positions in the Auxiliary Building mezzanine area where the radiation monitors and most of the associated -
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piping are located. Upon completion of this inspection, the licensee
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concluded that certain. valves in-the Hydrogen Purge systems were closed but not tightly seated. Also, valve WGS 105 (bypass valve around a.
hydrogen purge exhaust blower which allows sampling Reactor: Building gas concentrations) had been left open to enable repeated sampling of j
the Reactor Building and, valve WGS 108 may have been' inadvertently lef t open from a prior undetermined activity. - Finally,it was deter-mined that a hose had come loose allowing air leakage at the discharge
of the Roots Blower in RIS00I. The licensee properly aligned the
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l appropriate valves and reconnected the hose and tightened the hose
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clamp.
At 1204 on March 17, 1981, the licensee manually stopped a Reactor Building purge at a time when the Waste Gas Header read high activity.
j-Because increase in RIS00LB was observed, it was concluded that the leakage r :h between the Waste Gas Header and the Reactor Building monitor W 3een eliminated.
Throughout the remainder of the release of the "C" Waste Gas. Decay tank, which ended at 063L on March 18, 1981, there was no further in-dication of significant readings on RI500I.
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Based on the above, the licensee postulated the problem was due to leakage from the pressurized Waste Gas Header through a partially open valve WGS081, then through valve WGS 107 which did not seal under the applied pressure, then throuin open valve WGS'105~(open for sampling purposes) and out the pulled apart hose in the mezzanine room of the Auxiliary Building. Although gas escaped at the location'of the pulled
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-apart hose, sufficient gas apparently entered the inlet of monitor-RI5001B, to register a high radiation reading.
Since all radioactive gas observed in this sequence came from a Waste Gas Decay tank under an analyzed release, and'was exhausted via a
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-9-monitored stack there was no "unmonitored" activity release. There apparently was a small amount of-active gas which passed through RI5001B and into the Reactor Building, but the amount was ncn. de-tectable in the Reactor Building atmosphere.
A number of issues surfaced during this event:
(1) The licensee discovered a plastic cap in the sample inlet pipe from the Reactor Building. This did not affect release from the Reactor Building because during Reactor Building purges, the sample inlet shifts to the isokinetic probes in the Reactor Building stacks. The cap was apparently in place for only about one day and is felt to be an isolated incident.
In addition there were redundant operational radiation moni-tors in service during this event.
(2) Some licensee personnel attempting to track down the problem apparently did not refer to change Notices which were out-standing against certain system drawings. Drawings where such notices were outstanding included M5II (Radiation Monitoring System), M562 (Waste Gas System), and M55I' (Peactor Building Normal and Emergency Ventilation Systems). The licensee will look into this issue. This item will be followed up by the Resident Inspectors.
(81-12-01)
(3) The majority of valves in the mezzanine area are not labeled.
At least one valve, WGS 098, was incorrectly labeled as WGS i
088 and WGS 098. The licensee will look into this issue.
l This item will be followed up by the Resident Inspectors.
(81-12-02).
(4) Operations Procedures AII (Reactor Sampling System), A52 (Hy-drogen Purge System), A23 (Waste Gas System), Calibration Pro-cedure I-026 (Hydrogen Analyzer Calibration), and Surveillance Procedure SP 201.08 (Hydrogen Purge System Surveillance Tcst),
may require review to determine the need to revise valve line-j ups and procedures which were involved in the incident des-cribed above. The licensee committed to perform this review.
The review will be completed prior to startup from this refuel-ing outage. This item will be followed up by the Resident Inspectors.
(81-12-03)
(5) The licensee prepared an Engineering Change Notice (ECN3459)
to install a spool piece at WGS 081 which, if installed, would prevent accidental inter-connection between the Waste Gas
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System and the Hydrogen Purge and Sampling Systems. The licensee stated at the exit meeting on March 31, 1981 that the ECN would l
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-10-be voided because the modification would create a potentially un-monitored release path. The licensee expressed the opinion that better maintenance practices and more attention to valve manipula-tions and procedures should preclude this event from re-occurring.
(6) The flexible hose connections which are part of the radiation monitor system in question should be upgraded or periodic sur-veillance performed to verify system integrity. The licensee will look into this item.
The Resident Inspectors will followup f
on the changes.
(81-12-04)
This event recieved significant media attention, however, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
_Pluqqing of High Pressure In.iection Pump L0be Oil Coolers On March 18, 1981, the licensee provided prompt notification to the NRC of a condition involving the inoperability of the high pressure injection (HPI) pump lube oil coolers supplied by the Nuclear Service Raw Water (NSRW) system. The ESRW system is safety related, as is the HPI system.
Rancho Seco is provided with three (HPI) pumps as part of the Emergent.y Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Each of these pumps is served by two lube oil coolers which are attached in series to the HPI lube oil system-one cooler is supplied by the safety-related NSRW system cnd the other I
supplied by the non-safety related Component Cooling Water (CCW) system.
While inspecting the CCW lube oil cooler for the "B" HPI purp during the current refueling outage, the licensee observed a degraded condition
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of the cooler due to iron oxide sludge which clogged about 40-50% of l
the 3/16 inch diameter tubcs. The licensee then inspected the safety-
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related NSRW lobe oil cooler for the "B" HPI pump and noted hard scale
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clogging of cbout 90% of the tubes. The heads of this cooler were also observed to be pitted.
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l Approximately the same degree of clogging (80%) was also found on the
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NSRW supplied lube oil coolers for the "A" HPI pump and the Makeup pump.
The degree of clogging was such that the effectiveness of the lube oil coolers could have been seriously impaired if called upon to perform--
particularly with a coincident loss of off-site electrical power, which would have disabled the CCW system and the lube oil coolers it supplies.
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Accordingly, it is possible the HPI pumps might have operated for only a limited period of time before lubricant breakdown and bearing failure would have occurred in the safety injection mode of HPI operation. Thus, if the HPI pumps were needed for more than a short period of time, all three pumps night have failed. For certain types of small break loss-of-coolant accidents,this might have allowed uncovering of the core with attendant fuel damag.
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-11-Because the majority of the NSRW system is epoxy coated carbon steel, the licensee believes the cause of the problem is due to highly oxygenated water from the NSRW system coming in contact with the carbon steel heads of the lube oil coolers.
Although the system is not needed in the shutdown condition, the licensee has taken immediate steps to correct the problem. The one non-safety re-lated CCW lube oil cooler and all three safety related HPI lube oil coolers have been wire brushed and cleaned, thus freeing them of the clogged con-dition. The licensee has also placed an epoxy coating on the carbon steel heads of the "B" HPI lube oil cooler.
The licensee has inspected other coolers and heat exchangers served by the NSRW system to determine the extent of the rust problem. The results of these inspections are enclosed (Attachment 1).
On Friday, March 27, 1981, a meeting was held between licensee represen-tatives and NRC Regional management (See Paragraph 1) to review the licen-see's evaluation of the occurrence and the corrective action proposed to prevent recurrence.
During this meeting the licensee presented the results of an engineering analysis which indicated that with 10% of nominal cooler flow, in a worst case condition, there would he sufficient cooling to maintain lube oil temperature to less than 175 F.
(The limit is 1800F)
The following corrective action program was outlined by the licensee:
(1) The licensee will perform a conservative test to confirm the analysis noted above. The test will consist of securing all CCW and NSRW to the lube oil coolers for the Makeup pump. Lube oil temperatures will be monitored along with other major pump parameters. The Makeup pump will then be operated with flow through the recirculation line and with normal makeup and seal flow until critical parameters are reached or conditions stabilize at an acceptable level. The detatis of this test and the procedures which will be used to perform the test will be examined by the inspectors. Pending the examination of the results of this test, this item will remain unresolved (81-12-05).
(2) Corrosion coupons have been placed in the CCil and Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) systems to monitor future corrosion problems.
The placement of the coupons was planned prior to the present refueling outage, but nonetheless may supply important information with respect to the monitored systems.
(3) The licensee is reviewing a related event which occurred at Arkansas Nuclear One (Units 1&2) to determine if there is information which is applicable to the Rancho Seco event. Depending on the nature of the information available, the test described above may not be per-formed.
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(4) The fourteen day report on this event (LER 81-16) is due on or about April 1, 1981. The licensee will report the latest information on this issue and supplement the report as further information is obtained.
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In this regard, during October -1981, the licensee will inspect the NSRW HPI lube oil coolers to evaluate the corrosion rate and determine if the epoxy coating applied to the heads of the "B" HPI pump lube oil cooler has been effective in reducing or eliminating corrosion.
The licensee will also supplement the fourteen day report (LER 81-16)
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when the results of the test described above have been analyzed if any new information is developed.
J (5) The licensee stated that there is concern that corrosion problems could also exist in the non-safety related CCW lube oil coolers. The licensee therefore intends to inspect-the other two CCW lube oil /HPI coolers for sludge deposits similar to those seen in the "B" cooler.
(6) Finally, the licensee will review the requirements of ASME Section XI, IWP, with regard to inservice testing of pumps. Because further information on this matter is needed this item will remain unresolved (81-12-06)
No items of noncompliance were identified in the initial examination of this event. There are two unresolved items which will receive further inspection (81-12-05 and 81-12-06).
10.. Independent Inspection Effort
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Discussions were held between the Resident Inspectors and operations, security
and maintenance personnel in an attempt to Letter understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These discussions will continue as a standard practice.
On numerous occasions during this report period, the Resident Inspectors attended outage status ireetings. These meetings are held by the Outage Coordinator to provide all disciplines onsite with a update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
The following independent inspection effort was performed during the month of March, 1981:
Witnessed portions of the " keyway cracking" and " steeple indication" work a.
performed in connection with inspection of the main turbine.
b.
Toured external portions of the plant, including the spray pond, cooling tower and radwaste storage areas.
Followed up on use of stored stainless steel pipe in safety related systems.
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Discovered a Security Guard apparently inattentive at his post.
In-vestigation into the event disclosed that the post which was being manned by the guard was not required for security purposes during the shutdown condition.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliar.ce,
.or deviations.
The following unresolved items were discussed in this report:
a.
81-07-03 dealing with Item I.C.6 in NUREG-0737. See Paragragh 6.
b.
81-12-05 dealing with corrosion in HPI lube oil coolers and a test that may be performed to show the effects of loss of cooling to the lube oil coolers. See Paragraph 9.b.1).
I c.
81-12-06 dealing with inservice testing requirements for safety related pumps. See Paragraph 9.b.6).
12.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on March 31, 1981. They summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
,
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
l
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_ - - - - _ _ - - - - - _ _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ -
. _
NUCLEAR SERVIC8 RAW WATER HEAT EXCHANGERS
.
HEAT EXCitANCER HATERIALS
'
EQUIP. NAME EQUIP. I.D.
TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION RESULTS RDfARKS
P-238A E-239C Tube and Shell 3/16" dia. brass tubes, Tubes %90% plugged with Sand blasted & epoxy coated heads.
I Lube 011 Coolcr cast steel heads rust deposits cleaned tubing l
l
.
'
P-238A A-529A Tube and Shell 3/8" dia. copper tubes, Tubes clean, very minor corro-Small amount of cleaning done
,
Room Cooler C.S. flanged conn.,
sion on in/ outlet flanges
I S.S. water box
,
P-2383 E-239D Tube and Shell 3/16" dia. brass tubes.
Tubes %80% plugged with Cleaned heads & tubing tube 011 Cooler cast steel heads rust deposits
P-2388 A-529C Tube and Shell 3/8" dia. copper tubes.
Not inspected None
}
Room Cooler C.S. flanged conn.,
S.S. water box
,
P-236 E-237B Tu'3e and Shell 3/16" dia brass tubes.
Tubes %80% plugged with Cleaned heads and tubing l
Lube 011 Coolee cast steel heads rust deposite f
.
t
P-236 A-5298 Tube and Shell 3/8" dia. copper tubes, Not inspected None Room Cooler C.S. flanged conn.,
o
,
S.S. water box y
$
l-i
!
P-291A Internal to
' Water Jacket Carbon steel Noc inspected None
"
Lube 011 Coolee Pump a
s
8 P-291A A-529D Tube and Shell 3/8" dia. copper tuting, Tubes clean, very minor corro-Small amount of cleaning done" t
Room Cooler C.S. flanged conn.,
sion on in/ outlet flanges
S.S. water box
?
I
P-2918 Internal to Water Jacket Carbon steel jacket, In/ outlet pipe clean Reassembled i
Lube 011 Cooler Pump C.S. in/ outlet pipe l
,
O
P-2918 A-529E Tube and Shell 3/8" dia. ' copper tubing.
Not inspecte,d None
Q Room Cooler C.S. flanged conne.,
.{
S.S. water box
.
P-261A Internal to Water Jacket Carbon steel Not inspected None Luke Oil Coole :
Pump
,
um a
Ol'12 P-2615 Internal to Water Jacket carbon steel Not inspected None-g O
,
==
i Lube Oil Coole
-
Pump i
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.
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- fPNOTE
- All Heater Exchanger in/ outlet piping is copper except as noted on the internal. Lube 011 Cooler
.
.. _. _.
(CONTINUED)
HEAT EXCHANGER
EQUIP. NAME EQUIP. I.D.
TYPE MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION RESULTS REMARKS
%
.
,
G-886A 3/4" tubes; 90/10 CuN1; Heat Exchanger E-473A Tube & Shell Shell-SA53B carbon steel;
- 3% L.O. in/ outlet ATemperature Results fadicate tubes are clean Head covers-C.S. faced w/
decrease and acceptable 90/10 CuNi at water side
14 G-8868 3/4" tubes; 90/10 CuN1; l~
Heat Exchanger
.E-4738 Tube & Shell Shell-SA53B carbon steel;
- 8% L.O. in/ outlet ATemperature Results indicate tubes are alightly Head covers-C.S. faced w/
increase fouled, but acceptable 90/10 CuNi at water side
NSRW Cooler A E-480A Tube & Shell 7/8" tubes; Admiralty brass,
- 5 psi pressure drop across Results indicate tubes are clean and Shell-Carbon steel; Head tubes (10 psi AP allowable acceptable (NRW on tube side)
covers-C.S. epoxy lined; per manufacturer's specs.)
Tube sheets-CuNi i
NSRW Cooler B E-4808 Tube & Shell 7/8" tubes; Admiralty brass, ***5 psi pressure drop across Res'Ats indicate tubes are clean and Shell-Carbon steel; Head tubes (10 psi AP allowable acceptable. (NRW on tube side)
covers-C.S. epoxy lined; permanufacturer'sspecs.)
Tube sheets-CuNi
'
2n nx2 r
m t
-4-a
- - Peta from S?.206.03A 9/9/7 through 3/1/80 o
- - Data from sP.206.038 8/31 '74 through 2/19/.11
- - Data from 3/81 test I
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