IR 05000312/1981020
| ML20009E142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1981 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009E137 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-81-20, NUDOCS 8107270158 | |
| Download: ML20009E142 (12) | |
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U. S. Nt' CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE Or' INSPECTION AMD ENFORCEMENT REGIGN V Report No. 50-?l2/81-20 Docket No. 50-312 License No. DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento. California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Unit 1
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Inspection at:
Herald. California (Rancho Seco Site)
inspection cond cted:
June 1 - 30. 198L
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' Date Signed T. Young, /,cting Ch/[Ief, React)r/ rojects Section A2. Reactor Ooerations Pro _iect Branch Date Signed Summary:
Inspection between June 1 - 30, 1981(Report 50-312/31_-20)
Areas Inspected: Observation of Plant Operations; Followup on Reactor Plant Trips; SALP activities; Followup on Regional Request; Followup Headquarters Request; and Independent Inspection effort. The inspection activities involved 123 inspector hours by 2 Resident Inspectors.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified
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8107270158 810710 2-
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RV Form 219 (2)
PDR ADOCK 05000312 G
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I 1 DETAILS
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1.
Person Contacted
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- R. Roagriquez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- P. Cubre', Plant Superintendent
- D. Blachly, Operation Supervisar N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor D. Cass, Pechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance Engineering Technician
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor D. Elliott, Quality Assurance Engineer D. Gardiner, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer F. Kellie, Plant Chemist V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer
- R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor
- R. Myers, Nuclear Engineer
- T. Perry, On-site Quality Assurance. Supervisor D. Raasch, Manager of Generation Engineering Department S. Rotter, Quality Assurance Engineer L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director T. Singer, SMUD Inspector B. Stiver, Mechanical Engineer J. Sullivan, Quality Assurance Engineer T. Tucker, Outage Coordinator D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor-
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B. Wichert, Mechanical Engineer W. Wilson, Sen'ar Chemical & Radiation Assistant The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations, and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on June 30, 1981.
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2.
_0bservation of Plant Operations
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During the month of June, 1981, the inspectors performed the following activities:
Verified, on a sampling basis, that the physical security plan con-i a.
cerning entry and egress from the Restricted area was being followed
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and'that the associated equipment was fully operational.
l b.
Observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and con-ducted discussions with the control room operators.
c.
Verifitd proper control room manning and access. However, on one tour, the inspector found that the control room door access was not
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controlled. Subsequent inspection effort by Ret 'n V specialists resulted in"an item.of noncompliance.
(See L.E. Report 50-312/81-19.)
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d.
Verified the status of selected control room annunciators, and assured that the control room operators understand the reasons for important
illuminated annunciators. The inspectors also verified that appropriate action was taken to clear annunciators which signaled abnormal conditions.
Reviewed panel boards for the Engineered Safety Features System (ESF),
e.
and verified that the redundant trains were available for service where required.
The inspector further verified the proper lineup of the Auxiliary Feed System, the Emergency Diesel Generator System, and the off site power systems.
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Verified that containment temperature and pressure was in conformance with Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) requirements.
Verified that control rod insertion limits and power distribution g.
limits were in conformance with Technical Specification (TS) require-ments.
h.
Reviewed stack monitor recorder traces and verified that release requirements were met.
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Observed portions of maintenance on the following systems: diesel generator; auxiliary feed controls; and the fire protection system.
In addition, the inspectors verified the work was performed by quali-fied personnel, and in conformance with Limiting Conditions for Operation.
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Observed portions of selected ongoing ESF surveillance, and verified that the test equipment was calibrated, the redundant system or component was available for service, approved procedures were uced and testing was performed by qualified personnel.
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Reviewed the results of a sample of at least one liquid and one gascus release and verified conformance with 10 CFR 20 and Technical faecifications, prior to release.
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Verified that proper chemistry sampling and radiation protection controls were used when handling samples of the reactor coolant system and radraste systems, during maintenance on contaminated systems, and during normal entry to and egress from radiation areas.
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Conducted a visual inspection of selected piping between the containment and containment is..'atioi valves for leakage or leakage paths.
No items of noncompliance (except as noted in~ Paragraph 2.c.) or deviations were identified.
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Plant Trips Following the plant trips on June 17, 1981,and June 23, 1981,due to feed-water pump automatic control failures, the inspector verified the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indications, review of logs, and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee. All systems responded as expected.
Following the June 17, 1981 trip, control rod 10 in. group 4 failed to latch. The licensee decided to replace the stator for this rod. The licensee is expected to report the circumstances of this equipment failure in writing to the NRC by July 19, 1981. The plant returned to 50 percent power on June 20, 1981. Following the plant trip on June 23, 1981, the plant returned to 75 percent power on June 24, 1981.
The licensee is cal-ibrating and aligning the new feedwater controlle; and will operate at 50 to 75 percent power until the system is restored to full automatic.
operation.
No items of noncomnliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance (SALP) Inspection By letter dated August 28, 1980, J. L. Crews of Region V advised J. J.
Mattimoe of SMUD of apsects of Rancho Seco operations which would be re-ceiving an increased frequency and/or scope of inspection as a result of the Region V SALP review. These areas were Design Changes and Modifications, Quality Assurance Audits, Training, Quality Control, and Maintenance.
The inspector attended a Plant Rev'.ew Committee (PRC) meeting on June 9, 1981,'and a Management Safety Revi a C..mmittee (MSRC) meeting on June 11, 1981, as part of the Quality Assurance Audit aspect of the SALP review.
The subject of the PRC and MSRC meetings was to determine whether the
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erection of a construction crane on the Rancho Seco property (to be used for construction of the safety grade Nuclear Service Electrical Building (NSEB), represented an Unreviewed Safety Question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a). The subject was brought to the licensees attention by the Senior Resident Inspector on June 4,z1981, when the crane erection was nearing completion. The reactor plant was shut down during this. period and no loads were lifted over the Auxiliary Building with the"new crane.
TheMSRCdeterm#nedcertainaspectsofthe' crane'soperakiontobean Unreviewed Safety Question. Details of this: issue may be found in Paragraph 8.b. to this report.
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The inspector verifjed that tie 'mseting memberships met quorum requirements
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delineated in the Technical Specifications, The i.nspector also verified
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-4-that licensec followup to issues discussed in these meetings has been consistant with the decisions made in the meetings.
No items of noncompliance cr deviations were identified.
5.
Check Valve Testing On April 20, 1981, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued an order that modified the plant's license (DPR-54) concerning primary coolant.' system pressure isolation valve testing. Revision of the appropriate surveillance test procedure was approved by the Plant Review Committee on April 15, 1981, in anticipation of the order. Direct volumetric leak rate testing of the subject valves was performed on May 1, 1981,during the end of the refueling outage. The inspector verified that the licensee has adequately documented an acceptable test, and that approved procedures have been established to conform with the order.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Regional Requests During the month of June, 1981, personnel from the Region V office of the NRC in Walnut Creek, California, requested information from the Resident Inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning:
a.
Feedwater control system maintenance; b.
Emergency Plan appraisal; c.
Secondary Plant radiological cleanup; and d.
Security Plan violations.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup on Headquarters Requests TMI Action Plan Verification
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Utility District to comply with"" Category A" item'sTin,N Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term,UREG-0578, "TMI-2 Recommendations."
In November, 1980,the NRC issued kUREG-0737,'" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements".
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Thisparagraphdocumentsan' ins)ectionperfo'rme'dattherequestofNRC Headquarters of licensee /sctions regar' ding admi_nistrative controls / procedures, andstaffing..inresponsetoActionPlanRequirementsfueinearly1981.
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The inspection result that follows is preceded by the NUREG-0737 paragraph number. The licensee's response to this-item appears to meet the acceptance criteria stated in NUREG-0737.
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-5-I. A.1.1. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Long-Term Staffing (81-07-01 CLOSED)
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In I.E. Report 50-312/81-07, the inspector described the licensee's program for STA staffing. The inspector has since verified that the licensee is following through with the intent to license STA's. Their licensing exams are expected in April,1982.
- The inspector also compared the qualifications of each STA with the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) guide 1%es. The licensee management granted appropriate waivers in accordance with those guidelines, based on prior experience and educational background, and took appropriate corrective action on STA's who did not meet the guidelines.
There were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified in this review. Accordingly, item 81-07-01 is CLOSED as is the inspection on NUREG-0737, item I.A.1.1.3, " Shift Technical Advisor Training."
8.
Independent Inspection Effort Discussions were held between the Resident Inspectors and operations, security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These dis-cussions will continue as a standard practice.
On numerous occasions, during the month of June, 1981, the Resident Inspectors attended operations status meetings. These meetings are held by the Operations Supervisor to provide all disciplines onsite with an update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
In addition to the above, independent inspection effort was performed on the following items:
a.
Followup on Heating and Air Conditioning Concerns: (81-15-01 CLOSED)
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Paragraph 12.b of I.E.' Inspection ~ Report 50-312/81-15 discussed concerns of a contract engineer about-design and testing deficiencies of Rancho Seco's heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
systems. The' Unit Resident Inspector reviewed the Final Safety l
Analysis Report (FSAR), maintenance and surveillance records con-cerning the HVAC systems end followed up on the licensee's dis-position of the involved Nonconforming Reports (NCR's). The inspec-tors findings relating to the concerns are outlined below:
Concern Finding 1.
Fire protection should ORNL-NSIC-65 is not a referenced include a 40 square mesh'
design Standard or Code applicable cloth (0.011 inch wire)
to Rancho Seco.
Filter units built i
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-6-at least 4 feet upstream to con y with National Fire of a HEPA filter face in Protection Association Pamphlet an accessible location for 90A (see Para.9.7.3.6.D,FSAR).
inspection and ease of ORNL-NSIC-65 also states:"There cleaning. This is to are no published standards for the arrest sparks in the event
. design and construction of nuclear of fire. No spark plant exhaust systems, arrestors are installed.
"(para.1.2 dtd 1/70).
2.
Ducts are not fitted Rancho Seco units were built prior with lighting and a switch to the existence of referenced ANSI near entry to the duct N509-1980. Portable lighting has housings.
(ANSI N 509-proved adequate for the infrequent 1980).
work inside ducts.
3.
Filter unit housings Units constructed prior to existence should have suitable of ANSI N509-1980. Operation for valved or sealable over 7 years of the auxilary b1dg.
floor drains. None purgesystems has shown no need. As installed.
(ANSI N509-a result of a small quantity of water 1980).
condensed in several RB Emergency Coolers, ECN A-3190 was initiated in 10/80.
Installation of said drains are expected to be completed next outage.
4.
Filter unit housing Units constructed prior to existence should have door with of ANSI N509-80. N0 need for windows inspection windows, has been established.
none are installed.
(ANSI N509-1980).
5.
Electric heaters are Units constructed prior to ref.
not installed upstream standard. Air. heaters not required of charcoal filters according to. licensee. Normal ambient to control humidity
' conditions are below ".. entering air-
of air entering charcoal
_ stream mixture of approx. 70%RH beds.
(ANSI N509-1980).
desired." -Observations and Measurements
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show max' relative humidity will always
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be belowlthis. RB purging is only allowed during cold shutdown.
6.
Each item powered or, i.
Units-constructed prior to ref.
controlled electronically standard. The need for " operational such as a fan motor status" information was considered valve, damper operator, in the original designs and has been fire protection devices, provided where justified. ANSI-N509-solenoid valves should have 90 lists many more paramenters, which status indication for the would be nice to have; but as energized mode.
(ANSIN509-referenced, none are essential to 1980).
proper operation of the units.
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Existing charcoal has not Technical spec. 's specify a radio-been replaced since 1971 active Methyl-Iodide test. Each according to tags on absorber refueling outage subject charcoal cells.
has met its acceptance criteria.
(Refer. ASTM D3803 and Reg. Guide 1.52).
8.
Backdraft prevention dampers Units constructed prior to ref.
not installed are required standard. System is Quality class for Class A and B and leakage B II., and in accordance with ANSI Class I, II as shown on
_N509-80 are "..of industrial Table 5.2 of ANSI N509-1980.
quality construction.." leakage
testing is covered by existing surveillance test procedures.
9.
Permanently installed service Units constructed prior to ref.
gallery with. fixed ladder for standard.
Experience has shown
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filter banks greater than 3 adequate space exists in these high or AACC CS-8 absorber units for construction of scaffolding, cells 9 high are not installed.
when necessary.
(Section 5.6.1 ANSI N509-1980).
10. Principle structure of frame Units constructed prior to ref.
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holders for both HEPA and standard,:and is a class II structure.
charcoal absorber cells not Units have not been tested, and there installed as recommended no requirement to. Manufacturer.has in Oakridge National laboratory tested (new design) similiar units to
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study (0RNL-NSIC-55) and ANSI more strigent requirements than would N509-1981.
be expected for these units. Licensee claims units are seismically capable
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11. ANSI N509-1981 requires HEPA Units constructed prior to ref.
filters used in ESF systems standard, and meet requirements of shall have steel sides..
UL-586. 0RNL-NSIC-65 of January 1970, Filters for the control para.3.2.5 on " Fire Resistance" notes room ventilation Nye wooden that "..both wood-cased and steel sides.
cased filters can meet requirements of
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UL-586." N509-80 para.5.1.1 states that HEPA's~"in-Containment" shall have steel sides; these units are 1ocated=in the Auxilary Building and s
are handling air at near ambient temperatures. There is no requirement that the units be steel sided. The RB units.have steel sides. Control Room units with wood sides are stamped " Fire Resistance", and records show they are-designed to UL-586 requirements.
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-8-Based on the above findings, Rancho Seco's HVAC systems met the requirements committed to by the licensee. Followup item (81-15-01) is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were~ identified.
b.
Unreviewed Safety Question As discussed in Paragraph 4 to this report, the licensee detennined that the erection of a temporary tower crane for the construction of the Nuclear Service Electrical Building
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represents in part an Unreviewed Safety Question as defined in 10 CFP. 50.59 (a). The safety question deals with lifting, and possibly dropping, heavy loads over the auxiliary building, particularly over the Control Room, the Nuclear Service Cooling
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Water surge tanks, and/or the Emergency Control Room Air Con-ditioning suction.
After the inspector raised the question as to the plant's safety with the crane in place, an Engineering Change Notice (ECN A-2980), and an Nonconforming Report (NCR S-2402) were generated along with the appropriate safety analysis evaluation and basis for the safety analysis.
Subsequent to the PRC and MSRC meetings (June 12,1981), the information was forwarded to NRC Headquarters per 10 CFR 50.59 (c) which requires a submittal of an application for amendment of the license (DPR-54) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.
In the interim, until the NRC rules on the safety of the crane's installation and use, the licensee decided to allow the lifting of loads with the tower crane at a height of less than 39 feet above the ground level.
(Note: the control room floor is at 40'
and the auxiliary building roof is at about 70' while the crane trolley is at 110' and the top of the crane is at approximately 140' above the ground level.) Lifts to the 39' level will only be allowed by the tower crane if an electrical or mechanical interlock can be installed to limit the lifting height.
As of this writing, the licensee has apparently followed through on the decisions made in the June 11, 1981 MSRC meeting.
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This item will be an Unresolved Item pending resolution of the 10 CFR 50.59 (a) issue by NRC Headquarters.
(81-20-01)
c.
Liquid Waste Sampling, Monitoring, and Discharging Due to the "B" Once-Through-Steam-Generator (OTSG) tube leak discovered'in May,'1981,'the licensee has been releasing liquid wastes to the environs'through the' retention basins to the Clay Creek at the southwest end of the Rancho Seco fenceline.
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-9-The Appendix B Technical Specifications (B-TS),in conjunction with 10 CFR 20, sets specific limits on the concentrations of radionuclides that are allowed to be released. There have been inspections by regionally based inspectors along with periodic monitoring by the Resident NRC inspectors to verify that limits are not exceeded during releases from the holdup tanks and the retention basin.
B-TS 2.6.2.0 states that the liquid radioactive wastes shall be continuously monitored [R 15020] and recorded during release.
Whenever these monitors are inoperable for a period not to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, two independent samples of each tank to be discharged shall be analyzed and two plant personnel shall independently check valving prior to the discharge.
If these monitors are inoperable for a period exceeding 72 imurs, no liquid waste tank shall be released and any release in progress shall be terminated.
The licensee noted that the radiation monitor which is to be used to meet the " continuous monitor" criteria in B-TS 2.6.2.D, was malfunctioning due to its design.
The monitor (R15020) acts as a " crud trap" and thereby leads to erroneous readings.
Due to the serious need to discharge large amounts of slightly contaminated secondary plant water, the licensee asked the NRC for temporary relief to the referenced Technical Specification because the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> criteria could not be met, and on June 5,1981, received an amendment to Operating License DpR-54. The amendment added the following footnote to Specification 2.6.2.D which was discussed above:
(Note: This change was to be in effect between June 6, 1981 and June 30,1981.)
If these monitors [R 15020]_are inoperable for a feriod exceeding 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, tank' discharges may be continued up to 14 days provided that discharges are collected in a retention basin. The mixed retention basin will be sampled and analyzed.
Retention basin
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valving will be verified to prevent further additions to the basin and diluted discharges from.the retention basin will be sampled and analyzed every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> durin5 release.
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With the above change, the licensee is continuing its plant cleanup program.
The inspectors have not-been made aware or detected by independent sampling any releases over the Federal guidelines for the release of liquid waste.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were disclosed.
9.
Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in ordce to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item was disclosed during the. June inspection activity and is discussed in Paragraph 2.b.-to this report.
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10. Exit Interview
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Theinspectorsmetwithlicenseerepresentatives(benotedinParagraph1)-
throughout the month and at.the conclusion of the inspection on' June 30, 1981. They. summarized the scope and findings of the. inspection activities.
The inspector noted that the plant had returned to power on June 13, 1981 after steam generator tube repairs.
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