IR 05000312/1981007
| ML19343D193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1981 |
| From: | Canter H, Obrien J, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19343D192 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-81-07, 50-312-81-7, NUDOCS 8104090908 | |
| Download: ML19343D193 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-312/81-07 Docket No. 50-312 License No.
DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection conducted:
February 1-28, 1981 Inspectors: h
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H AL, C6Ater,Gedidr Resident Inspector Date Sign'ed '
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J. jP.7'Orienf Uhitf/ Resident Inspector Date Sign 6d Date Signed Approved By:
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G. B. Z@tzig,(JAcuing Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2, Date Sigded Reactor Operations Projects Section Summary:
Inspection between February 1 and 28,1981 (Report No. 50-312/81-07)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of long-term shutdown activities; monthly maintenance observations; monthly surveillance observations; preparations for refueling; refueling activities; followup on regional requests; LER followup; followup on Headquarters requests; SALP inspec-tion activities; and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 155 inspector-hours by the Resident Inspectors.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
810.no o go, RV Form 219 (2)
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e DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- +R. Rodriguez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- +#P. Oubre', Plant Superintendent
- +#D. Blachly, Operating Supervisor
+N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor D. Cass, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- +#Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance Engineering Technician
- +#R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- +G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- H. Heckert, Engineering Technician J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer F. Kellie, Plant Chemist V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer
+D. Low, Electrical Engineering Associate
- R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor
- +T. Perry, On-site Quality Assurance Supervisor S. Rutter, Quality Assurance Engineer
- +L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director
- J. Sullivan, Quality Assurance Engineer T. Tucker, Outage Coordinator
+#D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor W. Wilson, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations, and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on February 6, 1981.
+ Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on February 20, 1981.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on February 27, 1981.
2.
Inspection During Long Tenn Shutdown The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. Tha inspector verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified containment integrity was maintained as required by the technical specifications. Tours of the reactor containment and auxiliary building accessible areas were made to assess equipment and plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector
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by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the statien security plan.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications and verified the irplementation of radioactive waste system controls.
The inspector
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witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems centrols associated
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with radwaste shipments and barreling.
No items of noncompliance or deviatians were identified.
3.
fpintenance-Refueling The inspector Verified that maintenance procedures included administrative approvals for removing and return of systems to service; hold points for inspection / audit and signoff by QA or other licensee personnel; provisions for operational testing following maintenance; provisions for special authorization and fire watch responsibilities for activities involving welding, open flame, and other ignition sources; reviews of material certifications; provisions for assuring LC0 requirements were met during repair; provisions for housekeeping during and following maintenance; and responsibilities for reporting defects to management.
The inspector observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below and verified work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and by qualified personnel.
A)
Reactor coolant pumps "A", "B" and "D" seal replacement B)
"B" Diesel generator governor maintenance C)
"A" & "B" Diesel generators annual inspection and overhaul
D)
LP Turbine overhaul and inspection No items of noncompliance or devitions were identified.
4.
Surveillance - Refueling The inspector observed portions of the below listed surveillance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements, licensee comitments, and administrative controls; that minimum crew requirements were met; that test prerequisites were completed; that special test equipment was calibrated and in service; that the required data were recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and, that the test results were adequate.
A.
SP201.01 2/22/81) Surveillance of Fuel Handling Systems Interlocks.
B.
SP201.04 2/1/81 Surveillance of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems.
C.
SP201.05 2/8/81 Surveillance of Reactor Building Polar Crane.
D.
SP201.10 2/3/81 Safety System Hydraulic Snubbers.
E.
SP203.04 2/2/81 SFAS Digital Channel 2A and 2B Refueling Test.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Preparation for Refueling The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures were approved
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for fuel movement, monitoring saurce range instrumentation during core alterations, inspection of tha condition of fuel assemblies, and for maintaining proper decay heat removal. Acceptable criteria for fuel-reuse had also been developed.
The Resident Inspector determined that the licensee had informed the NRR Project Manager of their plans to submit the core reload technical specification changes for Cycle 5 on March 15, 1981.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Refuelino Activities The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the technical specifications and the licensee's procedures had been completed.
He also verified that periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by technical specifications. The inspector observed two shifts of the fuel handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures. The inspector also verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area and, that staffing during refueling was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.
The handling of the following fuel assemblies was observed on 2/23/81:
Fuel Assembly No.
Core Position A.
6GJ to B-11 B.
4D0 to E-9 C.
56Q to C-11 D.
57U to M-6 E.
7G7 to N-5 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup on Regional Requests During the month of February,1981, personnel from the Region V office of the NRC in Walnut Creek, California requested information from the Resident Inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning:
a)
Diesel generator maintenance procedures b)
Security Plan implementation l
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LER Followup The inspector was verbally informed of the following Licensee Event
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Reports (LER's) which required prompt followup.
Further inspection will be performed following the receipt of the written reports.
81-07 R.P.S. String Inaccuracies (OPEN)
The licensee infomed the inspector on February 11, 1981 of a B&W concern involving safety related instrument errors which are larger than previously assumed in the FSAR analysis. The exact impact of the increased " string errors" is plant specific and has not been determined yet for Rancho Seco.
B&W is expected to perform an analysis for Rancho Seco, which will be completed in March, 1981.
Rancho Seco is shut down for refueling and turbine inspection.
The NRR Project Manager has been informed of this issue and has stated that the issue will need to be resolved prior to startup.
81-08 Wrong Size Crimp on Safety Related Breaker Trip Coils The licensee informed the inspector on February 20, 1981 that a loose wire was found in a Reactor Building Spray Pump (P-291A) circuit breaker which caused the breaker to malfunction.
It was also determined that the reason the wire was loose was because a #14/16 crimp was used on -
a #20 wire pigtail from the breaker trip coil. The breaker is an ITE Model K600.
Preliminary information indicates that 13 out of 19 breakers on the Nuclear Service 480 V busses are of this type and may be susceptible to similar problems.
In addition, the problem may exist on ITE K1600 breakers.
The following information is applicable to the two breakers:
_Tyy_e, Frame Size e
ITE K600 600 A 50/60 cy 800 A DC ITE K1600 1600 A 50/60 cy 2000 A DC Rancho Seco is shut down for a refueling and turbine repair outage.
A licensee representative stated that they will inspect and repair all affected safety related breakers prior to startup.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during followup of these LER's.
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-5-9.
Followup on Headquarters Requests j
TMI Action Plan Verification Previous inspectior, sports 50-312/80-17, 80-20, 80-23, and 80-35 document various actions taku by the Sacramento Utility District to comply witn
" Category A" items in NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Tenn Recomendations." -In November,1980 the NRC issued NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."
This paragraph documents inspections performed at the request of HRC Headquarters of licensee actions regarding administrative controls / procedures, and staffing, in response to Action Plan Requirements due in 1980 and early 1981.
The inspection results that follow are preceded by NUREG-0737 paragraph numbers.
Except as noted, the licensee's response to these items appear to meet the acceptance criteria stated in NUREG-0737.
I. A.1.1. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) long-Term Staffing (0 pen)
The inspector reviewed a SMUD memorandum dated 12/30/80 on STA Responsibilities and Operating Guidelines. This document discusses, amono ather items, the following STA responsibilities, a.
Be available on site for the entire assigned duty days (48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> continuous shift coverage during plant operations with RCS temperature
greater than 200 F).
b.
Be in the Control Room for all Shift Supervisor shift reliefs.
Report to the Control Room immediately upon request by the Shift c.
Supervisor on a plant trip.
d.
Know the location in the Control Room of the major plant parameters.
Understand how to acquire incore thermocouple readings, RCS pressure, RCS terrperature, etc.
e.
Be knowledgeable of Natural Circulation conditions and Feedwater flow trandents, f.
Be familiar with the req' ad actions of selected emergency procedures and Small Break Analysis io Operating Guidelines.
Administrative Procedure AP-1, Responsibilities and Authorities, incorporates l
these and other duties and responsibilities for the STA's guidance.
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AP-1 also defines the STA's Accident Assessment function.
For example, during transients and accidents, the STA's are to compare existing critical parameters with those predicted, to ascertain whether the plant is responding to the incident as predicted.
In addition, the STA is to make a qualitative
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assessment of plant parameters during and following an accident in order to ascertain whether core damage has occurred.
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I Finally, AP-1 discusses the Operating Experience Assessment function of the STA's. This function is to review and evaluate the operating experience / history of Rancho Seco and plants of similar design. The sources of operating experience include, among others, Licensee Event Reports, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins, Circulars and Notices,
" Power Reactor Experience", INP0/NSAC documents, and B&W Owner's group and vendor letters.
In addition, the STA's_ are to prepare Operational Assessments (OA's)
on significant items applicable to Rancho Seco. These OA's should include, i
but not be limited to, research of system descriptions, drawings, schematics, technical specifictions, plant procedures, process standards and vendor
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supplied information. The STA's may also interview and discuss these items with the Operations Supervisor, control room operators, and senior
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operators, Shift Supervisors, cognizant maintenance supervisors, etc.
These assessments may include recommendations to prevent or reduce the probability of similar occurrences at Rancho Seco. The STA's also are i
to provide an operational Quality Assurance function.
Finally, they
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followup on open 0A's to ensure the Plant Superintendent's recommendations are accomplished in a timely manner.
There were twelve OA's issued in 1980.by the individual assigned to
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this duty on an interim basis. Three OA's have been issued by the full-tire STA's thus far in 1981.
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The licensee has seven STAS on his staff. They have received training in the following subjects over the past year:
a.
Reactor Theory and Plant Reactor Technology.
b.
Nuclear Radiation Protection and Health Physics.
c.
Plant Systems.
d.
General Operating Procedures.
e.
Transient-Accident Analysis / Emergency Procedures.
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Administrative Controls.
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Management / Supervisorial Skills, h.
College Level fundamentals in materials, thermodynamics, heat transfer.
and fluid flow, and other engineering subjects.
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On-the-job training (3 months).
Training was provided by in-house instructors and by contractor organizations.
INP0 guidelines were followed. The qualifications of each prospective STA was compared to the INP0 guidelines and waivers were granted by the Plant Superintendent and Chief Nuclear Engineer as deemed appropriate, based on prior experience and educational background. The inspector did not complete this aspect of the inspection. Accordingly, Item I. A.1.1.
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will remain open pending completion (81-07-01).
Licensee representatives have stated that the long-term intent is to
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have the STA's pursue a course of study leading towards an operator's license in 1982. When that occurs, the normal requalification program will apply to the STA's.
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-7-There were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified in this review.
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I. A.1.3.1 Overtime Limits (Closed)
This action plan item includes a requirement-to implement Administrative Procedures which comply with the recomended limits on overtime. The inspector verified that AP 23, Revision 8, " Control Room Watchstanding"-
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and a SMUD memo to Supervisors comply with the recommended limits.
The licensee has also extended the overtime policies to all personnel working on Class 1 equipment. Plant management has fount Tt necessary
to grant exceptions to the recomended overtime limits due to manpower limitations on a few occasions. These exceptions are in accordance with the guidance given under paragraph I.A.1.3.1.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were disclosed.
I.A.1.3.2 Shift Staffing (0 pen)
According to NUREG 0737, Pege I. A.I.3-4, by July,1982 the criteria for minimum crew size at Rancho Seco will be:
One Shift Supervisor (SRO)
One Senior Control Operator (SRO)
Two Reactor Operators (RO)
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Two Auxiliary Operators (nonlicensed)
By letter dated September 16, 1980 to R. H. Engelken, the licensee committed to provide six operating crews as the normal station complement.
In a November 3,1980 letter to NRR on this subject, the licensee stated that the earliest 30ssible date (assuming no turnover) for compliance
' with this paragrap1 (with six full crews) is November,1983.
In addition, their best estimate for achieving full compliance assuming a 30% turnover rate is June, 1985. Accordingly, it does not appear that the licensee will be able to meet these staffing requirements with six full crews by the date specified in NUREG 0737.
l The inspector determined that as additional operators are licensed over
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- 'ift manning to attempt the next few years, the licensee will increase to follow the new criteria.
In the meantime, the licensee will continue
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to meet the technical specification requirements for operational shift manning, which includes one shift supervisor (an SRO), two otner licensed operators (SRO or RO), one auxiliary operator and one equipment attendant or power plant helper.
The licensee's conformance with the shift manning (criteria in NUREG 0737 will be verified at a subsequent inspection 81-07-04).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were id'entified.
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-8-I.C.5 Feedback of Operating Experience (Closed)
As discussed for item I.A.1.1, the Shift Technical Advisors perfom Operations Assessments. They also serve as an operations experience evaluation group. A formal administrative mechanism exist,s to disseminate information developed by this group to the reactor operators and other operational and support personnel. ' By memorandum dated 11/6/80, from
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the Plant Superintendent, supervisors are given the responsibility and authority to screen and review the information generated by the STA's and to pass this information on to their subordinates either through "
routing, staff meetings, or training. The Operations Supervisor uses Special Order Procedure (AP-24) to disseminate the information from Operational Assessments, LER's Bulletins, Vendor Letters, etc.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
I.C.6 Verify Correct Performance of Operating Activities (0 pen)
The licensee's equip.c.i: control procedures appear to provide assurance that control room operators are infomed of changes in equipment status -
and the effects of such changes. These procedures (all of which are implemented at Rancho Seco) include AP-3, " Work Request Procedure";
AP-4, " Clearance Procedure"; AP-24, " Control of Special Orders"; and, plant Surveillance procedures.
With respect to maintenance, Work Requests must be written for all work done on safety related equipment.
Copies of Work Requests for work in progress, are kept in the Shift Supervisor's office, so that equipment status can be tracked by operators. This method of monitoring work helps keep operators aware of system conditions.
The licensee's clearance procedure also keeps operators aware of system conditions by providing standardized methods for taking equipment out of service, providing safeguards while working on equipment, providing safeguards while testing equipment and procedures for returning equipment to service.
It also provides a record of the clearance; Clearances at Rancho Seco do not require dual verification at the job site. That is, positioning of valves or instrument switches to perfom surveillance tests or routine maintenance is performed by one person operating under instructions issued by a control room operator, under the authority of the Shift Supervisor. The clearance procedure at Rancho Seco is designed to work as described below:
Prior to perfoming any repair, maintenance or testing, the responsible supervisor and the Shift Supervisor review the need for a clearance or test authorization. This review considers whether the issuance of a clearance or test authorization is required to protect individuals
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or equipment or to prevent violation of any limiting conditions
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for operations as specified in the Technical Specifications or other regulatory or design guidance. Any such conditions are logged in the Remarks section of the clearance authorization form. The clearance, therefore, establishes conditions which insure the safety of personnel and equipnent, transfers jurisdiction of the system /
equipment to the responsible supervisor, and maintains plant integrity during the maintenance or modification. This is accomplished by administrative procedures which require signatures by qualified operators (licensed or non-licensed) who hang and remove tags, and by issuing clearances only to authorized individuals. -These authorized individuals are designated by name on a list maintained by operations personnel in the Control Room.
This list is signed by the Plant Superintendent, and no changes are made without the approval of the Plant Superintendent or, in his absence, the Operations Supervisor.
The guidance given in NUREG-0737, NUREG-0585, Appendix A and the September 5, 1980 Eisenhut letter to licensees discusses the need for a "second qualified person to verify correct implementation of equipment control measures such as tagging of equipment and to verify proper system alignment.
Based on the procedures described above for tagging equipment, it does not appear the licensee meets the guidance relating to dual verification.
In other instances, the licensee does use a " dual verification" system.
The system is designed such that when any safety-related system or component, as defined in Chapter 6 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, is removed from, or placed into service, the operator performing the work will verify proper valve and equipment lineups.
In addition, surveillance rocedures for safety-related systems include the following statement:
p'This valve lineup must be performed by two operators sequentially, each independent of the other." These operators may or may not be licensed reactor operators, but they are qualified to perform the function requested by licensed operators. There are approximately 75 surveillance procedures and nine operating procedures which require dual verification. These procedures include circuit breaker and instrumentation lineups as well as valve alignment.
The inspector concludes this dual verification system should provide reasonable assurance that all equipment, valves and switches involved in surveillance activities ~oT safety related systems are correctly aligned.
With regard to tagging of equipment, however, it appears that the licensee does not meet regulatory guidance with respect to dual verification.
This ccndition may also exist with respect to some maintenance activities.
This item, therefore, is unresolved (81-07-03).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were disclosed.
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Independent Inspection Effort Discussions were held between the Resident Inspectors and operations, security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These discussions l
will continue as a standard practice.
On numerous occasions during this report period, the Resident Inspectors i
attended outage status meetings. These meetings are held by the Outage Coordinator to provide all disciplines onsite with a update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
Independent inspection effort was performed on the following items:
a.
Internal Audits of procedures (AP-27).
b.
Bad crimp connections on the trip coil of circuit breakers for certain Safety Features Valves.
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Security plan implementation.
d.
Anchor Bolt placement activities.
In addition to the above, the inspectors monitored the licensee's inspection
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of the low pressure turbine for rotor disc cracking. During this inspection, i
a crack was discovered in the generator end of the #1 rotor disc on
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the #1 LP turbine rotor. The crack is approximately one inch in depth.
The licensee is now considering removing the affected rotor disc and blading and the complementary items on the opposite side of the rotor.
In addition, the licensee will install baffle plates in place of the removed blading to provide the proper steam pressure for the remaining turbine stages. This modification will cause the turbine generator to be derated by 100 MWe during cycle 5.
At this time, it cannot be determined when this turbine work will be completed. The Resident Inspectors will continue to follow this work, and keep the NRR Project Manager informed of the i
licensee's decisions.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11. SALP Inspection Activities During the month of February,1981, the inspector reviewed the following dCtivities:
a.
Review and Audits The inspector attended a safety review comittee meeting. The inspector verified that provisions of technical specifications dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were met. The inspector also verified that comittee decisions were reflected in the meeting minutes and that specified corrective
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actions were taken.
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Training The licensee scheduled an extensive program for requalification training of licensed operators during this conth. Such training was not performed, however, due to work load and shift manning requirements during the current outage. The Resident Inspectors will followup to see that the training is re-scheduled and performed (81-07-02).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 9 Item I.C.6.
13.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
through the month (February 6&20,1981) and at the conclusion of the inspection on February 27, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's coments.
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