IR 05000312/1981003

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IE Insp Rept 50-312/81-03 on 810202-06.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on IE Bulletins & Circulars & Conduct of Type B & C Leak Tests
ML19350C593
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco
Issue date: 02/27/1981
From: Crews J, Zwetzig G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML19350C591 List:
References
50-312-81-03, 50-312-81-3, NUDOCS 8104060268
Download: ML19350C593 (6)


Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No.

50-312/81-03 Docket No.

50-312 License No.

DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813

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Facility Name:

Rancho Seco Inspection at:

Clay Station, California Inspection conducted:

February 2-6, 1981 f

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Inspectors:

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G S'.~ getzig dHeactor inspector

'Date Signed Date Signed bb

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Date Signed 4hl[Y

!N[!I Approved By:

J. L. ' Crews,~ Chief, Reactor Operations Projects Branch Ddte Signed

Summary:

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Inspection on February 2-6, 1931 (Report No. 50-312/81-03)

-Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of surveillance and maintenance activities performed during a refueling outage, the conduct of Type B and C leak tests, followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars and Independent inspection effort.

.The inspection involved 35 inspector-hours onsite by one inspector.

In addition, as a result of Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance (SALP) findings for

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Rancho Seco, the following' areas were also inspected:

licensed operator and non-licensed personnel training. This SALP portion of the inspection involved one inspector-hour onsite by one inspector.

Results: 'No items of noncompliance or' deviations were identified.

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RV Form 210 (2)

8.10406 OMS $

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted D. Blachly, Operations Supervisor

  • Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance Engineer
  • R. Colombo, Technical Assistant D. Comstock, Shift Supervisor G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor-J. Forcier, I&C Technician A. Fraser, Senior Control Room Operator
  • H. Heckert, Nuclear Engineering Technician M. Hieronimus, Shift Supervisor
  • R. Miller, Chemical and Radiation Supervisor
  • R. Oubre, Plant Superintendent
  • T. Perry, Site Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Price, Surveillance Coordinator
  • R. Rodriguez, Manager, Nuclear Operations Department
  • L. Schwieger, Manager, Quality Assurance Department T. Tucker, Scheduler D. Wiles, I&C foreman In addition, other craftspersons, craft inspectors, technicians and operations personnel were interviewed.
  • Denotes those present at the exit meeting on February 6,1981.

2.

Surveillance (Refueling Outage)

The inspector selected the licensee's surveillance procedure SP203.01 A,

"SFAS Digital Channel 1A Refueling Test" for review and observation during this site visit. This procedure tests selected portions of the "A" train safety features systems including high pressure injection, containment isolation and diesel generator starting. The inspector verified that the proper revision of the procedure was utilized, that a test c 'ew of adequate size and qualifications was utilized, and that all (lata were properly recorded. The inspector witnessed most of the preparations for, and the execution of the test.

Based on the inspector's observations it appeared that all safety features were properly actyated.

The inspector also noted that when the safety features signal was reset per the procedure,

all devices properly remained in their safety features mode until manually reset.

It also appeared that all preparations for and conduct of the test were performed in accordance with the procedure. One temperatory change was made in the procedure; however, this appeared to make in conformance with Technical Specifications requirements.

Following completion of the test the inspector reviewed the test results which appeared to be satisfactory.

No items _ of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.

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3.

Type B and C Leak Tests The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure SP 205.02, " Local Component Leak Rate Surveillance Testing," Revision 7.

Based on this review, it appeared that the procedure was technically appropriate and that all penetrations identified in Technical Specification 4.4.1.2.1

were covered by the procedure.

The inspector also reviewed the recoras of local leak rate tests performing during the 1980 refueling outage and subsequent local leak rate tests performed on airlocks.

A portion of the leak rate test of penetration 15 (letdown to demineralizers)

was also witnessed by the inspector.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4.

Maintenance (Refuelino Outage)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures SP 201.108, " Safety System Hydraulic Snubber Functional Testing", and MT.020, " Snubber Functional Testing".

On the basis of this review it appeared that these procedures were technically appropriate and conformed to the requirements set forth in Technical Specification 4.14.4.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the functional testing performed on snubbers 9 SW 30708-4 and 10 SW 20553-1A.

The testing was conducted by employees of a contractor who specializes in such testing and the tests were witnessed by a QC inspector.

Based on the inspector's

. observations it appeared that testing was performed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the procedures noted above.

No items-of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5.

Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance (SALP) Inspections.

By letter dated August 28, 1980, J. L. Crews of Region V advised-J. J.- Mattimoe of SMUD of aspects of Rancho Seco operations which would be receiving an increased frequency and/or scope of inspection as a result of the Region V SALP review.

These areas were Design Changes and l

Modifications, Quality Assurance Audits, Training and Quality Control and Maintenance. The inspections performed during the present visit pursuant to the SALP evaluation are reported below.

a.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training The only significant activity in this area since the previous inspection. (December 8-12 1980, Inspection Report 50-312/80-35),

was the. administration of the. upgraded written requalification examination to two additional operators during -the week of January 26, ~ 1981. - At the time of this inspection, however, grading-of the examinations had not yet been completed. The inspector also confirmed a previous commitment that individual file folders would

'be provided for each of the subject arets specified in the licensee's

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requalification program.

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b.

Non-licensed Personnel Training Based on discussions with the Training Supervisor the inspector determined that the individual designated to assist plant supervisors in the development of training plans, would complete his Senior Reactor Operator training and examinations on F'bruary 5,

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1981.

Accordingly, he was scheduled to comence assisting supervisors in the development of training plans on February 9,1981. This is consistent with the licensee's commitment to have the training program fully implemented by the end of 1981.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6.

Followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars a.

IE Bulletin 80-06 (0 pen)

This bulletin deals with the effect of actuating the " Reset" button following automatic safety features initiation.

Specifically, the concern is that such action could cause some components to automatically return to the condition existing prior to the automatic initiation of safety features.

By letter dated June 10, 1980 the licensee stated that such action did not occur for certain components which had already been tested. Subsequently, the inspector examined the referenced test reports on a sampling basis and confirmed the licensee's statements.

In the June 10, 1980 letter the licensee also stated that the balance of the equipment woulo be tested at.the next extended shutd an or refueling. A portion of this testing was witnessed by the inspector in the course of the licensee's performance of SP 203.01A, "SFAS Digital Channel 1A Refueling Test" (see para. 2, above). The inspector will examine the records of the balance of the SFAS refueling tests at a future inspection, b.

IE Bulletin 79-05C (Closed)

This bulletin deals 'with the need to shutdown the reactor coolant pumps promptly if there is a reactor trip and a reduction in the reactor coolant system pressure to or below the safety features

. automatic initiation setpoint. The inspector verified that Procedure D.5, " Loss of Reactor Coolant / Reactor Coolant System Pressure," had been modified to call for trip of reactor coolant pumps

.if the High Pressure Injection System is initiated due to low reactor coolant system pressure (Step 5.1.2.5) or if the reactor coolant system pressure decreased to 1600 psig (Step 5.2.1.2).

The inspector also determined that the licensed operators had received training in the procedure changes and that 'information requested by the bulletin had been furnished. The only outstanding licensee action relates to submission of a design for automatic trip of the reactor coolant pumps.

Since the requirement for this subnittal has been deferred until after completion of the LOFT-3 tests and since followup will be per NUREG 0737, item II.K.3.5, this bulletin is close.e.

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c.

IE Bulletin 80-24 (Closed)

This bulletin deals with water leakage inside the reactor building. Because the licensee's reponse of January 6,1981 indicates strong reliance upon the serability of two specific level switches to provide indication of leakage, the inspector

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examined licensee records to determine if these switches were regularly tested. The examination revealed that the switches were included in the licensee's regular preventive maintenance /

calibration program. The inspector therefore concluded that the licensee's submittal was responsive to the bulletin requests.

d.

IE Circular 80-15 (0 pen)

This circular deals with the St. Lucie incident where reactor coolant pumps were lost due to a loss of component cooling water, and a bubble was subsequently drawn in the reactor vessel due to use of excessive pressurizer spray to reduce system pressure. The inspector had previously confirmed appropriate licensee action with respect to items 1 and 2 of the circular.

During this visit the inspector verified that the licensee had responded appropriately to item 3 by incorporating a cooldown and depressurization rate envelope (developed by B&W) in Precedure B.4, " Plant Shutdown and Cooldown," Revision 18.

Regarding item 4, the licensee's Management Safety Review Committee has requested the engineering department to study the feasibility of adding a third component cooling water pump to provide reserve capacity for this system.

The inspector will' follow the licensee's activities with respect items 4 and 5 of this circular at subsequent inspections.

e.

IE Circular 80-22 (0 pen)

This circular deals with verification of new suployee's qualifications..The inspector determined that on Ncvember 24, 1980, plant management had referred this matter to the Personnel Department,.but as of February 5,1981 had not received a reply.

The inspector.then contacted the Personnel-Department to determine

.if'they intended to reply. The inspector was informed that an-analyst had been assigned to study the matter and that a reply

'would be provided. _ This -iten will'be followed up at a subsequent inspection.

f.

IE Circular 80-23 (Closed)

The inspector' reviewed an internal' memorandum stating that no Beloit' Power Systems Emergency Generators. which were the subject of this circular, were used'at Rancho Seco.. This circular is closed.

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e 7.

Independent Inspection Effort _

The inspector toured various areas of the plant to observe cperations and activities in progress and to inspect the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection rules.

During the course of the site visit the inspector observed 0A engineers monitoring a number of refueling outage activities.

Based on past observations, this indicates a significant increase in QA monitoring of plant activities.

flo items were identified which were in conflict with regulatory requirements.

8.

Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection of February 6,1981. The inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings.

The findings were acknowledged by the licensee.