IR 05000309/1989022
| ML19354E779 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1990 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19354E777 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-89-22, NUDOCS 9002010325 | |
| Download: ML19354E779 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No:
50-309/89-22 License Nu:
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Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power 83 Edison Drive
Augusta, Maine 04336
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Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine
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Conducted:
November 1 through December 11, 1989 Inspectors:
Richard J. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector Eric J. Leeds, Project Manager,' NRR Approved by:
kO O.b i /.'2c/9o E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date Summary: Resident Inspection Report 50-309/89-22 Areas Inspectedl Routine inspection of plant operations including: licensee
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event follow-up, operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance,.
physical security, radiation protection and fire protection. While the Senior
Resident Inspector was temporarily assigned to the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE0D), the 1.icensing Project Manager was onsite for two one-week periods to aid in the inspection. The inspection involved 124 inspector hours including 22 backshift and 37 deep.backshift hours.
Results: Operators exhibited good control during the plant shutdown due to the failure of the Number 1 reactor coolant pump seal and the power reduction to l
repair the packing on the main feedwater regulating. valve. However, the opera-tors' performance resulted in a high voltage switching error, _.This. item is unresolved. Maintenance and surveillance were conducted in a manner which re-suited in effective completion of the repair and test activities observed (de-
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tail 4). A system alignment inspection of the service water. system concluded i
that the equipment relabeling effort which is currently underway results in a
'j significant improvement in equipment identification (detai15). Adequate cor-rective actions were taken for a non-cited violation (NCV) of licensee proce-
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dure change request requirements (detail 4.e).
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_T_A_BLE OF CONTENTS
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Persons Contacted....................................................
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Summary of Facility Activities.........................................
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Operational Safety Verification (IP 71707)...........................
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a.
Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Fa11ure..............................-
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Main Generator Output Disconnect Switching Error................
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Maintenance / Surveillance (IP. 62703,61726)...........................
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Feedwater Regulating Valve Packing Replacement..................
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Design Basis Test of Component Cooling Water Motor Operated
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3-Va1ves.........................................................
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Control Element Assembly Exercising.............................
4-d.
Service Water Pump Test..........................................
5-e.
Emergency Feedwater Cold Shutdown Flow Test.....................
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Summary.........................................................
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System Alignment Inspection (IP 71710)...............................
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P hy s i c a l S e c u r i ty ( I P 717 0 7 ).........................................
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Radiological Controls (IP 71707)......................................
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Exit Interview (IP 30703)............................................
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee-personnel, including plant operators, maintenance technicians and the~ licensee's man-
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agement staff.
2.
Summary nf Facility Activities
The plant was operating at full power at the beginning of the report period. On November 7, the plant was shut down due to the' failure of the-Number 1 reactor coolant-pump seal. After replacement of both the Number 1 and the Number 3 reactor coolant pump seals, the plant was returned-to power operation on November 17. A power reduction to approximately ten (10) percent power was conducted on November 30, for isolation of the main-feedwater regulating valve to the> Number 2 steam generator for packing replacement after-a packing leak developed, The plant was returned.to full power the following. day.
Power operation continued through the re-mainder of the report period.
On November 1, a meeting was held in the Region 1 office, in which the-licensee presented the radiological controls improvement plan.
During the week of November 13, a regional specialist inspector was onsite to review-Radioactive waste transportation activities. His findings will be docu-mented in Region I inspection Report 50-309/89-23.
Four inspectors and a Region I management representative were onsite to observe an emergency plant drill conducted on November 15.
Details of-their observations will be documented in Region I Inspection Report 50-309/89-21. On November 24-
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a security specialist inspector was onsite to review an incident involving control of vital area keys. His findings will be documented in Region I-Inspection Report 50-309/89-24 3.
Operational Safety Verification During routine daily facility tours the following were checked: manning, access control, adherence to procedures and Limiting Condition for Opera-tion, instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems, control room annunciators, radiation monitors, emergency power source operability, t
operability of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating. orders.
On a weekly basis,.
selected Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains were reviewed for oper-ability.
The condition of plant equipment, radiological controls, secur-ity and safety were assessed.- On a biweekly frequency the-inspector re--
viewed a safety-related tagout, chemistry sample results, shift turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to workers.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness were also evalu-ated.
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The -inspector observed selected phases' of the plant's operations to assess reactor safety and compliance with NRC regulations.
In the areas in-spected, the licensee's actions did not constitute a health or safety
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har.ard to the public or plant y rsonnel.
The following are noteworthy:
a.
Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure On November 7, a controlled plant shutdown was commenced due to de-gradation of the Number I reactor coolant pump' seal. After the reac-tor was suberitical the seal failed, ~resulting in leakage of approxi-mately five (5) gallons per minute past'the vapor seal to the con-tainment building. No personnel ceataminations or contamination of areas outside the containment building resulted.
Inspector observa-tion of licensed operator performance during the shutdown indicated -
good teamwork and cooperation.
Disassembly-and inspection of the seal indicated that the failure mode of the Number 1 seal was similar to the. failure mode of the-Number 2 seal which was recently' replaced (See Region I-Inspection l
Report 50-309/89-13).
Sinca the Number 3 seal was potentially_ sus-
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ceptible to the same failure mode, the licensee chose to replace-both
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the Number 1 and 3 seals prior to plant restart. The seals were re-
placed with a modified design (Byron _ Jackson N-9000).
(The revised i
design seal had been scheduled for installation during the spring
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1990 ALARA refueling outage.) Installation at this time was advan-tageous for ALARA and other considerations. The inspector considered
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the licensee's actions to replace the. Number 3 seal as well as the i
Number 1 seal to be prudent.
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b.
Main Generator Output Disconnect Switching Error On November 17, at approximately 12:30 a.m.. plant operators were
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making preparations to phase the main generator to the grid, after
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pump seals.
An auxiliary operator was dispatched to the 345 Kilovolt
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(KV) switchyard to "make T1H operable.". T1H is the motor-operated
disconnect switch which isolates the main output transformers from
the grid.
Making it operable involves Lremoving 'a tag and lock and-
sliding a collar into place.
The auxilia'y operator also attempted
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r to manually close T1H, which had not yet been isolated from the grid,
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resulting in an electrical fault. The fault actuated two 345 KV breakers, which isolated it, and caused a main turbine trip.
Since-i reactor power was less than fifteen-(15) percent, the reactor did not l
trip, s
The inspector was present in the control room at the time of the in-
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cident. Operator response was considered good.
Evaluation of poten-i tial damage to the generator, transformers and T1H was conducted
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by the licensee prior to phasing the unit to the grid.- The Vice f-President, Operations, chartered an Event Review Board to investigate t
the incident and make appropriate recommendations _for corrective ac-f tion. This item is considered unresolved 7ending further inspection i
review of the results of.the Board and licensee corrective actions.
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(UNR 50-309/89-22-01)
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Maintenance / Surveillance f
The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and problem' investigation-activities to-assess compliance with regulations, administrative and main--
tenance procedures, codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement,7 safety-tag. use, equipment alignment, jumper use, personnel qualifications, radio-
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logical controls for worker protection, retest requirements, and report-
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ability per Technical Specifications.
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Also, the inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in
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i accordance with approved procedures and LCO's,- test results, removal and
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restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution.
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The following activities were considered noteworthy:
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Feedwater Regulating Valve Packing Replacement l
On November 30, feedwater regulating valve FW-F-207 for the Number 2 steam generator developed a~ packing leak.
The packing was: adjusted-in an attempt to stop the leakage but the-_ leakage could only be're-r_
duced. Power was reduced to approximately ten (10) percent to allow isolation and repair'of the valve.. The inspector' observed-control
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room activities during the power reduction, checked the safety' tags which were installed to isolate the valve, witnessed portions of the.
repair, and reviewed root cause determination activities.. During~the~
power reduction, tnols and. equipment for the packing replacement were i
staged, safety tagging orders were prepared,.and a work' package was i
developed. Members of the operations, ma'intenance, engineering and:
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_ quality departments demonstrated the ability _to coordinate activities
to allow the work to be accomplished safely and-efficiently.
The Plant Engineering Department evaluated the cause for the degradation of the valve packing and concluded that the valve stem had apparently.
been scored during installation.
Improved methods for-installation of the stems was discussed with the valve manufacturer and are to be incorporated into plant documents as necessary.
The licensee's action to reduce plant power level and repair the packing leak in a controlled fashion, prior to further degradation, was considered to be conservativ.--
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Design Basis Test of~ Component Cooling Water Motor-Operated Valve.
j During the plant shutdown to replace reactor coolant pump seals and as part of a commitment made to the NRC during-'a specialist inspec--
q tion:of design' changes (see Region.I Inspection Report 50-309/89-20),
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the licensee performed a test of the' motor-operated. valves which isolate component cooling water flow through the residual heat re-moval heat exchangers.
The reliability of these valves was addressed.
in the NRC Safety System Functional: Inspection (see Region I Inspec-
tion Report 50-309/89-80). The valves,-PCC-M-43 and SCC.M-165, are installed on the outlet of the compunent cooling water from the resi '
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dual heat removal heat exchangers.
During normal plant operation
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they are closed. After a design basis accident the valves are re-
quired to open during the recirculation phase to provide long term
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core cooling.
Postulated conditions under which the valve would be required to open-could only be generated in the system during a plant shutdown. The design basis test of the valves consisted of the
establishment of initial conditions identical. to those which would be l
generated by. normal operation of the valves, followed by opening
strokes of the valves with the component cooling systems aligned as they would be during the initiation of the recirculation phase of an accident. Each valve was open stroked twice, once with one pump in-l its associated train in operation and once with two pumps operating.
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During the' testing of the secondary component cooling train, a non-safeguards isolation valve was closed to simulate the actuation-of
the valves as would occur if there was a failure in the non-seis-
mically qualified portion of the secondary component cooling system, j
The inspector considered the test configuration to be-acceptable to
ensure that the valves were capable of performing their design acci--
dent' function, i
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CEA Exercising
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On November 6, 1989,-the inspector watched two operators perform pro-cecure 3.1.8,'CEA Exercising. The operators' conduct was profes-sional and they properly followed each step of the procedure. The inspector questioned the operators on the specifics.of. the procedure, expected alarms and their setpoin.ts, and the test frequency. The operators were aware of procedural cautions,'were knowledgeable of the CEA deviation limits, Technical Specification limits and admini-
.strative limits, and were aware of the recent change in test fre-
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quency from bi-weekly to monthly. The inspector also examined the i
surveillance record sheets for proper sign-offs and reviewed:the pre-i vious two months records to ensure that the testing.was being per-
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formed in accordance with the Technical Specification frequency. The
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inspector assessed the performance of.this procedure as very good.
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.5 d-Service Water Pump Test On November 7, 1989, the~ inspector watched two operators perform pro-cedure 3-1-2.9, Service Water Pump Test.
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operatorrc to be knowledgeable of the procedure and system operation.
Coordination between the operators in the _ control room and the _ opera-tor in the pump house was very good. The inspector also examined the:
surveillance record sheets for proper sign-offs and reviewed the re-cords for the previous three months-to ensure-that the testing was being performed in accordance with the Technical Specification fre-quency.
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Emergency Feedwater Cold Shutdown Flow' Test On November 15, the inspector observed the performance of procedure-3.1.22, Emergency Feedwater Cold Shutdown Flow-Test. The test is
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performed'followingaextended cold-shutdowns as required by Technical Specification 4.6.
~Therefore, the test had not been completed since-December of 1988,. the most recent' refueling outage.
The operator performing the test found that the-test could not be accomplished by the steps included-in the procedure to transfer-control of the Emer-
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gency Feedwater System to the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
The: operator appropriately stopped the test'and obtained the _necessary Procedure l
Change Request (PCR) to allow the test to continue. The test was I
subsequently completed without further difficulty.'
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Further review by thi inspector identified that the Alternate Shut-
down Panel-(ASP) controls had been modified during the 1988 refueling-outage. The modification included the installation of additional transfer switches for each steam generator level indication.
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sion of the surveillance procedure'(3.1.22) as directed by the Engi-neering Design Change Request process was apparently overlooked.
Other procedures including Abnormal Operating Procedures which were-affected by this modification were reviewed with no further discre-pancies noted. Performance of the surveillance test prior to plant startup from the refueling outage should have also identified the discrepancy and resulted in a Procedure, Change Request to correct the
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procedure. The significance of these errors is minimal since the j
purpose of the procedure was fulfilled at each performance of_the
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test and they appear to be isolated occurrences.
Therefore, although
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the test procedure was not updated when the modification was in-stalled and a PCR was not initiated when'the test was conducted in December 1988 (a violation of licensee Administrative Procedures
covering PCRs), this violation was not cited because it was licensee
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identified, promptly corrected, and an isolated occurrence (NCV.
50-309/89-22-02).
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The operator who was. observed to perform the test took appropriate actions to resolve the discrepancy between the as installed equipment
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and the procedure. However, evidence that graater attention to de-tail-in the previous performance of the procedure would have resulted in the initiation of a Procedure Change Request at that time, f.
Summary Overall, maintenance and surveillance resulted in effective comple-tion of the repair and test activities observed.
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System Alignment Inspection A system alignment inspection of the Service' Water System was performed.
Accessible valve positions and-status were. examined. Power supplies and breaker alignments-were checked. ' Visual inspection of-major components was conducted._-Operability of instruments essential to system performance
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was assessed. The performance of surve111anceltesting_and-system sampling requirements were verified. The operating procedure was also used to-
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verify proper system alignment.
In addition, the licensee's system train-l ing manual Chapter 48 on the Service Water System was reviewed for accu-racy.
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cated that surveillance and sampling requirements were met over the past -
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six months,
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The inspector noted that the majority of the Service Water-System-valves i
had been re-labled using the new labeling system currently being-imple-j mented by the licensee. The new labeling system, which is color coded by system and uses'large easy-to-read _ number / letter valve designations as well as valve descriptions, provided a significant human factors improve-ment over the stamped metal identifiers used on most plant systems.
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stamped metal identifiers often required the in~spector to physically handle and study the imprint on the metal to positively identify the i
valve The ir.spector found that the, new labeling. system made positive
identification of the system valves much easier. That could reduce opera-
tot errors during valve line-ups and valve re positioning and provide an ALARA benefit as well.
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i Minor updating-discrepancies were identified with the system manual train-
'l ing chapter.- These included the need to incorporate the Service Water inlet temperature limits imposed by the 2700 MWth uprate granted in July 1989. The training chapter also indicated that a weekly Service Water system outlet sample is collected and sent off-site for radiological analysis and that a biweekly sample is taken for sediment content and PH.
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In actuality, a weekly sample is not taken and the biweekly sample is only analyzed for PH.
This training inaccuracy was assessed as a minor weak-ness.
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Plant housekeeping in the various component areas inspected was generally _
good, with the exception of recently burned out breaker light indications for the Containment Recirculation Fan FN-17-4, Containment Spray Switch-gear P-615, Circulating Water pump (PP-P-26B), and Heater Drain pump
(PP-P-62B).
These lights were promptly replaced.
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Physical Security
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Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures.. Those i
checks included security staffing, protected and vital area barriers, i
vehicle searches and personnel identification, access control, badging,
and compensatory measures when required.
On November'21, the licensee identified that a set of security vital area keys could not be accounted for. A specialist inspector from the regional office reported to the site on November 24 to review the the incident.-
His findings will be documented in Region I Inspection Report 50-309/89-24.
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Radiological Controls Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis. Areas reviewed included Organization and Management, external radiation exposure control and contamination control.
Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 require-ments were observed.
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Af ter the plant shutdown to replace the Number 2 reactor coolant pump seal in October of 1989, the operations department performed an evaluation of their accumulated dose during the shutdown. The evaluation' considered dose accumulation on a daily basis as well as by task. A significant por-tion of the dose expended during the shutdown by the operations department was not directly related to the seal replacement.
Tasks such as the in-
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itial and closecut containment inspections, cleaning of boron deposits on valves, valve location documentation, and a pressurizer spray valve repair accounted for a large portion of the accumulated dose.
High dose tasks
were reviewed in detail, including interviews with the operators who per-formed the tasks to identify suggestions on improved methods to accomplish the task while expending less dose.
The inspector considered the evalu-ation to be a valuable tool for the operations department to utilize for ALARA purposes during future plant outages.
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Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection.
The licen-see did not identify any 10 CFR 2.790 material, i