IR 05000309/1989024
| ML20005F310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1989 |
| From: | Keimig R, Olsen W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005F308 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-89-24, NUDOCS 9001160164 | |
| Download: ML20005F310 (6) | |
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Report No.
50-309/89-24
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Docket-No.- 50-309--
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License No.
DPR-36:
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Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
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83 Edison Drive
. Augusta, Maine 04336 Facility, Name: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station
. Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine
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In'spection Conducted:
November 24, 1989 Type of Insp ction:.-_Special, Announced Safeguards Inspection Inspector:
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W. T. Olsen, Reactor Engineer-Physical Security -
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. Approved by:
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R. R. Keimig, Chief ( Safeguards Section date Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Inspection Summary: -Special, (Reactive') Announced Physical Security Inspection on November 24,1989 (Report No. 50-309/89-24) in Response to a Licensee
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Security Event.
Areas Inspected: Onsite followup of licensee security event (No. 89-SO4-00)
Management _ Ef fectiveness; Security Locks and Keys Program; and Compensatory
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Measures.
Results: The licensee was found to be in non-compliance with NRC requirements in the control of vital area keys.
In addition, it was found that the Operations Department procedure for inventory of vital area keys under its control stipulated a frequency that was less than tht required by the licensee's NRC-approved Security Plan.
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DETAILS
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-Personnel Contacted
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Licensee:
'P.' Lydon, Vice President of Administration
- R. Blackmore, Plant Manager
- R. Nelson, Security Director, Technical Support Manager
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- H. Torberg, Security Supervisor, Operations
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- P. Metivier, Assistant Security Director
- S. Nichols, Section Head, licensing USNRC:
"R. Fruedenberger,. Resident Inspector
- Indicates those-present for entrance and exit meetings.
'I 2.
On-site Follow-up of a Report of a Non-Routine Event
1 a.
Background At approximately 2:01 p.m., on November.21, 1989, the licensee notified the NRC Operations Center, via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) of the discovery of uncompensated and unaccounted for emergency spare security vital area keys, that could have allowed unauthorized, but not undetected, access to plant vital areas.
Three emergency spare security vital area keys could not'be accounted for by Operations Department personnel during the' weekly performance of i
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" Conduct of Operations" Procedure No. 1-200-10, Section 4.11, Key i
Control, on November 19, 1989.
This was due to the fact that the key to the locker, in which the emergency spare security vital area keys
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were stored, was inadvertently left in a desk that was removed from the control room, when furniture was being replaced. The old desk
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was removed, on November 15, 1989 to a maintenance department office,
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in the Services Building, which is located inside the Protected Area (PA). The fact that the keys could not be accounted for was noted by the Operations Department's Plant Shif t Supervisor (PSS) on a form, " Control Room Key Inventory Index", Attachment I, to the
- procedure, after a weekly inventory on November 19, 1989. A " Note" on that form indicates that any missing or unaccounted for security or high radiation area keys shall be immediately reported to the appropriate department. That form was signed, dated and sent, via inter plant mail, to the Security Department on(November 19, 1989.
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When the completed inventory-form was received by the Security I
Supervisor on November 21, 1989, he realized that the action required
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by the procedure, i.e., to immediately notify the' Security Department
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if any Security keys could not be accounted-for,.was not taken by the Operations Department.
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In October of 1988, an Operations Department key ring, containing-security vital area keys, was lost by the_ Operations Department.
Approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> later, when security personnel were notified by the Operations Department of the lost keys, security personnel i
f ailed to implement proper compensatory actions and the NRC was not
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notified until approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> later. That event resulted in
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escalated enforcement action and the imposition.of a civil penalty.
The ' licensee stated.in its response to the escalated enforcement
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action concerning the October 1988 event that the root causes contributing to the loss of the security vital area key ring included: inadequate control of security keys issued to the Operations Department, and inadequate security key control guidance in Security Procedures.
Further, the licensee stated that vital area keys were removed from all Operations Department key' rings, except those determined to be absolutely necessary and that procedural controls, requiring security key accountability on each Operations Department Shift Turnover Checklist, were instituted at that time.
In addition, training was given to personnel in the Operations and Security Departments on the new procedural changes and the NRC's
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reporting requirements (10 CFR 73.71, Appendix G.)
Due to the similarity between the October,1988 event and the November 19, 1989 event, a. region-based security specialist was dispatched to the station to review the circumstances surrounding the latest event.
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NRC Findings i
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On Friday November 24,1989, the security specialist arrived at the station and reviewed the event. The inspector reviewed the Maine Yankee physical Security Plan (the Plan), applicable Operations Department and Security Department procedures, and vital area access controls and authorizations. The inspector also interviewed plant operations and security personnel (both licensee and contractors),
and conducted a physical inspection of the control room and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), and observed the locations of security vital area key storage lockers.
He also inspected the Central Alarm Station (CAS) to observe where the spare security vital area keys
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will be permanently stored when a storage locker is installed, in the near future.
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The' inspector determined that plant on-shift operations personnel performed the required " Conduct of Operations" procedure (No. 1-200-10) and completed the-attached inventory form as required,
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but failed to comply with the instructions-in the' procedure, which I
required the -immediate notification of the Security department if the security keys could notL be accounted for during the inventory.
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addition, the inspector determined that the PSS failed to properly.
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control the key to the emergency key storage locker, which housed three emergency spare-vita'l area keys, and allowed the. desk to be removed from the control room with the key still in a drawer. This
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would also have prevented the operations personnel from responding to an emergency.. condition,_if other vital area keys assigned to the-Operations Department were unavailable which was the stated purpose of the Operations Department having the emergency spare keys. When the completed inventory form from plant Procedure No. 1-200-10 was
received by the Security Department on November 21, 1989, the
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Security Supervisor immediately went to the Control Room to determine whether the emergency spare vital. area keys were in their storage locker.- The on-duty PSS retrieved the locker key from the desk which was still in the Services Building. The three keys were found in the
locker. The Security Supervisor then implemented appropriate i
compensatory measures.
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When plant personnel were interviewed by the inspector concerning the event, several' stated that they did not consider the emergency
spare security vital area keys to be missing, only that the key to
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the storage locker was misplaced, and that the keys were still in the l
locker.
The operators on shift at the time of the incident, in their written i
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statements taken by the licensee, indicated that they were of the same opinion.
The operations department personnel also stated that the emergency spare vital area keys had never been issued from the Control Room emergency key storage locker, to their knowledge.
They apparently never considered the possibility that spare keys could have been removed by someone who had access to the locker key, even though such an action would have been difficult without being detected by the PSS.
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The inspector toured the Control Room and the SAS to' verify proper i
n vital area key storage and control and confirmed that the vital area L
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procedures, keys were being controlled in accordance with existing plant n
.The inspector determined that plant operations personnel failed to recognize that all security vital area keys must be' accounted for, ii or. notification _made'to security personnel immediately.
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The' operations department personnel gave no explanation as to why,
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when the emergency spare security vital area keys could not be J
accounted for during the inventory, they did not consider this to
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require immediate action, and did not make an atte.npt to locate the
desk that was removed from the Control Room in order to-retrieve the key.
Therefore, from November 19, 1989, for a period of about 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />, emergency spare security vital area keys were unaccounted for, which required compensatory measures, and this was not recognized by operations or security department personnel until November 21, 1989, when the completed inventory form was received, via inter plant-
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mail, by the security department. Approximately 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> elapsed between identification of an event requiring a report to the NRC within one hour, as required in 10 CFR 73.71, and.the time it was actually reported.
The inspector reviewed the NRC-approved Maine Yankee Physical Security plan (the Plan) and implementing procedures and found the following requirements:
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Contrary to the above, the inspector determined that'the
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NRC-approved Plan, the Station procedures, and 10 CFR 73.71
Appendix G,1(3)(c), is an apparent violation of NRC
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requirements.(50-309/89-24-011 h
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This is an apparent violation of the NRC requirements.
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(50-309/89-24-02)
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3.
Exit Interview An exit meeting was held with the licensee's representatives on November 24, 1989. The. inspector reviewed the findings of the inspection
and informed the licensee that they would be notified of NRC Region I
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management's assessment of this matter on a later date, i
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