IR 05000309/1989021
| ML19354D739 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1989 |
| From: | Lazarus W, Vito D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19354D738 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-89-21, NUDOCS 9001020121 | |
| Download: ML19354D739 (7) | |
Text
.,. ' '.,
,
.
l, U; S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
REGION I
Report No. 50-309/89-21 Docket No. 50-309 License No.: DPR-36 Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Comoany 83 Edison Drive Auausta. Maine 04336~
Facility Name: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant Inspection At: Wiscasset. Maine Inspection Conducted: November 14-16. 1989 Inspectors: _
D.- Vito/ Emergency Preparedness-Specialist date Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards C. Conklin, ~ Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards R. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector - Maine-Yankee, Division of Reactor Projects G.Marfin,Dat Pac 4f Northwest Laboratories Approved by:.d
/T
" W
'J.
hief, Emergency Preparedness.
date on, ivision of Radiation Safety and Safeguards-Inspection Summary:
_In_soection on November 14-16. 1989 (Inspection Report No. 50-309/89-21)
'
Areas Insoected:
Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise on November 15, 1989.
The inspection was performed by a team of three NRC Region I personnel and an NRC contractor. The State of Maine participated to a limited degree.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not observe the exercise.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
Licensee emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public,
/ '9001020121 891215 r
PDR ADOCK 0S000309
>
Q PNU-
. - - -.
.j -
..
,._
DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted
$ 1ne Yankee Atonic Power Company k. W. Blackmore, Plant Manager E. T. Boulette, Vice President, Operations t
S. D. Evans, Senior Licensing Coordinator J. Garrity, Vice President, Engineering and Licensing G. Lehouillier, Section Head, Mechanical / Electrical Maintenance S. Nichols, Section Head, Licensing G. Pillsbury, Radiation Protection Manager H. Siercles, Onsite Emergency Planning Coordinator J. Temple, Offsite Emergency Planning Coordinator G. D. Whittier, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing These individuals attended the exit meeting on November 16, 1989.
The
inspectors also observed the actions of, and ii terviewed other licensee
<
personnel.
2.0 licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Inspection Findinas Based on discussions with licensee representatives, observations of the exercise, and review of records, the following items which were identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report 50-309/88-08)
were not repeated and are closed.
,
- (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-309/88-17-01 - Recovery Manager
'
not included in event classification discussions.
The Recovery Manager was included in event classification discussions.
This item is closed.
- (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-309/87-11-05 - Poor radio
communications between Operations Support Center and in-plant repair teams, Radio communications between the Operations Support Center and in-plant repair teams were improved. The licensee has noted that several areas exist in the plant where radio communications remain difficult.
The licensee stated following the exercise that they will perform a survey to formally identify these poor reception areas and make the results of the survey available to the Operations Support Center Coordinator and for general use.
This item is closed.
3.0 Emeroency Exercise The Maine Yankee partial participation exercise was conducted on November 15, 1989 from 8:00 A.M. to 1:30 P.M.
The State of Maine participated to a limited degree. The Federal Emergency Management Agency did not observe the exercise.
,
. _. _
.
L.,5 x
e
3.1 Pre-Exercise Activities The 1989 Maine Yankee emergency preparedness exercise was originally scheduled to be a full-participation, ingestion pathway exercise. The licensee was requested by the NRC, approximately one month before the scheduled exercise date, to change the exercise scope to partial-scale. The request for exercise scope alteration was due to the unavailability of the Region I office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to observe the exercise as a.significant portion of the FEMA Region I staff had been diverted to emergency response efforts in South Carolina and San Francisco. The licensee responded to this request by offering to use an old (1985 vintage) exercise scenario for the 1989
,
exercise. NRC Region I had telephone conversations with the licensee to discuss-the scope and objectives of the modified scenario and suggested that certain scenario events be altered so
.
that they would not be readily recognized by individuals who may
'
have participated in the 1985 exercise. Certain portions of the scenario were revised by the licensee as a result of these discussions.
NRC exercise observers attended a licensee briefing on November 14, 1989 to discuss the final status of the modified scenario and emergency response actions anticipated during the exercise. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario and to ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupted.
The licensee was commended for their efforts in adapting an alternate exercise scenario on such short notice.
3.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events:
l-1.
An increasing Reactor Coolant System leak rate leading to reactor shutdown; 2.
Failure of a suction line from the containment sump interrupting Refueling Water Storage Tank recirculation i
during the Loss of Coolant Accident; 3.
Failure of one High Pressure Safety Injection train; 4.
A break in a containment spray suction line resulting in the drainage of containment sump contents; and 5.
Core uncovery leading to a significant release to the environment through the plant vent stack.
,
-
-
- - - - -
- -
- -
- -
-
-
.
-
. :,.
.
3.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the exercise, four NRC team members made observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
1.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3..
Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation; 4.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information; 5.
Communications, information flow, and record keeping; 6.
Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose, consideration of protective actions, and recommendation of
- protective actions to state officials; 7.
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection; 8.
Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys; 9.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 10.
Performance of technical support,1epairs and corrective actions; 11.
Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; 12.
-Preparation of press releases; and 13.
Critique of the exercise.
-
4.0 Classification of Exercise Findinas Emergency Preparedness findings are classified as follows:
Exercise Strenaths Exercise strengths are actions taken by the licensee's emergency response organization which provide strong positive indication of their
'
ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and effectively implement the Emergency Plan.
l l
--
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ - - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - _ _ - - _ -. - _ -. _ _ - - _ _ _ - -
_ - - - _ _
- - - - -
~*
7.-
,
r Exercise Weaknesses An exercise weakness is a finding that the licensee's demonstrated level of_ performance could have precluded effective implementation of the Emergency Plan in the event of an actual emergency. in the area being observed. The existence of an exercise weakness does not, of itself, indicate that overall response was inadequate to protect the health and safety of the public.
Areas for 1morovement An area for improvement is a finding which does not have a significant negative impact on the ability of the licensee to implement the Emergency Plan. Although the emergency res)onse related to a noted area for improvement is adequate, the licensee siould still evaluate the finding to determine if corrective action could be taken to improve
'
performance.
5.0 Exercise Observations The inspectors observed the licensee's emergency response actions during the exercise as noted below for each emergency response facility. The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with the Maine Yankee emergency response plan and implementing procedures, i
Control Room The following exercise strengths were identified:
.1.
Good command and control 2.
Proper event classification and timely notifications.
An appropriate conservative event classification was made by the Plant Shift Supervisor at the Alert level.
3.
Good use of Emergency Operating Procedures and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures No exercise weaknesses were identified.
No areas for improvement were identified.
Technical Support Center The following strengths were identified:
1.
Good anticipatory thinking and tracking of control room activities L
_
.,. ; -
-
'
.r
throughout the exercise.
2.
Good establishment and maintenance of TSC task priorities and good coordination of priorities with the Operations Support-Center.
3.
Use of Critical Safety Functions to characterize plant status.
4.
Facility habitability was maintained throughout the exercise.
No exercise weaknesses were identified.
No areas for improvement were identified.
Operations Suonort Center The following exercise strengths were identified:
'
1.
Good coordination of efforts with the TSC.
2.
Improvement in quality of radio transmissions to in-plant repair teams.
3.
Good team briefings.
4.
Facility habitability was maintained throughout the exercise.
No exercise weaknesses were identified.-
No areas for improvement were identified.
Emeraency Operations Facility The following exercise strengths were identified:
1.
Prompt staff augmentation and timely facility activation 2.
Frequent and informative briefings.
3.
Proper event classification and timely notifications.
4.
Facility habitability was maintained throughout the exercise.
5.
Offsite monitoring teams were kept apprised of plant status.
No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The following area for improvement was identified:
1.
The licensee made a decision during the exercise to provide a sheltering Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) to the State of Maine at the Site Area Emergency (SAE) event classification leve._-.
.-
..
.
g..;
t
..
,
Although the suggestion of a PAR at this time was conservative and would not have adversely affected the emergency response effort, the licensee should have altered the event classification level to reflect the increased level of concern for public safety, i.e.,
l escalated the event classification to that of a General Emergency.
In making a determination that the situation at hand warranted-J protective actions (sheltering) for the general public, the i
licensee had effectively determined that they were in a General Emergency condition and should have revised the event i
,
classification level accordingly.
The inspectors noted that the licensee's procedural guidance for making PARS was somewhat lacking in that the text of the procedure allowed for the development of a sheltering or evacuation PAR at the SAE level while a reference table in the same procedure
'
indicated that a PAR was not in order for the given plant condition.
The inspectors discussed this issue in detail with the licensee following the exercise.
The licensee acknowledged that a sheltering or evacuation PAR should not be issued unless a General Emergency has been declared and has agreed to change their current Emergency Plan and procedural guidance accordingly.
6.0 Licensee Critiaue
.
The NRC exercise observation team attended the licensee's post-exercise l-critique on November 16, 1989 at which the licensee's observations of L
the exercise were discussed. The Manager, Nuclear Engineering and 1-Licensing indicited that the observations would be evaluated and
I appropriate corrective actions taken. The critique was thorough and i
' comprehensive and demonstrated the licensee's ability to perform a proper self-evaluation.
'
7.0 Exit Meetina and NRC Critiaue l
!
The NRC team leader met with the licensee representatives listed in
'
l Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
,
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and that no violations or deviations were observed.
Although there was an area identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which could adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate the NRC comments and observations and take corrective actions as appropriate.
-
- -
- -
. -