IR 05000302/1982002
| ML20053B458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1982 |
| From: | Brownlee V, Beverly Smith, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053B408 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-82-02, 50-302-82-2, NUDOCS 8205280422 | |
| Download: ML20053B458 (17) | |
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o UNITED STATES
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/i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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101 MARIETTA ST., N W., SUITE 3100 U
o ATLAN TA, GEORGI A 30303 Report flo. 50-302/82-02 Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Facility flame:
Crystal River Unit 3 Iluclear Generating Plant Docket flo. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at Crystal River site near Crystal River, Florida Inspectors:
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T.jf. Stetka 7/
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Date Signed Y
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B.jf., Smith 9f
IJate Signed Approved by:
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V. L. pfownlee, Section Chief, Division of O' ate $1gned
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Project and Resident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on January 23 - March 3,1982 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 247 hours0.00286 days <br />0.0686 hours <br />4.083995e-4 weeks <br />9.39835e-5 months <br /> onsite by the two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports (LER's) and Non-conforming Operations Reports (NCOR's), non-routine events, licensee action on IE Circulars, and licensee action on previous l
inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conductei a-J facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on back shifts.
Resul ts One recurrent violation was identified (Failure to comply with work request
procedure prior to commencing plant maintenance; paragraph 5.a and 6.a(5)).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G. Boldt, Technical Services Sup3rintendent
- C. Brown, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor J. Buckner, Security Officer
- J. Bufe, Compliance Auditor
- J. Cooper, QA/QC Compliance Ibnager
- G. Claar, Nuclear Maintenance Specialist M. Culver, Reactor Specialist Q. Dubois, Technical Assistant to the Nuclear Plant ibnager
- S. Ford, Licensing Consultant W. Herbert, Technical Specification Coordinator S. Johnson, Nuclear Technical Support Engineer W. Johnson, Operations Engineer
- T. Lutkehaus, Nuclear Plant ibnager P. McKee, Operations Superintendent G. Perkins, Health Physics Supervisor G. Ruszala, Chemistry / Radiation Protection Ibnager D. Smith, Security and Special Projects Superintendent
- J. Lander, llaintenance Superintendent
- K. Lancaster, Senior Quality Auditor G. Williams, QA/QC Supervisor
- K. Wilson, Nuclear Licensing Specialist
Catalytic, Inc.
- W. Benoist, Site Manager
- R. Laxton, Electrical Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chem / rad, and corporate personnel.
- Present at the exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on ihrch 3,1982. During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report. During this meeting, the violation, unresolved items, and inspector followup items were discussed.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (302/81-19-05): The licensee issued a revised response to this violation on January 26, 1982.
In this revised response the
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I licensee stated that other test procedures were reviewed and verified that actuation of the sensing device is perfonned where required.
The licensee's action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-05-12):
During the past refueling outage, the licensee rebuilt approximately one-third of the Clark relays that have been identified as being used in safety-related systems. The remaining two-thirds of the relays were rebuilt during the recent unplanned
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maintenance outage.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-28-06):
The licensee has determined that since the Technical Specification (TS) safety analysis only
provides for a maximum moderator temperature coefficient (HTC), and that the llTC is the most limiting coefficient, that the addition of a maximum negative power doppler coefficient into procedure PT-120 is not necessary.
The licensee's actions on this item are complete.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-20-03): The licensee has installed a new auxiliary hoist (FCHR-5) that conforms to the speed recommended by
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Babcock and Wilcox for movement of new fuel.
The inspector reviewed the completed test procedure for this hoist and has no further questions on this
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-33-07):
SP-113 was revised to require installation of the XY plotter and digital voltmeter into buffered front panel jacks which makes switching RCS flow signals unnecessary.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-38-10):
Installation of safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip circuitry eliminates the need to install a jumper prior to linear amplifier removal.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/80-38-03): Numerous changes were made to radiation monitor procedures to ensure control of the removal and return to service of radiation monitors.
The inspector reviewed several of these revisions and has no further questions on this item.
(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (302/80-38-09): The inspector has reviewed the licensee's response to this item and has closely monitored the licensee's reporting activities and verified that corrective actions are adequa te.
(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (302/80-38-01 anc 80-38-02):
The inspector has reviewed and verified the licensee's response to these items. The corrective actions appear to be adequate to preclude additional occurrences
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of this type.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-30-07): The licensee's test coolant pump power monitors (RCPPM's)ys will have to be added to the reactor results have indicated that time rela to prevent inadvertant trips. The
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inspector's review of this issue indicates that a re-design of the system is
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necessary.
This issued will be tracked in accordance with Unresolved Item
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(302/82-02-11) discussed in paragraph 9.b of this report.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations. Three new unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6.a(5), 6.b(1), and 9.b.
5.
Review of Plant Operations At the beginning of this inspection period the plant was in Mode I, power operations, and continued in this mode until January 28, at which time a reactor coolant system weld leak necessitated a plant shutdown to Mode V, cold shutdown operations, in order to effect repairs (see section 9.a of this report for details).
The plant remained in Mode V until March 2, at which time a brief startup to power operations was performed which ended in a reactor trip from approximately 75% power the same date (see section 9.b
of this report for details).
The plant remained shutdown in Mode III operations during the remainder of this report period.
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records.
The inspectors reviewed the records listed below and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with TS and the licensee's administrative procedures.
-Shift Supervisor's Log;
-Reactor Operator's Log;
-Equipment Out-of-Service Log'
-Shift Relief Checklist; l-Control Center Status Board;
-Auxiliary Building Operator's Log;
-Chemistry / Radiation Log;
-Daily Operating Surveillance Log;
-Daily Shutdown Surveillance Log;
-Work Requests; and-Short Term Instructions.
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In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified selected clearance order tagouts.
As a result of these reviews, the following violation was identified:
During a review of the shift supervisor's log, on February 4,1982 the inspector noted that reactor building pressure transmitter, BS-16-PT, had failed and was being worked on by maintenance personnel.
The inspector discussed the maintenance status with the technicians and asked to see the work request (WR) associated with this work.
The
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inspector was told that the WR was still in planning and had not been issued to the shop.
Further investigation indicated that removal of the pressure transmitter for maintenance had occurred prior to part, II of the WR being evaluated and prior to the shift supervisor signing the work authorized section of Part III.
CP-113, Procedure for Handling and Controlling Work Requests, section 5, requires Part I, Part II, and the nuclear shift supervisor's work authorization signature in Part III to be completed prior to commencing work.
Contrary to the above, work associated with reactor building pressure transmitter (BS-16-PT) was comenced prior to part II and shift supervisor's authorization signature in part III of the work request being completed.
This is a violation.
This violation is similar to the violation described in paragraph 6.a (5) of this report and therefore is considered to be a part of this violation.
An additional issue was discovered as a result of the failure of BS-16-PT.
During the initial checking of this instrument, the isolation valve was found in the closed position. This valve is required to be open for the transmitter to be operational and was verified open by two independent checks prior to startup from the refueling outage. The inspector discussed this issue with the licensee and stated that an investigation should be conducted to determine why the valve was out of position. Also, if the reason could not be determined, a new instrument valve lineup should be performed to verify the po;;ition of other safety-related instrument valves. An investi-l gation was conducted with negative results and SP-111, Valve Lineup Verification for Critical Instrumentation, was performed.
No additional valves were found out of position. The inspectors are satisfied that the licensee's action on this issue was adequate to ensure that no additional instrumentation valves were mispositioned.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during l
backshi f ts.
Also, during this inspection period, numerous licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observed planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
-Security Perimeter Fence;
-Control Room;
-Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms;
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-Auxiliary Building;
-Intermediate Building;
-Reactor Building;
-Battery Rooms; and,
-Electrical Switchgear Rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) tionitoring instrumentation - The following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the Technical Specifications for the current operational mode: Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and, auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
No discrepancies were identified in this area.
(2) Safety Systems Walkdowns - The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the following safety systems that were disturbed during the maintenance outage to ensure that these systems were returned to service in accordance with approved procedures:
Engineered Safeguards electrical distribution; Emergency Diesel Generator air and Fuel oil systems; Engineered Safeguards Instrumentation Systems; Core Flood Systems; and, Portions of safety system valves on the station locked valve list.
No discrepancies were identified in this area.
(3) Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified by numerous checks that operating shift staffing was in accordance with Technical Speci-fication requirements.
In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnovers on different occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant infor-mation was being accomplished.
No discrepancies were identified in this area.
(4) Plant housekeeping conditions - Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire l
hazards exist.
i No discrepancies were identified in this area.
(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation control areas (RCA's) were observed to verify proper identification and implementation. These obser-vations included selected licensee-conducted surveys, review of l
step-off pad condition, disposal of contaminated clothing, and area posting. Area postings were independently verified for accuracy through the use of the inspector's own monitoring instrument. The inspectors also reviewed selected radiation work l
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I permits and observed personnel use of protective clothing, respirators, and personnel monitoring devices to assure that the licensee's radiation monitoring policies were being followed.
No discrepancies were identified in this area.
(6) Security Controls - Security controls were obser.e i to verify that security barriers are intact, guard forces are on 'uty and access to the protected area (PA) is controlled in accor;ance with the facility security plan.
Personnel within the PA were observed to insure proper display of badges and that personnel requiring escort were properly escorted.
Personnel within vital areas were observed to insure proper authorization for the area.
No discrepancies were identified in this area.
(7) Operating Procedures - Operating Procedure use was observed to
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verify that; approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were performing the operations; and, Technical
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l Specification requirements were being followed.
The following procedures were observed:
-0P-210, Reactor Startup (and associated estimated critical position calculations);
-0P-202, Plant Heatup;
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i-0P-302, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation; l-0P-301, Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant System; and,
-0P-407-A, Operation of the Evaporator Condensate Storage Tanks.
No discrepancies were identified in this area.
(8) Surveillance Testing - Surveillance testing was observed to verify that: approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; testing was adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment, as required, were utilized; and, Technical Specification requirements were being i
followed.
The following tests were observed:
-SP-354, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) flonthly Test (For A and B EDG);
-SP-435, Valve Testing During Cold Shutdown (time stroking of
!!UV-259 and 260);
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1-SP-130, Engineered Safeguards !!onthly functional Tests (completed procedure review);
-SP-381, Locked Valve List (Completed procedure review);
-PT-305, !!akeup/HPI flozzle Thermal Shock Test (Procedure review r
and portions of testing);
i l-SP-324, Containment Inspection (observed and performed);
-SP-321, Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and Power Availability Verification; and,
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-SP-135, Engineered Safeguards Actuation Time Response Testing (partial procedure review).
As a result of these observations the following item was identi-fied:
On February 23, 1982, during the performance of SP-135, Engineered Safeguards (ES) Actuation Time Response Testing, an inadvertant ES actuation occurred.
The plant was in flode V, Cold Shutdown, at the time of the actuation. llo water was injected into the reactor l
coolant system due to prompt operator action and equipment tagouts that were in effect at the time of tha actuation.
The cause of the actuation was technician error in that the technician was in the wrong channel of the ES actuation Train "A" and inadvertantly shorted across an indicating-status light while connecting Brush recorder leads. This resulted in a blown fuse and tripping of Channel 1 of ES Train "A".
Channel 2 was already in a tripped condition due to the testing being performed, thus providing the required 2 out of 3 conditions necessary for ES actuation. The inspector reviewed and discussed this event with the licensee.
The licensee made an immediate temporary change (ITC) to the procedure to require the hookup of the Brush recorder to be made at the indicating-status light relay in lieu of the indicating-status light.
This should prevent recurrence of this event because the high probability of inadvertant shorting across the indicating light due to the close proxin:ity of the connecting points. This ITC will be follosed up by a p:<rmanent revision to SP-135.
Furthennore, additional labeling fc. the ES actuation cabinets will be obtained to clearly identify Channels 1, 2 and 3 for both trains "A" and "B",
which will aid in identifying the right channels. Other than a followup of the permanent procedure
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change to SP-135 and the new labeling for the ES cabinets, the inspectors have no further questions on this issue at this time.
Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-01): Verify revision to SP-135 to change Brush recorder hookup location and verify installation
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of additional labeling on ES actuation cabinets.
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(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance l
activities to verify that:
-Correct equipment clearances were in effect;
-Work Requests (WR's), Radiation Work Penaits (RWP's), and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
-Quality Control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and,
-Technical Specification requirements were being followed.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
-Work package review of EDG exhaust manifold work;
-ftP-166, RC Pump Seal Package Refurbishment and Testing;
-f1P-165, RC Pump Seal Cartridge Removal and Replacement;
-11P-402, Maintenance on Limitorque Valve Controls (fiUV-259 and 260 work and RCV-11 documentation review);
-MAR 81-12-21T, Temporary Support for itVV-61, 67 and 71 (reviewed flAR package and observed installation of supports);
-MP-149, Check Valve Cap Removal (f1VV-36);
-MAR 81-2-17, Velan Check Valves;
-Work package review for ftUV-37 and 42;
-flP-130, Pipe Snubber liaintenance (DHH-39);
-!!AR T82-3-1, Torque Switch flodification (document review); and,
-flAR 82-1-16, Install Time Delay Relays in RCPPfl Cabinets (document review).
With the exception of the issue concerning f1AR 82-1-16 discussed in paragraph 9.b of this report, no discrepancies were identified.
(10) Radioactive waste controls - Selected liquid and gaseous radio-active releases were observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, that required samples were taken, and that appropriate release control instrumentation was operable.
Solid radioactive waste processing was also observed on a sampling basis to insure that the licensee's controls were implemented.
fio discrepancies were identified in this area.
(11)
Pipe Hangers seismic restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restaint settings were appropriate, and that anchoring points were not bindin j..
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The inspectors have noticed by discussions and observation that
operations personnel appear to be unaware or insensitive to investigating and reporting of snubber fluid leaks that
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periodically occur throughout the plant.
In most cases, the leaks are minor and if corrected in time will not effect the operability
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of the snubber.
The inspectors have provided information to the licensee on numerous snubber hydraulic fluid leaks that should
have been identified by operators as they do their tours of their l
respective areas. The inspectors discussed this issue with the
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licensee and the inspectors' comments were acknowledged. The
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inspector stated that some method should be implemented to i'acrease operator awareness of the importance of checking and
reporting hydraulic snubber fluid leaks.
l Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-02):
Review licensee's action
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to increase operator awareness of hydraulic snubber fluid leaks.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports and lionconforming Operations Reports (fiC0R's)
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The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) to verify that:
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i-The reports accurately describe the events;
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-The safety significance is as reported;
-The report satisfies requirements with respect to information provided and timing of submittal;
-Corrective a'ction is appropriate; and,
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-Action has been taken.
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LER's 81-76, 81-82, 81-83, 81-84, 82-01, 82-02, 82-05,'82-06, 82-07 and
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82-08 were reviewed.
This review identified the following items:x (1) LER 81-83 reported continuing control problems with the Decay that h' >
Pump (DHP) discharge throttle valve DHV-110. As reported in flRC >
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Inspection Report 50-302/80-38 and 50-302/81-30, the licensee iss i
continuing to investigate these problems and is planning a
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re-design of the valve control system.
Further action on thiss item will be tracked under Inspector Followup Item (302/80-38-07).
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(2) LER 82-02 reported that the "B" makeup pump (!10P) casing, which was removed for maintenance was determined to be a seismic anchor and that a seismic analysis to determine the effect of this pump. -
removal upon the remainder of the makeup system had not been s
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performed.
The licensee performed the necessary analyses and has concluded that all pipe lines except for the 2 inch recirculation line had sufficient restraints to meet seismic criteria. Based upon initial analysis, additional restraints were added to the recirculation line and more detailed analyses are continuing. The licensee is conducting an engineering evaluation to. determine the cause of and prevent recurrence of this type even _
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Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-03):
Review of final analysis for itUP-B 2 inch recirculation line.
Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-04):
Review engineering evaluation to determine failure to perform required seismic analysis.
(3) LER 82-05 reported the meteorlogical monitoring instrumentation was found to be out of tolerance during' surveillance testing.
This problem has occurred before (LER 81-74) and has been attributed to coal dust accumulation on the meteorlogical tower.
The licensee is performing an engineering evaluation to resolve a possible design problem.
This evaluation is being tracked in accordance with Inspector Followup Item (302/81-30-05).
(4) LER 82-08 reported slight contamination of the service water system due to a leak in the "A" letdown cooler.
This cooler was isolated and a demineralizer was installed in the system to effect cleanup. The inspector examined the demineralizer. installation and reviewed sampling data.
By February 14, the contamination was reduced below minimum detectable concentration (ilDC) and the demineralizer was isolated.
The inspectors had no further questions on this event.
s (5) LER 81-82 reported the failure of containment isolation valves to operate due to the failure of their associated control relays during surveillance testing.
The control relays are Clark Type PM relays.
The licensee has identified a number of failures with these relays as a result of the relays failing to " drop out" after the de-energization. These failures were reported in various LER's and NCOR's and was being) tracked under Inspector Followup Item (302/81-05-12).
The licensee issued modification IMR 81-5-20 to rebuild all the safety-related system relays with a special modified coil plunger assembly.
This rebuilding w5s supposed to be completed during the past refueling outage that ended in December, however parts availability problems allowed only approximately one-third of the
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relays to be rebuilt.
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s While investigating this'$ ER, the inspector noted that two of the
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three failed relays appeared to be relays that had been rebuilt.
Subsequent investigations by the inspector and the licensee indicated that two out of the approximately 100 relays rebuilt
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failed during the operational surveillance testing and that the failure mechanism was traced to a coil lamination misalignment.
As a result of the inspector's finding, the licensee checked other re-built relays and verified no other misalignments existed.
The third failed relay, which had not been previously rebuilt, was also modified with the new plunger assembly.
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Since the plant had shutdown to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) for an unplanned maintenance outage and based upon the inspectors'
findings, the licensee decided to rebuild the remaining two-third relays.
This rebuilding was completed on February 22 and the relays were subsequently tested as satisfactory.
During review of the work packages associated with these relay modifications, the inspector identified a violation and an unresolved item.
The relays were rebuilt in accordance with MAR 81-5-20 under work request (W/R) 24403.
Review of this W/R and the work package indicates that the rebuilding of the first one-third of the relays was accomplished from November 16 through November 26, 1981. The in-plant authorization to perform this work is given by the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS).
This authorization was not obtained until the job was completed on November 26.
Failure to receive NSS concurrence prior to perfonning work is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1 and paragraph 5.3.1.1 of compliance procedure CP-113, Procedure For Handling and Controlling Work Requests, and is a violation.
Violation (302/82-02-05):
Failure to comply with the requirements of procedure CP-113 prior to conuncing work.
During the inspection period of September 23 - October 23, 1981 (NRC Report 50-302/81-21), the licensee was cited for the same violation.
In their response to this violation aated December 10, 1981, the licensee stated that maintenance personnel were required to complete a document review that stressed procedural compliance.
These document reviews were completed by the end of October,1981.
This recent violation occurred within approximately two weeks of the completion of the licensee's corrective actions which indicates that the corrective action was not effective. This recent violation is considered to be recurrent and uncorrected.
The work package review also indicated that the licensee does not have an effective method for insuring that if work is not completed, (e.g., a modification is only partially completed and will be resumed during a subsequent outage) that resumption of this work will be concurred iri by the NSS, thus insuring that operations personnel are aware of plant maintenance activities.
Since the present method is to leave a W/R open, if work is stopped and will be resumed at a later date, the possibility exists that the work would be resumed without notifying the NSS since the open W/R would already have an NSS concurring signature for the work accomplished to date. The licensee will review their methods for handling work and/or modifications that are not completed and left open and develop an effective system to insure that the N55 is aware when such work and/or modification is resumed.
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Unresolved Item (302/82-02-06):
Revise method of handling incomplete work packages to insure the NSS is aware when work is
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resumed.
(6) LER 82-001 reported the inoperability of Core Flood Tank (CFT) "8" due to level indication problems.
Part of the corrective action indicated that REI 81-5-43 had been initiated to replace the CFT level transmitter.
The inspector reviewed this issue and concluded that the problem appears to be in keeping the reference legs of the transmitter filled with water and that replacing the transmitter would not correct the problem. The licensee concurred with the inspectors' findings and stated the REI would be revised to request investigation into a fix for maintaining a full
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reference leg.
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Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-07):
Review of revised REI q
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81-5-43 and subsequent actions to correct reference leg loss of water problem in CFT level transmitters.
(7) LER 81-084 reported the inoperability of the Boric Acid System flowpath due to chemical addition pump (CAP)-1B failing to pump.
This issue was initially reported in LER 79-044. A recently installed itAR.to correct air binding of this pump failed to correct the problem.
This was discovered when the pump was
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returned to its normal surveillance frequency and failed its operability test. The plant has returned to the remedial solution of running the CAP's on a daily basis to reduce the possibility of recurrence. An engineering evaluation is being performed to dete.mine the cause of this problem.
Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-08):
Review engineering evaluation as to the cause of air binding of the CAP's.
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b.
The inspector reviewed NCOR's to verify the following:
-Compliance with Technical Specifications;
-Corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews hava been accomplished or are being pursued for completion;
-Generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR
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Part 21; and,
-Items are reported as required by the Technical Specifications.
The following NCOR's were reviewed.81-438 81-486 82-11 82-32 81-439 81-487 82-12 81-33
- 31-440 81-488 82-13 82-34 81-446 81-4S9 82-14 82-35
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.81-447 81-490 82-15 82-36 81-449 81-492 82-16 82-37 81-466 81-493 82-17 82-38 81-474 81-495 82-18F 82-39 81-475 81-496 82-19 82-42 81-476 81-497 82-20 82-45 81-478 81-498 82-21 82-50 81-480 81-500 82-22 82-51F 81-481 81-02 82-23 82-53F 81-482 82-03 82-24 82-55 81-483 82-04 82-26 82-05 82-28 As a result of this review, the following items were identified:
(1) 14COR 82-35 reported that records for tracking the cyclic or transient limits of various system components were not adequate.
The tracking of these limits is a requirements of Technical Specification 5.7.1.
The licensee is presently reviewing records to obtain an accurate accounting of these limits. Though the licensee has a surveillance procedure, SP-296, Documentation of Allowable Operating Transient Cycles, which is used to track these cycles, the procedure is not adequate to assure accurate records.
The licensee will revise SP-296 and applicable operating procedure to improve the tracking accuracy.
Unresolved Item (302/82-02-09):
Review the licensee's actions to revise SP-296 and applicable procedures to accurately track transient cycles.
(2) MCOR's81-475, 81-482, and 81-483 reported the failure of a socket weld on the make-up pump (MUP) 1A suction line relief valve. The weld initially broke on December 12, 1981 and was repaired. The weld broke twice more on December 15 and December 17, 1981 before the licensee determined that the cause of the weld failure was pump-induced vibration. A temporary support was added to the relief valve under temporary modification MAR 81-12-21T. This support has solved the weld fatigue problem and the licensee modified the other two pumps (HUP 1B and MVP 1C) so that their suction line relief valves are similarly supporte.
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1 The inspector has reviewed the modification and independently verified the installation.
During this review the inspector noted that the calculated weight for the support equals approximately 17% of the calculated pipe weight for 1 foot of pipe.
Based upon these calculations, the licensee assumed that the additional support weight had a " negligible" effect on the seismic and dead weight mass of the system.
The inspector questioned these assumptions based on the high weight percentage of the support vs.
pipe weight. The licensee recalculated the seismic and dead weight mass utilizing the total pipe length involved (approxi-mately 13 feet) and the installed valve in this line. This total weight demonstrates that the support weight can be considered negligible. The licensee will design an additional modification that will provide a permanent support for these relief valves.
Inspector Followup Item (302/82-02-10):
Review the suction line relief valve permanent modification for MVP's A, B, and C.
(3) NCOR 81-498 and NCOR 82-024 reported the failure of personnel to make one hour reports to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
In addition, NCR0 82-024 also reported the failure of personnel to initiate the emergency plan following the discovery that the reactor coolant system leakrate exceeded the allowable limit. To prevent recurrence of thse events, the licensee held meetings with the Nuclear Shift Supervisors (NSS's) on January 29 and February 12 to review the reporting requirements.
In addition the licensee revised procedure CP-111, Procedure for Documenting, Reporting, and Reviewing Nonconforming Operating Reports, and the associated NCOR form on February 12.
This revision provides for a check off space that reminds the NSS to verify whether the
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emergency plan should be initiated.
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The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and have no further questions on this item at this time.
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(4) NCOR's81-492, 81-496, and 81-497 reported the failure of l
containment isolation valves to operate due to failure of their (
associated control relays.
This event was subsequently reported l
under LER 81-82 and is discussed in paragraph 6.a.(5) of this report.
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7.
Review of IE Circulars The following IE Circulars (LEC) were reviewed to verify the adequacy of the licensee's actions:
a.
IEC 81-02 Performance of NRC-Licensed Individuals While on Duty b.
IEC 81-03 Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation i
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IEC 81-04 The Role of Shif t Technical Advisors and Importance of Reporting Operational Events.
d.
IEC 81-09 Containment Effluent Water that Bypasses Radioa::tivity floni tor.
e.
IEC 81-10 Steam Voiding in Reactor Coolant System during Decay Heat Removal Cooldown, f.
IEC 81-12 Inadequate Periodic Test Procedure of PWR Protection System.
g.
IEC 81-14 flain Steam Isolation Valve Failures to Close.
No inadequacies were identified and the licensee's actions on these Circulars are considered to be complete.
8.
Review of Personnel Qualifications On January 4,1982, Mr. D. Poole, Nuclear Plant fianager, resigned his position effective February 5.
Mr. T. Lutkehaus, Assistant to the Nuclear Plant flanager was appointed Nuclear Plant flanager on January 4, and Mr. Poole was appointed Assistant to the Nuclear Plant flanager until the effective resignation date. On February 5, the licensee appointed Mr. Q. DuBois as the Acting Assistant Plant Manager.
Mr. DuBois was the corporate Director of Quality Programs.
The inspector reviewed the qualifications of these new managers to verify that their qualifications are consistent with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.3 and ANSI 18.1-1971.
The review consisted of an exami-nation of personnel resumes and interviews.
The inspector noted that the Acting Assistant Nuclear Plant Manager appears to lack the experience and training normally required for a senior reactor operator's license (though personnel are not required to be licensed for l
this position). This individual will attend reactor operator licensing classes to strengthen this area and will remain in an acting capacity until
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sufficient training and experience is accumulated.
The inspectors will follow this progress and have no further questions on this iten at this time.
9.
Non-Routine Events a.
On January 28, at approximately 0900, the plant commenced a controlled shutdown due to an unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leakrate of 0.8 gallons per minute (GPil).
During the shutdown, the RCS leakrate increased to 1.08 gpm which exceeded the Technical Specification limit of 1.0 gpm. After reaching flode 3 (Hot Shutdown) at 1247, the licensee identified the leakage as apparently coming from the body-to-bonnet flange on makeup system check valve fiUV-43. At this point the licensee i
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planned to Furmanite the flange connection (injecting of a rubber-like substance between the flange and valve body) to stop the leakge.
At 1100 on January 29, the licensee discovered a weld break on the reactor coolant pump (RCP) 1A seal interstage pressure connection.
This weld break was contributing to the RCS leakage and the licensee began plant cooldown to !! ode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to effect pump seal replacement. At 1740 on this date, after removal of the insulation around valve i1UV-43, the licensee discovered an unisolable thru-wall weld crack between flVV-43 and the reactor coolant loop nozzle. The plant eneterd flode 5 at 0255 on January 30 and was subsequently de-pressurized and drained to the maintenance level.
Details of the cause of the weld failures and the repairs performed are contained in NRC Report 50-302/82-03.
The inspectors observed the plant shutdown and the licensee's activities. No inadequacies were identified.
b.
On liarch 2 at 1729, a reactor trip from approximately 75% of full power occu rred. A normal plant shutdown to Mode 3 (Hot Standby) occurred.
The reactor trip was inadvertant and was caused by the newly installed reactor coolant pump power monitors (RCPPM's).
The licensee has experienced inadvertant reactor trips from the RCPPM's on previous occasions (see paragraphs 7.b and 7.c of NRC Inspection Report 50-302/81-30) and has determined the cause of these trips to be the extremely fast time response of these monitors. The fast time response makes these monitors susceptable to tripping from normal bus and grid perturbations.
The licensee issued modification MAR 82-1-16 " Install Time Delay Relays in RCPPM Cabinets" cn March 2.
This modification replaces existing relays in the cabinets with new time relays that will increase the time response of the RCPPM's from 100 to 150 Milliseconds (!!S).
It is believed that this modification will prevent the inadvertant trips.
The inspectors reviewed this MAR, observed maintenance activities in progress, and reviewed the test data for setting of the new time delay relays. During this review the inspectors noted that the new tise delay relays will appear to cause the RCPPM's to exceed the maximum Technical Specifications limit of 470 MS. This issue was discussed with the licensee and remains to be resolved.
Unresolved Item (302/82-02-11):
Determined if the new time delay relays added to the RCPPM's will exceed TS limits.
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