IR 05000302/1982008
| ML20053A889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1982 |
| From: | Andrews D, Cline W, Jenkins G, Marston R NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| To: | Florida Power Corp |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053A886 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-82-08, NUDOCS 8205270396 | |
| Download: ML20053A889 (17) | |
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'o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y" A
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-302/82-08 l
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 14042, M. A.C. H-2 St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Facility Name:
Crystal River 3 Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at the Crystal River site near Crystal River, Florida Inspectors:.
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D. L. Andrews Date Signed j
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g, R. R. Marston Date Signed N, f [/<duwI h:5/S7
[etW.E. Cline Date Signed Accompanying Personr 13, D M. Ro rer, F. G. Pagano, E. E. Hickey, J. L. Kenoyer Y
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Approved by:_
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en ips' Chief, Dat'e Signed Emergency r paredness Section SUMMARY Inspection on March 28-31, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 123 inspector-hours on site in the area of a full scale radiological emergency exercise.
Results In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS l
l 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- Dr. P. Baynard, Manager, Nuclear Support Service
- L. Hill, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Support Service
- J. R. Wright, Health Physicist, Nuclear Support Service
- T. C. Lutkehaus, Plant Manager
- K.
F. Lancaster, Senior Quality Auditor
- C. H. Long, Serior Quality Auditor
- J. C. Smith, Senior Quality Auditor
- E. P. Komara, Nuclear Compliance Auditor
- D. H. Smith, Nuclear Security and Special Projects Superintendent
- R. Clarke, Chem / Rad Protection Specialist
- S. D. Mansfield, Nuclear Technical Instructor
- D. K. Nauschaefer, Training Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included several craf tsmen, operators, security force mem'.rs, and of fice personnel.
Other Organizations R. S. Wilkerson, Chief, Bureau of Disaster Preparedness, State of Florida W. Johnson, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services J. P. Heard, Federal Emergency Management Agency C. Stovall, Federal Emergency Management Agency NRC
- G. R. Jenkins, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section, RII
- T. Stetka, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Smith, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 31, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Exercise Scenario The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, state and local emergency pla s and organizations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on March 24, and March 29, 1982.
The inspectors concluded that the scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the onsite and of f site emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State and local governmental agencies for their full participation in the exerci se.
The inspectors had no further questions in this araa -
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6.
Assignment of Responsibility This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staf f is available to respond to an emergency as required by criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II. A.
The inspectors observed that speci fic emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency; however, the capability for long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not demonstrated.
The inspectors stated that during full scale exercises, a long term emergency organization should be outlined to demonstrate capability in this area and to ensure effective utilization of available personnel.
This area will De c aserved during a subsequent exercise.
There app 93 red to be a discrepancy in the licensee's concept of operations with respect to command and control functions at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Throughout the exercise it was not clear that the EOF Director was fully in command of the emergency organization. This problem is discussed in paragraph 13.d.(1).
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7.
Onsite Emergency Organization The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.B.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization.
Aug,wntation of the initial emorgency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel and corporate assistance. The on duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon the initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Station Manager. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
8.
Emergency Response Support and Resources This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staf f at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.C.
Assistance resources utilized during this exercise included the Citrus County Ambulance Service, Citrus Memorial Hospital, Seven Rivers Community Hospital, Shands Teching Hospital and Citrus County Sheri f f's Department.
The inspectors observed that assistance resources were called upon and responded promptly to the assistance request as stated in the agreements between Florida Power Corporation and the various of fsite organizations.
Medical and public health support is discussed in paragraph 17.
The
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inspectors had no further questions in this area.
9.
Emergency Classification System This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.D.
The inspectors observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the implementing procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided initial and continuing mitigating actions taken during the simulated emergency.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
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4 10.
Notification Methods and Procedures This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup message to response organization has been estat'lished; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.E.
The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures have been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augumented emergency response organization. Due to the time constraints of this exercise some of the State response organiza-tion was pre positioned in the Crystal River area; however, the notification procedures appeared to be timely and adequate and the inspectors had no further questions in this area.
The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operational. Portions of the system were activated by Citrus County during this exercise to warn the public of the significant simulated events occurring at the Crvstal River site.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
11.
Emergency Communications This area was observed to determine that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.F.
a.
Control Room - In general emergency communications from the control room to the Technical Support Center and support teams were adequate.
There was some dif ficulty in portable radio operations within the plant although this problem did not appear to affect the efficient operation of the Control Room staff.
The Operations Technical Assistant (OTA)
was utilized in the Control Room as a dedicated communicator.
The inspector stated that while it is important to have a knowledgeable individual act as communicator, the OTA might be better utilized to provide engineering assessment functions and direct assistance to Control Room personnel.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - Overall communications from the TSC to the other elements of the emerge.cy organization were adequate.
The inspector noted that due to the number of telephones in the TSC it was sometimes difficult to determine which one was ringing. The inspector stated that ring lights on the TSC telephones would be helpful.
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The near-site E0F appeared to have adequate communications systems to support that operation; however, the need for ring lights on the telephones was more pronounceJ at the EOF than at the TSC.
It is recognized that the EOF i s ar.
interim facility and some equipment upgrade is planned for the permanent EOF now under construction.
The inspector had no further questions in this area. Item 50-302/81-14-40 is closed.
d.
Corporate Command Center (CCC) - There did not appear to be an adequate number of telephones at the CCC and there is a need for ring lights and ring volume control on telephones. Due to the small size of the room used as the CCC the loud ringing of the telephones caused an unacceptable noise level in that facility. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-302/82-08-01).
e.
Crystal River Plant Site - A number of times during the exercise the inspectors noted that emergency announcements could not be heard in various areas of the plant.
Audibility of emergency alarms and communications has been addressed in IE Bulletin 79-18 and previous deficiencies in this area are being tracked by item 50-302/80-28-01.
The inspector stated that the licensee should review the corrective actions taken in response to the above noted items and take prompt additional actions to correct this problem.
f.
News Center - Additional telephone lines are needed at the News Center for Florida Power Corporation and media use.
e The licensee identified some of the above noted communication problems during the critique of the exercise on March 31, 1982.
The area of emergency communications and licensee's corrective actions in this area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
12.
Public Education and Information This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(B)(7),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.G.
Information concerning emergency actions had been distributed throughout the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and was considered to be adequate.
Provisions have been made to provide emergency information to transient persons who may be present in the EPZ during an emergency.
News releases and briefings by Florida Power Corporation (FPC) and the State did not appear to be well coordinated in that at times the State repre-sentative held briefings without apparent input from Florida Power and at other times FPC held briefings without apparent correlation with State of Florica representatives. Additionally, coordination with County Information Of ficers and NRC representatives appeared to be lacking.
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The News Media Center did not have adequate work space, telephones or copying capability for use by media representatives.
A licensee repre-sentative stated that news media facilities would be upgraded upon the completion of the new Emergency Operations Facility now under construction.
13.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654 Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of the emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.
a.
Control Room - The inspector observed that control room personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available to the Emergency Coordinator and the response to the simulated emergency condition was prompt and effective. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - TSC was activated and staf fed promptly upon notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert emergency classification. The TSC staf f appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities and TSC operations proceeded smoothly.
With the exception of minor communications problems noted in paragraph 11, the TSC appeared to have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
c.
Operations Supoort Center (OSC) - The OSC was staf fed promptly upon activation by the Emergency Coordinator. The inspector observed that teams were formed promptly, briefed and dispatched efficiently.
Overall, OSC Operations were considered adequate.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The EOF, which is an interim f acility located at the District Of fice in Crystal River, was activated and staf fed following the declaration of an alert at the plant site.
Although the f acility is small f or the number of persons assigned there were adequate communications available and the facility was considered adequate for an interin EOF. A permanent EOF is under construction and is expected to be complete in October 1982. The following weaknesses were identified by the inspectors at the EOF.
(1)
It was not clear to the observers that the EOF Director had overall management control of the emergency organization.
It appeared to the inspector that major decisions concerning
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emergency response actions were being made by the Corporate Command Center following discussions with the EOF Director and the Emergency Coordinator at the TSC. This gave the appearance that the EOF functions as an information center rather than a command and control organization.
Review of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Section 6, supported the impression that the EOF functions as an ancillary organization and is not in direct control of the emergency organization. Licensee representatives disagreed with this observation.
The inspector stated that the EOF Director should be given full authority and responsib:lity to act independently to direct licensee's emergency response resources, coordinate radiological and environmental assessment, recommend public protective action to State and local governmental authorities present at the E0F and to coordinate emergency response activities with Federal, State and local agencies. This issue was addressed in a confirmatory letter to the licensee dated April 8, 1982.
(2) Off site dose assessment at the EOF was considered inadequate.
This area is discussed in paragraph 14.
(3) There appeared to be delays in providing plant status, data and dose projection information to State and local representatives at the EOF.
There needs to be better technical liaison and more indepth interface among the various agencies present in the EOF.
The inspectors attributed this problem to the weakness observed in command and control functions noted above.
(4) Plant data and status displays, including important parameter trends and historical accident infcrmation displays were considered inadequate.
The licensee identified this problem during the exercise critique held on March 31, 1982.
e.
Corporate Command Center (CCC) - The CCC is a corporate organization located at the general office in St. Petersburg.
It was the inspector's understanding that the CCC would provide corporate support to the emergency organization; however, during this exercise it
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appeared that the Recovery Director and the CCC staff acted in the capacity of command and control of the overali emergency organization.
This operational concept is in variance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.101, NUREG 0654 and NUREG 0696.
This issue is discussed further in paragraph 13.d.(1).
In addition, there were weaknesses in the CCC operation which need improvement.
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(1) There did not appear to be adequate members of telephones for the j
number of persons operating within the CCC.
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(2) The Recovery Manager needs a communicator assigned to relieve him of excessive time spent on the telephone.
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(3) There were an excessive number of persons in the area assigned as tha CCC and the noise level, at times, was unacceptable.
The inspector stated that additional space should be considered for some of the functional groups assigned to the CCC.
(4) Status board, and data displays were inadequate and should include plant parameters, status, important parameter trends and accident historical information.
This problem was identified during the licensee's critique of the exercise.
The CCC facility and available equipment will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-302/82-08-02).
14. Accident Assessment This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific crite 'ia in NUREG 0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of the radiologicci hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
At the Crystal River Plant the engineering accident assessment team functioned to analyze the plant equipment status during the accident and to make recommendations to the site Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency condition.
The radiological assessment group provided continuous updates on inplant radiation hazards and potential releases of radioactive materials.
This group was supplemented by field teams to measure actual radiation levels and activity concentrations in the environment during releases of radioactive materials.
Radiological assessments of offsite dose equivalents did not include projections of integrated doses based on estimated release duration and no attempt was made to estimate integrated doses based on potential concentra-tions of radioactive materials which may occur, such as the waste gas decay tank leak postulated by the scenario. In addition, radiological assessment personnel in both the TSC and EOF need assistance due to the numerous
assigned duties which included information and data transmission, update of data displays as well as evaluation of offsite dose equivalents. This area was addressed in a confirmatory letter to the licensee dated April 8,1982.
Of fsite monitoring teams dispatched by Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
appeared to have adequate equipment and functioned effectively in measuring simulated radioactivity concentrations in the environment.
Under the agreement between FPC and the State of Florida, the State teams will assume responsibility for offsite monitoring when they are in position and ready to
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do so. The inspector noted that there appeared to be a lack of coordination and information exchange between the FPC and State teams.
The inspector stated that offsite monitoring data should be consolidated and made available to both organizations through their assessment teams; in addition, continued monitoring near the plant by the FPC teams should be coordinated closely with the State team monitoring to take advantage of the most ef ficient direction of monitoring uperations.
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-302/82-08-03). Based on observations of the of f site survey team equipment and performance items 50-302/81-14-24, 50-302/81-14-29 and 50-302/81-14-47 are closed.
15.
Protective Responses This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
The inspectors observed that protective actions for onsite personnel were taken promptly and a site evacuation and accountability was initiated in a timely manner.
The accountability was reported complete within about 25 minutes; however, there was some confusion over various lists of personnel i
remaining onsite and the accountability was not considered complete and verified until about 55 minutes following initiation.
The procedure for accounting for personnel remaini ; onsite in the emergency response centers I
needs to be reviewed and actions taken to improve overall accountability to achieve the 30 minute criteria provided by the guidance referenced above.
Based on the inspectors observation of protective responses during this exercise items 50-302/81-14-31 and 50-302/81-14-65 are closed.
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Radiological Exposure Control This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendation as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.K.
The inspectors observed that exposure contr 1 measures were utilized throughout the exercise end included dosimetry distribution to onsite personnel.
Radiation surveys were conducted in the onsite emergency
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facilities on a routine basis: however, there were no radiation surveys observed at the EOF, nor were dosimetry devices issued to EOF personnel even through at times the EOF was in an elevated radiation field resulting from the release plume.
The State Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) was situated immediately adjacent to the EOF and contained operating instruments which would have indicated exposure levels to personnel in the area; however, FPC needs to provide radiation monitoring capability in the EOF to ensure the protection of EOF personnel. '
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Item 50-302/81-14-53, concerning exposure limits for emergency personnel is closed.
17.
Medical and Public Health Support This area was observed to determine that arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as equired by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, pa.agraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.L.
The medical portion of the exercise involved three injuries occurring at different times durine the exercise.
Only one of the simulated injuries involved a simulated contaminated patient.
The two non-contaminated injuries were taken to Citrus Memorial Hospital and Seven Rivers Hospital respectively.
The simulated contaminated injury was transported to Shands Teaching Hospital in Gainesville.
The inspectors observed the onsite portion of the medical emergencies and determined that the first aid team responded quickly and appeared to have a good understanding of basic first aid procedures.
With respect to the simulated contaminated injury, the team took minimal contamination control measures before treating the injured person. The inspectors concluded that the team acted correctly in providing prompt first aid to the simulated injured individual.
The offsite portion of the medical emergencies was not observed during this exercise.
The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
18.
Exercise Critique The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.N.
A formal Florida Power Corporation critique of the emergency exercise was held on March 31, 1982 with exercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management and NRC personnel attending.
Deficiencies and weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program, identified as a result of this exercise were presented.
Followup of corrective actions taken by Florida Power Corporation identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be accomplished through subsequent NRC inspections.
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Federal Evaluation Team Report The report of deficiencies noted by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise is included as an attachment to this report.
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ATTACHMENT
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f, q~.,.g ', Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Region IV 1375 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309
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April 9,1982 c
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Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson R,..
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Director, Division of Public Safety '
" 1)ESIGELTED ORIGINAII \\
Planning and Assistance A
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1720 Gadsden Strcot torttited EY / I*0!O
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Tallahassec Florida 32301 a
Dear Mr. hilkerson:
Encloscd is a list of dcficiencies concerning the Plant Crystal River
Excrciso conducted on March 30, 1982. Many specific phascs of the Exercise were observed to be adequate; howcVer, only deficiencies are identified in the attached list in ordct to simplify the revicw and correctivo action process.
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The acabers of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) and FEMA regional staff, in particular, commented on the onthusiasm and professionalism of the emergency responsu personnel.
The Exercisc was a success in that it pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of the stato and local Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans.
As a result of the Exercise and critique at Crystal River, as well
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as the two previous Florida Exorcises, revisions shonid be made in the stato and site-specific plans in accordance with our comments.
Since the regulatory dcadline is April 1,1982, wo strongly urge that you provide the FEMA Regional Director with a report as soon as possibic on how and when the deficiencies will be corrected. After this report
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Sincerciy yours, e
G1cnn C. Woodard, Jr.
Chairman, RAC RIV Enclosure
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Radiological Emergency preiatedness Exercise Crystal River plant ~, Inverness, Florida March 30,1982 Deficiencies Observed by FEMA /RAC
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITIES AND RESOURCES (working space,
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internal communications and displays, communications, security).
1.
State EOC: Telephone communications barely adcquate. Installa-tion of ring down circuit should improve system. PIO function co-located with state EOC created problems.
2.
FEOC: Use of the Citrus County EOC as both a county EOC and a state EOC created significant overcrowding, noise and
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insufficient ventilation.
Location of IER, NAWAS, and conference phone equitxacnt made it necessary for supctvisors/
coordinators to 1cava duty stations to use this equipment.
Relocation or remoting of terminal equipment should be considered.
3.
Citrus Ccunty EOC: Working space was inadequate. The hot ring down telephone alcrting systcm, planned to be installed, will alleviate NAWAS party line prob 1 cms and low audio levels experienced on the conference systcm.
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Levy County EOC: Working space was inadequqte. Record-kceping procedures could be improved by maintenance of a master log
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of messages are! agencies' actions. Direct communication between law enforcement officials and the dispatch center is needed.
e II.
ALERTING AND MODILIZATION OF ' OFFICIALS AND STAFF
_(Staffing, 24-hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness)
1.
State EOC: Adequate 2.
FEOC and local: Not observed - staff pre-positioned.
III. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
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(Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, infonnation flow between 1evels and organizations, docision making, checklists and procedures.)
1.
State EOC: Adeq ua te 2.
FEOC
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Citrus Co. EOC: Adequato 4.
Levy Co. EOC: Adcq ua te
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IV.
PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION (Means of notification, c.g., sircns vehicles, or
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'other system, notification timelincos)
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State: Not observed
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Citrus Co. EOC: The qcncral emergency was dociated at
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12:45 p.m. ; this knowicdgo was announced at tho Cltrus Co.
EOC at 1:25 p.m.
This excessivo delay was apparently the
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result of cumulativo delays by utility and stato staff in the EOF, and also the result of a delay within the County COC itself.
3.
Levy Co. EOC:
The backup notification system needs improvo-ment and additional resources for offcctivo dissemination
of notification is needed.
V.
PUBLIC AND MEDIA REIATIONS (Publications, press facilitics, media briefings, news release coordination)
1.
Stato EOC: Adequa te 2.
FEOC
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Citrus Co. EOC: Adequate
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Irvy Co. EOC: Adequato 5.
ENC and EOF:
Inadequato. Media could not get timely information from all principals, i.e.,
utility, stato and
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local governments and NRC, throughout the day of exercise.
Written news tc1caso system is cumbersome.
Other inadequacies:
1.
Area phonc book contains information on
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hurricano procedures but nothing on nuclear accident procedures.
2.
No posted messages on nuc1 car accident procedurcs in four major motel / hotel facilitics checked within the 10-mile EPZ.
3.
Periodic, scheduled and posted news con [crences
needed, with all agencies represented.
4.
Joint media facility inadequatc; no telephones, typewriters, etc.
The two status boards were not kept current. Security inadequatc.
Loadcrship and control of ENC inadequate.
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Information messages not c1 car.
Public infrirma-tion inadequate for the public to make decisions.
6.
Evacuation information given by sector. Considera-tion should be given to releasing this information by geographic areas in addition to sector designators.
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Education program for media representatives needed.
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VI.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMEllT
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(Staff and ficidTperations, monitoring, adequacy of
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cq uipmen t a technical calculations, issuance of timely
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State EOC: Adequa to
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FEOC
Because of the inaccurate and delayed information flow into the FEOC, the RSO and staff did not have a full appreciation of the plant status and parameters.
Thero was
confusion as to whether the initial release was a continuous release or a "putf" tc1 case.
There was confusion relative to measured vs. projected dose rates.
3.
Citrus Co. EOC: Not observed 4.
Levy Co. EOC : Not observed
5.
HERL: Data and communication logs need to be consistent in format with those used by teams and the EOF.
No security personnel assigned specifically to the HERL. MERL needs ability to easily monitor communications betwecn the EOF and field monitoring teams. MERL should have been batter prepazed to handle field team deployment activitics when the hi-band link to the EOF want out.
Tbc decision to rolocate the HERL should have been made sooner. Apparentlya there was no awareness of the relationship of the plume to s
tha HERL location. MERL personnoi not used affectively in direction of field teams.
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6.
Monitoring Teams: No periodic brictings were given to teams.
Teams should have a clear policy on withdrawing from a high-cxposure arca in the absence of a prompt reassignmont from MERL or EOF.
Field teams had no access to XI except through being recalled to the MERL.
Direction and control of field teams needs to be improved.
Field teams need current, well-labeled maps using local landmarks.
7.
EOF: EOF inadequato in size. Status boards to display basic data inadequate. Maps indicating monitoring data and dose projections were not utilized until late stages of exercise.
Consideration should be given to co-locating state and facility doso assessement personnel to promote more timely and accurate cxchange of information; also, standardized forms for the exchange of information would be helpful in information c::chango.
Thero is a shortage of trained health physics personnel to man an extetuicd cmcrgency situation.
VII. ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (Sheltering, cvacuation, reception and care, transportation)
1.
State EOC: Adequa te
2.
FEOC
- Not obscrved
!
.
.
.
c o
-
,
-
-
.
3.
Citrus Co. EOC: The shelter manager at the withlacoochee Center las not received shelter management training and was unsure of responsibilities and procedures related to monitoring, registering, security, etc.
Shelter staffing was not fully demonstrated.
4.
Invy Co. EOC: Procedures for registration were lacking at
the Bronson High School shelter. More training of staff is
'
,
needed.
VII. HEALTH, MEDICAL AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES (Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplics, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilitics and treatment)
1.
State EOC: Adequate
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2.
FEOC
No instruction was given concerning acquisition and distribution of KI to emergency workers.
The county health officer initiated actions to have KI distributed to state emergancy workers (Fish and Game) wi thout authoriza -
tion or knowledge of the State Coordinator.
3.
Citrus Co. EOC: Procedures for the use and distribution of KI were inadequate.
Adequacy of access control t.o evacuated areas was not demonstrated.
The Citrus Co. Sheriff's Department personnel assigned to traffic control points
,
did not have dosimeters and luve not been trained it. radio-logical procedures.
4.
Levy Co. EOC: Decontamination procedures need to be improved; additional staff and routing pattcrn needed.
5.
EOF: Provisions to minimize exposurc of workers were not eviden t.
TX. RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS
'
State and Local: Although this phase of the cir.orgency operation was not observed, it appears that appropriate procedures are in place to adequately conduct this phase. Adequate briefings were provided to state and local staffs.
X.
RELEVANCE OF THE EAERCISE EXPERIENCE (Benefi t to participants, adequacy of tha scenario)
.
Participants * questionnaires indicated the exercise was bcncficial in pointing out strengths and weaknesses. Scenario could have exercised some response organizations more thoroughly.
.
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