IR 05000298/1989033
| ML19332D848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1989 |
| From: | Bennett W, Constable G, Greg Pick NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332D845 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-89-33, NUDOCS 8912050317 | |
| Download: ML19332D848 (7) | |
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' APPENDIX B
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e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIDN IV (n; NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/89-33 Operating Licence:
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[',., q Docket: 50 298 im (Licensee: ' Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
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P.0, Box 499
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Columbus, Nehraska 68602-0499
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Facility Neme:
Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
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Inspection At: CNS, Nemaha for Nebraska L
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Inspection' Conducted: October 1-31, 1989
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Inspectors:-
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11 f (4 / 79 G. A. Pick, esidlnt-Inspector, Project Date I
r Section C Divi ; ion of Reactor Projects
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WhW li//V/}'<1 W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector.
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Project Section C, Division of Reactor Projects C-Approved:
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G. L. Constable, Chief, Project Section C Da t'e
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Division of Reactor Projects 8912050317 891127 ADOCK0500g8 DR
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i Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 1-31. 1989 (Report 50 298/89-33)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety
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verification, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations, onsite followup of events, access control, and emergency exercise evaluation.
Results: One violation concerning access control was identified in the inspection period. This is a repeat of a-violation identified in October 1988.
The repeat violation is another example of weakness in training records and the licensee's corrective action program. The operations staff war, alert in identifying a potential problem during performance of a surveillance, which was outside the bounds of the test being performed. The licensee was responsive to NRC concerns in aress other than those identified-in the violation.
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i DETAILS i
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Persons Contacted
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Principal Licensee Employees
- G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations
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- G. A. Trevors, Division Manager of Nuclear Support
- J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager of Operations
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- S. Peterson, Senior Manager of Technical Support Services T
- E. M. Hace, Engineering. Manager
- J. W. Dutton, Nuclear; Training Manager
- R. A. Jansky, Outage and Modifications Manager
- S. L. Bray, Quality Assurance
- R. L. Gardner, Maintenance Manager
- J. V. Sayer, Radiological Manager
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- H. T. Hitch, Plant Services Manager
- G. R. Smith, Licensing Supervisor
- L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
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- C. M. Estes Management Trainee
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- R. Brungardt, Operations Manager
- Denotes those present during the exit interview conoucted on November 2, 1989.
i The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees and contractors
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during the inspection period.
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Plant Status
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The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout the i
inspection period.
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Access Control-Personnel (81070)
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.The inspectors observed security personnel monitor personnel access to the l
site. On October 12, 1989, the inspectors determined that one individual L
had been allowed continuous access to the site even though his required L
security training (including the 90-day grace period authorized by site procedures) had expired on June 19, 1989. This is an apparent violation J
L-(298/8933-01) of Plant Services Procedure 1.1, " Station Security,"
Revision 12, dated August 24, 1989. This is a repeat of a violation l.
docunented in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/88-31-(Violation 298/8831-01).
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The inspectors determined that the training department had not notified the security department, as required by procedure, that the individual's j
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training had expired. The licensee subsequently determined that
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19 additional. personnel had been allowed access to the site even though their required training had expired. Ten of these personnel had been l'
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onsite with expired training. The upgrade of the computerized training
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records tracking system comitted to as corrective action.in response to the previous violation, is not complete at this time. The interim
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corrective actions taken after the previous violation were apparently not successful in preventing a repeat of the violation.
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A repeat violation concerning unauthoHzed personnel access due to inadequate training records was identified. The failure to prevent a repeat. violation m6y indicate lack of tinely and complete corrective
' action and failure to verify adequacy of the corrective actions taken.
No other viobtions or deviations were identified in this area.
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4.
Operational Safety Verification (71107)_
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The inspestors observed operaticnal activities throughout the inspection period. Prsper control rcom staffing was continuously maintained.
Control room activities and ccnduct were observed to be well controlled and profe:sional. The inspectors observed several shift turnover meetings
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and verified that infomation concerning plant status was properly
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comunicated to the oncoming operatot s.
Discussions with operators detemined that they were cognizant of plant status and understood the
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importance of, and reason for, each lit annunciator. Control board
walkdowns and tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to verify operability of plant equipment. Overall plant cleanliness was
observed to be excellent throughout the inspection period.
The licensee completed their followup of anomalies associated with the September 28, 1989, reactor scram documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/89-32.
During the fast bus transfer which accompanied the scram, the Reactor Equipment Cooling (REC) Pumps C and D tripped.
The licensee generated an engineering work request to add a time delay relay to the REC pump control circuit. This work will be completed during the 1990 refueling outage.
In addition, the licensee completed the root cause detemination of why the feedwater sthrtup flow control valves and the low
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pressure steam supply valve to the reactor feed pump did not automatically operate subsequent to the scram. The cause of the failures was a wire interfering with a contact assembly bar preventing proper relay operation.
This was determined to have occurred during the detailed control room design review upgrade perforned during the 1989 refueling outage.
The licensee inspected the control room panels and found no similar problems and determined that this was an isolated occurrence due to personnel error.
The inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection plan were implemented in conformance with facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements.
Radiation areas and contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled. Radiation monitors were properly utilized to check for contamination.
Radiation work permits contained appropriate information to ensure that work was perforned in a safe, controlled manner.
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The inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of vehicle, personnel, and package search. Vehicles were properly authorized and escorted or controlled within the protected area (PA). The PA barrier had adequate illumination and the isolation zones were free of transient material. The inspectors observed installation of upgrac" > 'n i.he PA barrier. The inspectors conducted site tours and verifieu teat compensatory neasures were implemented when required due to equipment malfunction or weather conditions.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this crea. The lir.ensee promptly perfonned rect caete analyses on anomalies associated with the September 28, 1989, reactor scram. The licensee 1.t continuing to make (
improvenents to the protected area barrier.
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{ollowup on Previously Identifie1 Inspection [indings (92701 cnd 92702)
(Closed)InspectorFollowupItem 298/8914-02: This item was initiated to verify the issuance of a procedure requitynent for annual itplacement of a lube oil filter housing gasket.
The licensee replaces the diesel generator lube oil filter and filter housing gasket annually. The diesel generator maintenance procedure required changeout of the filter but failed to mention the filter housing gasket.
The licensee changed Procedure 7.2.53.1, " Diesel Generator Engine Mechanical Inspection," on August 24, 1989, to insure that the lube oil filter housing cover gasket is replaced during the annual diesel generator inspection. This item is considered closed.
(Closed)Unresolveditem 298/8923-01: This item concerned the failure to revise an abnormal procedure end train operators after completion of a designchange(DC).
DC 88-156, "250 VDC Station Service Batteries 1A and 10," among other things, installed a swing charger which could temporarily replace one of
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the normal chargers if it failed. - The DC package identified Abnonnal Procedure 2.4.6.9 ds requiring revision due to the DC. The revision was initiated and was considered for approval by the Station Operations Review Comittee (SORC) on June 10, 1989. At that time, several questions were raised concerning the qualification of the swing charger, and the procedure was withdrawn from consideration for further review.
Since the procedure status is-being tracked as a SORC open item, no violation of procedures occurred. This item is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
The licensee was responsive to NRC concerns.
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Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed portions of Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.3.12.1,
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" Diesel Generator (DG) Operability Test," Revision 28, dated June 8,1989, t
perfonned on October 23 and 24,1989. During the perfonnance of the SP for DG No.1 on October 23, the operators perferming the test noted that
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it took 23 se':onds for the diesel to reach operating voltage and frequency.
Even though the procedure did not specify an acceptance criteria for this time, the operators were aware of the requirement that the DG reach operating voltage and frequency within 16 seconds. The
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operators discussed the concern with licensee managenent and the system engineer, end the licensee decided to repeat the DG start at the completion of the monthly operability test. Tho DG reached voltage and i
o frequency in 12.5 seconds on the repeht start.
The licensee
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perforned SP 6.3.12.1 on DG No. 2 and another start of DG No. 2 on
October 24. On both occasions, the DG reached operating voltage and
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frecuency in less than 16 seconds.
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The DG monthly operability test is normally performed with only one of the
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two starting air banks in service.
Since both air benks would normally be in service if an automatic DG start was required, and the long start time could not be repeated DG No. I was not declared inoperable. The licensee i
believes the problem to be an isolated occurrence, but will monitor start times on future surveillances. All tests were perfonned by qualified
operators who demonstrated knowledge of the system and requirements beyor.d l
that described in the procedure. All required precautions and l
prerequisites were verified, and completed procedures were properly
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reviewed. All acceptance criteria was within required values.
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The inspectors observed portions of the calibration of the exit portal l
monitors on October 30 and 31,1989. The calibration was perfonned in accordance with Health Physics Procedure 9.3.4.1, " National Nuclear
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i Corporation (NNC) Portal Monitors,"- Revision 4 dated November 5,1987.
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The calibration is perfonned annually, and was perfonned by a qualified health physics technician who was familiar with the procedure.
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staff was very alert in identifying a potential problem even though it was not specified in the surveillance procedure. The licensee performed a
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l tinely, technically adequate analysis of the potential problem.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)_
L The inspectors observed portions of the cleaning of the "B" REC exchanger l
on October 16 and 18,1989.. The cleaning was performed in accordance with
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l Maintenance Work Request 89-3864 and Special Maintenance Procedure 89-009, I-
" Cleaning REC Heat Exchangers Using Conco Tube Scrapers," dated L
October 16, 1989. The cleaning was performed under a special procedure since this was the first cleaning performed utilizing this type of l
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equipment. Analysis and evaluation is being performed by the system engineer to determine if this will become the normal method of cleaning.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Evaluation of Emergency Exercise (82301)
On October 25, 1989, the inspectors participated in the annual emergency exercise. The results of the exercise are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/89-35 The inspectors observed that conamnications had improved greatly since the previous observed exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.in this crea.
9.
ELit Interviews (30703)
An exit interview was conducted on November 2,1999, with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1.
During the interview, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the ir.spection. Other acetings between the NRC inspectors and licensee aansgament were held
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periodically during the inspection period to discuss toentified. concerns.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any infornation provided to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspectors.
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