IR 05000298/1989039
| ML20006C126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1990 |
| From: | Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006C125 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-89-39, IEB-79-24, NUDOCS 9002060345 | |
| Download: ML20006C126 (9) | |
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APPENDIX-
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U.'S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY C0t941SSION'
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REGION IV
o NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/89-39 Operating License:' DPR-46
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-Docket:: 50-298-
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Licensee:' Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
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P.O. Box 499.
-Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 Facility Name':- -Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
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. Inspection At: CNS, Nemaha County, Nebraska
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. Inspection Conducted: December 16, 1989, through January 15, 1990
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. G. A' Pick, Resident-Inspector, Project Section C
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= Inspectors:
- Division of. Reactor Projects W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector, Project C Division.of Reactor Projects-
' Approved:
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G. L. Constable, Chief, Project Section C Date'
Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Sur nary
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Inspection ~Conucted December 16, 1989, through January 15, 1990 (Report 50-298/87-39)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety
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verification, licensee event report followup, monthly maintenance and
. surveillance observations, fitness-for-duty (FFD) training programs, and cold
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. eather preparations.
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.Pesults:.No violations or deviations were identified in this' report. The-licensee implemented a new program for controlling the spread of contamination (paragraph 3).
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Good comunication and cooperation among departments continues to contribute to
- the excellent operation of the plant (paragraphs 6 and 7).
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The licensee's implementation of and training on the fitness-for-duty rule was
comprehensive (parcgraph 8).
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9002060345 900131 PDR ADOCK 05000298 e
o PDC
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DETAILS 1.
PersonsL Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
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' *G. ' R.: Horn. Division Manager. of Nuclear Operations -
- Ji M. Meacham, Senior Manager of Operations
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(*S. M. Peterson, Senior Manager of Technical Support Services
- E. M. Mace, Engineering Manager R. L. Gardner, Maintenance Manager i
J. V.. Sayer, Radiological' Manager
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- H. T. Hitch, Plant Services Manager i
- G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
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- R. Brungardt, Operations Mancger
- L. E. Bray. Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- R. L.'Beilke, Radiological Support Supervisor
- *V..W. Stairs, Assistant Operations Manager J
- Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on January 17, 1990.
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The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees and contractors during the inspection period.
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2.
Plant Status r
The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout the
' inspection period. On January 8, 1990, the plant entered the coastdown i
period ~in preparation for the Cycle 14 refueling outage scheduled to begin on March 5,1990.
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-Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed operational activities throughout the inspection period. Control room activities were observed to be well controlled.
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' Proper control room staffing was maintained and professional conduct was continuously observed. Discussions with operators determined that;they-
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were-cognizant of plant status and understood the importance of, and reason for, each lit annunciator. The inspectors observed selected shift
' turnover meetings and noted that information concerning plant status and planned evolutions was communicated to the oncoming operators.
Control panel walkdowns were conducted to verify that emergency core cooling systems were in a standby condition. Tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to confirm operability of plant equipment, including the fire suppression systems and other emergency equipment.
Facility operations were performed in accordance with the requirements established in the CNS operating license and Technical Specifications (TS).
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7The inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with t
facility policies procedures, and regulatory requirements. Radiation
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and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled.
Radiation
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work permits contained appropriate information-to ensure that work could
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be performed in a safe and controlled manner. Radiation monitors were properly utilized to check for contamination, f
On January 15,1990, the licensee implenented a new program'for controlling the spread of contamination within the olant. The program F
designates the power block, which includes the reactor building, turbine-building, multipurpose facility, radwaste building, auxiliary radwaste building, and control building, as a radiologically controlled area.
Exit from the power block, except in an emergency, is allowed only at three locations which require'the use of wholebody personnel contamination monitors prior to exit. The use of personnel contamination monitors assures a more thorough count than obtained by the previously used hand.
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.and foot monitors.
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J A11' entries into the radiologically controlled area are posted, "No
~ eating, drinking, smoking, or chewing allowed." Doors that no longer
allow egress from the radiologically controlled area are posted.
" Emergency Exit Only," and further specify that the exits from the
radiologically controlled area are from the three, normal exits. The inspectors attended training on the new program, presented to supervisors -
and managers, on January 9, 1990. The training,-conducted by the health physics supervisor, provided a thorough explanation of the.new program.-
Each supervisor was responsible for making his subordinates aware of the new requirements. General orientation training incorporated the new
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requirements on January 10, 1990.
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The inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of l
. vehicle, personnel, and package search. Vehicles 'were properly authorized i
and escorted or controlled within the protected area (PA). The PA barrier had adequate illumination and the isolation zones were free of transient material. Site tours were conducted by the inspectors to ensure that compensatory measures were properly implemented as required. The PA-barrier had adequate illumination and the isolation zones were free of transient material. On January 10, 1990, the inspectors observed a security drill where personnel attempted to bring a fake gun into the PA.
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The fake gun was detected by access personnel and proper actions initiated.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The licensee l
implemented a new program for controlling the spread of contamination.
4.
Followup (92701)
(Closed) Open Item (298/8814-03): This item concerned the large backlog of drawing change notices (DCNs) in the control room.
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At the time this item was opened, there was a backlog of almost 700 DCNs.
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lThe licensee' assigned additional personnel to assist in reducing the
- backlog.. In ' addition, the program for handling changes was modified to help expedite'the DCN process. The inspectors have observed that control room personnel have had no recent problems with control room drawings. On January 12, 1990, the control room backlog was 13 DCNs. This item is considered cicsed.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The licensee j
=.was responsive.to NRC concerns and implemented a program which greatly i
reduced the backlog of DCNs in the control room, j
5.
Onsite Followup of Written Reports (92700)
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j (Closed)LER87-025: This LER documented'a design deficiency in response j
to Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (THI-2), lessons learned..
In:1981, the licensee installed a motor operator on the drywell exhaust a
inboard isolation bypass valve, in response to NRC concerns regarding TMI-2.. The design change installing the motor operator, however, required -
i that the operator be supplied from a power source not automatically reenergized by a diesel generator (DG) if a loss of. power occurred.
This was not in compliance with the Safety Design Basis requirements.
The root cause of the problem was a-failure to do an adequate 50.59
review.
After the licensee identified the problem, the valve position was L'
administratively controlled. A design change was implemented in the 1988 refueling outage which powered the valves from a nonload-shedding motor control center.
Power is automatically restored to the valve by a DG subsequent to a loss of offsite power.
In addition, the licensee j
verified that-power supplies for all other primary containment isolation
,3 valves' comply wit _h appropriate design requirements.
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The inspectors verified _ that the design change specified that power for
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the valve would come from an appropriate motor control center and that all-other primary containment isclation valves had proper power sources. The inspectors have noted no other similar problems with 50.59 review. This LER is closed.
(Closed)LER88-005: This LER documented an inadvertent isolation of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system during a plant cooldown due to low
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p' ump net positive suction head (NPSH).
The licensee determined that the root cause of the occurrence was a design problem, in that only a small margin exists for RWCU pumps NPSH whenever feedwater is not available to enhance recirculation suction line subcooling. Corrective actions consisted of providing guidance for system operation under similar plant conditions and performing an engineering evaluation for implementing a modification to the RWCU system to prevent recurrence of this problem.
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The inspectorsL observed that,- during the cooldown for the 1989 refueling
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outage, the operators were extremely cautious to ensure that no RWCU pump trip occurred.
In addition, DCN 89-256.will install a subcooling line to inject cool water into the RWCU piping to increase the operating margin for RWCV. pump NPSH during reactor cooldown evolutions. This design-change is scheduled for completion during the 1990 refueling outage and is being tracked by the licensee as an NRC comitment item. This LER is-closed.
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(Closed)LER88-008: This LER documented a failure of residual heat
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I renoval (RHR) inboard injection valves to close during surveillance testing.
The licensee ~ determined that the cause of the problem was a limit switch which was out of adjustment on the shutdown cooling suction valve. This limit switch indicated that the suction valve was not open which meant that the RHR inboard injection valves would not be required to close.
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The licensee replaced the out-of-adjustment limit switch with limit.
l switches of a design more appropriate to its usage. The licensee also verified that there were no similar limit switches in use. The inspector
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' verified that the RHR inboard injection valves have operated i
satisfactorily since this occurrence. This LER is closed.
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(Closed)LER'88-026: This LER documented an unplanned automatic startup of both emergency diesel generators due to 69KV transmission line
disturbances.
i The licensee had. several unplanned actuations of the diesel generators prior to this occurrence.
Most have been due to momentary interruptions of 69KV power caused by lightning. The licensee evaluated these q
occurrences and implemented a design change to correct this problem.
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DCN 88-263, which removed the emergency transformer (69KV) undervoltage automatic start signal from the DG circuitry, was completed during the
.1989 refueling outage. No diesel generator actuations have occurred Lsince this design change was implemented. This LER is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The licensee's reporting and implementation of changes to the plant to correct problems were prompt and complete.
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6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
rogress maintenance on the DG No.-2 (DG2) high pressure carbon dioxidethe inspector observed in-p(C On December 26, 1989, system shuttle valve.
Instrumentation and control tl&C) technicians determined that the shuttle valve failed to operate properly during system During the period the postmaintenance testing of the DG2 C0 system was inoperable, the libensee ma.intained the required fire DG2 CO watch.2
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Normally, the shuttle valve has pressure equalized on each side of the plunger;.however. when actuated, a relief path opens moves the plunger,
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and routes;CO fr m the actuating CO, bottle to a bank of high pressure
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C0 bottles. 2The I&C technicians an5 the mechanics cleaned,' rebuilt, and '
bekch tested the shuttle valve with unsatisfactory results; subsequently,.
the licensee procured a replacement valve. The system engineer was involved in.the troubleshooting and repair activities..The-inspector -
reviewed the completed maintenance work request which indicated that, a
af ter installation of the replacement shuttle valve, postmaintenance j
testing had been completed satisfactorily.
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On December 27, 1989, the inspector reviewed maintenance activities-related to troubleshooting and repair of a radiation monitor. The radiation detector had saturated during performance of a source check.
l The troubleshooting narrowed the monitor failure to electronic circuitry M
supporting the detector. The I&C technicians replaced the microprocessor
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board, the system board, and an integrated circuit chip that contained the software. This radiation monitor utilizes an erasable programmable read only memory (EPROM) integrated circuit. The technician reprogrammed the
EPROM and. returned the microprocessor and system boards to the
manufacturer for failure analysis and replacement. After the technician
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replaced the electronic components, he conducted postmaintenance testing'
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and determined that the detector was operating satisfactorily.
- On January 8,1990, the inspector observed performance of corrective
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maintenance on Service Air Compressor B.
The compressor indicated a
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37 psi-intercooler pressure when the unit was not operating, instead of
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- the normal 0 psi. Discussions with the mechanic indicated that this q
problem had occurred in the past.. Previous elevated intercooler pressure i
was due to the high pressure, nonlubricated, discharge valves having back
- leakage past their seats. The mechanics replaced the high pressure valves
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with spares obtained from the warehouse. After the compressor was
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reassembled, the intercooler pressure indicated 0 psi.
The mechanics
identified a light coating of dust on the valves with the-consistency of
talcum powder. The dust was determined to be desiccant _ deposited in the-compressor as a result of the instrument air postfilter failure, which occurred on November 25, 1989.
Subsequently, the mechanics generated an
additional maintenance work request to completely disassemble, clean, and
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inspect other moving components-in the service air compressor.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The inspector noted that good cooperation and communication was evident among the various onsite departments during troubleshooting and repair of the shuttle valve, and postmcintenance testing was properly specified for the level of work performed.
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Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The following surveillance procedures (SP) were observed and/or reviewed
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SP 8.8.1~.1'7,." Noble Gas Sampling," Revision 1, dated August 3, 1987.
On December 27,1989.- the inspector observed.a chemistry technician take a -
noble gas grab. sample from the reactor building ventilation monitor. The
- test apparatus was properly placed in service.
After obtaining the sample, the chemistry technician.quickly placed'the-lid on the canister of
. charcoal and secured it with tape to prevent any noble gases from i
escaping,,The start time, stop time, and sample. volume were recorded on
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the canister as required by procedure. The technician was knowledgeable-
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about the precautions and limitations of the procedure.
SP 6.4.1.1(S), " South CRD Hydraulic Units Instrumentation Calibration Test," Revision 1 dated July 14, 1988. On January 8, 1990, the inspector observed performances of the control rod drive (CRD) instrument
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calibration checks on two hydraulic control units (HCU). The instrumentation monitors both nitrogen pressure in the nitrogen bottle and water leakage past.the accumulator piston. CNS procedures require testing of the CRD HCU instrumentation biennially. The HCUs are divided into north and south banks. The licensee alternates between the banks so that one-half of the HCUs are tested each year. The inspector observed I&C technicians perform the SP on HCU Nos. 22-23 and 22-35. The technicians found the instruments to be within calibration and properly returned them to service. Communication was maintained with control room personnel.
Review of the SP indicated that testing could not be completed on HCU
' No. 26-35, because Cartridge Valve CRD-V-111(26-35) would not fully isolate the instrumentation from the nitrogen accumulator. When the technicians' attempted to test the HCU, the nitrogen pressure in the
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accumulator decreased slightly; subsequently. -a station operator recharged the accumulator to the correct pressure. Because the instrument calibration is not a TS requirement and the accumulator was fully
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charged, the licensee decided to wait until the upcoming outage to repair the cartridge valve and test the instrumentation.
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'SP 6.3.4.1, "CS Test Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 26, dated inservice / operability test of the core spray (quarterly August 10, 1989. The inspector observed this CS) pump on January 10, 1990. Good communications between the control room and station operators were observed.
System engineers were present during the performance of the test. All data taken met acceptance criteria of the procedure.
No-violations or deviations were identified in this area. Good
. communications and cooperation between departments continues to be an area
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of strength during performance of surveillance procedures.
8.
Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Training Programs (2515/104)
The inspectors observed FFD training to determine the acceptability of the implementation of the training program. On December 29, 1989, the inspector attended general orientation FFD training. This training is required for all individuals allowed unescorted access within the CNS protected area. The instructor presented the requirements specified in General Order 24, " Fitness for Duty Policy," dated December 5,1989.
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i The' dated December 5,1989.
The drug and alcohol testing methods that will be used to. implement the policy include:
initial testing prior to access to CNS, random testing, and for-cause testing.
The instructor discussed personal safety hazards and public health / safety hazards associated with the use of nonprescription drugs and with.the misuse of prescription ' drugs or alcohol. The effects of both prescription and over-the-counter medication on job performance were described. The program requires that personnel demonstrate within 24 hcurs that any
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positive test results were due to prescribed medication.
For the failure
to prove the' medication was prescribed to the employee, site access would
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be denied and further disciplinary actions taken.. The medical review officer's role in reviewing. test results and referral to the employee assistance program was discussed.
The employee assistance program provides confidential counseling services j
and treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. Consequences for failure to comply with FFD policy were explained during the training session.
T On December 22, 1989, the inspector attended FFD escort training. The training presented provided guidance on the requirements that must be met to be a personnel escort at CNS, on the duties and responsibilities of an escort, on the' actions necessary to report identified drug / alcohol
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use, on the FFD policy, and on the penalties for possession or use of
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The instructor discussed aberrant behavior, including the short-term symptoms of such behavior. The trainees received handouts that specified common names of each drug type, the hazards associated with use of each drug type, and behavioral patterns of users of each drug type.
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kinds of drug paraphernalia available and methods used to conceal drugs in the workplace were demonstrated by the use'of visual aids.
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.Both the general, orientation and escort FFD training were presented in a clear, concise manner. The instructors were knowledgeable and prepared.
. The presentations explained the changes created by the NRC FFD rule. No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's preparations for cold weather to verify that the licensee continued to effectively implement a program of protective measures for extreme cold weather as committed in their response to IE Bulletin 79-24.
The safety-related process, instrument, and sampling lines located outdoors and subject to freezing were the off-gas line and standby gas treatment line. These lines were insulated and heat traced at appropriate points. Preventative Maintenance Item 01271 was performed on October 19, 1989, to verify that heat tracing on the elevated release point, the off-gas line, and the standby gas treatment line was operating properly.
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- Additional. heat tracing had been installed on nonessential. lines not
, mentioned in the~ bulletin response, such as on the condensate storage
. tank piping:and on the riverwell pump piping. These were also verified
'to be operable.
Cold weather preparations appeared to be effective and were implemented
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prior to the onset of' cold weather.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
10.
Exit Interviews (30703)
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E An exit interview was conducted on January =17,1990, with. licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1.
During'the interview, the NRC inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. Other-
meetings between the NRC. inspectors and licensee managenent were held
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periodically during the inspection period to discuss identified concerns.
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The. licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, i
v or reviewed by, the NRC inspectors.
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