IR 05000298/2025001
| ML25128A180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/2025 |
| From: | Douglas Dodson NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBC |
| To: | Dia K Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) |
| References | |
| IR 2025001 | |
| Download: ML25128A180 (1) | |
Text
May 13, 2025
SUBJECT:
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000298/2025001
Dear Khalil Dia:
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Cooper Nuclear Station. On April 7, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with John Dent Jr., Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Cooper Nuclear Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Cooper Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000298 License No. DPR-46
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000298
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-001-0004
Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District
Facility:
Cooper Nuclear Station
Location:
Brownville, NE
Inspection Dates:
January 1, 2025, to March 31, 2025
Inspectors:
B. Baca, Health Physicist
G. Birkemeier, Resident Inspector
L. Carson, Senior Health Physicist
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector
J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist
Approved By:
Douglas E. Dodson II, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Cooper Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Maintain Design Configuration Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000298/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[P.1] -
Identification 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control." Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain design configuration of safety-related instrumentation associated with main steam safety relief valves, which resulted in the licensee violating Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.0.4, while the low-low-set (LLS) valve instrumentation was inoperable and the licensee entered the MODE of applicability for LCO 3.3.6.3.
Failure to Follow Surveillance Procedure Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000298/2025001-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a, "Instructions,
Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to implement surveillance tests, procedures, and calibrations on reactor protection systems. Specifically, formal reviews of completed surveillances failed to identify equipment calibrated out of tolerance, rendering equipment inoperable.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000298/2024-007-00 Inoperable Pressure Switch during Mode Change Results in Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed LER 05000298/2024-006-00 Human Performance Errors Cause a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Common Cause Inoperability of Independent Reactor Protection System Channels 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Cooper Nuclear Station began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On January 26, 2025, the plant lowered power to approximately 96 percent when the leading-edge flow meter became nonfunctional. After the licensee completed surveillance testing, the leading-edge flow meter was returned to functional status and the unit was returned to rated thermal power. On February 7, 2025, power was lowered to approximately 70 percent for a planned rod pattern adjustment. The plant returned to rated thermal power on February 9, 2025.
On February 10, 2025, power was lowered to approximately 70 percent for a planned rod pattern adjustment. The plant returned to rated thermal power on February 11, 2025. On March 23, 2025, power was lowered to approximately 80 percent for the reactor feedwater pump A governor valve position deviation alarm and maintenance. The plant was returned to rated thermal power on March 24, 2025. The unit remained at rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather during a winter storm warning on January 6, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather during a winter storm warning on February 11, 2025.
- (3) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather during a high wind and blizzard warning on March 4, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)division 2 reactor building closed cooling water system on January 16, 2025 (2)restoration of division 2 emergency diesel generator following jacket water leak repairs on January 28, 2025 (3)restoration of division 1 emergency diesel generator following maintenance during the week of February 3, 2025 (4)reactor core isolation cooling partial system walkdown following a maintenance window on March 12, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)reactor building standby liquid control area on January 15, 2025 (2)reactor building motor generator set area on January 23, 2025 (3)reactor building refueling floor area on January 29, 2025 (4)critical switchgear 1F on February 10, 2025 (5)reactor building northwest quadrant on February 11, 2025 (6)control building basement on February 24, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on February 16, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the first quarter rod pattern adjustment on February 11, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operations training in the simulator on March 5, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)jacket water and lube oil leaks on the division 1 emergency diesel generator on February 3, 2025 (2)main steam isolation valve logic relays during downpower on February 8, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Yellow risk window for 125 Vdc A charger maintenance on January 9, 2025 (2)emergent Yellow risk window for division 2 emergency diesel generator inoperability due to jacket water leakage on January 23, 2025
- (3) Yellow risk window for division 2 residual heat removal maintenance on January 29, 2025
- (4) Yellow risk window for division 1 emergency diesel generator maintenance on February 5, 2025
- (5) Yellow risk window for reactor core isolation cooling maintenance on March 4, 2025 (6)emergent Yellow risk window for division 2 emergency diesel generator maintenance following failure to start on March 18, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)division 1 emergency diesel generator jacket water and lube oil leaks on February 3, 2025 (2)main steam isolation valve logic relays during downpower on February 8, 2025 (3)division 1 emergency diesel generator exhaust pipe measurements on February 12, 2025 (4)small leak on division 1 emergency diesel generator cooler on February 12, 2025 (5)reactor core isolation cooling air operated valve calibration found out of specification on March 18, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)restoration of division 1 emergency diesel generator following maintenance during the week of February 3, 2025 (2)battery charger post-work testing on February 27, 2025 (3)division 2 emergency diesel generator post-maintenance testing following failure to start and replacement of trip solenoid valves on March 19, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)division 2 service water booster pump operability test on February 3, 2025 (2)24-month primary containment purge and vent valve test on February 25, 2025 (3)division 1 quarterly residual heat removal test mode surveillance operation on March 3, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)division 2 quarterly residual heat removal test mode surveillance operation on February 4, 2025
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
(1)emergency response organization drill on February 18,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
(1)high radiation area controls during the loading of a condensate liner into the shipping cask for transportation into the public domain on March 26, 2025, using radiation work permit 2025-102, "High Integrity Container (HIC) Prep / Shipments," Revision 0 (2)radiological controls for the reactor water cleanup pump disassembly on March 25, 2025, using radiation work permit 2025-116, "RWCU Pump B Work," Revision 0 (3)respiratory protection control measures during the system breach of the reactor water cleanup system in the pump room on March 26, 2025, using radiation work permit 2025-116, "RWCU Pump B Work," Revision 0
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
(1)portable ion chambers stored ready for use' (2)portable frisker located in the airlock to the reactor building (3)portable wide-range Geiger-Mueller survey instrument (tele-pole)
(4)personnel contamination monitors at the radiologically controlled area exit (5)gamma exit monitors at the radiologically controlled area exit (6)tool and equipment monitors in the multipurpose facility (7)area radiation monitors in reactor and radwaste buildings (8)elevated release point effluent monitor (9)turbine building ventilation effluent monitor
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (14 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) Eberline AMS 4, RP-10981/10987, January 17, 2024
- (2) KAMAN Effluent Monitor (reactor building), RMV-RM-40, February 14, 2024
- (3) Eberline RO-20, RP-10574, March 11, 2024
- (4) Radeco H-809-V-1, RP-10091, May 7, 2024
- (5) Mirion FastScan, FastscanEXT, May 29, 2024
- (6) General Electric Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors, RMP-RM-251A/B/C/D, August 21, 2024
- (7) General Electric Area Radiation Monitor System, RMA-RA-1 thru RMA-RA-30, September 10, 2024
- (8) Mirion RDS-32iTxSD, RP-12050, September 27, 2024
- (9) Victoreen Model 875, RMA-RM-40A/B, October 7, 2024
- (10) Merlin Gerin AMP-100, RP-10860, December 5, 2024
- (11) Ludlum Model 3, RP-11167, January 14, 2025
- (12) Canberra Chronos 11, RP-11976, January 21, 2025
- (13) Ludlum Model 177, RP-11432, March 3, 2025
- (14) MGP Tele-pole, RP-11243, March 10, 2025 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Turbine Building (KAMAN) Effluent Monitor, RMV-RM-20A and 20B, W/O 5436569, February 23, 2024
- (2) Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor, RMP-RM-354, W/O 5438238, February 28, 2024
- (3) Elevated Release Point (KAMAN) Effluent Monitor, RMP-RM-3A and 3B, W/O 5449357, June 13, 2024
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
(1)elevated release point effluent monitoring system (2)liquid radwaste discharge monitoring system (3)multipurpose facility ventilation monitoring system (4)service water effluent monitoring system (SW-A and SW-B)
(5)turbine building ventilation monitoring system
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (5 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:
(1)particulate and iodine samples for the elevated release point effluent dated March 25, 2025 (2)particulate and iodine samples for the multiple purpose facility effluent dated March 25, 2025 (3)particulate and iodine samples for the radwaste building effluent dated March 25, 2025 (4)particulate and iodine samples for the reactor building effluent dated March 25, 2025 (5)particulate and iodine samples for the turbine building effluent dated March 25, 2025
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
(1)fourth quarter 2024 quarterly dose evaluation for gaseous effluent (2)first quarter 2025 quarterly dose evaluation for gaseous effluent up to March 12, 2025, effluent samples Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04)
There were no abnormal discharges for the inspectors to evaluate.
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed the collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling, and securing the following radioactive materials:
(1)radioactive material and waste stored within the radiologically controlled area and the protected area
- (2) Category 2 quantities of radioactive material within the calibrators stored in the calibration lab (3)selected radioactive sealed sources within the radiologically controlled area per the Source Inventory Report
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
(1)reactor water cleanup waste system
- (2) AVANTech radwaste resin processing system (3)condensate waste system
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:
- (1) Work Order 672500, 10 CFR Part 61 condensate phase separator and waste sludge tank resin waste stream analysis and characterization, dated July 12, 2024
- (2) Work Order 699028, 10 CFR Part 61 dry active waste stream analysis and characterization, dated December 30, 2024
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment #25-03 of spent resin on March 26, 2025.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
(1)23-06, UN3321, radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-II), fissile-excepted, Class 7, reportable quantity (RQ), dated August 8, 2023 (2)23-10, UN2912, radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-I), fissile-excepted, Class 7, RQ, dated November 14, 2023 (3)24-01, UN3321, radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-II), fissile-excepted, Class 7, dated March 6, 2024 (4)24-06, UN2912, radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-I), fissile-excepted, Class 7, dated August 28, 2024 (5)25-01A, UN3321, radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-II), Class 7, dated January 7,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) January 1 through December 31, 2024 IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1 through December 31, 2024
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1 through December 31, 2024
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)automatic depressurization system valve testing failure and review of apparent cause analysis on March 31, 2025
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000298/2024-007-00, Inoperable Pressure Switch During Mode Change Results in Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (ML24366A126). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results section 71153. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 05000298/2024-006-00, Human Performance Errors Cause a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Common Cause lnoperability of Independent Reactor Protection System Channels (ML24354A318). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results section 71153. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain Design Configuration Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000298/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[P.1] -
Identification 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control." Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain design configuration of safety-related instrumentation associated with main steam safety relief valves, which resulted in the licensee violating Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.0.4, while the low-low-set (LLS) valve instrumentation was inoperable and the licensee entered the MODE of applicability for LCO 3.3.6.3.
Description:
On November 3, 2024, at 7:53 p.m. during performance of Procedure 6.ADS.201, "ADS Manual Valve Actuation IST," Revision 14, in support of startup in MODE 1, the safety relief valve discharge pressure monitoring pressure switch, MS-PS-300B, did not actuate as expected when safety relief valve MS-RV-71B was taken to the OPEN position.
Tailpipe temperature readings immediately rose, indicating the valve was physically open as expected. A physical walkdown revealed that the stainless-steel braided flex hose connecting the safety relief valve tailpipe was disconnected, contrary to the design configuration specified in Burns and Roe Drawing 2028, "Cooper Nuclear Station Flow Diagram Reactor Building & Drywell Equipment Drain System," Revision 57, rendering MS-PS-300B and its associated functions inoperable.
During investigation of the issue, the licensee discovered a photograph taken on October 16, 2024, while the plant was in MODE 4. The photograph showed the braided hose from MS-RV-71B to MS-PS-300B was disconnected from the tailpipe. The image was taken for unrelated activities, and the subject deficiency was neither identified at the time nor during containment closeout activities or other start-up preparations.
In addition to the primary function of safety relief valve position indication, MS-PS-300B provides secondary functions associated with the LLS relief logic, which lowers operating setpoints of two safety relief valves to reduce cycling of components and stresses on downstream SSCs. The inoperability of MS-PS-300B could have prevented the arming logic for the A channel of LLS to function.
Technical Specification 3.3.6.3, Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation, which is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, requires LLS valve instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.3-1, to be operable. However, when the plant started up on November 2, 2024, and entered the MODE of applicability at 6:56 p.m., pressure switch MS-PS-300B for channel A LLS valve instrumentation functions was not operable. Additionally, the licensee transitioned the plant from MODE 2 to MODE 1 on November 3, 2024, at 10:29 a.m. However, the licensee failed to recognize before changing MODES that the channel A LLS logic was inoperable and that the the impacted valve (safety relief valve MS-RV-71B) needed to be declared inoperable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
As a result, the licensee entered the MODE of applicability for LCO 3.3.6.3, while LLS valve instrumentation for one channel was not operable, and therefore, failed to meet LCO 3.0.4 due to entry into MODES of applicability when an LCO was not met without meeting one of the acceptable exceptions of LCO 3.0.4.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program and repaired the deficient condition identified during the failed surveillance 6.ADS.201, ADS Manual Valve Isolation -IST.
Corrective Action References: CR-CNS-2024-05524 and CR-CNS-2024-05593
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Failure to maintain design configuration of safety-related instrumentation does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control." The licensee failed to ensure the braided hose from MS-RV-71B to MS-PS-300B was connected to the tailpipe, which is reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and is therefore, a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee's failure to maintain control of the configuration of main steam safety relief valve instrumentation rendered a required channel of LLS unavailable and incapable of performing its technical specification required functions.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of equipment, but the equipment maintained its probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, the organization failed to recognize deviations from standards during the refueling outage and containment closeout inspections and failed to identify equipment deficiencies, which could contribute to conditions prohibited by technical specifications.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states, in part, that for those SSCs to which this appendix applies, measures shall include provisions to assure that deviations from quality standards are controlled.
Technical Specification 3.3.6.3, Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation, requires, in part that the LLS valve instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.6.3-1 shall be operable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Condition A requires channel(s) to be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when one LLS valve is inoperable due to inoperable channel(s). Condition B requires the associated LLS valve(s) declared inoperable immediately when the required action and associated completion time of Condition A is not met.
Technical Specification 3.0, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Applicability, LCO 3.0.4, requires, in part, that when an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the applicability shall only be made when LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4.b, or LCO 3.0.4.c are met.
Contrary to the above, from November 2, 2024, to November 4, 2024, the licensee failed to include provisions to assure that deviations from quality standards were controlled.
Specifically, the braided hose from MS-RV-71B to MS-PS-300B, a safety-related component, was not maintained and controlled in the configuration specified by Burns and Roe Drawing 2028, "Cooper Nuclear Station flow diagram reactor building & drywell equipment drain system," Revision 57, a quality standard. As a result, the licensee entered the MODE of applicability for LCO 3.3.6.3, while LLS valve instrumentation for one channel was not operable, and therefore, failed to meet LCO 3.0.4 due to entry into a MODE of applicability when an LCO was not met, and neither LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4.b, nor LCO 3.0.4.c were met.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Follow Surveillance Procedure Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000298/2025001-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to implement surveillance tests, procedures, and calibrations on reactor protection systems. Specifically, formal reviews of completed surveillances failed to identify equipment calibrated out of tolerance, rendering equipment inoperable.
Description:
On October 22, 2024, while performing underfrequency relay calibration in accordance with Procedure 6.2RPS.313, "RPS Electrical Protection Assemblies Calibration and Functional Test (Div 2)," Revision 15, the performer documented as left frequency to be low out of specification per technical specification requirements for the RPS-EPA-1B1 and RPS-EPA-1B2 electric power monitoring assemblies. The licensee marked the surveillance as passed, which was subsequently reviewed by both a Maintenance Supervisor and Control Room Supervisor, as delegated by the Shift Manager. Both reviewers failed to note the discrepancy. Reactor protection systems (RPS) division 2 was declared operable following the control room supervisor review.
On October 24, 2024, the surveillance coordinator was completing an informal review of the completed surveillance when he discovered the error. The surveillance coordinator documented the condition in CR-CNS-2024-05020 and notified the control room.
On October 23, 2024, at 2:05 a.m., while in MODE 5, the licensee commenced control rod timing and calibrations, causing the station to enter the MODE of applicability for Technical Specification 3.3.8.2, which requires two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies to be operable for an in-service RPS motor generator set. Since the as left frequency was low out of specification on October 22 for the two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies (RPS-EPA-1B1 and RPS-EPA-1B2), the licensee did not recognize Condition B was applicable, which requires the removal of associated in-service power supply(s) from service within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The duration of the control rod movements exceeded 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, which should have resulted in the licensee taking action in accordance with Condition Dinitiation of action to fully insert all control rods in cells containing fuel assemblies immediately.
The inspectors determined that the required reviews of surveillance testing procedures completed by a maintenance technician, maintenance supervisor, and control room supervisor, were inadequate. With the inadequate reviews and the relays being outside acceptable technical specification limits, the licensee failed to recognize that standard control rod movements (one rod at a time) in preparation for startup were not permitted. As a result, the licensee did not comply with Technical Specification 3.3.8.2.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the condition into their corrective action program, developed a procedure use and adherence lesson for electrical maintenance personnel, and reviewed requirements for surveillance test reviews with all licensed senior reactor operators.
Corrective Action References: CR-CNS-2024-05020
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Failure to follow surveillance procedures associated with safety-related equipment in accordance with licensee procedures and Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" is within the licensee's ability to foresee and prevent, and is therefore, a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to calibrate relays within the acceptable tolerance rendered two RPS electrical power monitoring assemblies inoperable.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. Using Exhibit 3 -
"Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not affect the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC; did not represent a loss of system safety function; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment during shutdown designated as risk-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; did not degrade a functional auto-isolation; did not involve an open, cold leg penetration without an adequate, large hot leg vent path; did not involve a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event; and did not involve issues related to fire protection, fire brigade, fire hoses fire extinguishers, or hose stations.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, individuals did not adequately consider potential undesired consequences of their actions before performing work and implement appropriate error reduction tools while performing the surveillance and conducting required reviews of the surveillancethe Maintenance and Control Room Supervisors reviews failed to identify as left conditions that were outside of calibration tolerances.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 8 of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, provides recommendations for procedures for control of measuring and testing equipment and for surveillance tests, procedures, and calibrations for systems, including RPS tests and calibrations.
The license established Procedure 6.2RPS.313, "RPS Electrical Protection Assemblies Calibration and Functional Test (Div 2)," Revision 15, to implement Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirements. Step 7.1 of Procedure 6.2RPS.313 requires that acceptance criteria include "Values recorded in shaded AS LEFT blocks on Attachment 1 within CALIBRATION TOLERANCES."
Technical Specification 3.3.8.2, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring, requires, in part, two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies to be operable for an in-service RPS motor generator set or alternate power supply while in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. Condition B requires inservice power supply(s) to be removed from service within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> when one or both inservice power supplies have both electric power monitoring assemblies inoperable.
Condition D requires initiation of action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies immediately when required action and associated completion time of Condition B is not met in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
Contrary to the above, from October 22 to October 24, 2024, the licensee failed to ensure that acceptance criteria included "Values recorded in shaded AS LEFT blocks on 1 within CALIBRATION TOLERANCES." Specifically, on October 22, 2024, the licensee documented as left values were out of specification per technical specification requirements for the RPS-EPA-1B1 and RPS-EPA-1B2 RPS electrical power monitoring assemblies, and reviewers failed to note the discrepancy. As a result, the division 2 RPS electrical power monitoring assemblies remained inoperable following surveillance testing, and on October 23, 2024, the licensee performed multiple control rod withdrawals from core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies, which also represented a violation of Technical Specification 3.3.8.2.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On March 28, 2025, the inspectors presented the public radiation safety inspection results to Khalil Dia, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 7, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to John Dent, Jr., Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
2019-06302, 2024-01350, 2025-00260, 2025-01266, 2025-
267
Drawings
2031, Sheet 2
Flow Diagram Reactor Building - Closed Cooling Water
System Cooper Nuclear Station
Miscellaneous
DGB-1-5581972
DG2 JW LEAK
Clearance Order
2.2.20.1
Diesel Generator Operations
Procedures
2.2.65
Reactor Equipment Cooling Water System
Cooper Nuclear Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plan Control
Building Basement Floor Elevation 882'-6"
CNS-FP-213
Cooper Nuclear Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plan
Reactor Building Northwest Quadrant 881'-9" and 859'-9
CNS-FP-216
Cooper Nuclear Station Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plan Rx.
Bldg. Critical Switchgear Rm. 1F Elevation 932'-6"
CNS-FP-220
Reactor Building Standby Liquid Control Area
CNS-FP-221
Reactor MG Set Area
Fire Plans
CNS-FP-223
Reactor Building Refuel Floor
0-BARRIER-
CONTROL
Control Building
5.4POST-FIRE-
REACTOR
Reactor Building Post-Fire Operational Information
Procedures
TPP 207
Fire Brigade Drills and Evaluations
2.0.1
Plant Operations Policy
2.0.2
Operations Logs and Reports
24
2.0.3
Conduct of Operations
108
2.1.10
Station Power Changes
27
2.1.10
Station Power Changes
27
2.2.19
480 VAC Auxiliary Power Distribution System
2.2.68.1
Reactor Recirculation System Operations
5.3AC480
480 VAC Bus Failure
Procedures
5.3GRID
Degraded Grid Voltage
Work Orders
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
25-00693, 2025-00694, 2025-00744, 2025-00748
DGA-1-DG1
Protected Equipment Tagout, Week 2505
DGB-1-DG2
Protected Equipment Tagout, Failed to Start
DGB-1-DG2
Protected Equipment Tagout, Week 2503
EDC1-1-EE-
CHG-125A
MAINT
Protected Equipment Tagout, Week 2501
PRA-SA019
Probabilistic Safety Assessment System Analysis Notebook,
Cooper Nuclear Station, Service Water and RHR Service
Water Booster System
PSA-SA006
Probabilistic Safety Assessment System Analysis Notebook,
Cooper Nuclear Station, Electrical Power System - AC
PSA-SA006
Probabilistic Safety Assessment System Analysis Notebook,
Cooper Nuclear Station, Electrical Power System - AC
PSA-SA018
Probabilistic Safety Assessment System Analysis Notebook,
Cooper Nuclear Station Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
(RCIC) System
RCIC-1-RCIC
Protected Equipment Tagout, Week 2509
Miscellaneous
RHRB-1-RHR-
SUBS-B
Protected Equipment Tagout, Week 2503
0-CNS-FAP-OM-
031
Emergent Issue Response, Risk Classification, and
Oversight Determination
0-CNS-06
Site Risk Significance Standards
0-CNS-WM-104
On-line Risk Assessment
Procedures
0-PROTECT-
EQP
Protected Equipment Program
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
25-00693, 2025-00694, 2025-00744, 2025-00748, 2025-
00765, 2025-00807, 2025-01266
Drawings
CC05920,
460014829
Air Operated Control Valve Flomatics Globe Valve - Socket
Weld Ends
Miscellaneous
Vendor Manual,
CNS Number
0988
Fisher 4195K Series Gauge Pressure Controller
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
14.25.3
RCIC Auxiliary Cooling Supply Pressure Control Loop
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
21-00623, 2024-06048
Miscellaneous
BCT-2000
Battery Load Test Report
2/27/2025
2.2.20.1
Diesel Generator Operations
6.1PC.204
Purge and Vent Valve 24-month Test (Div1)
6.1RHR.101
RHR Test Mode Surveillance Operation (IST)(Div 1)
2, 43
6.2DG.101
Diesel Generator 31 day Operability Test (IST)(Div 2)
6.2RHR.101
RHR Test Mode Surveillance Operation (IST)(Div 2)
6.2SWBP.101
Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Booster
Pump Flow Test and Valve Operability Test
Procedures
6.EE.604
25V Battery Charger Performance Test
Work Orders
WO 5433593, 5481355, 5482129, 5482148, 5488476, 5489278,
5490144, 5497887, 5502872, 5566172, 5588872
0-EP-04
Emergency Preparedness Simulator Scenario-Based
Testing
2.4ICE
River Icing
2.4RR
Reactor Recirculation Abnormal
2.4RXLVL
RPV Water Level Control Trouble
2.4VAC
Procedures
5.3EMPWR
Emergency Power during Modes 1, 2, or 3
ALARA Plans
25-03
RWCU Pump B Seal Repair
03/04/2025
CNS-RP-100 HIC Survey for ASC-200 Metal liner
03/12/2025
RWCU Pump Room 1B
03/24/2025
MPF Decon Pit
03/25/2025
MPF Decon Pit
03/25/2025
RWCU Pump Room 1B - Down Post Survey
03/25/2025
MPF 903' Decon
Pit
Work Area Air Sample for RWCU Pump Disassembly
03/25/2025
MPF 903' Decon
Pit
Work Area Air Sample for RWCU Pump B Work
03/25/2025
Radiation
Surveys
MPF 903' Decon
Pit
General Area Air Sample for RWCU Pump B work
03/25/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
MPF 903' Decon
Pit
Beta/Alpha Ratio Smear Count Data Sheet for RWCU Pump
B Post Decon
03/25/2025
Rx 931' RWCU
Pump Room 1B
Beta/Alpha Ratio Smear Count Data Sheet for RWCU Pump
Removal
03/24/2025
Rx 931' RWCU
Pump Room 1B
Work Area Air Sample for Pump Removal and Seal Repair
03/24/2025
25-102
High Integrity Container (HIC) Prep / Shipments
Radiation Work
RWCU Pump B Work
Work Orders
5585974
Replace RWCU Pump B Mechanical seal
03/25/2025
044591
DMC 2000 Electronic Dosimeter Calibration Report
08/12/2024
DET03 - Charcoal
Cartridge
Efficiency Calibration at 1 cm
08/07/2024
DET03 - Liquid
Marinelli
Efficiency Calibration
07/19/2024
DET03 -
Particulate Filter
Efficiency Calibration at 1 cm
08/14/2024
NCS IS-10117
Certificate of Calibration for RadCal Model 2026C
10/30/2024
RMA-RA-11
Area Radiation Monitors Calibration and Functional Test
2/11/2025
RMA-RM-40A/B
Containment High Range Area Monitor Channel Calibration
09/11/2024
RMV-RM-30A/B
Radwaste Building Kaman Monitor Channel Calibration
11/27/2023
RP-10615 and
RP-11961
J.L. Shepherd Model 89 Calibration Range
11/20/2024
RP-10844/11189
Instrument Calibration Data Sheet:
Thermo Eberline AMS-4
01/15/2025
RP-10870
Instrument Calibration Data Sheet:
Ludlum Model 2401P
11/18/2024
RP-11271
Instrument Calibration Data Sheet:
Radeco Model HD-29A
08/29/2024
RP-11462
Instrument Calibration Data Sheet:
MGP DRM-1
06/11/2024
RP-11984
Instrument Calibration Sheet:
Mirion ARGOS-5AB
11/13/2024
Calibration
Records
RP-11996
Instrument Calibration Sheet:
Mirion GEM-5
08/152024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
23-03848, 2023-04598, 2023-04599, 2023-04630, 2023-
04640, 2023-05245, 2024-01778, 2024-01847, 2024-01899,
24-01912, 2024-02394, 2024-03302, 2024-03323, 2024-
03462, 2024-03475, 2024-03497, 2024-03505, 2024-03925,
24-04117, 2024-05219, 2024-05739, 2024-05834, 2024-
05904, 2024-06156, 2024-06212, 2025-00810
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-CNS-
25-01626
Miscellaneous
4Q 2024
CNS System Health Report for RM (Radiation Monitors)
2/31/2024
15.ARM.302
Area Radiation Monitors Calibration and Functional Test
4.15
Elevated Release Point and Building KAMAN Radiation
Monitoring Systems
6.PRM.308
Liquid Radwaste Effluent System Channel Calibration
6.PRM.310
ERP Kaman Monitor Channel Calibration
6.PRM.313
Reactor Building Kaman Monitor Channel Calibration
6.PRM.315
Turbine Building Kaman Monitor Channel Calibration
6.PRM.320
Radwaste Building Kaman Monitor Channel Calibration
6.PRM.322
Containment High Range Area Monitor Channel Calibration
6.PRM.323
High Range Containment Monitor Victoreen Model 875
Source Calibration Check
6.PRM.324
Main Steam Liner Process Radiation Monitor Channel
Calibration Source Test, and Setpoint Determination
8-CNS-CY-102
Laboratory Analytical Quality Control
9.INST.11
Calibration/Verification of NIST Traceable Radioactive
Sources
Procedures
9.INST.50
Geiger-Mueller (GM) Survey Meters
LO-2024-0044
Chemistry Laboratory Analytical Quality Assurance/Quality
Control (QA/QC) Focused Self-Assessment
2/11/2024
Self-Assessments
LO-2024-0164
Pre-NRC Assessment for Radiological Monitoring
Instrumentation and Radioactive Solid Waste Processing
and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transport
Inspections
01/31/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
QAD 2023-035
NIOS Audit 23-07, "Chemistry, Effluent and Environmental
Monitoring"
11/06/2023
QAD 2024-016
NIOS Audit 24-04, "Radiological Controls"
09/11/2024
CM 5549428
Replace Detector for RMP-RM-452C
06/06/2024
CM 5555902
Replace Detector for RMP-RM-452A
07/29/2024
Containment High Range Area Monitor Functional Test
2/04/2025
Replace RMA_RE_29 Radiation Detector
03/25/2025
Work Orders
Replace RMA-RE-2 Radiation Detector
11/15/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
22-02855, 2022-03078, 2022-03608, 2022-03626, 2022-
03633, 2022-03742, 2022-03900, 2022-05300, 2022-06054,
22-06418, 2023-00075, 2023-00571, 2023-01802, 2023-
01819, 2023-02429, 2023-02606, 2023-03138, 2023-03483,
23-03974, 2023-04471, 2023-04597, 2023-04598, 2023-
04599, 2023-04630, 2023-04650, 2023-04718, 2023-04995,
23-05011, 2023-05012, 2023-05027, 2023-05151, 2023-
05335, 2024-00774, 2024-01691, 2024-01778, 2024-01847,
24-01874, 2024-01912, 2024-01999, 2024-02217, 2024-
2381, 2024-02394, 2024-02398, 2024-04676, 2024-02513,
24-02691, 2024-02708, 2024-02709, 2024-03164, 2024-
221, 2024-03444, 2024-03614, 2024-04676, 2024-05098,
24-05976, 2024-06277, 2025-00784, 2024-02709, 2024-
03614
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-CNS-
25-01604, 2025-01605
Eckert & Ziegler Analytics - Quarterly Results of
Radiochemistry Cross Check Program for 2022
Eckert & Ziegler Analytics - Quarterly Results of
Radiochemistry Cross Check Program for 2023
Eckert & Ziegler Analytics - 1st Quarter Results of
Radiochemistry Cross Check Program for 2025
Miscellaneous
Eckert & Ziegler Analytics - Quarterly Results of
Radiochemistry Cross Check Program for 2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Annual CNS Land Use Census / Potable Water Use for 2023
07/10/2023
Annual CNS Land Use Census / Potable Water Use for 2024
07/10/2024
Limiting Condition
of Operation
Tracking Record
(LCOTR)
TS22-RMP-RM-3A WATCHDOG -1, TS22-RMV-RM-20A
INOP -1, TS22-RW KAMAN FOR 6.2DG.302-01, TS23-ERP
NR-HR KAMANS-05, TS23-SGT-A WEEK 2315 MAINT-07,
TS24-SGT-B WEEK 2424 -1,
NLS2023030
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2022
04/27/2023
NLS2024030
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2023
04/25/2024
6.1SGT.501
SGT A Carbon Sample, Carbon Adsorber and HEPA Filter
In-Place Leak Test, and Components Leak Test (Div 1)
6.2SGT.501
SGT B Carbon Sample, Carbon Adsorber and HEPA Filter
In-Place Leak Test, and Components Leak Test (Div 2)
6.HV.104
Control Room Emergency Filter System Flow Test, Charcoal
and HEPA Filter Leak Test, Filter DP Test, And Charcoal
Sample Analysis
8-CNS-CY-102
Laboratory Analytical Quality Control
8-CNS-CY-102-
Quality Control for Analytical Laboratory Interlab and Intralab
Cross-Check Programs
8.8ERP
Particulate and Iodine Sample Collection for ERP Effluent
8.8MPF
Particulate and Iodine Sample Collection for MPF Building
Effluent
8.8RW
Particulate and Iodine Sample Collection for Radwaste
Building Effluent
8.8RX
Particulate and Iodine Sample Collection for Reactor
Building Effluent
Procedures
8.8TB
Particulate and Iodine Sample Collection for Turbine Building
Effluent
NUPIC Audit
Number 25248
NCS Corporation audit
10/18/2022
Audit/Survey
Number 25559
Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Services Audit
11/22/2024
Self-Assessments
QAD 2023-035
NIOS Audit 23-07, "Chemistry, Effluent and Environmental
Monitoring"
11/06/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
WO 5348812, 5353473, 5400535, 5446361, 5463966
NPPD W.O.
5418613
Meteorological Instruments
09/01/2022
NPPD W.O.
5444382
Meteorological Instruments
04/06/2023
Calibration
Records
NPPD W.O.
5461855
Meteorological Instruments
09/28/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
22-03116, 2022-03182, 2022-03183, 2023-00018, 2023-
00019, 2023-00118, 2023-02108, 2023-05143, 2024-00223,
24-00224, 2024-00923, 2024-01201, 2024-01878, 2024-
2609, 2024-03913
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-CNS-
25-01603, 2025-01653
CNS Groundwater Protection Plan
08/31/2008
CNS Groundwater Monitoring Wells Tritium Trends
01/01/2025
21
CNS 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
04/27/2022
21
CNS 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Report
05/10/2022
22
X/Q and/or D/Q Sectors Annual Offsite Dose Assessment
07/25/2022
22
CNS 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
04/27/2023
22
CNS 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Report
05/11/2023
22
22 CNS Annual Land Use Census
07/18/2022
23
X/Q and/or D/Q Sectors Annual Offsite Dose Assessment
07/23/2024
23
CNS 2023 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
04/25/2024
23
CNS 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Report
05/08/2024
23
23 CNS Annual Land Use Census
07/10/2023
24
X/Q and/or D/Q Sectors Annual Offsite Dose Assessment
07/24/2023
24
24 CNS Annual Land Use Census
07/10/2024
Miscellaneous
January 1, 2022 -
December 31,
22
Meteorological Program for Cooper Nuclear Station
06/2023
Procedures
14.MET.304
Meteorological Maintenance Procedure for New 100-Meter
Tower System-A
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
14.MET.305
Meteorological Maintenance Procedure for New 100-Meter
Tower System-B
8.ENV.1
REMP Administration
8.ENV.2
REMP Sampling
8.ENV.4
REMP Air Pump Calibration
8.ENV.5
Annual Review of Broadleaf Vegetation Sample Locations
Procedure
9.RADOP.113
Response to Contaminated Leaks and Spills
Offsite Dose Assessment Manual
09/18/2024
LO 2024-0082
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
Self-Assessment
01/30/2025
NUPIC Audit 23-
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
Environmental, Area, QAQC, and
ISFSI TLDs processing for Environmental Monitoring
Programs
05/23/2023
Audit/Survey
Number: 25559
NUPIC Audit: Teledyne Brown
11/22/2024
Self-Assessments
QAD 2023-035
NIOS Audit 23-07: Chemistry, Effluent and Environmental
Monitoring
11/06/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
23-03833, 2023-03880, 2023-03977, 2023-03978, 2023-
03997, 2023-04589, 2023-05081, 2023-05234, 2023-05308,
24-00101, 2024-00187, 2024-00582, 2024-00937, 2024-
00947, 2024-01805, 2024-02784, 2024-02812, 2024-03330,
24-04126, 2024-06235
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-CNS-
25-01646, 2025-01647, 2025-01662, 2025-01663
Engineering
Changes
LBDCR 2023-012
Implementation of the Process Control Program with the new
AVANTech Radwaste Resin Processing System at Cooper
Nuclear Station
09/14/2023
Radioactive Source Inventory and Leak Test Record
2/18/2024
Miscellaneous
USAR, Chapter IX - Radioactive Waste Systems
03/21/2013
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
USAR, Chapter XIII - Process Control Program
Offsite Radioactive Material Storage Inventory
2/25/2025
Cooper Nuclear Station Process Control Program
04/17/2024
USAR Change Request 2023-0004, IX-3, Radioactive Waste
Systems; XIII, Conduct of Operations - Process Control
Program
09/14/2023
CNS-RP-504
Radioactive Source Inventory and Leak Test Record -
Disposal of LS85
01/11/2025
CNS-RP-602
23 Radioactive Material Shipment Log
23
CNS-RP-602
24 Radioactive Material Shipment Log
24
CNS-RP-602
25 Radioactive Material Shipment Log
25
NLS2024003
Day Report - Unauthorized Disassembly of Liquid
Scintillation Detector
01/15/2024
NLS2024030
Cooper Nuclear Station Annual Radioactive Effluent Release
Report - Table 3 Shipments
04/25/2024
2.5.1.6
Radwaste Low Conductivity Liquid Waste Sample Tank Fluid
Transfer
2.5.4.5
AVANTech Dewatering System
59.RW.10
Physical Protection of Category 1 Quantities of Radioactive
Material in Transit
9.NISP-RP-04
Radiation Protection Posting and Labeling
9.RADOP.10
Radioactive Sources Control and Accountability
9.RW.1
Radioactive Shipments
9.RW.7
Waste Stream Sampling
9.RW.9
Filling Containers with Waste/Radioactive Material
Procedures
Security
Procedure 2.16
Radioactive Materials Security
Spent Fuel Pool
11/26/2024
Rad Material Storage Building
2/05/2024
Low Level Rad Pad
2/25/2025
Radiation
Surveys
Shipment 25-03 ASC-200 Metal Liner
03/12/2025
Radiation Protection Program Annual Report
23
Self-Assessments
LO-2024-0164
Radiological Monitoring Instrumentation and Radioactive
01/31/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling,
Storage, and Transport
QAD 2024-016
NIOS Audit 24-04, Radiological Controls
09/11/2024
23-06
UN3321, Radioactive material, LSA-II, Fissile-excepted,
Class 7, RQ
08/08/2023
23-10
UN2912, Radioactive material, LSA-I, Fissile-excepted,
Class 7, RQ
11/14/2023
23-12
UN2912, Radioactive material, LSA-I, Fissile-excepted,
Class 7
2/12/2023
24-01
UN3321, Radioactive material, LSA-II, Fissile-excepted,
Class 7
03/06/2024
24-05
UN2912, Radioactive material, LSA-I, Fissile-excepted,
Class 7
06/04/2024
24-06
UN2912, Radioactive material, LSA-I, Fissile-excepted,
Class 7
08/28/2024
25-01A
UN3321, Radioactive material, LSA-II, Class 7
01/07/2025
Shipping Records
25-03
UN3321, Radioactive material, LSA-II, Fissile-excepted,
Class 7
03/26/2025
2500
CFR 61 Analysis - Condensate Phase Separator Tank 'A'
Condensate/Waste Sludge Tank Resin
07/12/2024
Work Orders
699028
CFR 61 Analysis - Dry Active Waste Smears RE-33
2/30/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
22-06220, 2024-05593, 2024-05524
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-CNS-
24-05524