IR 05000289/1978007
| ML19276H249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1978 |
| From: | Higgins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276H238 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-78-07, 50-289-78-7, NUDOCS 7910150874 | |
| Download: ML19276H249 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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Region I
.Jort No.
50-239/78-07 Cocket No.
50-239 License No. DPR-50 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Metrecolitan Edison Comoany P. O. Box 542
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Readino. Pennsv1vania 19603 Facility Name:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conduc cap } 6, 10-15, 1978
/A l< ? S., b 5-/r/77 Inspectors:
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J.C'Higgins,ReactorInspector date signed ll fAf ~,
S~h h7 H. Wong/Enginur/ Intern cate si,gned O
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cate sicned
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Approved by'.
4/,. OM /
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0:'t.~Capnton, Later, nuclear support
/cace signed Sectior No. 1, RO&NS Branch
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Insoection Summary:
Insoection on Aoril 6,10-15.1.'78 (Recort No. 50-289/78-07)
Areas Insoected:
Routine, unannouncec inspection of previous inspection items, the containment integrated leak rate test and hydraulic snubber surveillance.
The inspection involved 75 inspector-hours and 46 acccmpaniment-hours on sit-
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by one NRC inspector and one intern.
Results:
Of the three areas inspected, no Items of Noncomoliance were found in two areas and one Item of Noncompliance was found in the third area (infra'ction -
failure to implement surveillance procedure - paragraph 4.e).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The below tecnnical and supervisory level personnel were contacted.
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a.
Metrooolitan Edison
- D. Good, Maintenance & Surveillance Systems Ccorcinator
"C. Hartman, Engineer W. Herman, Test Coordinator E. Lawrence, I&C Foreman
- J. O'Hanlon, Unit 1 Superintendent W. Ream, ISI Coordinator M. Ross, Operations Supervisor
"R. Summers, Engineer W. Zewe, Shift Supervisor
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b.
Gilbert Associates, Inc.
h F. Acker, Engineer
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R. Shirk, Engineer
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technic'ai and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, mainten-ance personnel, quality assurance personnel and instrument technicians.
2.
Previo~s Inscection Item Ucdate (Closed) Unresolved Item (289/77-11-02):
NRC management has established the position that weld channels on the reacter building liner must be vented during CIRLT's. The licensee included venting of all accessible weld channels in his procedure.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Itt (289/77-11-03):
The licensee was informed of NRC management's pot tion on tneir future CILRT senedule by a letter from Reid, NRR to Herbein, Met Ed dated January 18, 1973.
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This required a CILRT during the April,1978 refueling cutage to replace the April, 1977 test. The April,1978 test is described
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in this report and the next test will be due approximately 31/3 years from April,1977.
(0 pen) Item of Noncompliance (289/77-24-01):
The inspector reviewed the correction to the 1977 Integrated Leak Rate Test Report sub-mitted on January 11, 1978 by the licensee.
This document conser-vatively incl _uded instrument error in the leah rate calculat ons.
i The inspector was unable to verify that measures to prevent recurrence weresatisfactory, since instrument error corrections had not yet been applied to the raw data at the completion of the 1978 CILRT.
This item remains open.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (289/77-24-07):
The licensee noW separately tests those penetrations and containment isolation valves on the penetration pressurization system with a Type B or C test and in-
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cludes the results into his Type B and C leakage.
(0 pen) Unresolved Items (289/77-09-02 and 03):
The' licensee has
not yet incorporated all comments under these items into his snubber visual inspection and functional testing procedures but.
stated that they would be completed by June 1, 1978.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (289/77-09-04): The inspector reviewed Operations Department Memorandum 78-3, a Memo frcm the Uni.t 1 Superintendent to Plant Foremen and Supervisors, the Exception and Deficiency (E&D) sheet initialed in January 17, 1978 for snubber NSE-96A and the PORC meeting minutes #78-03 discussing snubber NSE-96A and concluded that there is reasonable confidence that snubber NSE-96A had not been empty of fluid as initially thought.
This item of noncomoliance is therefore downgraded from an infraction to a deficiency.
The visual inspection procedure had not yet been changed to regroup the data sheets, but the licensee stated that it would be completed by June 1,1978.
Additionally, the inspector reviewed ccmpleted surveillance results from the latest snubber visual inspections and noted that Administrative Procedure (A/P) 1010 was not in all cases followed when comcleting the E and D sheets.
A draft A/P 1010 has been ini-iated to eliminate :nese s
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O preolens and the licensee stated that it would be approved by July 15, 1978. This item remains open pending the new visual inspection procedure and verification that E and D sheets are properly executed following the issuance of the revised A/P 1010.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (289/78-01-02):
The inspector reviewed the 1976 ISI results from procedure 1300-1V25 and verified by a sampling in plant inspection that discrepancies identified by the procedure had been corrected.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (289/78-01-03): A Technical Specification (TS) change has not yet been submitted to include snubbers BS-25A and CF-4 in the TS Table.
The licensee stated that this would be submitted to the NRC by October 1,1978.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (289/78-01-04):
Procedures 1300-1V25 and 1300-1V36 now contain design settings for spring hangers which are used to verify the proper setting.
The check of snubber settings, however, only verifies the snubber position as is and does not ensure that sufficient travel is available for that snubber's hot
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to cold thermal growth.
This item remains open pending inclusion of snubber thermal crowth considerations.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (289/78-01-05):
Step 6.JO of procedure id10-Y-34 requires use of hydraulic fluid from a Quality Control container and prohibits reuse of the fluid.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (289/78-01-06):
PORC meeting #78-03 minutes Attachment F document the fact that Three Mile Island Unit I has no snubbers in the plant with cork seals.
Procedure 1410-Y-
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34 has been modified to allow replacement seals of only ethylene propylene.
3.
Fire Hose Signs The inspectr-- discussed with the licensee the hazards of utilizing a fine mist pray for fire fighting in the new fuel storage area and observed signs on hoses near this area.
The signs implied that the hoses should not be used any where in the Spent Fuel Pcol arsa.
The licensee stated that clearer signs would be crdered for all
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hoses near the new fuel storage area, which only restricted their use in that area.
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4.
Containment Inteorated Leak Rate ' st (CILRT)
a.
General The inspector witnessed preparation for and the conduct of the Three Mile Island Uriit I second periodic CILRT, which was performed in accordance with Surveillance ?rocsdure 1303-6.1, Rev. 6, dated March 1, 1978, " Reactor Building Integrat~d Leak Rate Test." The CILRT was performed this year due
. the failure of the initial attempt last year and the NRC's review of the CILRT schedule as discussed in a letter from Rcid to Herbein dated January 18, 1978.
The test was conducted at the peak c;lculated accident pressure of 50.6 psig.
The inspector verifi=d that the test procedure, Technical Specifications and App J were followed and that test personnel were qualified and properly performed their duties.
Except'as noted belcw the inspector had no further questions on the test.
b.
Pre-CILRT Inscections
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On April 11, the inspector accompanied a licensee Engineer on a structural inspection of the containment, whose purpose was to check for deterioration, which could cause problems O
during the CILRT.
No discrepancies were noted.
On April 12, the inspector also accompanied licensee personnel on the containment closecut inspection prior to the CILRT.
One Argon gas bottle was removed, Purge '/alve seats were checked, '
accessible weld channels were noted to be vented and instru-mentation was observed to be adequately placed.
Conditions were generally good and the containment was deemed readv for the CILRT.
c.
Instrumentation The inspector reviewed the calibration records for the Pressure Detectors, the Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTD's), the Dewcels, the digital readout equicment, the multipoint recorder and the flowmeters to verify that their calibration was trace-
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able to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) and to verify that calibration corrections / errors were properly incoroorated into the ccmputer leak rate calculations.
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l The flowmeters for use in the suoplemental verificatien test
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had last been calibrated in 1970 and had been calibration checked prior to the CILRT.
The licensee statac -hat these flowmeters would be sent to the vendor for an.'155 traceable calibration after the CILRT and their calibration information
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backfitted into the verification test calculations.
This is
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an unresolved item (289/73-07-01).
The licensee perfcmed leak rate calculations during the CILRT using raw data, therefore calibration corrections could not be reviewed at this time.
Proper inclusion of these corrections /
errors will be verified when the licensee submits his fomal report.
d.
Pressurizer Level Loss (1)
Ruotured Tycon Tube Prior to the CILRT the licensee had drained the loops for steam generator tube plugging.
On April 12. the loops were refilled using CP 1103-2, " Reactor t.- lant
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Fill and Vent".
This procedure measures water level as the fill progresses with a tygon tube attached to the cold leg low point.
Normally the system fill takes the O'
pressurizer solid, isolates the tygen tubing and then draws a bubble in the pressurizer, but'the fill was interruptad at about 40% pressurizer level (150") for the CILRT and the tygon tubing was left connected to the system.
At 1200 on April 12, pressurization for the CILRT ccmmenced.
While pressure was increased to 12 psig, it was noted that pressurizer level was decreasing and reactor building sump level was increasing.
During the internal containment inspection at 12 psig the tygon tube was found ruptured (presumaoly due to unecual pressuri-zation of some sort) and about 3000 gallons of water were found added to the sump.
The leak was then promptly isolated. To prevent recurrence of a similar event the licensee stated that the CILRT valve lineup would be modified to check that the tygon level tubing is isolated and the Reactor Coolant Fill and Vent procedure would be modified to isolate the tygon tubing whenever it was not needed, even if the procedure was not i m ediately carried through to its conclusion.
This item is unresolved pending these revisiens (289/78-07-C2).
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l2) Makeuo Puro Maintenance At 1233 on April 13, pressurization to 50.8 psig was completed and the stabilization period for the CILRT was begun.
The inspe-tor noted that pressurizer level was slowly decreasing.
The licensee attributed this to water transfer from the pressurizer to the loops as has occurred during previous CILRT's.
At 2025 t:1e casing drain on makeup pump IC was found open and leaking water at the rate of several gallons per mir ate to the Auxiliary Building Sump.
The drain had been open due to packing replacement on the pump discnarge valve.
The CILRT valv~e lineup had subsequently opened normally shut valves between the makeuo pumps and the reactor coolant loops to place the plant in the post-accident lin2up.
Thus a leakage path was established since the te coetainment.
isolation valves are check valves, into safety injection lines, which do not saat particularly tightly witt; only a
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50 psi differential pressure.
Approximately 2000 gallons leaked from the primary system to the Auxiliary Building
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Sump.
The inspector stated that it appeared that better control and coordination was needed.at the operational level between personnel invcived in maintenance and
personnel making system valve lineups.
This item is unresolved pending licensee review and determination of any required preventive actions.
(Item No. 289/78-07-03).
e.
Leak Insoection/Lineuo Verification The inspector accompanied the licensee on several tours of the external containment area to check for any leaks.
Several minor leaks were identified and logged but no repairs were initiated during the CILRT.
Additionally, while at test pressure, the inspector accompanied the licensee on a plant tour around the perimeter of the reactor building to inspect selected valves and vents.
Valve SA-V34 was found in the closed position thus providing an imcrocer barrier to containment leakage.
A tag existed on the valve designating it as lined up for the CILRT.
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9 Also, Enclosure III to SP 1303-6.1, " Reactor Building
.ite-grated Leak Rate Test" recuires this valve to be ocen.
This is considered to be an Item of Ncncompliance with TS 6.8.1, wnich requires that writter, procedures be established, in-piemented and maintained.
(Itam No. 289/78-07-04).
The licensee opened the valve ir=ediately upon discovery and r.oted that there was no pressure builduo in the line; hence
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the test results should not have been affected.
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Satisfactory CILRT
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At 1700 on April 13, the stabilization period was completed and the official test was commenced.
Due to operation of Reactor Building Industrial Cooling and inability to drain the seat of IC-V4, local leak rate test (LLRT) corrections had to be included in the CILRT for these three penetrations.
At the end of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> the mass point leakage at the 955 upper confidence level with LLRT corrections was 0.0761%/ Day.
This exceeded the acceptar.ce criteria of 0.75 La which ecuals 0.075f;/ Day. The licensee continued the test and as additional data was accumulated the confidence interval gradually decreased.
By 1330 on April 15, after 44.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of testing
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the licensee calculated the 95% upper confidence level with LLRT corrections as 0.0737%/ Day.
The inspector calculated
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'he mass point leak rate as 0.0637%/ Day, the LLRT additions as 0.00666%/ Day and the 95% upper confidence level with
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corrections as 0.0733%/ Day.
At this time the licensee
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officially ended the CILRT.
The inspector noted that since instrument calibration corrections had not yet been made, since the leak rate might have to be modified due tn reactor building sump isel increases and since the final result was close to the acceptance criteria, the licensee should make all necessary corrections and verify that the final
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leak rate at the 95% upper confidence level was below 0.75 La prior to startup.
The licensee subsequently notified the inspector on April 18, 1978 that with all corrections applied the leak rate had decreased slightly, from 0.0737%/ Day to i
l 0.071%/ Day.
This met the acceptance criteria.
At the completion of CILRT, the Reactor Building ' atmosphere was sampled and a kncwn leakage it::csed on the containment.
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Leakage rate calculations were then run and a verificaticn
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test was satisfactorily ccmoleted en April 15, 1978.
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4 5.
Local Leak Rate Testina a.
Reverse Direction Testina The insoector verified that all valves locally tested in a direction which would reverse the differential pressure seen
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during the design basis accider,t were oriented so that the local test would give conservat1ve results.
b.
Decay Heat Removal The licensee operated the Decay Heat Removal system for' core cooling during the CILRT and hence the containment isolation.
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valves in that system should be Type C tested in accordance with section III. A.l.(d) of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 (App J).
The licensee has stated his intentions and reasons for not testing these valves in a September 17, 1975 letter to the NRC.
The NRC is still evaluating this item and hence it is designated as unresolved item (289/78-07-05).
6.
Snubber Surveillance
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The inspector reviewed the data frcm the TS required snubber visua'
inspections and functional testing. The licensee's visual inspec-
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O tion identified 2 snubbers with questionable fluid levels.
Both were checked for. operability on the snubber test stind and one (MS-201) failed to lockup.
The other tested satisfactorily.
Dis-assembly of MD 201 revealed damage seals.
The licensee thus remains on a twelve month scheoule for visual inspections.
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snubbers were representatively selected for TS functional testing.
One of these snubbers failed and thus 10 more were selected, all of which passed. Some of the snubbers which eventually were considered to have satisfactorily passed the functional test did not meet the acceptance criteria in procedure 1410-Y-34.
These snubbers were evaluated on a case basis by Gilbert Associates to have acceptable lockup and bleed rates. The inspector noted the evaluation of potentially high lockup and bleed rates should include consideration of increased rates caused by snubber operating temperatures higher than test temperatures.
The licensee stated that these considerations would be included.
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gresolvedItems Items about which more information is recuired to determine acceptability are considered unresolved.
Paragraphs 4.c, 4.d(l),
4.d(2) and 5.b of this report contain unre:olved items.
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Exit Interview At tne inspection's end the inspectors held a meeting (see Detail
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1 for attendees) to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
The Item of Ncnccmpliance and unresolved items were icentified.
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