IR 05000320/1978028
| ML19224A247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1978 |
| From: | Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19224A246 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-78-28, NUDOCS 7811090290 | |
| Download: ML19224A247 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CFFICE 0' :NSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-320/78-28 Docket No. 50-320 License No. DPR-73 Priority
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Category B2 Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company P.O. Box 542 Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 Facility Name:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: Septem r 5-7, 1978 Inspectors:
/h 9[/P[ 7,g D. R. Haverkamp, Reactg Inspector cate signed date signed
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date signed
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Approved by:
4[
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[ R. R. M, Chie,
eactor Projects
/date signed Sectio. o.1 S Branch Inspection Summary:
Insoection on September 5-7, 1978 (Recort No. 50-320/78-28)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of SIS reset feature; licensee followup actions ccncerning selected previous inspection findings, licensee events and IE Bulletins and Circulars; and selected licensee.special reports. The inspection involved 22 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results:
No items of nor. compliance were identified.
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781109 0a9 0
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Region I Form 12
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(Rev. Acril 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Metrocolitan Edison Comoany Mr. R. Bensel, Unit 2 Lead Electrical Engineer
- Mr. M. Bezilla, Unit 2 PORC Secretary
- Mr. J. Floyd, Unit 2 Supervisor of Operations Mr. J. Hilbish, Station Lead Nuclear Engineer Mr. B. Mehler, Shift Supervisor Mr. I. Porter, Unit 2 Lead Instrumentation and Controls Engineer
- Mr. J. Seelinger, Unit 2 Superintendent-Technical Support Mr. R. Warren, Unit 2 Lead Mechanical Engineer General Public Utilities Service Corocration Mr. W. Gunn Site Project Manager Mr. R. Toole, Test Superintendent Mr. J. Wright, QA Manager The inspector also interviewed several other licensee and contractor employees during the inspection. They included control room operators, technical and engineering staff personnel and general office personnel.
- denotes those present at the exit interview on September 7,1978.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 320/77-29-02:
Fuel component and material certifications.
A licensee representative stated that these records remain stored at the GPU offices in Parsippany, New Jersey. The inspector acknowledged the availability of the records for future NRC review and had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Noncompliance 320/77-47-09:
Installation of pipe supports in variance with detail drawings. The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to Region I, serial GQL 0433, dated March 16, 1978. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
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(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-12-01: Welding of anchor plate studs without an approved welding procedure.
The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to Region I, serial GQL 0811, dated May 1, 1978.
(Reference: NRC Inspection Report 50-320/78-15, paragraph 2.) The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-20-01:
Failure to verify equipment
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hatch closed and sealed.
The licensee's corrective actions were completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978.
The inspector reviewed Surveillance Procedure 2301-MS, " Containment Integrity Verification," Revision 5, dated June 12, 1978. The revised procedure includes requirements to verify that the equipment hatch is c!osed and sealed.
The in-spector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-02:
LLRT procedure items.
The inspector reviewed SP 2313-R7, " Reactor Building Local Leak Rate Testing," Revision 1, dated July 19, 1978.
The revised procedure includes appropriate changes / provisions for (1) quantifying test boundary valve leakage vice CIV leakage, (2) taking flowmeter readings after both pressure and flow stabilization, (3) ensuring instrumentation is traceable to NBS standards, (4) operating the test rotameter and LLRT test stand and associated valves, (5)
deleting references to superseded items (steps 5.2 and 7.3) and (6)
specifying applicable minimum sen sitivity values.
In addition, TCN's have been initiated for SP 2313-R7, SP 2311-5, and SP 2303-SA2 to ensure that all applicable test results are included in the total combined leakage rate of penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests.
(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-20-03:
Improper air lock door seal test. The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978.
The inspector reviewed SP 2311-5, " Containment Integrity",
Revision 3, dated June 12, 1978.
The revised procedure requires testing of the air lock door seals using a rotameter type flowmeter, which is consistent with recently revised Technical Specifications for conducting this test.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
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(Closed) Noncomoliance 320/78-20-04:
Failure to implement sur-veillance procedures for air lock door seal testing.
The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978.
The inspector reviewed completed surveillance procedures SP 2311-5, " Containment Integrity," Revisions 3 and 4, performed during June 15-August 31, 1978.
Required data were correctly entered in tnese procedures.
Additionally, the licensee's method of identifying TCN's in the body of the control room file and working copies of procedures has been satisfactorily implemented.
The inspector had no further ques-tions concerning this item.
(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-20-05:
Failure of emoloyees to monitor themselves when leaving a controlled area.
The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in' MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978.
All operators have reviewed the requirements of HPP 1612 and SP 2311-5.
The inspector inter-viewed selected operators and determined that they were knowledgeable of the proper procedure for gaining access to the air lock door seals for surveillance testing. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-06:
Isolation of pressure source by a single root valve during pressure decay tests. The licensee's method of measuring air lock seal leakage has been changed from a pressure decay test to a rotameter type flow test.
Additionally, when pressure decay is used as a measurement of other leakage rates, the pressure source is disconnected.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-07:
Guidance on sequence of seal leak test and door closure.
The inspector reviewed SP 2311-5, " Con-tainment Integrity," Revision 4, dated July 12, 1978.
The revised procedure requires testing the inner door seal and then the outer door seal of both air locks. These tests are accomplished without opening any door after the test.
The inspector had no further ques-tions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-08:
Bypass leakage durir.g air lock test. The inspector reviewed SP 2303-SA2, "RB Hatch Leak Rate and Interlock Test," Revision 1, dated July 26, 1978, and TCN 2-78-580.
The TCN requires use of a modified test oressurization rig which isolates and vents the flowmeter bypass line during air lock leak tes ting.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 320/78-23-01:
Pipe restraint deficiencies. The loose steel support plate near mechanical snubber 863 and the excessive attachment angle of mechanical snubber 411 were corrected by Catalytic work authorization #809.
While performing this work, snubber 411 was found to be bound up and was replaced with snubber 2459. The inspector observed the completed maintenance and had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-24-02: Heat treating procedure (draft) heating and coo'ing rates were greater than allowed by code requirements.
The inspector reviewed the approved main steam piping post weld heat treatment procedure for FCR 2520.1, " Heat Treating Procedure," (Original) dated July 18, 1978.
The procedure included appropriate heating and cooling rates above 600*F, in conformance with requirements of the USAS B31.7 Code.
Additional'"
the inspector reviewed selected QC inspection reports of actual heat treatment and determined that identified deviations were satisfactorily resolved.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 3a/78-24-03:
EDG low lube oil day tank level alarm operability. The apparently out of service annunciator alarm was due to a burned out light bulb, which was replaced.
The inspector verified the alarm operability and had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-24-04: Corrective measures for LER's 78-33/LT and 78-34/LT. The inspector reviewed the results of main steam safety valve testing.
Each valve was checked for proper lift setting using a hydroset lift rig. Valve adjustments and additional tests were perfomed until satisfactory lift setpoints were attained.
Selected valves were lift tested by slowly raising steam pressure, and the lift setpoints closely correlated with the hydroset test results. Appropriate blowdown ring positions were determined during the steam pressure lif ts, and each valve was subsequently adjusted. The inspector verified that final test results were acceptable and had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-24-05: Update report for LER 78-44/3L. The licensee submitted Update LER 78-44/3L, dated August 24, 1978, which contained adequate narrative descriptions of the event and the cause.
The licensee's corrective measures were satisfactorily completed, as described in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this report. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
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3.
SIS Reset Feature Peview The inspector reviewed the design capability for resetting a safety injection signal following a LOCA.
The control system designs at certain other PWR facilities include a SIS reset feature that, if actuated, would prevent proper ESF sequencing operation after a loss of offsite power following a LOCA.
The emergency safeguards design at TMI-I includes a bypass function of each ESF actuation c.i rcui t.
The ESF bypass functions and their effects are similar, but not identical, to the SIS reset function at other facilities.
The inspector reviewed the following Unit 2 emergency procedures.
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EP 1202-6, " Loss of Reactor Coolant / Reactor Coolant Pressure,"
Revision 7.
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EP 1202-2 & 2A, " Station Blackout and Station Blackout with Loss of Both Diesel Generators," Revision 9.
These procedures adequately control the insertion and removal of ESF bypass functiens.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup The inspector reviewed the licensee's followup actions regarding the IE Bulletin and Circular listed below.
IEB 78-10 "Bergen-Patterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor
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Accumulator Spring Coils," dated June 27, 1978.
IEC 78-09, " Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2
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Contactors," dated June 8,1978.
This review included discussions with licensee personnel, review of selected facility records, and observation of selected facility equipment and components.
With respect to the above Bulletin, the inspector verified that licensee management fon<arded copies of the bulletin response to appropriate onsite tranagement representatives, that information and corrective action discussed in the reply was accurate and effected as described, and that the reply was submitted within the time period described in the bulletin.
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With respect to the above Circular, the inspector verified that the circular was received by appropriate licensee management, a review for applicability was performed, and that action taken or planned is appropriate.
Acceptance criteria for the above review included inspector judgement and requirements of applicabie Technical Specifications and facility procedures.
Licensee followup to the above Bulletin and Circular was acceptable.
5.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reoorts (LER's)
The LER's listed below were reviewed in the Region I office prcmptly following receipt to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and the adequacy of corrective action.
The LER's were also reviewed to determine whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, whether the event should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence, and whether tha event warranted onsite followup.
The following LER's were reviewed.
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Update LER 78-33/IT, dated July 31, 1978; Reactor ?, rip followed by RCS depressurization and sodium hycroxide injection, due to steam generator safety valves not properly reteating.
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Update LER 78-34/IT, dated July 31, 1978; Decradation of natn steam safety valve discharge piping.
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Update LER 78-44/3L, dated August 24, 1978; Man xi output breaker G2-IE2 for the "A" diesel generator was not closed when the unit was placed in emergency standby, due to a procedure inadequacy.
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LER 78-45/IT, dated July 19, 1978; Nonconservative calculatic,nal errors resulted in incorrect Technical Specification limits for variable pressure temperature trip and positive imbalances.
LER 78-48/3L, dated August 22, 1978; A wall penetration in the
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"A" Emergency Diesel Generator Building switchgear room was discovered to be lacking a fire barrier seal, due to an oversight on the part of the contractor.
The above LER's were closed based on satisfactory review in the Region I office, except those LER's selected for onsite followup.
denotes those LER's selected for onsite followup.
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Onsite Licensee Event Followuo For those LER's selected for onsite followup (denoted in Paragraph 5), the inspector verified that the reporting requirements of Technic 01 Specifications and GP 4703 (Origina:) had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by Technical Specifications, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in con-formance with Technical Specification limits.
The inspector's findings regarding these licensee events were acceptable.
7.
In-Office Rev1ew of Soecial Reoorts The special reports listed below were reviewed in the Region I cffice to verify that the report included infomation required to u re-ported and that test results and/or supporting infomation discussed in the report were consistent with design predictions and perfomance specifications, as applicable. The reports were also reviewed to ascertain whether planned corrective action wcs adequate for resolu-tion of identified problems, where upplicable, and to determine whether any infomation contained in the report should _be classified as an Abnomal Occurrence.
The following TMI 2 special reports were reviewed.
10 CFR 50.55(e) repcrt, dated January 31, 1978; Reactor
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Suilding emergency cooling booster pumps did not meet system design requirements.
10 CFR 50.55te) report, dated January 11, 1978; Reactor building
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spray pumps had a higher required NPSH than the system available NPSH during runout conditions.
Special Report 78-03, dated August 9,1978; Fire Service air
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intake tunnel halon system actuated during a thunderstom a-d remained inoperable for more than 14 days while the halon storage containers were being recaarged and reinstalled.
The above reports were closed based on satisfactory review at the Region I office.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 7,1978.
The in-t spector sumarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
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