IR 05000320/1978017
| ML19220C333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1978 |
| From: | Haverkamp D, Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19220C328 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-78-17, NUDOCS 7904300432 | |
| Download: ML19220C333 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-320/78-17 Docket No.,50-320 License No. OPR-73 Priority
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Category B-2 Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company P. O. Box 542 Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania i
Inspection conducted May 3-5-and 5-10, 1978 Inspectors:
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l7f D. R.6 dverk M, Reactor Inspector date signed date signed
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Approved by:
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v D.' N. Sternberg, Acting '.5i%f, Reactor date signed Projects Section No.1, P.0&NS Branch Insoection Sumary:
Inspection on May 3-5 and 8-10.1978 (Recort No. 50-320/78-17)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations including snift logs and records and facility tour; licensee followup actions concerning selected licensee events, IE Circulars, and previous inspection findings; reactor coolant system decontamination; emergent:y safeguards actuation on April 23, 1978; unit auxiliary. transformer design deficiency; and postualted small break LOCA.
The inspection comenced during a backshift and involved 42.5 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Region I Form 12 l
(Rev. April 77)
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pETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Metrocolitan Edison Comoany Mr. C. Adams, Shif t Foreman Mr. M. Beers, Shift Supervisor Mr. R. Benzel, Unit 2 Lead Electrical Engineer
- Mr. M. Bezilla, PORC Secretary Mr. J. Brummer, Unit 2 Lead Instrumentation and Controls Engineer Mr. W. Conaway, Shift Foreman Mr. R. Dubiel, Supervisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry
- Mr. J. Floyd, Supervisor of Operations Mr. C. Guthrie, Shift Foreman Mr. J. Hilbish, Station Lead Nuclear Engineer
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Mr. K. Hoyt Shift Foreman e
Mr. R. Hutchinson, Shift Foreman Mr. P. Lydon, Shift Foreman Mr. B. Marshall, Operations Engineer Mr. G. Miller, Station Superintendent Mr. T. Mulleavy, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- Mr. J. Seelinger, Unit 2 Superintendent - Technical Support General Public Utilities Mr. C. Gatto, lead Mechanical Engineer Mr. R. Toole, Test Superintendent The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licen-see employees during the inspection. They included reactor operators and engineering and office personnel.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findinas (Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-09-02: Audible Count Rate. The licensee's corrective measures have been completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I serial GQL 0458, dated Ma >h 27, 1978.
Procedure 251-4.01, " Core Assembly", was revised by PCR 2-78-491, which added a prerequisite to ensure a specific operator inside containment is responsible for continuously monitoring audible count rate.
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(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-10-01:
Drawing and Drawing Change Control. The licensee's corrective measures have been completed or initiated as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I serial GQL 0707, dated April 18, 1978.
The comprehensive review and audit of Unit 2 drawings is being tracked by PORC Action Item (PAI) 2-78-15.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-10-02:
Revision of Surveillance Procedure 2311-F4.
Revision I to SP 2311-F4 was issued March 21, 1978, which incorporated values of moderator temperature coefficient consistent with Technical Specification LCO values.
(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-10-06: Torque Wrench and Torque Wrench Tester Calibration.
The licensee's corrective measures have been completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I serial GQL 0707, dated April 18, 1976.
Revision 1 to PM Procedure M-48 was issued April 6,1978, which incorporates criteria for determining
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that calibration of torque wrenches and torque wrench testers will be satisfactorily accomplished. Additionally, a QA evaluation was completed, as described in NRC Region I letter to MEC, dated May 1 1978. The evaluation of torque wrench tested data and troque wrench data indicated that the out of tolerance condition of the equipment related only to its use for left hand threaded fasteners.
Since there are no such fasteners used at the facility, no further action was necessary.
3.
Review of Plant Operations a.
Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and records:
Shift Foreman Log, Control Room Log Book, Control Room
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Operator's Log Sheets, Primary Auxiliary Operator's Log-Tour Readings, Primary Auxiliary Operator's Log-Liquid Waste Disposal Panels, Secondary Auxiliary Operator's Log Sheets, and Auxiliary Operator Log Sheets-Out-Building Tour; dated February 8 - April 30,1978.
Shift and Daily Checks; dated February 8 - April 30,
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Jumper, Lifted Lead, and Mechanical Modifications Log
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(active and cleared); entries made during February 8 -
May, 5, 197d.
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Equipment Lockout Tag Log (active and cleared); entries
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made during February 8 - May 5,1978.
Do Not Operate Tag Log; entries made during February 8 -
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May 5,1978.
Transient Cycle Log Book; entries made during February
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8 - May 5,1978<
Unit 2 Superintendent's Operating Memos Nos. I through 4.
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Unit 2 Stinding Order No.1, dated March 23, 1976.
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Unit 2 Operations Department Memos 2-78-1 through 2-78-8.
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The logs and records were reviewed to verify the following i
items.
Log keeping practices and log book reviews are conducted
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in accordance with established administrative controls.
Log entries involving abnormal conditions are sufficiently
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detailed.
Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specifications
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(TSs).
Jumper log and tagging log entries do not conflict with
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TSs.
Jumper / lifted lead / mechanical modification and tagging
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operations are conducted in conformance with established administrative controls.
Problem identification reports con rm compliance with TS e
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reporting and LCO requirements.
Acceptance criteria for the above review included inspector judgement and requirements of applicable Technical Specifica-tions and the following procedures.
Station Administrative Procedrue (SAP) 1002, " Rules for
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the Protection of Employees Working on Electrical and Mechanical Apparatus," Revision 12.
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SAP 1010, " Technical Specification Surveillance Program,"
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Revision 12, TCN 2-78-328.
SAP 1011, " Controlled Key Locker Control," Revision 15.
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SAP 1012, " Shift Relief and Log Entries," Revision 8.
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SAP 1013. " Bypass of Safety Functions and Jumper Control,"
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Revision 7.
SAP 1016, " Operations Surveillance Program," Revision 12.
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SAP 1033, "Operati.ng Memos and Standing Orders," Original.
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SAP 1037, ' Control of Caution Tags," Original.
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Yhe inspector's findings regarding shift logs and operating records were acceptable, except as noted below.
Shift Foreman Log and Control Room Log Book entries were
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explicit and complete.
Some minor discrepancies were noted regarding the administration
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of controls for lifted leads and jumpers, including manner of log sheet completion and accountability of active, inactive and missing tags.
These items were discussed with licensee representatives and corrected or scheduled for correction prior to completion of the inspection. The inspector determined that active lifted leads and jumpers were properly installed and had no further questions cancerning tnis item.
The Transient Cycle tog Book did not include entries for
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all recent heatups, cooldowns, reactor trips and safety inj ecti;ns.
Licensee representatives stated that the log book would be reviewed and entries would be included for appropriate transients. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
SAP 1037, issued March 13, 1978, implements use of yellow
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cardboard type CAUTION tags as an infonnation tag only.
The tag is to be attached to a component, control switch or other device to indicate an off normal condition or to caution personnel to a specific condition which must (
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be satisfied prior to using the component or device.
Additionally, SAP 1037 provides for use of a red bakelite DO-NOT-OPERATE tag in place of a CAUTION tag, particularly when used in environments where the' CAUTION tags may easily deteriorate under extended use.
The administrative controls provided by SAP 1037 have not yet been fully implemented, including operator training regarding use of CAUTION tags and replacement of existing white informa-tion stickers and 00-NOT-OPERATE tags w-ith CAUTION tags where applicable.
Licensee representatives stated that the full implementation of SAP 1037 would be expedited.
This item is unresolved (320/78-17-01) pending licensee implementation of SAP 1037.
b.
Plant Tour
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Upon arrival at the site at 8:30 p.m. on May 3, 1978, the inspector proceeded directly to the Control Room to observe plant operations during off normal hours.
Control Room manning and Control Board monitoring instrumentation and equipment controls were observed for conformance with applicable Technical Specification requirements.
The inspector then conducted a tour of the Unit 2 Reactor Building tc observe activities in progress, radiation controls established at the personnel access control point, general cleanliness conditions and potential fire hazards. The tour was completed at 10:15 p.m.
At various tires during May 4-5 and 8-10,1978, the inspector conducted tours of the following accessible plant areas.
Auxiliary Building
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Turbine Building
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Fuel Handling Building
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Control Room
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Switchgear Rooms
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Inverter and Battery Rooms
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Diesel Rooms
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Make-up Pump Rooms
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Building Spray Pump and Decay Heat Pump Vaults
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The following observations /discussicns/ determinations were made.
Control Room and local monitoring instrumentation for
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various components and parameters was observed, including reactor coolant flow, pressure and temperature, pressurizer pressure and temperature, and control rod positions.
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Radiation controls established by the licensee, including
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the posting of radiation areas, the condition of step-off pads and the disposal of protective clothing, were observed.
Radiation work permits used for entry to radiation and controlled areas were reviewed.
Actual radiation level measurements were taken and compared with posted values throughout the plant.
Plant housekaeping, including general cleanliness conditions
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and storage of naterials and components to prevent safety and fire hazards, were observed.
Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed
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for the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibrations.
Selected DHR, BS, MS, and FW system piping snubbers /
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restraints were observed for proper fluid level and condition / proper hanger settings.
The indicated positions of electrical power supply breakers
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and selected RBS, RBECR, NSRP, nHR, DH, and DHCC control board equipment start switches and remote-operated valves and the actual positions of DH, BS, DF, CO, and MU nenual-operated valves were observed.
~ lected equipment lockout tags were observed for proper c
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posting and tagged equipment was observed for proper positioning. The items observed included tags and equip-ment associated with clearances 2095, 2226 a.,d 2360.
Selected jamper and lifted lead markers were observed for
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proper identification and the effected wiring changes were observed for proper completion.
The items observed included controls associated with the lifted leads 8 and 9 and jumpers 4 and 5.
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The Control Board was observed for annunciators that
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normally should not be lighted during the existing plant conditiorcs.
The reasons for the annunciators were discussed with control room operators.
The licensee's policy and practice regarding plant tours
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was reviewed. -
Control Room manning was observed on several occasions
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during the inspection.
~ Acceptance criteria for the above items included inspector judgement and requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k), Regulatory Guide 1.114, applicable Technical Specifications and the following procedures.
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SAP 1002, " Rules for the Protection of Employees Working
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on Electrica? and Mechanical Apparatus," Revision 12.
SAP 1003, "Raaiation Protection Manual," Revision 12.
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SAP 1008, "Goou Housekeeping," Revision 3.
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SAP 1009, " Station Organization and Chain of Command,"
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Revision 3.
SAP 1013, " Bypass of Safety Functions and Jumper Control,"
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Revision 7.
SAP 1028, " Operator at the Controls," Original.
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SAP 1037, " Control of Caution Tags," Original.
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The inspector's findings regarding the plant tours were acceptable.
4.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reoorts (LERs)
The LERs listed below were reviewed in Region I office promptly following receipt to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and the adequacy of corrective action.
The LEPs were also reviewed to determine whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, whether the event should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.
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The following LERs wer: reviewed.
LER 78-01/3L, aate1 February 28, 1978; Reactor Building purge
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supply fans and as.:ociated dampers were inoperable due to in-complete construct.on.
LER 78-02/3L, dated February 28, 1978; Manufacturer's defect
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noted in plate #6 of seismic instrumentation triaxial spectrum recorder #714.
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LER 78-03/IT, dated February 27, 1978; Fire watch not stationed during cable room Halon system inoperability.
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LER 78-04/IT, dated February 27, 1978, Source range neutron insturmentation audible counts not in service during fuel load.
i LER 78-05/99T, dated February 21, 1978; Rock rip-rap moved
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down slope of dike due to improper slope.
LER 78-06/IT, dated March 2,1978; Direct communications not i
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established between Reactor Building and Control Room during incore detector installation.
LER 78-07/3L, dated March 16, 1978; during surveillance testing
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the reverse power relay actuated causing Diesel Generator DF-X-IB to trip.
- -- LER 78-08/3L, dated March 25, 1978; three fire penetration seals were not functional.
- -- LER 78-09/3L, dated March 25, 1978; during pre-op test of CRD mechanisms the CRD trip breakers were closed and control rods withdrawn prior to performing function test of T.S. 4.3.1.1.1.
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LER 78-10/.3L, dated April 4,1978; river water pump outlet and prelube valves and redundant RCp seal injection valves were not functionally tested prior to placing their respective systems in service.
= denotes tnose LERs selected for onsite followup.
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LER 78-11/3L, dated April 7,1978; Reactor Building door seals
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surveillance was not performed within previous 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to entering Mode 4.
- -- LER 78-13/It, dated March 27,1978; "A" Diesel Generator was not demonstrated operable by performing required surveillance, when "B" Diesel. Generator was tagged out of service.
LER 78-14/3L, dated ApriT 12, 1978; inner door seals or. both
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airlocks failed the surveillance test due to insufficient seating on the inner doors.
- -- LER 78-15/IT, dated March 27, 1978; remedial action required on the "B" Steam Generator special vibration instrumentation inspection opening assembly to prevent the developement of an unsafe condition.
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LER 78-16/IT, dated April 5,1978; Nuclear Service Water Pumps lA and 1B inoperable due to failure'of load shed relays to reset.
LER 78-17/3L, dated April 21, 1978; weld leak at 1/2 inch
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inlet nipple socket weld joint to OH-V1218 at Decay Heat Pump 1B suction piping.
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LER 78-19/IT, dated April 5,1978; power shaping rod position out of specification in Mode 2.
LER 78-20/3L, dated April 21, 1978; containment isolation
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valves NM-VS2 and.NS-V81 inoperable due to engagement of manual handwheel pins.
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LET 78-21/3L, dated May 1,1978; Vital Bus 2-IV became de-energized during ES test due to fuse blown on bus power supply transfer.
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LER 78-23/3L, dated April 24, 1978; only one boron injection flow path verified operable prior to entry into Mode 4.
The above LERs were closed, based on satisfactory review in the Region I office, except those LERs selected for onsite followup.
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5.
Onsite Licensee Event Followuo For those LERs selected for ensite followup (denoted in Paragraph 4), the inspector verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specific tions and GP 4703 (Original) had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by Technical Specifications, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in con-formance with Technical Specification limits.
The inspector's findings regarding'these licensee events were acceptable, unless otherwise noted below.
Corrective measures associated with LERs 78-10/3L and 78-23/3L
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are being tracked for completion by PORC Action Items 2-78-007 and 2-78-017, respectively.
The inspector determined that the licensee's planned corrective actions were appropriate and had no further questions on these LERs.
Corrective measures associated with LERs 78-09/3L, 78-12/3L,
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78-13/IT, 78-16/IT and 78-19/IT are being tracked for completion by PORC Action Items 2-78-005, 2-78-016, 2-78-014, 2-78-009 and 2-78-010, respectively.
The inspector determined that the licensee's planned corrective actions were appropriate and
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substantially completed.
However, the originally scheduled dates for completinq le PORC Action Itsas were overdue.
Licensee representatives stated that appropriate reviews of outstanding PORC Action Items would be performed to ensure that corrective measures are properly completed as scheduled or that extended completion due dates are approved when necessary on an ad hoc basis.
Licensee measures to ensure timely completion of PORC Action Items in general and resolution of the specific items listed above will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(320/78-17-02)
6.
IE Circular Fellowuo The inspector reviewed the licensee's followup actions regarding the IE Circulars listed below.
IEC 77-14, " Separation of Contaminated Water Systems from
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Noncontaminated Plant Systems."
IEC 77-16, " Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Lock-
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out Features."
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IEC 78-02, " Proper Lubricating 011 for Terry Turbines."
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The review included discussions with licensee personnel and review of selected 'Icility records.
The licensee's foiiowup actions were reviewed to verify that the circulars were received by appropriate licensee management, a review for applicability was performed, and inat action taken or planned is appropriate. Acceptance criteria for the above review included inspector judgement and requirements of applicable Technical Specifications and facility procedures.
The licensee has initiated, but not completed, PORC Action Items 2-78-022, 2-78-023 and 2-78-020 to require reviews of IE Circulars 77-14, 77-16 and 78-02, respectively, to determine facility applicability and appropriate followup actions.
Licensee resolution of the above PORC Action Items will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(320/78-17-03)
7.
Reactor Coolant System Decontamination Several facilities have recently carried out or are planning to carry out decontamination of reactor coolant pressure boundary components without prior NRC approval. This is allowed under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
Operations of this nature generally do not represent unreviewed safety questions provided that the following conditions are satisfied.
The components involved have been physically removed from the
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system.
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The licensee's administrative controls and post-decontamination surveillance are adequate to assure that residual decontamination solution is not introduced into other components within the
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reactor coolant pressure boundary.
The component is not degraded.
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The inspector infonned licensee representatives that NRR is actively developing generic criteria to govern decontimination of reactor coolant pressure boundary components.
Until these generic criteria are developed, decontamination solutions with unproven corrosion characteristics should not be introduced into components within the reactor coolant pressure boundaries of operating reactors without prior NRC approval.
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the inspector determined that chemical decontamination has neither been carried out on components within the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor is planned in the near future by the licensee. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
8.
Emergency Safeguards Actuation The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective measures concerning the emergency safeguards (ES) actuation which occurred on April 23, 1978.
Details of the occurrence, including the event description, the cause, and the related consequences, were reported in MEC letter to Region I serial GQL 0871, dated May 8,1978, which enclosed LERs 78-33/IT and 78-31/IT.
Subsequent to the occurrence, an in-depth investigation was initiated by the licensee to evaluate the actual event and appropriate corrective action. The inspector reviewed the finalized site report of the incident, forwarded by JLS memorandum to GPM, dated May 4,1978.
The report included sections which described the synopsis of the event, the sequence of events, conclusions and recormendation/ action items, as well as various pertinent appendices. The inspector noted that the licensee's investigation was thorough and addressed all significant aspects of the incident.
The inspector also reviewed B&W letters to MEC serial 50M-II-140, dated May 2, 1978, and serial SOM-II-143, dated May 5, 1978. These letters provided evaluations of specific areas of concern following the transient, based on a preliminary B&W review of the effects of the supplied data, which supported continued facility startup and operation. The specific evaluations, included findings, transient results and recomendations, concerning the reactor coolant pumps, the control rod drive mechanisms, fuel components, w water chemistry, the once through steam generators,. the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant piping and pressurizer usage factors, and voiding of the pressurizer. The licensee will submit a special report of the ES actuation and injection pursuant to T.S. 3.5.2.b.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this incident.
The licensee's final ' disposition of recomended corrective and the ES actuation / injection report actions will be reviewed during a subsequent routine inspection.
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Unit Auxiliary Transfomer Desian Deficiency
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On May 3,1978, Region I was notified by a licensee representative that the unit auxiliary transformers did not meet the requirements of General Desiar Criteria 17 of 10 CFR 50.
Each of the two unit auxiliary transfomers was detemined to be incapable of carrying the unit full lead auxiliaries and the engineared safety feature auxiliaries, for the normal operating range of the 230 KV grid, during periods of peak unit auxiliary demand.
Additional details of this occurrence were reported by MEC to Pegion I in a telegram, dated May 4,1978, and in a written followup report, dated May 9, 1978.
The followup report described the following corrective actions, which would be taken to assure adequate voltage levels to support operation of the ESF and balance of plant auxiliaries:
The unit will not be operated above a (bus loading) power
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level compatible to safe single transformer operation; Selective balance of plant load shedding will be installed; or
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The automatic bus transfers to the other auxiliary transformers for designated buses will be disabled.
On May 10,1978, licensee representatives informed the inspector that, for the normal 232-238 KV grid voltage operating range, each unit auxiliary transformer would meet the requirements of GDC 17 provided that the total 4170/6900 V bus load was restricted to 48 MW and that each 4160 V. bus load was restricted to 20 MW. Appropriate administrative controls will be implemented to ensure that the unit is operated within these maximum bus loading values.
Additionally, pending further review by the licensee, the fast transfer of balance of plant loads may be defeated, if necessary.
For long term corrective actions, the licensee is considering to selectively block the fast transfer of individual balance of plant components including two circulation water pumps, one condensate booster pump and one heater drain pump. The inspector subsequently infomed the NRR project manager for the facility of these planned corrective actions. The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter. The licensee's final resolution of planned corrective measures will be reviewed during a subsequent routine inspection.
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10. Postulated Small Break LOCA MEC letter to NRC:NRR serial GQL 0854, dated May 5,1978, enclosed the results of B&W's most recent calculations concerning a small break LOCA at TMI, as well as the analysis presented to the NRC staff by B&W at a meeting on April 25, 1978.
Additionally, the letter described certain actions that have been taken or that were planned to ensure proper operator response to a small break LOCA.
The inspector verified that the following acticas have been satis-factorily completed by the licensee.
Emergency Procedure 2202-1.3 was revised to detail the operator
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response as described in MEC letter serial GQL 0854.
Operating Procedure 2104-1.2 was revised to ?ermit operations
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with one of the make-up pump discharge cross-connect valves open and the other one closed.
Each shift was briefed on the contraints of the license and
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the small break LOCA procedure requirements, and each operator has physically located all equipment required to be operated in accordance with the procedure changes.
" nit 2 Operations Department Memo 2-78-10 was written to
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require each operator to signify understanding of the procedure changes and specific LOCA response manning requirements designated therein.
Ops Memo 2-78-10 required a sheet to be attached to the Control
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Room Log sheet showing the two individuals assigned the responsi-bilities for carrying out the actions indicsted in the prncedure changes.
Ops Memo 2-78-10 required each shift to be rebriefed at least
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once per month of the actions required in the procedures.
Each shift has perfomed drills to verify that the assumed
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operator response time is achievable and within the analysis assumptions.
The inspector discussed the LOCA response actions with selected operators and verified their understanding and knowledge of the procedure changes. Additionally, the inspector observed that the HPI discharge valves and cross-connect valves were properly aligned and instructions posted for normal and LOCA operation, that the
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valves were accessible for prompt operation in the event of a LOCA, and that dedicated comunications headsets were provided at the HPI discharge valve areas.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's plans to submit B&W results
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of additional calculations for pcwer levels up to 2772 MW(t) and to submit a Technical Specification Change Regt2st covering the above procedures. Licensee representatives stated that the LOCA procedures T.S. Change Request would be submitted to flRR by June 15, 1978, in conjunction with the B&W reanalysis submittal.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
Find-ings were acceptable.
11.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters for which more information or additional time is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.a.
12.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on May 10, 1978, to discuss the findings of the inspection.
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