IR 05000282/1993007
| ML20045B544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1993 |
| From: | Westberg R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045B537 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-93-07, 50-282-93-7, 50-306-93-07, 50-306-93-7, NUDOCS 9306180054 | |
| Download: ML20045B544 (28) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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REGION III
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Reports No. 50-282/93007(DRS); No. 50-306/93007(DRS)
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Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; No. DPR-60
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Licensee: Northern States Power Company
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Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station 414 Nicollet Hall Minneapolis,.1N 55401
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Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station
Inspection At: Red Wing, MN
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Inspection Conducted: April 12 through May 14, 1993
Inspection Team:
R. Westberg, Team Leader
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D. Butler, Reactor Inspector
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J. Neisler, Reactor Inspector R. Winter, Reactor Inspector D. Roth, Reactor Inspector Trainee
NRC Consultants:
N. Dienha, Atomic Energy of-Canada, LTD. (AECL)
P. Pattantyus, AECL
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J. Haller, AECL
Approved By:
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Rolf A. Westbe'rg, Team Leader Date Region III Approved By:
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teoffrey C.' Wright, Chief Date Engineering Branch.
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Inspection Summary Inspection on April 12 throuah May 14. 1993 (Reports No. 50-282/93007(DRS):
50-306/93007(DRS)) Special announced EDSFI in accordance with Temporary i
Instruction (TI) 2515/107(25107).
Results: The team concluded that Prairie Island's EDS was. designed, operated
and maintained in an effective manner and that engineering and technical
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support was good. One unresolved item was identified regarding the alternate positioning of EDG intake air dampers (Paragraph 3.3.3) and one inspection.
j followup item was identified regarding the impact of additional loads on.the
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batteries (Paragraph 3.2.1).
Strengths and weaknesses in system design and
engineering support are provided in the Executive Summary.
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9306180054 930611
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PDR ADOCK 050002B2 O
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I TABLE OF CONTENTS
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................
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I.0 LICENSEE. ACTION ON PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ITEMS...............
2.0 INTRODUCTION..................................................
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3.0 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS...........................................
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3.1 AC SYSTEMS..............................................
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3.2 DC AND 480V SYSTEMS.....................................
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i 3.3 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS......................................
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L 4.0 ENGINEERING AND T[r.HNICAL SUPP0RT............................
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b 5.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS.............................................
6.0 INSPECTION FOLLOWUP ITEMS....................................
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7.0 EXIT INTERVIEW....................
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l Appendix A - Personnel Contacted
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Appendix B - Requests for Information-
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l Executive Summary
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During the period April 12 through May 14, 1993, a Region III inspection team
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conducted an EDSFI at the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant.
The inspection reviewed the plant's EDS design and operation. The team also r: valuated the engineering and technical support (E&TS).
The team reviewed EDS electrical and mechanical support systems, examined installed EDS equipment, reviewed EDS testing and procedures, and interviewed selected corporate and site personnel.
The team concluded that Prairie Island's EDS was designed, operated and maintained in an effective manner and that engineering and technical support was good.
The team identified the following strengths:
Robust EDS design.
Good plant material condition.
Good margin in diesel generator (EDG) calculations and
conservative assumptions in calculations in general.
t Competent well qualified people with good plant knowledge in
sufficient numbers to support plant operation.
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Good configuration control program.
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Excellent site EDS audits.
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Excellent EDS surveillances.
Good self assessment relative to the EDS.
The team identified the following calculational weaknesses:
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Standard industry recommended practices were not used in the short
circuit, voltage drop, and battery sizing calculations.
Battery sizing calculations did not consider all potential loads.
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The Dl/D2 EDG preliminary transient analysis contained
deficiencies and inconsistencies that should be addressed.
The team identified the following design weaknesses:
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The batteries and load bank were not protected against faults
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during battery testing.
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The battery design did not include the ability to disconnect the e
battery and its charger to f acilitate testing.
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DETAILS 1.0-Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items
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level IV Violation (50-282/92022-01) 50-306/92022-01):
Failure to adequately translate design requirements into specifications and drawings and
to implement those requirements resulting in partial loss of seismic
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independence between the D5/D6 building and the turbine building flood wall.
The licensee submitted an as-built configuration analysis that demonstrated the construction error caused insignificant impact on both building's seismic response and that the buildings are acceptable as constructed. The licensee's analysis was reviewed and accepted by NRR.
This item is considered closed.
2.0 Introduction During electrical inspections at various operating plants in the country, the NRC staff identified several EDS deficiencies. The Office of Nuclear Reactor
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Regulation (NRR) Special Inspection Branch initiated special EDS inspections
at other operating plants after they determined that such deficiencies could-i compromise design margins. These deficiencies included unmonitored and uncontrolled load growth on safety buses and inadequate modifications, design
calculations, testing, and qualification of commercial grade equipment used in
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safety related applications. The NRC considered inadequate E&TS to be one cause of these deficiencies.
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The EDS inspection objectives were to assess Prairie Island's EDS performance-
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capability and the licensee's-E&TS capability and performance in this area.
For this inspection, the EDS included power sources to systems required to L
remain functional during and following design basis events.
EDS components i
reviewed included EDGs, 125Vdc batteries, offsite circuits'and switchyard, l
4160Vac switchgear, 480Vac load centers (LCs), 480Vac Motor Control Centers
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(MCCs),125Vdc MCCs, battery chargers, inverters, ' associated buses, breakers,
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relays, and other miscellaneous components.
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The team reviewed the emergency, offsite and onsite power sources _for EDS
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equipment, the power regulation to essential loads, protection for postulated
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fault currents, and coordination of protective devices interrupting-
capability.
The team also reviewed the mechanical systems that interface with the EDS, including air start, lube oil, and cooling systems plus the cooling
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and heating systems for EDS equipment. The team walked down originally installed and as-modified EDS equipment for configuration and equipment i
ratings and reviewed system component qualification, testing, and calibration
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records.
The team assessed the licensee's E&TS organization capability with
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respect to personnel qualification and staffing, timely and adequate root cause analyses for failures and recurring problems, and involvement in design and operations. The team also reviewed training for operations and E&TS personnel relative to the EDS.
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A The team verified conformance with General Design Criteria (GDC) 17 and 18 and the applicable 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria. The team also reviewed plant Technical Specifications (TSs), the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), and
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appropriate Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) to verify that TS requirements and licensee commitments were met.
The areas reviewed and the concerns identified are described in Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 4.0 of this report. Conclusions are provided at the end of each of these sections.
Personnel contacted and those who attended the exit meeting on May 14, 1993, are provided in Appendix A.
A complete listing of the team's requests for information is attached as Appendix B.
3.0 Electrical Systems 3.1 AC Systems In order to assess EDS capability, the team reviewed EDS load regulation, engineered safety system (ESS) bus electrical interfaces, equipment short circuit ratings, overcurrent protection schemes, environmental equipment qualification, and protective devices coordination for compliance with regulations, design engineering standards and accepted engineering practices.
The review was based on the following information:
e system descriptions e
station USAR
related TS sections e
system design basis documents voltage drop and short circuit calculations
e equipment sizing calculations
protection coordination studies e
equipment specifications licensee event reports (LERs)
e test and operating procedures e
electrical one line diagrams e
control logic diagrams
elementary schematic diagrams
The team conducted EDS equipment walkdowns and verified that operational, environmental and seismic criteria had been correctly applied.
The characteristics of the power system electrical grid to which the Prairie
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Island plant is connected were reviewed to assess the adequacy of important parameters such as voltage regulation, short circuit contribution, protection schemes, surge protection, control circuits, stability and reliability.
The preferred power source supply transformers were reviewed for capability, connections to the ESS buses, field installation arrangements, protection, and voltage regulation. The EDGs were reviewed to assess power rating adequacy, ability to start and accelerate the assigned safety loads in the required time sequence, voltage and frequency regulation under transient and steady state conditions, compliance with single failure criteria and applicable separation requirements.
The 4kV ESS buses and their connected loads were reviewed to assess load current and short circuit current capabilities, voltage
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The team's review determined that the Class 1E safety related AC system design was robust.
Requirements were well defined, proper input ~ parameters were used, assumptions were conservative, and references were traceable.
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general, methodologies were in accordance with standard engineering practice and the results satisfied the requirements.
However, the following concerns
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were identified:
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3.1.1 Diesel Generator Steady State loadina The team was concerned that nonconservative motor power factors associated with EDG kilowatt loading steady state values could have led to EDG overload.
The calculations used to develop the EDG steady state loading contained computerized motor load lists which identified EDG electrical loads (e.g.,
motors, motor-operated valves, heaters, etc.) and their associated critical i
parameters (e.g., full load current, rated nameplate voltage, KVA load, power factor, etc.). The power factor value identified in the list was used to determine the kilowatt loading from the KVA load which was based on nameplate
voltage and full load current. The licensee indicated that where the power
factor for a motor load less than 100HP was not available, a power factor value was obtained from Table 2 of ABB Impell Report No. 09-0910-0176, Revision 3, " Design Basis Load Study." Review of power factor values contained in this table indicated that they were nonconservative (too low).
The licensee determined that Table 2 had only been used for motors 50HP and below; for motors above 50HP, specific values of power factor were based on manufacturer's data. The impact of this nonconservatism to the worst case
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hading at 480Vac resulted in a 30kW increase in loading or approximately 1.5%
of EDG loading; however, the team determined that the EDGs had sufficient capacity. The licensee indicated that it would consider adjustment of these power factors for motors smaller than 100HP in the future. The team found I
this response acceptable.
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3.1.2 Short Circuit Calculations i
The team was concerned that short circuit calculations did not account for the electrical cables' ability to pass a larger portion of available short circuit current.
Medium and low voltage short circuit calculations were performed assuming a pre-fault voltage of 1.0 per unit (PU). However, the maximum grid voltage is l'
355kV or 1.03 PU of the nominal 345kV. To account for the additional short circuit current associated with this maximum voltage, the acceptance criterion for the safeguards breakers required the available short circuit duty at 1.0 PU voltage to be less than or equal to 97% of breaker rating.
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While the cdjustment to the acceptance criteria accounted for the additional short circuit current resulting from higher driving voltage, it did not account for_ the cables' ability to pass a larger portion of available short
circuit current. The team calculated that a 1.03 PU voltage would result in approximately a 6% increase in short circuit MVA assuming an infinite source.
The actual increase in short circuit current would vary depending upon the -
specific situation and available short circuit current.
The team concluded that the additional calculated short circuit current would not exceed the rating of the safeguards breakers. The-licensee indicated that
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the maximum grid voltage would be used in the next revision to these calculations. The team considered this response acceptable.
3.1.3 Cable Conductor Operatino Temperatures
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The team was concerned that standard industry recommended practices for cable I
temperatures were not used in the short circuit and voltage drop calculations.
The calculations assumed a cable conductor operating temperature of 65 C.
For short circuit studies, it is industry practice to assume a conductor temperature of 20 or 25 C.
This low temperature results in a minimum cable'
resistance value and a maximum short circuit current value.
For voltage
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regulation studies, it is industry practice to assume the maximum rated '
conductor operating temperature (usually 90 C). This results in a maximum i
value for both resistance and voltage drop.
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The conductor temperature effect is most significant at the distribution system's 480Vac level. Further review identified that any nonconservatism-i
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resulting from the assumed conductor operating temperature was offset by' other
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conservative loading assumptions, i
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Engineering Manual to ensure that future calculations are performed using 20 C i
for short circuit calculations and 90 C for voltage regulation studies. The
team found this response acceptable; however, the use of nonconservative cable
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temperatures in the calculations was considered a calculational' weakness.
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3.1.4 Diesel Generator Transient Analysis The team was concerned that deficiencies and inconsistencies in the Unit I EDG D1 and D2 transient analysis, Coltec Industries Engineering Report File No.
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R-6.03-6033 dated April 5, 1993, raised questions about the EDGs' ability to
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start and accelerate required loads. The following concerns were identified:
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Starting loads for each automatically sequenced step had not been adjusted to reflect the nominal EDG output voltage of 4160V.
L Calculation No. ENG-EE-018 developed starting KVA values based on rated motor nameplate voltages (e.g., 4000V, 460V, etc.) and full load
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8.16% increase in starting KVA values.
For 460V motors the starting KVA would be greater depending upon load center tap settings.
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Further Coltec Report review and discussion with the licensee identified that this deficiency would be offset by the 10% margin which the licensee used in calculating its steady state and starting loads;
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however, the team considered this a calculational weakness. The J
licensee indicated that the above weakness would be reviewed in future Coltec Report revisions.
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Predicted generator output voltage recovery times in the Coltec Report for load step 1 were significantly less than the actual generator output voltage recovery times recorded-during the 1993 integrated test. The following table summarizes the voltage recovery times:
Coltec Report Inteorated Testino Recovery case 1 Case 2 D1
i 90% of 0.95 sec.
1.12 sec.
2.385 sec.
2.555 sec.
Nominal i
100% of 1.24 sec.
1.43 sec.
2.810 sec.
2.675 sec.
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Nominal
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Note:
Case 1 of the Coltec Report is associated with starting only those loads presently expected to be required in the event of a safety
injection (SI) signal. Case 2 is the same as Case 1 except an l
additional 10% loading margin has been assumed.
l The team considered this a weakness in the Coltec Report.
The team was concerned that slower than predicted terminal' voltage
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recovery during SI motor acceleration could affect load sequencing.
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Although motor terminal voltage can be expected to recover as the SI pump accelerates, it is critical that the SI pump and motor accelerate within 5 seconds since this is the interval between sequenced step
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loads.
Therefore, if the SI pump / motor in step I does not allow l
3enerator output voltage to recover, the EDG load sequencer would prevent the step 2 loads from being sequenced on the diesel generator at
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the time interval assumed in the safety analysis.
i The Coltec Report determined that, under full load conditions, the 51
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pump and motor would accelerate to rated speed in 2.5 seconds. However,
the integrated surveillance test indicated that the acceleration time for step 1 loading would be in excess of 2.5 seconds under light load _
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conditions when the SI pump was recirculating water to the reactor water storage tank.
In addition, review of the motor manufacturer's speed vs.
torque curves (Westinghouse curves dated December 1, 1992) indicated that acceleration times could vary significantly depending upon motor terminal voltage as follows:
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Motor Terminal Voltaae Acceleration Time 100%
2.0 sec.
90%
2.9 sec.
80%
4.8 sec.
The above acceleration times were based on voltages greater than the minimum generator output voltage reached during the integrated surveillance testing, which dipped to approximately 70% of rated motor nameplate voltage. Therefore, acceleration times would be longer.
(See Section 3.3.2 for mechanical aspects of SI pump modeling)
The team considered this concern a further example of weaknesses in the modeling of the Coltec Report.
The team recognized that the plant had not yet accepted the Coltec Report and that there was no commitment to have a transient analysis.
3.2 DC and 480Vac Systems The team reviewed the station Class IE DC systems, inverters and cable penetrations for design compliance to applicable standards and codes.
The inspection included review of 125Vdc battery design with respect to sizing,-
duty cycle loading, cell temperature, battery aging and capacity. The associated battery charger design was reviewed for total loading capabilities and applicable calculations were reviewed. The inverter sizing and design calculations were reviewed to verify their adequacy.
Short circuit calculations and voltage drop calculations for the 125Vdc systems and 120Vac systems from the inverters were reviewed for correctness and accepted engineering practices.
Penetration electrical parameters were reviewed for adequacy.
Cables in the 125Vdc and 120Vac systems were checked and the cable sizing criteria were reviewed for acceptance in accordance with standard engineering practices. The circuit breakers and fuses were checked for sizing and coordination.
The 480Vac ESS buses and MCCs along with their connected loads were reviewed to assess load current and short circuit current capabilities, voltage regulation, protection and cable connections adequacy between loads and sources, and compliance with single failure criteria and applicable separation requirements.
The team determined that, in general, Class IE safety related 125Vdc and 480Vac systems designs were acceptable.
However, the following concerns were identified.
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3.2.1 Battery Sizina The safety related battery sizing calculation did not include all potential
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loads and did not use a design margin factor. The team had the following concerns:
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The load list used in Calculation 194401-2.2-001, Revision 0, " Battery Cell Sizing Calculation for 125V DC System," did not include the additional loading applied to a battery when the same train battery of
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the other unit was undergoing a performance discharge test.
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The licensee agreed that the impact of these potential additional loads had not been analyzed. Pending further review, the licensee issued Temporary Memo, TM-93-35, dated April 4,1993, which instructed that the transfer switches for these loads not be used.
Pending resolution of the impact of the additional loads and subsequent NRC review, this is considered an inspection follow up item (282/93007-01; 306/93007-Ol(DRS)).
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Battery sizing calculation, No. 194401-2.2-001, Revision 0, did not considered a 1.1 to 1.15 design margin factor as recommended by lEEE Standard 485-1983, " Recommended Practice for Sizing Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
The licensee's response acknowledged that the recommended conservatism had not been considered and advised that it would be applied in future
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calculation revisions. Because the batteries had sufficient capacity, the team found this response acceptable.
3.2.2 125Vdc System Voltage Regulation The team was concerned that Unit 2 DC System voltage levels may not be adequate during the first minute of a loss of offsite power coincident with a loss of coolant accident (LOOP /LOCA).
I The team's review of Calculation No. 194401-2.3-015, Revision 0, "125V DC System Voltage Adequacy Study," indicated that the Unit 2,125Vdc system's batteries, having a capacity of 100% (no aging factor considered), would have had terminal voltages of 113.lv for the 21 battery and 110.8V for the redundant 22 battery during the first minute of a LOOP /LOCA. With these battery terminal conditions, voltages available at the redundant D5 and D6 emergency diesel generator excitation cabinets would be 89.7V and 90.2V,
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respectively.
These voltages are below the 95V level that had been indicated,
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by the manufacturer, to be required for generator field flashing.
The licensee stated that there was an apparent discrepancy in the field flashing circuit data that had been provided by the manufacturer and used in
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the calculation. The licensee felt that periodic testing had confirmed i
acceptable excitation circuit operation. Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee provided documentation supporting the required voltage levels for the field flashing circuits. The Technical Manual will be revised to reflect these values.
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With regard to the lack of aging consideration in the calculation, the licensee stated that recent performance discharge tests indicated that battery capacity was 101.5% for 21 battery and 107% for 22 battery.
The licensee also indicated that aging would be considered, per industry standards, in the next calculation revision.
The team considered the licensee's responses acceptable.
3.2.3 DC System Desian In the DC system design, the batteries were directly connected to their chargers without a means to switch the battery to the load bank to accommodate battery and charger testing. The following design weaknesses were identified:
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DC system testing did not demonstrate that the battery chargers could
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recharge their associated batteries while carrying their normal loads.
i Following the performance discharge test of a battery, it was necessary
to recharge the tested battery, using a portable battery charger.
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The team also observed that the system configuration resulted in a i
connection from the batteries to their associated battery chargers and
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spare charger connection that was not protected in the event of an j
overcurrent condition.
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The lack of a disconnecting device between station batteries and their associated battery chargers also placed heavy reliance on an electrician's skill to avoid arcing and subsequent equipment damage and
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personal injury during the connection and reconnection of the batteries.
l The licensee committed to initiate a modification to the DC system that would
(1) permit battery charger capability testing to recharge their respective batteries while carrying their normal loads, (2) ensure that the battery
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charger connection is protected in the event of an overcurrent condition, and (3) install a switching mechanism to decrease reliance on an electrician's
skills in preventing damage to safety related equipment and personal injury during battery testing. The team considered the licensee's response and proposed actions to be acceptable.
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3.2.4 Lack of protection Durina Battery Performance Testina
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The team was concerned that during battery surveillance testing, a fault in
the temporary cables, between the battery and the load bank, or in the
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unprotected portion of the load bank, could remain uncleared and could result in a fire.
During review of Surveillance Procedure No. SP 2314, Revision 1, "22 Station
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Battery Refueling Outage Discharge Test," the team identified that temporary
test cables were routed from 22 battery, through the redundant 21 battery room
to the load bank located outside the battery rooms. The only Unit 2 access to 22 battery room was through 21 battery room.
The procedure did not specify~
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any overcurrent protection between the battery and the load bank. The load
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bank did provide a degree of overcurrent protection in that individual load resistor groups were fused. Thus, a fault in the temporary cables or the unprotected portions of the load bank circuitry could go uncleared and could result in a fire. A similar condition was observed in the other Unit's surveillance procedures.
With the lack of circuit separation due to the temporary cable routing, an overcurrent condition in the 22 battery test circuitry could impact the redundant 21 battery and its related DC system.
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specifications do not address DC requirements during unit shutdown; however, DC power is required to allow fuel handling.
The licensee revised the surveillance procedures during the inspection to include the use of inline fuses at the batteries during testing.
The team reviewed the procedures and found them acceptable.
3.3 Mechanical Systems
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The team reviewed the D1/D2 and D5/D6 EDGs and their mechanical support systems to determine their adequacy following design basis accidents.
Included in the review were EDG fuel oil, air start, lube oil, air intake and exhaust, room ventilation, and control panel ventilation.
In determining each system's functional adequacy, the team conducted system walkdowns and examined
associated licensing, engineering, vendor, purchasing, and plant operational documents including the following:
USAR e
design basis documents
TSs e
selected modifications and safety evaluations.
mechanical system calculations.
- piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID).
pump performance curves and motor data sheets.
- HVAC flow diagrams.
- diesel generator manufacturer technical manuals and component drawings.
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annunciator and testing procedures.
The team's review of selected mechanical, HVAC, and setpoint calculations, pre-operational test results, testing / maintenance / surveillance programs and seismic qualification reports indicated that, in general, the quality was good.
Except as mentioned below, requirements were well defined, proper input parameters were used and references were traceable.
The methodologies were in accordance with standard engineering practice and the results satisfied the requirements. The team identified the following concerns:
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EDG and support systems material condition was excellent. There was a noteworthy absence of leaks considering equipment age, the rooms were clean
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and well maintained, and piping systems were well preserved and system leakage was minimal.
3.3.2 SI Pump Start-up Modelina The team was concerned that the input parameters to the preliminary Coltec
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transient analysis (which determined the power required for the SI pump to reach full speed and establish full flow into the cold leg) were limited to the pump / motor inertia and calculated pump torque / speed relationship rather than extended to actual system configuration response during the start-up period (See Section 3.1.4 c for electrical aspects of SI pump modeling).
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Pump torque was modeled by the licensee up to the maximum value, which is reached at pump run-out (maximum flow) condition. However, the flow restriction orifices, one of which is installed in each injection line and the
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recirculating line, prevent the pump from developing the maximum torque. The licensee considered this a conservatism in the transient analysis.
t Because injection immediately follows pump start (valves are normally open in the injection lines), the team concluded that water mass inertia in the.
injection and recirculating lines also affected pump torque requirements.
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Raising this water mass to full flow conditions and overcoming resistance
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generated by flow friction losses add to the pump torque requirements and should be included in the transient analysis. The team considered this a weakness in the transient analysis, which could off-set the conservatism built
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in by the flow limitation.
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3.3.3 Tornado Oualification for EDG Ventilation Dampers The team identified that the EDG room ventilation system supply and exnaust dampers have not been evaluated for the effect of tornado induced depressurization when the EDG units are not running.
The original design did not consider loads on components caused by differential static pressure resulting from the pressure reduction in the vicinity of a tornado funnel. Tornado induced depressurization could cause a
common mode failure for all EDG units and the extent that operator
intervention could restore ventilation capability is difficult to determine as
_l it would greatly depend on the nature and degree of damage caused to the dampers.
The licensee agreed with the teams assessment and committed to analyze the identified ventilation dampers. During the inspection, each associated damper was placed in the open position and will be kept open during Prairie Island's i
tornado season until the analyses justify alternate positioning.
j Pending completion of the analyses and subsequent NRC review, this was considered an unresolved item (282/93007-02; 306/93007-02(DRS)).
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4.0-Encineerina and Technical Support E
During the inspection, the team reviewed the programs for controlling modifications, alterations, temporary modifications, bypasses, engineering interfaces, drawing control,10 CFR 50.59, evaluations, discrepancy management, manual operator actions, maintenance, and QA/QC.
In addition, the team reviewed the electrical training programs for engineers and the root cause analysis for LERs.
The team concluded that engineering and technical support was good and recognized the following strengths:
engineering staff experience and competence; quality services organization audits, surveillances, inspections,.
and followup activities; configuration control activities; and EDS
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surveillance procedures.
4.1 Enaineerina Staff
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The team evaluated the training requirements for system and design engineers.
Job descriptions and training programs had been developed for engineering
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department personnel that provides general and specific plant and systems
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training for engineers assigned to Prairie Island.
Staffing levels are sufficient to accomplish the normal. workload for a two unit nuclear power plant. The licensee augments the engineering staff with
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contract engineers when necessary to accomplish major modifications.
The team considered engineering staff experience and competence a strength.
4.2 Quality Assurance
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The team concluded that the Prairie Island quality assurance audit and surveillance programs were well managed with an appropriate mix of
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programmatic and performance based audits. Audit and surveillance reports were thorough, well documented and the quality organization;followed up on
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proposed corrective actions.
For example, the licensee's self assessment of the EDS was good.
It identified issues similar to those the team identified and each issue was promptly and correctly resolved.
The quality, organization audit and surveillance effort relative to the EDS was considered a strength.
4.3 Modifications The team concluded that Prairie Island had a good program for controlling changes or modifications to plant. structures, systems and components.
Safety (10 CFR 50.59) evaluations were thorough and well documented.
Each
. modification and alteration was reviewed under.the configuration management program to determine its affect on the plant design basis.
Bypasses were well
,
controlled and were usually of short duration. The bypass index provided to the team listed only two systems with an installed electrical bypass (jumper)
.and one of those systems, chlorine monitoring, is scheduled for physical removal along with the bypass in 1993.
)
.
-
,
i i
4.4 EDS Surveillance The team reviewed EDG instrument calibrations and all surveillance tests
,
associated with the EDS. The team concluded the licensee had a good testing program.
Instrumentation including panel meters, process indicators, process switches, and time delay relays were included in the calibration program.
In addition, the surveillance test procedures were well written.
The team
'
considered the EDS surveillance procedures to be a strength.
5.0 Unresolved Items i
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order r
to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph
'
3.3.3 of this report.
6.0 Inspection Followup Items i
Inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed with the
,
licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve
,
some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. One inspection i
followup item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.2.1
of this report.
.
7.0 Exit Interview The team conducted an exit meeting on May 14, 1993, at the Prairie Island-
Nuclear Generating Station to discuss the major areas reviewed during the
!
inspection, the strengths and weaknesses observed and the inspection results.
Licensee representatives and NRC personnel in attendance at this exit meeting are documented in Appendix A of this report.
The team also discussed the inspection report likely informational content with regard to documents reviewed by the team during the inspection.
!
>
12 i
p
'
,
.
APPENDIX A
~
.
'
Northern States Power Company Mike Wadley, Plant Manager Jim Hoffman, Project Manager / Team Leader
.j Matt Blaskowski, System Engineer Scott Onnen, System Engineer
!
Mark A. Rush, System Engineer
Brad Johnson, System' Engineer
RC Sloss, System Engineer
'
Kalyan Mustaphi, Substation Engineer Tom tillehei, Electrical Engineer Bob Peterson, Electrical Engineer
Paul Hellen, Electrical System Engineer Scott Hiedeman, Mechanical System Engineer Marcia Thompson, SB0/ESU Project Engineer
Robert Cole, SB0 Project - Mechanical Eng Greg Thoraldson, System Engineer
!
George Aandahl, Configuration Management Russell Pond, Princ. Elect Engineer Jeff Maki, Electrical Systems Engineer Bob Fraser, Supt Mech & Civil Engineer i
John Bystrzycki, General Supt Project Mgt Marty Sieh, Electrical Engineer
.
James Hill, Supt, I&C System Engineer Don Swenson, I&C Supv
-
Mike Werner, Fire Protection / Safety Dennis Carlson, Fire Protection / Sect XI Ted Amundson, Training Manager George Morgan, Project Coordinator EDSFI Bob Wyly, Electrical Engineer Tom VerBout, I&C Engineer Gary Sundberg, Electrical Eng Supv Mark Loosbrock, Engineer & Tech Training Lance Vale, Engineer, Electrical System r
Sandy Johnson, Engineer, Electrical System -
Kenneth J. Albrecht, Gen. Supt. Engineering
,
Greg A. Rolfson, Gen. Supt. Engineering - NPD
,
Jeff Kivi, Design Standards Engineer j
Joe Ruether, Sr Consultant Elect Engineer Dan Peterson, I&C Supervisor i
Mark Reddemann, Gen. Supt.. Elect. & Inst Sys Ray Hansen, Electrical Engineer Systems Ben Stephens, Supt. System Engineer Mech Pete Valtakis, Shift Manager
+
!
United States Nuclear Reaulatory Commission Geoffrey C. Wright, Chief Engineering Branch Marc Dapas, Senior Resident inspector, Prairie Island
-!
i a
.
APPENDIX B
.
1.
PROVIDE PROCEDLRES DETAILING INTERFACES BETVEEN ENGINEERING AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS, ARCHITECT / ENGINEERS PROCLREMENT, ETC?
2.
PLEASE PROVIDE LIST OF DUTSTANDING TEMPORARY M3DIFICAT10NS / ALTERRATIONS.
3.
PRDVIDE A COPY OF PRAIRIE ISLAND MODIFICATION PROCEDURES. 4. PROVIDE A LIST OF MODIFICATIONS (OPEN AND CLOSED) INVOLVING
,
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS $!NCE JANtMRY 1988.
'
5.
PROVIDE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERS.
6.
PROVIDE A COPY OF PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING ACTIVITIES OF CONTRACTORS.
I 7.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE EDG LOAD STUDY / TRANSIENT ANALYSIS.
8.
PROVIDE PROGRAMS / PROCEDURES FOR CONFIGURATION CONTROL?
9.
PROVIDE ELECTRICAL DEVIATION REPORTS FOR THE PAST TtREE YEARS.
10.
PROVIDE A LIST OF ELECTRICAL VORK REQUESTS ISSUED FOR THE PAST TV3 YEARS.
11.
PROVIDE A LIST OF ELECTRICAL LERS ISSUED SINCE JANUARY 1987.
'
12.
PROVIDE A LIST OF DERS GENERATED SINCE JANUARY 1988.
13.
PROVIDE A LIST OF AUDITS AND StRVEILLANCES INVOLVING ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS PERFORMED BY QA SINCE JANUARY 1988.
14.
PROVIDE OR MAKE AVAILABLE ISEG REPORTS ISSUED $1NCE JANUARY 1990.
15.
DO ENGINEERS RECEIVE PLANT SYSTEMS INTERFACE TRAINING?
16.
PROVIDE EXISTING PROCEDtRES FOR TRACKING IMPLEMENTATION OF INDUSTRY INITIATIVES (INCLUDE A LIST OF SILS, TILS, ETC.).
17.
WMT IS THE BACKLOG OF VORK ITEMS IN THE TECHNICAL ENGINEERING GROUP BY CATEGORY, MANIOJRS, AND MANYEARS? M MT IS TE TREND FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS?
18.
PROVIDE TE PROCEDURES FOR THE AC LOAD GROWTH PROGRAM.
19.
HOW MANY MAINTENENCE VORK REQUESTS ARE ON HOLD AWAITING RECEIPT OF PARTS OR MATERIALS? VHAT IS AVERAGE AGE OF WR$ AWAITING PARTS? 20. ARE ALL THE SAFETY RELATED SWITCHGEAR ROOM COOLERS FED FROM A CLASS IE POWER SUPPLY? PROVIDE APPLICABLE DRAVINGS.
21.
PROVIDE PROCEDtRES FOR NRC INFO NOTICE RESPONSE AND TRACKING.
22.
PROVIDE A LISTING OF ELECTRICAL AND I&C INFO NOTICES SINCE 1988.
23.
PROVIDE PROCEDLRES FOR OPERATOR ACTIONS TAKEN IF ESF SIGNAL ACTUATION OCCURS DLRING ESDG TESTING (MONTHLY SLRVEILLANCE TEST).
24.
PROVIDE DRAWING LIST /INDEX FOR EDG SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING AS APPLICABLE: DNE-LINES, SCHEMATICS, RELAY AND METERING
.
KEY DIAGRAMS.
i 25.
PROVIDE A LIST OF SAFETY RELATED CALCULATIONS.
26.
PROVIDE LIST OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTS IN RECALIBRATION PROGRAM.
27.
ARE THERE 7.MY PROCEDURAL OR PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS VHICH VOULD PREVENT OPERATORS FROM TRANFERR]NG TO THE DFFSITE SOLRCE WHEN LESS THAN ADEQUATE VOLTAGE IS AVAILABLE7 28.
PROVIDE SHORT CIRCUIT CALCULATIONS FOR SIZING OF 4160 AND 480V BREAKERS.
29.
PROVIDE SHORT CIRCUIT CALCULATION FOR AC SYSTEMS, NEDILM AND LOW VOLTAGE.
3D.
PROVIDE SHORT-CIRCUIT CALCULATIONS FOR THE DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
31.
PROVIDE THE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR TE DC GRDUND DETECTORS. PROVIDE GROUND DETECTOR VIRING DIAGRAMS AND CONNECTION DIAGRAMS FOR THE BATTRY SYSTEM.
32.
ARE DC GROUND DETECTORS CECKED AND AT WMT ACCtRACY?
33.
WHEN IS A GROUND PRESENT, TtMT 15. AT MMT RESISTANCE VALUE VOULD A GROUND BE INVESTIGATED?
PROVIDE TE PROCEDLEE FOR LOCATING DC GROUNDS.
35.
ARE SURGE ARRESTORS PROVIDED ON TE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE START-UP AND STANDBY TRANSFORMERS?
,
36.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE FAST BUS TRANSFER STUDY.
37.
PROVIDE *STARTUP" TRANSFORMER SIZlNG CALCULATIONS 38.
PROVIDE STATION * NORMAL" POWER TRANSFORMER SIZING CALCULATION.
39.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE SIZING CRITERIA FOR POWER CABLES.
40.
MRT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR CABLE TRAY FILL / CONDUIT LOADING 7 41.
MMT IS THE BASIS DOClMENT FOR CABLE SEPARATION 7 42.
WHAT CABLE CONDUCTOR TEMPERATURE WAS USED TD DETERMINE CONDUCTOR RESISTANCE USED IN VOLTAGE DROP CALCULATIONS? M MT IS THE MAX DESIGN TEMPERATtRE ALLOWED IN THE PLANT 7 43.
PROVIDE DC CABLE SIZING CRITERIA.
44.
M1AT CONDUCTOR TEMPERATtRE VAS USED TO DETERMINE THE CONDUCTOR RESISTANCE USED IN THE SHORT CIRCUIT CALCULATION.
45.
PROVIDE AC CABLE SIZING CRITERIA.
' 46.
PROVIDE BACK-UP CALCULATIONS f 0R SIZING AND SELECTING CABLES TO CLASS 1E MOTORS. SWITCHGEARS AND TRANSFORMERS.
47.
PRDVIDE TE INSULATION CO-ORDINATION STUDY TO BACKUP THE $[LECTION OF SURGE ARRESTORS IN THE PLANT.
48.
PROVIDE A RECORD OF GRID VDLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS FOR THE PAST YEAR.
49.
PROVIDE DETAILS OF 1RANSFER SCHEME FOR SUPPLY OF DIV I AND DIV II, INCLUDING LOGIC STATEMENTS AND SCHEMATICS.
SD.
MMT 15 THE PIMSE ANGLE DIfiTRENCE BETVEEN POWER SUPPLIES PRIOR THE BUS TRANFER7 51.
PROVIDE THE HISTORICAL RECORDS OF 34SKV SVITCHYARD VOLTAGES.
52.
SHOULD A LDSS OF 34SKV BUS DCCtR DLEING TESTING OF EDGS. HOW IS BUS TRANSFER INITIATED TD TRANSFER THE LOADS.
53.
IS THE FAST TRANSFER SCHEME TESTED PERIODICALLY? PLEASE PROVIDE PROCEDURES AND TEST RESULTS FOR LAST S TESTS.
54.
IF OFFSITE PDWER IS RESTORED FOLLOWING A LDSS OF OITSITE POWER, DO OPERATING PROCEDURES ALLOW / REQUIRE RETRANSFER TD TE OFTSITE S0tRCE? PROVIDE PROCEDURES THAT GOVERN THIS CONDITION.
55.
MMT ARE THE MINIMlM STARTING AND RUNNING VOLTAGES FOR TE ESSENTIAL MOTORS?
.,.
..
- -
~
i e
>
.!
56..
WHAT ARE THE MINIMUM PICKUP VOLTAGES FOR THE 480V SAFETY RELATED MOTORS?
f 57.
WHAT ARE TE MINIMUM PICKUP VOLTAGES AT TE SAFETY RELATED MOTOR CONTACTORS7 i
58.
PROVIDE MDTOR STARTING CALCULATIONS WHICH REPRESENT WORST CASE TRANSIENT AND STEADY STATE VOLTAGES.
$9.
PROVIDE PROTECTIVE RELAY AND C8 COORDINATION CURVES FOR AC SYSTEPS. MEDIUM AND LOW YOLTAGE.
. 60.
PROVIDE CtRRENT COMMITMENT REGUARDING BREAKER / FUSE COORDINATION FOR TE DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
i
. 61.
PROVIDE THE PROGRAMS / PROCEDURES FOR FUSE CONTROL.
i 62.
PROVIDE EXISTING PROCEDIRES FOR BREAKER SETTING / VERIFICATION.
. 63.
PROVIDE EXISITING PROCEDURES FOR SETTING MOTOR THERMAL OVERLOAD HEATERS.
!
64.
PROVIDE THE PROCEDURES FOR SETTING THE EMERGENCY BUS LOSS OF VOLTAGE AND DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAYS.
g 65.
PROVIDE THE PROCEDURES FOR TESTING THE OVERCURRENT DEVICES.
t 66.
PROVIDE CALCULATIDN INDEX AND DESIGN INSTRUCTIONS INDEX FOR APPENDIX "R".
!
67.
PROVIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE OVERCURRENT RELAYS.
,
- 68.
PROVIDE SCHEMATIC FOR ALL EDG TRIP CIRCUITS AND RELAY SETPOINTS.
.
69.
PROVIDE COPY OF PROTECTIVE RFLAY CALIBRATION PROGRAM.
I 70.
PROVIDE DC BREAKER / FUSE CHARACTERISTIC CLRVES.
71.
PROVIDE THE DEGRADED VOLTAGE SETPOINT CALCULATION AND SUPPORTING LOADFLOW DOCUMENTS.
i 72.
PROVIDE A COPY OR COPIES OF THE VENDOR MANUAL FOR THE TYPE OF PROTECTIVE OVERCURRENT RELAYS INSTALLED IN SAFETY RELATED SWITCHGEAR.
73.
PROVIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DAY TANK LEVEL SWITCH CALIBRATION.
I 74.
PROVIDE THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DAY TANK LEVEL SWITCH CALIBRATION.
,
. 75.
PROVIDE A SCHEMATIC OF THE EDG FUEL TRANSFER PUMP CONTROL LOGIC.
- 76.
PROVIDE RESULTS OF THE LAST 6 OIL SAMPLE TESTS.
I 77.
PROVIDE TEST DATA DEMONSTRATING FUEL DIL CONSlMPTION AT DESIGN CON 0!TIONS.
!
78.
PROVIDE DRAWINGS OF STORAGE AND DAY TANK INTERNAL DIMENTIONS,
{
79.
PROVIDE CALCULATIONS FOR FUEL DIL STORAGE CAPACITY.
80.
PROVIDE SETPOINTS FOR STORAGE TANK AND DAY TANK LEVEL ALARMS AND SWITCHES.
'
Bl.
PROVIDE EI6 FUEL SYSTEM CONTROL SCHEME.
82.
' PROVIDE DOCLMENTATION OF SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EDG LUBE Olt TANK, FUEL Dil DAY TANKS, AND MAIN STORAGE TANKS.
83.
PROVIDE THE CALIDRATION PROCEDURES FOR TE EDG LUBE DIL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER.
. PROVIDE METHOD FOR VERIFYING CHECK VALVES WORK FOR TE AIR RECEIVER CHLCK VALVES.
'i 85.
HAS VENTILATION, SUPPLY AIR. AND EXtMUST PIPING BEEN EVALUATED FOR TORNADO INDUCED DEPRESSLRIZAT10N7 t
86.
PROVIDE EDG PRE-OPERATIONAL TEST RESULTS.
i 87.
PROVIDE TEST DATA DEMONSTRATING TECH SPEC REQUIRED STARTS WITHOUT RECHARGING RECEIVER TANKS.
88.
PROVIDE SETPOINTS FOR PRESSURE SWITCHES AND ALARMS.
-
89.
PROVIDE HVAC LOAD CALCULATIDW FOR LOP /LOCA OPERATION FOR THE SWITHGEAR ROOMS.
!
- 90.
PROVIDE HVAC LOAD CALCULATION FOR LOP /LOCA OPERATION FOR THE BATTERY ROOMS.
}
91.
PROVIDE HVAC LDAD CALCULATION FOR LOP /LOCA OPERTION FOR TE EDG ROOMS.
+
92.
PROVIDE MINTENENCE AND OPERATING MANUALS FOR THE ULS.
f 93.
PROVIDE THE SCHEMATICS FOR EACH OF THE EDG START CIRCUITS.
!
94.
HOW ARE BATTERY ROOM TEMPERATURES MONITORED 7 WHAT ARE THE ALARMS FOR HIGH/ LOW TEMPERTURE7 95.
IS THERE A LOAD GROWTH PROGRAM FOR THE BATTERIES 7 PROVIDE MOST UP-TO-DATE LOAD LIST AND PROFILE.
'
96.
PROVIDE VENDOR INSTRUCTIONS / MAINTENANCE MANUAL FOR THE BATTFRY CHARGERS.
97.
PROVIDE THE MOST RECENT DC BATTERY CHARGER SIZING CALCULATIONS / STUDIES.
98. -
PROVIDE SEISMIC QUAllFICATION DOClMENTATION FOR BATTERIES. IN PARTICULAR DISCUSS HOW BATTERIES ARE RESTRAINED IN THE VERTICAL PLANE.
99.
WHAT IS THE GUIDANCE TO LOAD BATTERY CHARGERS ON THE EDG AFTER TEY HAVE EEN LOAD SHED7 WHEN RUNNING ON BATTERIES AFTER
LOAD SE D, HOW OS BATTERY CONDITION / CAPACITY MONITORED 7 i
100.
PROVIDE MANUFACTURERS DATA SEETS FOR BATTERIES, AND CHARGERS.
i 101.
ARE THE BATTERIES SIZED FOR THE FULL CAPACITY OUTPUT OF INVERTERS OR ARE THEY SIZED ON EXISTING INVERTER LOADS 7 i
107.
WAS WORST CASE TEMPERATURE RATING USED TO DETERMINE TE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE SHORT CIRCUIT CAPACITY OF THE BATTERY 7 WHAT IS
!
THE ROOM MAXIMUM TEMP 7 WHAT IS THE ELECTROLYTE TEMP USED TO CALCULATE MAX SHORT CIRCUIT TEMPERATURE.
103.
PROVIDE BATTERY CAPACITY AND DISCHARGE CURVES.
!
104.
PROVIDE BATTERY TEST PROCEDURES.
l 105.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE SAFETY RELATED BATTERY CHARGER VENDOR MANUAL.
.
.
,
.106.
PROVIDE THE TEST PROCEDURE THAT VERIFYS THAT EACH OF THE BATTRY CHARGERS ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPLYING THE NORMAL DC LOADS ON TE BUUS AND SIMULTANEDUSLY RECHARGING THE BATTERY IN A REA50kABLE TIME.
107.
15 THE SWITCH YARD BATTERY TEMPERATURE MONITORED 7 AT WMT TEMPERATtRE WILL THE BATTERY MAINTAIN THE DESIGN RATING 7
'
.308.
VHAT IS THE LOW VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN POINT FOR THE INVERTERS?
i 109.
PROVIDE VENDOR INSTRUCTIONS / MAINTENANCE MANUAL FOR THE INVERTERS AND RELATED REGULATING TRANSFORM [RS.
'
"110.
PROVIDE DESIGN AND PURCHASE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE I?DV INVERTERS.
]
111.
PROVIDE THE PROCED!RE AND DATA SHEETS WHICH CHECK THE REGULATION OF THE SAFETY RELATED INVERTERS.
112.
IMS THE OUTPUT REGtR.ATION OF.THE INVERTERS EEN TESTED BY VARYING THE INPUT VOLTAGE FROM THE LOWEST TO THE HIGHEST EXPECTED INPUT VOLTAGES 7 113.
PROVIDE LOAD GROWTH CONTROLS FOR EDG LOADING.
'114.
PROVIDE COPIES OF EDG LOADING SEQUENCER LOGIC DIAGRAMS AND ELECTRICAL SCHEMATICS.
.
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
,
e-
,
.
-
_
._
.
i
!
'
l
F
- 115,
' PROVIDE MANUFACTURERES LITERATURE FOR EDG LOADING SEQUENCER.
116.
PROVIDE OPERATOR *S E0P PROCEDLRES TO CONTROL MANUAL LOADING ON EDG.
if-117.
EDG LOADS: PROVIDE PUMP CURVES SHOWING SYSTEM OPERATING POINTS, ACTUAL MOTOR SPECS VS ABOVE PLMP CURVES, AND MOV
,
SPECIFICATIONS.
[
118.
PROVIDE AN UPDATED LIST OF PLANT EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD BE LDAD-SKD DLRING AN "ESF WITH A LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER" VITH THE
PLANT AT 1001 POWER.
!
119.-
PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING FOR CABLE PENETRATIONS: SIZING CALCLAATIONS, PROTECTION CALCULATIONS, AND MANUFACTURER'S INFORMATION
FOR MEDIUM VOLTAGE, LOW VOLTAGE AND CONTROL PENETRATIONS.
.l 120.
PROVIDE SEVEN COPIES OF SECTION 8 0F THE FSAR.
,
121.
PROVIDE TWO COPIES OF SECTION 7 OF THE FSAR.
!
122.
PROVIDE A LIST OF ELECTRICAL /I&C SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES.
-[
123.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
i
- 124.
PROVIDE MANUFACTURER'S DATA DN CABLES USED IN THE DC SYSTEMS (CABLE INSULATION TYPE, TEMPERATURE RATING, AMPACITY, ETC).
'
125.
PROVIDE VOLTAGE DROP CN.CULATIONS FOR DC OPERATED EQUIPMENT AND DEVICES IN THE ESS SYSTEMS (MOTORS, CIRCUIT BREAKER
COMPONENTS, SOLENDID YALVES, MOVS, ETC).
.
126.
PROVIDE THE SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS AND DESIGN BASIS DOCIMENTS FOR THE CLASS 1E DC SYSTEM AND THE INVERTER SYSTEM.
127.
PROVIDE THE BATTERY SIZING CALCULATIONS FOR THE CLASS 1E BATTERIES AND THE SWITCHYARD BATTERY.
'i 128.
PROVIDE THE DC (MAIND PLANT AND SWITCHYARD) AND INVERTER BUS ONE-LINE DIAGRAMS.
e
!
129.
PROVIDE THE CALCULATION USED TO ESTABLISH TK STATION GROUND GRID DESIGN. ALSO PROVIDE DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE GRID. WHAT IS THE MEASURED GROUND RESISTANCE AND HOW OFTEN IS IT CHECKED 7
.
130.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE ONE-LINE DIAGRAM FOR T K ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FROM THE SWITCH YARD TO THE 4kV BUSSES.
!
131.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE ONE-LINE DIAGRAMS FOR THE 480V BUSES.
132.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE TEST / SLRVEILLANCES THAT IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING TECH SPECS: TS4.6(ALL); TS TABLE TS.3.5-3 NO. 3.b;
!
TS TABLE TS.3.5-2 NOS.13 AND NO.14.
I
~133.
PROVIDE COPIES OR MAKE AVAILABLE THE FOLLOWING QA AUDITS: 92-44-13, 92-36-12, 92-19-10, 92-18-3, 92-6-12, 91-55-10,
!
91-21-3, 91-20-12, 90-26-10, 90-2-12 AND 89-54-10.
I 134.
PROVIDE TRAIN SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS FOR RCP TEST POINTS.
i 135.
PROVIDE CALIBRA110N DATA FOR THE LAST TWO PERFORMANCES OF SP 1216 AND SP 2217.
~l 136.
PROVIDE LICENSEE RESPONSE FOR NRC INFORMATION NOTICES 93-17 AND 92-40.
!
137.
PROVIDE DIESEL GENERATOR G1 SEQUENCER SCHEMATICS, INCLUDE: THE SI, LOOP, AND DEGRADED VOLTAGE INITIATION RELAYS; THE LOAD
!
SHEDDING RELAYS; THE AFFECTED BREAKER $; AND THE VOLTAGE RESTORATION LOGIC.
138.
PROVIDE UNIT 1 OPERATOR ROUND SHEETS /. PROCEDURES THAT ARE USED TO PERFORM SHIFTLY / DAILY / WEEKLY CHECKS OF EDS EQUIPMENT
AND EDS SUPPORT SYSTEMS (SUCH AS HVAC).
!
139.
PROY!DE UNIT 1 RCP BUS FAST TRANSFER SCHEMATICS.
'
140.
RE: QUEMION 70. 07D REQUESTED DC BREAKER AND FUSE CHRACTERISTICS; HOWEVER, THE RESPONSE ONLY INCLULUDED FUSE DATA. PLEASE.
!
PROVIDE THE BREAKER CHARACTERISTICS.
' 141.
PROVIDE COPIL3 OR MAKE AVIALABLE FOR REVIEW THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS: 90T010, 92T021, 92T026, AND 93T030.
.
v-142.
. PROVIDE COPIES OR MAKE AVIALABLE FOR REVIEV THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS: 89L108, "RX TRIP BREAKER DC CONTROL POWERE FUSES"
!
AND 911272, "TD'M. BOX 1794 REVISE CONFIGURATION OF WIRING".
[
143.
-PROVIDE D1 VENDOR MANUAL SECT]DN THAT INCLUDES INSTRUMENTATION..
!
.145.
PROVIDE OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW THE FOLLOWING ALTERATIONS: 92A262, "11AFVP RELAYS 33X-1/31998 AND 332/91998"; 92A238,_
(
144.
PROVIDE A LIST OF VENDOR SERICE OR TECHNICAL INFORMATION LETTERS (LAST 5 YEARS) APPLICABLE TO EDS EQUIPMENT.
'
" SAFEGUARDS FUEL Olt TRANSFER PLMP MOTOR CAPACITOR"; 90A162, "121 JOCKEY PIMP TIME DELAY RELAY", 90A156, *MECURY. THERMOMETER
{
ON D1 AND D2 REPLACEMENT".
.
146.
PROVIDE A SCHEMATIC DRAWING OR P&lD OF UNIT 1 FUEL 01L SYSTEM AND INTER CONNECTED FUEL OIL TANKS.
[
147.
PROVIDE OR MAKE AVIALABLE FOR REVIEV TK FOLLOWING ALTERATIONS: 89A124, 90A178, 90A187. 92A235, 92A236, 92A242, 92A245, l
92A246, AND 93A265.
148.
THE HANDOUT RECE!VED DURING THE ENTRANCE MEETING INDICATED THAT TK OFFSITE SOURCE TRANSFORMER 2R (ACTUALLY 2RS, 2RX, AND l
2RY) VAS INSTALLED IN 1984; HOWEVER,THIS SIGNIFICANT FEATURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO DE ADDRESSED IN USAR CHAPTER 8.
WHEN VILL
-
THE USARTEXT AND DIAGRAMS BE UPDATED 10 SHOW THIS ADDITION 7 149.
PROVIDE COPIES OR MAKE AVIALABLE FOR REVIEV THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS: 89t099, 90L210, 92L361. 91L347, 89Y945, 89Y045,
,
88L40.
i 150.
PROVIDE ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC FOR AIR COMPRESSOR NO.123.
I 151.
CAN THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY PLMP RANDOMLY LOAD ON THE EDG, FOLLOWING ITS SEQUENCER STARTING STEP, IN RESPONSE TO THE l
CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE SIGNALT IF SD, HAVE THE EDGs BEEN ANALYZED FOR MULTIPLE LARGE MOTOR STARTS 7
152.
HAS AN EDG LDAD]NG ANALYSIS BEEN PERFORMED FOR ONE UNIT IN A LOCA AND THE SECOND UNIT ALREADY IN COLD SHUTDOWN (WITH COLD SHUTDOWN LOADS RUNNING)? IF NOT, WOULD THE EDG LOADING SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE 7 153.
DURING THE SWAP FROM THE St INJECTION PHASE 10 RECIRCULATIDN PHASE, WOULD THE SI SIGNAL DE RESET 7 1 54.
REFERENCE 5 ACD 3.9: PROVIDE LIST OF INSTALLED BYPASSES AND DATES INSTALLED OR COPY OF BYPASS INDEX.
155.
PROVIDE A COPY OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW F01 A0457 THE CABLE TRAY FILL ASSESSMENT.
156.
PROVIDE A COPY OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW PI SPECIAL TLST PROCEDURE NO. 27.4.4, " DIESEL GENERATOR LOCA - SPURIOUS LOCA
,
CAPABILITY VERIFICATION".
!
157 PROVIDE THE CALCULATION OR STUDY WHICH DEMONSTRATES PROTECTION COORDINATION IN THE CLASS IE 125V SYSTEM.
'
.
.
.
,
158 RE: EDG AIR RECEIVER D1 AND DS. PROVIDE LAST 1) PRESSLEE SWITCH START / STOP / ALARM CALIBRAT'ON DATA AND MEAStRING AND TEST EQUIPMENT USED, INCLUDE RANGE AND ACCLEACY; AND 2) REllEF VALVE CAllBRATION DATA VITH MEAbtRING AND TEST EQUIPMENT USED, INCLUDING RANGE AND ACCURACY.
.
159.
PROVIDE LIST AND CALIIRATION DATA FOR A DI AND D6 TIME DELAY RELAYS THAT ARE IN TE AUTOMATIC FAST START CIRCUIT AND/OR ANY 01ER TIME DELAY RELAYS THAT COULD PREVENT THE EDGs FROM STARTING.
160.
1) HAVE ALL SAEETY RELATED MOV THERMAL OVERLOADS BEEN EVALUATED AND FIELD YERIFIED AGAINST PROCEDLRE H6.1, H6.2, AND HG.3 DESICN CR11[RIA7 IF NOT, VHICH ONES? 2) PROVIDE COPY OF DRATT H6.4 "WESTINGt0USE THERMAL OVERLDAD HEATER SIZING FOR NON-MOV MOTOR $*.
3) PROVIDE NON-MOV N010R SIZING CRITERIA USED IN THE PAST.
161.
PROVIDE ANY ELECTRICAL LERs, DEVIATION REPORis, OR OTHER PROBLEM DOCtMENTATION CONCERNING INVERTERS FOR THE PAST 3 YEARS.
162.
PROVIDE TE ANALYS15 FOR DETERMINING TE ACCEPTABILITY AND JUSTIFICATION OF JtNPERING OUT ONE CELL IN UNIT 2. TRAIN B, BATTERY BANK NO. 22, 163.
PROVIDE TRENDING DATA FOR TE LAST 2 YEARS ON THE FOLLOWING: CLASS 1E BATTERIES, 4.16kV UNDERVOLTAGE AND UNDERFREQUENCY TRIPS, AND 4kV MOTORS INSULATION RESISTANCE AND POLARIZATION INDEX.
164.
PROVIDE CAtlBRATION DATA IOR THE FOLLOWING G1 DIESEL INSTRLMENTATION. SEE ATTACHED LIST.
165.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE RESULTS FOR THE ESF INTEGRATED TESTING FOR BOTH UNITS. INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1)ESF INTEGRATED TEST PROCEDtRES & RESULTS, 2) SEQUENCER TIMING VERIFICATION, 3) DIE $EL GENERATOR DUTPUT CHART RECORDINGS FOR EDG OU1PUT VOLTAGE, f REQUENCY, ETC., 4) IDENTIFY SCALE USED ON EDG CHART RECORDINGS AND THE BASIS FOR DETERMINATION.
166.
HAS THE LICENSEE PERFORME() ANY SYSTEM S1ABILOITY STUDIES FOR THE OFFS!1E $0lRCES OF POWER 7 IF A STUDY WAS PERFORMED, MiAT WERE THE RESULTS AND AND HOW VAS THE STUDY PERFORMED (i.e., OBJECTIVES, ASSUMPTIONS, METHODOLOGY, ETC.).
167.
1) MMT DO CONTACTS 83XS2Y (111/112) AND 52PSX (117/118) DO ON NE 40406 SH187 2) IF THESE CONTACTS ARE AIR COMPRESSOR 123 ACCIDENT BLOCKING CONTACTS, HOW DO THESE CONTACTS SEAL-IN TO PREVENT THE AIR COMPRESSOR FROM LOADING ON EDG Gl? 3) ARE TE AIR COMPRE5SOR CONTROL FUSES,.4 & 3.2 AMPS, OF THE SAME TYPE 7 168.
PROVIDE A COPY Of GENERIC LETTER 86-10 (IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRE PROTECTION RlQUIREMENTS FOR APPENDIX R) OR MAKE A COPY AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW / REFERENCE.
169.
PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR 121 MOTOR DRIVEN AND DIESEL DRIVEN SAflGUARDS COOLING WATER PtNPS AS FOLLOVS: 1) P&lD DIAGRAMS FOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM, 2) SLEVEllLANCE PROCEDURES, AND 3) NPSH CALCULA110NS.
170.
REF. COMPUilR ASSOCI ATED EDGs NOS. 03 & D4 AND ASSOCIATED BUSSES 31, 32, 41 AND 42.
1) IN THE CASE OF A DBE, ARE IHESE BUSSES ISOLATED fROM THE RIMAINING AC SYSTEM 7 2) HOW IS THE TRANSFER OF POWER 50tRCES (i.e., MAIN GENERATOR TD OFFSITE POWER 50tRCE) COORDINATED WITH THE STARTING SCHEME OF EDGs D3 & D4 171.
PROVIDE CR!ilCAL CORRESPOND (NCE BETVEEN NRC AND LICENSEE WHICH DISCUSSED REPONSE TO BTP PSB-1 FOR DEGRADED VOLTAGE CONDITIONS.
172.
5 AWI 7.1.3, REV 0, "COMMERCI AL GRADE PROClREMENT" SAYS ON PAGE 6.1.3 THAT A FIRST TIME PROClREMENT DtRING A MOD IS CONSIDERED LIKE-FOR-LIKE. PLEASE EXPLAIN THIS SECTION MORE.
173.
PROVIDE A LIST OF VORK REQtESTS ISSUID TOR THE INVER1ERS AND CORRECTION OF GROUNDS (AC & DC) FOR THE LAST 2 YEARS. NOTE ANY OF THESE WORK REQUEST 1FMT ARE STILL OUTSTANDING.
114.
FOR SCI INVERIERS. ARE COMPONENIS REPLACED ON A PLANNED PM INTERVAL, e.g., ARE CAPAC110RS REPLACED EVERY S YEARS? IF THERE IS PLANNLD PM REPLACEMf N1, WMT IS THE PROCEDlRE THAT SPECIFIES THIS7 175.
1) VHAT 151HE DEAD 005 TIME ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANSFER OF THE POWER S0tRCES (i.e., FROM RESERVE TRANSFORMLR TO BUS CT11 &
12) FOR TK SAFETY RELATED BUSES 25,26, IS, AND 167 2) IW IS THIS TRANSFER OF POWER $0tRCES ACCOMPLISHED (i.e., CONTROL SCHEME)?
176.
1) PROVIDE kARRATIVE EXPLAINATION FOR THE CURVE 5 ATTACHED TO THE RESPONS. 2) EXPAND DATA 10 COVER SWITCHYARD HISTORY FOR THE L AST S YESRS FOR 1101H TE 34SkVAND 161kV NETWORKS, 117.
PROVIDE COPl[S OF THE FOLLOWING NIRs: 0518-537 TO S45, 0588, 0631R, 0637R, 0727 AND 0788 10 0190.
178.
PROVIDE COPIES OF THE FOLLOWING NARS: A306 A448, A292, AND A289.
179.
PROVIDE A LIST OF ALL ELECTRICAL VJRK REQUESTS FOR THE PAST 2 YEARS. NOTE: A LIST OF CLOSED WRs WAS PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY.
180.
PROVIDE A COPY OF SECTION C20 0F THE OPERATIONS MANUAL.
181.
RE: 5AVI 4.4.1-3.
1) PROVIDE DRAWING INFD. HOW DOES A DRAVING BECOME *AS BUILT *7 2) GIVEN A WORK!R FINDS AN [RROR IN A DRAVING COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL EQUIPMENT, WlERE IS THE PROCESS REQUIRING HIM OR HER TO REPORT IT7 182.
PROVIDE P]NGP 4FA, *CONTR0llf D DRAWING FILE USERS INSTRUCTIONS *
183.
1) PROVIDE A COPY OF lie 27N VOLTAGE RlLAY MANUAL. 2) PROVIDE A COPY OF THE CAtlBRAT10N PROCEDURE TIMT TIS 15 TS TABLE 3.5-1 DIGRADED AND UNDERVOL TAGE RELAY TIME DELAYS.
184.
ARE THE SAFEGUARDS 4.lEAV UV AND DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAYS RFQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE DlRING ALL MODES OF OPERATION 7 185.
1) IN THE NEW SPs (1216, 1217, 2216, 2217), IF TS RELATED AS-F0l*D DATA IS OUT OF TOLERANCE, MtLN IS THE SHIFT SUPERVISOR NOTIFIED OF POTENilAL INOPERABILITYT 2) HOW DOES THE SP REVIEVER DE1 ERMINE ON THE DATA SHEETS THAT THE 0.6V PU-DO RATIO HAS BEE N VERIFilD7 186.
PROVIDE A COPY OF JOB /IASK DESCRIP110N FOR SYST[M ENGINEERS RESPONSIBLE FOR 4kV, DIESEL GENERATORS, 480V, DC, R TRANSFORMIR, C90 LING WATIR, AND HVAC SYSTEMS.
187.
spi?lb STATES THAT THE FLlKE 8842A (ESMM25) 15 USED BECAUSE THE REQUIRED ACClRACY OF.03 PERCENT OF READING: HOWEvf R, THE FLlC. VINDOR MANUAL ST ATES THE 2V-200Vac RANGE ACCtRACY AS 0.35 PERCE NT OF READING + 100 COUNTS. DOES THE 0.35 PERCENT ACCtRACY ADVIRSEt Y AFFECT TK SETPOINI CALCUL ATION FOR THE UV AND DEGRADf D VOLTAGE SE1 POINTS 7 188.
RE: TOP IUL BLOCK ]N BUS 16 l0AD SEQUlNCER RELAY PANEL. PROVIDE DRAWING OR VENDOR INFO IMAT SHOVS THE TYPE AND SIZE OF FUSE INSTAlt[D.
189.
PROVIDE THE f 0tt0VING INFORMATIONON ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE & PROTECI10N TRAINING: TRAINING PL ANS, INTERFACE TRAINING, AND TRAINING PLAN RICORDS.
.
190.
PROVIDE FOLLOWUP INFORMATION ON TE FOLLOWING FINDINGS /DEFICl[NCIES: DG 91-19, " EXPIRED CERTIFICATES", ISSED 10 MGR.
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE & PROTECTION: FG 91-51 AND 52, " TRAINING", ISSUED TO MGR. ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE & PROTECTION.
19),
PROVIDE REVIEW INFO AND RESULTS FOR THE FOLLOWING: 1) ID. NO. 92r023, VESTINGHDUSE LETTER NO.92-101, "DC COIL ASSEMBLIES",-
2) 10. h0.91-232, INPO PS NO. 911202, "4kV BRKR FAILURE DUE TO PETROLEtM BASED LUHRICATION DEPOSITS", 3) ID. NO.91-221, WESTINGHOUSE LETTER NO.91-208, " ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITOR IN POWER SUPPLIES. NOTE COMPANION QUESTION 22 AND 44.
192.
PROVIDE ONE COPY OF EACH OF TK FOLLOWING: KTERING MD RELAY DIAGRAMS NF 4D002, SHTS 4 AND 5, NF 92194, AND CIRCUIT DIAGRM NT 40022-2.
193.
RE: PM AND SURVEILLANCE FOR UNDERGROUND EDG SUPPORT SYSTEM COMPONENT. PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING MAINTENANCE /SLRVEILLANCE PROGRAM FOR TE UNDERGROUND PORTION OF THE EDG D1/D2 AND DS/D6 UNITS, INCLUDING BURIED PIPING.
194.
THE ACTIVE BYPASS INDEX LISTS 2 LOST JUMPERS BPI-121 AND 122. MMT INVESTIGATION WAS PERFORMED TO FIND THE JUMPERS AND WHAT WERE THE RESULTS7 WERE JUMPERS INSTALLED AND STILL IN PLACE 7 ALSO, LIFTED WIRE TAGS, BPI-53 AND 54. ARE THE VIRES STILL LIFTED SOMEWHERE IN THE SYSTEM 7 195.
IS BREAKER NO.1 DN BUS 25 FEED TO PUMP 121, NORMALLY LOCKED OPEN OR RACKED OUT7 196.
RE: FOLLOWUP 10 0.181. PROVIDE PROCEDURE USED TO VERIFY "AS-BUILT" STATUS OF DRAWINGS (AS USED IN LAW 14.4.3 STEP 6.4.5).
PROVIDE PROCEDURE REQUIRING DEFICIENCIES TO BE REPORTED. ARE PERSONNEL TRAINED IN THE USE OF THIS PROCEDURE 7
197.
RE: CONTROL PANEL IN MAIN CONTROL R00M ASSOCIATED WITH CONTROL OF THE [MERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS D1/D2 AND DS/D6.
'
INDICATING LIGHTS ON THIS PANEL INCLUDES VOLTAGE NORMAL PIMSE A AND PIMSE C LIGHTS WHICH ARE NORMALLY LIT. 1) PROVIDE EXPLAINATION OF TE FUNCTION OF THESE LIGHTS. 2) IF ASSOCIATED VITH DEGRADED VOLTAGE, LOSS OF POWER RELAYS, HOW MANY CHANNEL
TRIPS ARE REQUIRED TO ALARM CONTROL R00M7
'
193.
RE: SAFETY RELATED BUS SEQUENCERS. 1) PROVIDE MANUFACTURER'S INFORMATION (VENDOR MANUAL) FOR THE ALLEN BRADLEY CONTROLLER.
2) PROVIDE TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR THE SLAVE OUTPUT RELAYS.
!
199.
PROVIDE TYPICAL ASSEMBLY DRAWINGS FOR THE PENETRATION TYPES USED AT PINGP.
20D.
RE: EDG PROTECTION. 1) IDENTIFY PROTECTION PROVIDED EDGs 01, D2, DS, AND D6. 2) IDENTIFY PROTECTIVE RELAYlNG milch IS BYPASSED DURING AN ACC! DENT.
201.
RE: EDG PANEL IN CONTROL ROOM FOR EDGS Dl/02 AND DS/D6. 1) MMT IS THE FUNCTION OF CONTROL SWITCHES FOR DI AND D2 VHICH READ * SI MCA RESET"? 2) MMT IS THE FUNCTION OF CONTROL SWITCHES FOR D5 AND D6 WHICH READ *EMERG. START AND EMERG. START RESET"?
202.
RE: D5/D6 FUEL DIL LOGIC DWG. NF-11B45. COULD THE DAY TANK LEVEL HI-H1 "NOT" FUNCTION Fall AND L.0CK OUT BOTH FUEL DIL TRANSFik PUMPS WITHOUT THE H1-HI ANNUNCIATOR ALARMING 7 203.
1) PROVIDE 2 COPIES OF ONE-LINE DIAGRAMS FOR MCCs 2A1, 2AC1, 2K1, AND 2XI. 2) PROVIDE A COPY OF DRAWING NOS. NF-40022-2 AND NF-40022-1. 3) PROVIDE 2 COPIES OF DRAWING N05. CNE-119871-A.
r 204.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE CURRENT DIESLL GENERATOR RELIABILITY PROGRAM.
205.
VITH REFERENCE TO SECT. 8.7.8 (PG. 8.7-6) DF TIE USAR, THE DIAGRAM SHOWING APPROXIMATE DIMENSIONS BETWEEN PENETRATIONS WITHIN A QUADRANT IMPLIES 9 FOOT SPACING, WHEREAS THE TEXT STATES APPROXIMATELY 4 FOOT SPACING. PLEASE CLARIFY.
206.
RE: ALTERATION 92A262. 1) WILL THE AGASTAT [GPD003 REPLACEMENT RELAYS BE CHANGED OUT EVERY 2 YESRS (PM3122-1-11)7 2)
PROVIDE SCHEMATICS THAT SHOW 11 AFVP RELAY N05. 33X-1/31998 AND 33Z/31998. 3) PROVIDE A COPY OF SP1301.
207.
PROVIDE THE LAST CALIBRATION RECORDS FOR EDG D1 AND D6 CONTROL R00M INDICATION FOR kW, kVA, VOLTS, AND AMPS, IF APPLICABLE.
208.
ARE THE TOLLOWING INSTRUMENTS PERIODICALLY CAllBRATED. -SEE ATTACHED SHEET -
209.
PROVIDE A COPY OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEV THE FOLLOWING MODS: 89Y976 A, " RACEWAY CABLE INSTALLATION", 89Y976 AR2, "DG PLANT INTERFACE", 89Y976 BRI "D5 DS + ESU", AND 91L317. "U2 GEN. TRANSFORMER"
210.
RE: ALTERATION 92A238. 1) HAS THE TOKHEIM CORP. VENDOR MANUAL BEEN UPDATED TO REFLECT CAPACITOR NO. GE P/N 1-Z97F9601T 2)-
i PROVIDE A COPY OF ACCEPTANCE TEST CGI P10068 FOR THE CAPCITOR. 3) WiMT WAS TE SIZE (AMPS) 0F THE INTEGRAL MOTOR OVERLOAD
'
THAT WAS REMOVED AND THE SIZE (AMPS) 0F TE CURRENT STARTER OVERLOAD 7 i
211.
PROVIDE COPIES OFTHE FDLLOWING QA/QC/QS SURVEILLANCES: PIB9-62, PI89-54 PI90-182, P190-171, PI91-115, PI91-073, PI90-050, P191-070, PI92-210. P!92-205, P192-174 PI92-202, 3764, 3934, AND 3968.
212.
REF:ALTERAT10N 90A01621) MMI IS TE ACCURACY OF A 2424AG RELAY; 2) MMT IS THE BASIS FOR A MINIMUM RUNTIME OF 3 MINUTES; 3) !$ THE RELAY'S 3 MINUTE SETTING VERIFIED PER1001CALLY; 4) IS AN AGASTAT H 316SP2 THE SAME AS A 2424AG; 5) MMT WAS USED TO VERIFY THE 3 MINUTE TIME DELAY; 6) PROVIDE A COPY OF DWG NE40007 SH 136 213.
PROVIDE ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSES OF DI DIESEL AUTO-START EVENIS L1-89-03, L1-90-07, AND L1-92-12.
214.
PLEASE PRDVIDE A COPY OF TE PENETRATION PROTICTION C00DRikAT10N STUDY PREPARED AS A CORRECTIVE ACTION IDENTIFIED BY F01A0681. NOTE - IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS STUDY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEV UNITL LATE FRIDAY (4/16/93). PLEASE EXPRESS-MAIL A COPY TO MY HOME OFFICE.
21$.
PLEASE PROVIDE N010R DATA SHEETS FOR All SAIETY RELATED 4kV MOTORS AND LARGE 460 V MOTORS (i.e. 75 HP OR LARGER)
216.
PROVIDE A C00Y OF BLOCK DIAGRAMS ATTACED TO DOORS OF INVERTERS AND UPS (ONE TYPICAL INVERTER DIAGRAM AND ONE UPS DIAGRAM).
217.
SCI PROVIDLD A COMPONENT REPLACEMENT SCHEDULE (DATED 1984) FOR SkVA INVERTERS WHICH LISTS REPLACEMENT INTERVAL OF S YEARS FOR C1, C4, PC5, PC4, RL1, C805, ETC. f0R UNIT 2 INVERTERS. IMVE THESE COMPONENTS BEEN REPLACED AT TE MANUFACTURER'S RECOMMENDED INTERVAL. IF THEY ARE NOT BEING REPLACED AT THE MANUFACTURER'S REC 0 MENDED INTERVAL, WiMT IS THE RATIONALE FOR USING A LONGER (e.g.,10 YEARS FOR RELAYS, CAPACITORS, CIRCUIT BOARDS, ETC.).
218.
PROVIDE PR00F OF SEISMIC QULIFICATION FOR THE UNDERGROUND P] PING PORT 10N OF THE EDG FUEL DIL SYSTEM. LIMITED SCOPE TD LINE
'
NOS. 2.5"-f 0-35; 2.5" FO-26; AND 2"40-26.
219.
PROVIDE ISOMETRIC DRAWINGS OF THE COOLING WATER PIPING FOR THE EDG DI. 220. SHOW HOW THE MINIMUM FLOW REQUIREMENT IS MET FOR ANY OF TE SAFLGUARD COOLING WATER PUMPS N05.12, 22, & 121 FOLLOWING AN EMERGENCY STARTUP SIGNAL.
221.
PROVIDE PUMP CURVES AND OPERAIING CONDITIONS FOR THE NON SAFETY MOTOR DRIVEN COOLING WATER PUMPS N05.11 AND 21.
222.
PROVIDE SEISMIC QULIFICATION OF AREA IEATLR AND LIGHTING TRANSFORMERS MOUNTED ABOVE THE AIR RECEIVERS OF PUMP NO.12.
{
223.
PROVIDE TESTING PROCEDURES FOR RELIEF VALVES OF AIR RECEIVING TANKS FOR PUMP NOS.12 AND 22.
i
.
!
?
r 224 PROVIDE PROOF OF OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION FOR AIR COMPRESSORS OF PLMPS NOS.12 AND 22.
225.
EXPLAIN WHY NO OVERPRESStRE PROTECTION IS PROVIDED ON THE COOLING WATER SIDE OF THE JACKET WATER COOLIR FOR PLMP NOS.12 AND i
l
,
226.
EXPLAIN WHY NO OVERPRESSLRE PROTECTION IS PROVIDED ON THE COOLING WATER SIDE FOR PLMP GERA DIL FOR THE PLMP NDS.12 AND 22.
227.
PROVIDE Y0lR LICENSING GROUP'S INTERPRETATION OF ITEMS 3.7.B.7 AND 3.7.B.8.
PLEASE NOTE THE STATEMENT ABOUT BATTERY e
OPEATION WITHOUT BATTERY CHARGERG IN USAR SECT!DN 8.5.2.
!
228.
PROVIDE A COPY OF THE "AEC GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION PERMITS" PUBLISED FOR PUBLIC
,
COMMENT ON JULY 10,1967, (THIS IS REFERENCE 7.1.8 0F THE PINGP AUX SYS DBD). NOTE: PLEASE INCLUDE WITH THE EXPRESS MAIL i
COPY OF THE RESPONSE TO Q-214.
!
229.
PROVIDE SCC PROCEDLRE FOR DEGRADED VOLTAGE GRID CONDITIONS WHICH REFLECT THE REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN ENGINEERING MANUAL
!
C20.3.
!
230.
PROVIDE DRAWINGS DEPICTING THE OVERALL PI GRID SYSTEM.
t 231.
RE: ENG-EE-018 & [NG-EE-021. 1) PROVIDE COPIES OF CALCULATIONS E-415-[G-8 AND E-415-EG-10. 2) FOR ATTADMENT 1. PROVIDE COPY 0F DOCLMENT EXPLAINING MEANING OF COLLMN TITLES. 3) ON PAGE 19 (TTPICAL EXAMPLE) 0F CALCULATION ENG-EE-018, PROVIDE BASIS OF CALC 1, CALC 2, ETC NOTES IN RIGHT HANDMARGIN. 4) PROVIDE COPYOF IMPELL REPORT (NARRATIVE PORTION ONLY) THAT PROVIDES BASIS OF STEADY STATE LOAD DATA IN PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM MOTOR LIST.
232.
RE: ATTADNENT 3 TO CALC ENG-EE-018. FOR SPECIFIC LOADS LISTED IN SECTION Id.1) PROVIDE OPERATING PROCEDURES THAT DOClDENT WHEN TESE LDADS ARE MANUALLY STARTED IN RESPONSE TO THE DBA (ONE COMPLETE SINGLE PROCEDURE OR TITLEPAGE / APPLICABLE PAFE
.
EXTRACTS OF MUTIPLE PROCEDURES). 2) ARE THESE ALL SAFETY RELATED LOADST 3) WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF REACTOR YESSEL SUPPORT
'
COOLING FAN 7 4) DO VE HAVE NON SAFETY L.0 ADS ON SAFETY RELATED BUSES 7 233.
RE: ATTAD NENT 3 TO CALC GEN-EE-018. FOR ITEN 3b, PROVIDE OPERATING PROCEDlRES DlRING NORMAL AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND SCHLMATIC DIAGRAMS FOR TK TRANSFER SWITCH CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR THE SHARED MCCs (ITI IT2, IAB1, AND 1AB2).
234 RE: ATTADMENT 3 TO CALC GEN-EE-018. FOR ITEM 3d, PROVIDE BASIS FOR INTERMITTENT LOADS CONTINDUSLY OPERATING AT ONE-HALF DF COMBINED LOAD FOR DIESEL GENERATOR STEADY STATE LOADING.
'
235.
RE: ATTACtMENT 310 CALC GEN-EE-018. FOR ITEM 4d, PROVIDE CONFIRMATION THAT ALL LOADS, IN ADDITION TO THOSE LISTED, WERE EVALUATED TO IDENTIFY THOSE THAT COULD START AFTER THEIR LCAD SEQUENCER STEP IN A SUBSEQUENT STEP. (IF PREVIUSLY REQ 9ESTED, PROVIDE SEQUENTIAL TRACKING NtMBER OF RESPONSE).
236.
K: ATTACIMENT 3 10 GEN-EE-018. PROVIDE COPY OF NARRATIVE PORTION OF REFERENCE D.4, " DIESEL STEADY STATE LOADING STUDY".
237.
RE: ATTADNENT 310 CALC GEN-EE-OlB. PROVIDE COPY OF SACM FACTOR TEST REPORT THAT WAS THE BASIS OF DS/D6 LOADING VALUES IN APPENDIX A.
238.
. WHAT VAS THE DESIGN CRITRI A FOR SIZING OF P0h!ER FEEDERS TD MCCs ITA2, IK2, IAC2, AND 1A2 POWERED FROM 480V BUS NO.121 239.
WITH REGARD TO CALCULATION 194401-2.2-001, PLEASE PROVIDE THE RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS RAISED IN PAUL HELLEN'S LETTER DATED 4/07/93, 10 BOB WYLY. IN PARTICULAR, RESPONSES TO ITEMS 4, 8, 9,11,13,14, IS,18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 AND 27 ARE DESIRED.
240.
SECTION 5.0, DESIGN INPUT, OF CALCULAT10N 194401-2.2-008 REVISION 2. LISTS BATTERY 11 AND BATTERY 21 SHORT CIRCULI
'
CAPABILITY AS 17.094 AMPS AND OPEN CIRCUIT VOLTAGE AS 207 VOLTS. THIS INPUT APPEARS TO BE UNCONFIRMED BY THE MANUFACTlRER BASED ON THE CALCS ATTACHED REFERENCE 12 (CDPY NOT $1GNED BY C&D REP.). PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING STATUS.
241.
RE: CALC 194401-2.2-008. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AND CONCLUSIONS DO NOT APPEAR TO ADDRESS FAULT DUTY VS THE FOLLOWING: 1)
-!
INTERRUPTING RATING OF BATTERY DMRGER DUTPUT BREAKfRS (INCLUDING MOBILE CHARGER) AND INVERTER INPUT BREAKERS. 2) WITHSTAND CAPABILITY OF THE CONTROL POWR TRANSFER SWITCHES FOR THE SW GEAR SAFEGUARDS RACKS AND THE DS/DG BUILDING 12SVdc PANES UITHSTAND CAPABILITY OF THE BATTERY CHARGER DUTPlff TRANSFER SWITDiES. AND4) MOBILE BATTERY CHARGER DUTPUT RECEPTICLE.
242.
THE RESPONSE TO QUESTION 43 ADDRESSED DC CONTR0tED CABLES. PLEASE PROVIDE INFO RIGUARDING DC POWER CABLE SIZING CRITERIA.
243.
PROVIDE COPIES OF THE JULY,1967, AEC GDC (REF 7.1.8 IN THE DC DBD) AND THAT PORTION OF THE SER WHICH ADDRESSED THE DC SYSTEM DISCUSSED IN THE FSAR.
I 244.
RE: ITEM 6 0F SECTION 4.0 (AS$lMPTIONS) IN CALC 194401-2.2-008. PLEASE ADVISEREGUARDING THE STATUS OF THE FUSE REPLACEl(NT
ADDRESSED IN REFERENCE 21. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE REFERENCE. NOTE THAT THIS CALC, ON SHEET 34, INDICATES THAT MAIN FUSES l
ARE 1500A, VHEREAS CLAC 194401-2,3-009 INDICATES, IN SECTION 6, THAT TW MAIN FUSES ARE 801A. ALSO, DIAGRAMS 40024-1&2 SHOW THESES FUSES AS 1600A AND DIAGR/iMS 40418-l&2 INDICATE 1500A FUSES. PLEASE CLARIFY.
245.
MITH REFER [NCE TO ITEM 7 OF SECTION 4 (ASSlMPTIONS) IN CALC 194401-2.2-008 PLEASE PROVIDE DOCLMENTATION OR REFERENCES WHICH SUPPORT THE AS$lMPTION ItMT DC CtRRENT LIMITING CHARACTERISTICS OF FUSES ARE EQUlVALENT TO THE AC CURRENT LIMITING D MRACTERISTICS.
246.
RE: CALC 194401-2.3-009 SECTION 1.0 (PAGE 3) STATES TIMT THE DMRGER DUTPUT BREAKER IS NOT INCLUDED IN TE STUDY. WHAT ASSLRES THAT C00RDikATION EXISTS BETWEIN THIS BREAKER AND DOWNSTREAM FUSE WHEN THE DMRGER IS TE SOLE 50lRCE OF POWER TO TE DC TRAIN (i.e.
UNDER BATTERY TESTING CONDITIONS)T 247.
RE: CALC 194401-2.3-009, SECTION 7 (CONCLUSIONS) STATES THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE FWA AND FVX FUSES SHOULD BE EVALUATED.
ALSO, THE 40 AMP LPN-RK FUSES ON PANELS 27 AND 28 SHOULD BE EVALUATED. PLEASE PROVIDE THE STATUS OF THESE ACTIONS.
248.
PLEASE IDENTIFY THE FUNCTIONS OF CIRCUITS SERVED BY THE PANELS INVOLVED IN THE MARGINAL OR INADEQUATE CDORDINATION CASES ($f E TABLE 1. PAGE 5) AND RATIONAL FOR ACCEPTABILITY.
249.
PROVIDE A COPY OF REFERENCE 3.2 IDENTIFIED IN CALC NO. E-415-EA-3, MEMO ESU-2882. DATED 09/21/92 FROM M. THEMPSON TO DISTRIBlfil0N "DEGRADf D VOLIAGE MEETING M]NUTES" 250.
RE: CALC ENG-EE-039i REV 0.
THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 1. PAGE 2 IMPLIES THAT CONSULTATION WITH D. G. OBRIEN INC.
INDICATED TtMT THE MEDMNICAL VIlHSIAND CAPABILITIES OF THEIR PENETRATIONS FOR HIGH F AULT LEVELS VERE ADIQUATE. CAN TH15 BE ASSUREDFOR THE CONAX UNITS?
251.
RE: CALC ENG-EE-039. REV. D.
THE TEXT DISCUSSING FIG. 2 (SEE ATTADM[NT 2) STATES THAT THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING CRANE l
SUPPLY BRE AKER IS OPEN DlRING REACTOR POW [R OPERATION. IS THIS COVERED BY AN OPERATING PROCEDURE?
I
,
i i
- i l
I
'
i
' t
>
I 252.
RE: CALC ENG-EE-039, REV. D.
IN FIGURE $ (ATTACHMENT 3), IT ]$ NOT CLEAR THAT GLASS SEAL DAMAGE WOULD NOT DCCUR FOR A FAULT 0F ABOUT $00A, PLEASE ADVISE. ALSO, IN FIG. 5, IT APPEARS AS THOUGH GLASS SEAL DAMAGE COULD OCCUR AT ABOUT 10kA WHEREAS
FAULT CLRRENT IS SHOWN AS ABOUT 12.7kA ON THE 480V SUPPLY BUS. BASED ON THE SHORTEST CABLE RUN FOR THIS TYPE CIRCUIT, WRT l
WOULD THE FAULT LEVEL BE JUST INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT 7 253.
RE: CALC ENG-EE-039, REV. O.
PROTECTION AS SHOWN BY FIG. 6 (ATTActMENT 3) APPEARS TO BE MARGINAL IN THE INSTANTANOUS RANGE UNLESS ACTUAL FAULT DUTY AT THE PENETRATION CAN BE SHOWN TO BE LESS THAN INDICATED. PLEASE ADVISE.
254.
RE: CALC ENG-EE-039, REV. O.
THE TEXT IN ATTADMENT 2 HAS MADE VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS WEN ADDRESSING FIGlRES 1, 3. SA, j
10,11, AND 17. PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING THE STATUS OF TESE REcopMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVC ACTIONS 10 BE TAKEN.
-
255.
WITH REFERENCE TO THE RESPONSE TO Q125. PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE VOLTAGE DROP STUDY WHICH IS IN PROGRESS.
WITHOUT THIS STUDT, WHAT ASStRANCE IS TERE THAT ACCEPTABLE VOLTAGE CONDITIONS WOULD EXIST AT THE TERMINALS OF SAFETY
RELATED DC DEVICES UNDER WORST CASE CONDITIONS 7 j
256.
BASED ON A REVIEW OF TE BATTERY TEST PROCEDlRES ATTACED TO THE RESPONc. 10 0104, IT DOES NOT APPEAR TIRT A BATTERY PROTECTIVEDEVICE IS USED. PLEASE ADVISE, AND IF NOT, PROVIDE THE RAIMALE.
!
257.
SECTION 1.7.2 0F TE BATTERY REFUELING OUTAGE DISCHARGE TEST PROCEDif.ES PROVIDES, FOR TE BATTERY UNDER TEST, Timi THE LOAD TRANSFER SVITCHES BE ALIGNED TO TK OTER UNIT'S BATTERT SYSTEM. PJ 3 THIS INCREASED LOADING BEEN CONSIDERED IN TK BATTERY l
SIZING CALC 194401-2 2-001 AND CHARGER SilING CALC ENG-EE-00l?
258.
RE: PROCEDLRE NO. SP1216 REV. 6. *4.lfAV SAFIGUARDS BUS 15 UNDERV JLTAGE RELAY CALIBRATION". PAGE 4 0F THE PROCEDlRE j
CONI AINS A NOTE WHICH INDUCATES TK TEST INSTRtMENT (FLtKE 8842A) tRS AN ACCURACY OF 0.37 0F READING. THIS ACCLRACY DOS NOT
APPEAR 10 BE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE +/-0.1 Vac TOLERANCES IDENTIFifJ AGAINST PICKUP AND DROPOUT REQUIRED CAllBRA110N SETPOINTS r
SHOWN IN TABLE 3 0F THE PROCEDtRE. ALSO, HOW IS THIS DIFTERENCE IN ACCtRACY CONSIDERED IN CALC $0C-EA-006?
259.
RE: D1 INSTRLMENTATION. 1) PROVIDE COPY OF CHT SEPOINT CHANGE fALC REF. FILE NO. 2295. 2) PROVIDE BASIS / SETP0lNT CALC
!
FOR TE CPLS-LOW JACKET COOLANT PRESSURE SHUTDOWN SWITCH SETPO!!T CHANGE ROM 12 psi TO 9 psi. 3) PROVIDE BAS 15 / SETPOINT CALC FOR TK RPLA-RAW WATER PRESStRE SWITCH. 4) PROVIDE BASIS, SETP0lNT CALC FOR TE CCP-CRANKCASE PRESSLRE SWITCH SETPOINT CHANGE FROM.05 TO 2]NWC.
260.
PROVIDE OR MAKE AVILABLE FOR REVIEW "ATTADMENT A" ROM TFE IMPELL REPORT NO. 09-0910-0176 REV. 3, * DESIGN BASIS LOAD
'
STUDY" PROVIDE SUPPORTING DATA FOR DETERMINING MOTOR POWER FAC10R.
261.
RE: CALC. ENG-EE-018 (EDG LOADING CALC) ATTADMENT 4 TO THIS CALC CONTAINS AN INPELL CALC NO. 910-227-002 (PEARTIAL). TABLE 2 0F THIS CALC CONTAINS STARTING kVA VALUES FOR CERTAIN PLANT M010RS (e.g.121 CL WR PUMP, AUX FV PIMP, ETC.) VHICH ARE CREDITED BY CALC ENG-EE-018; HOWEVER, THE IMPELL CALC SPECIFICALLY INDICATES THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THESE N010R$ WERE NOT TESTED AT FULL DESIGN PRESSLRE / FLOW. PLEASE ADDRESS HOW THIS IMPACTS STARTING kVA VALUES SHOWN AND JUSilFY THE USE OF I
TESE RESULTS IN ENG-EE-OlB.
'
262.
RE: CALC NO. E-415-EG-8, REV.1 *D5/06 LOAD SEQUENCING" ONE OF THE PlRPOSES OF THIS CALC IS TO VERIFY THAT FACTORY TESTS CONFORM TO YOLTAGE AhD FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT SPEC. 10 WEVER, THE FACTORY TESTS CONTAINED IN 1.D 2.3,
,
VHICH ARE CREDITED, DOES NOT INDICATE THAT FREQUENCY WAS MONITORED. IT APPEARS itM1 CREDIT IS BEING TAKEN FOR TE MONITORING OF SPEED IN LIEU OF FREQUENCY. PLEASE PROVIDE TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION.
263.
RESPONSE TO Q208, INSTRtMENTS LISTED AS *PREDIC11VE AND CORREC11VE MAINTENANCE". WHAT IS THE CALIBRATIDN TT(EQUENCY OF 101 i
TRANS TEMP,102 TRANS TEMP, AND VOLTMETERS 4172904, 4172906, 7200060, AND 72000617 264.
PROVIDE COPIES OR MAKE AVIALABLE THE FOLLOWING WR PACKAGES. $58SS-IP, $2B48-IP, R6247-IP-Q, U1997-EB-0 S2489-IP-Q, 50716-
EB-0 R4902-EB-Q, U20000-EE-0, 51273-IP-0, 50563-EB-0, R3866-DC-0, UD036-IP-Q, $1082-EB-0, 50264-EA-Q, R3727-EA-Q S9799-DC-Q, SD938-IP-Q R7451-DC-0, R3694-EA-0, $6739-IP, SD852-EB-Q R7444-EB-0, R3332-IP-Q $6472-IP-0, SD817-EB-Q, R7445-EB-0, R1848-IP-Q, 56473-IP-0, 50790-EB-Q R6247-IP-0, R0966-DC-0 R0861-EA-Q, R0344-]P.
265.
RE: SP1093 PG. 6. STEP 7.8: 1) WiMT IS THE BASIS FOR A PRELUBE MINIMUM RUN TIME OF 3 MINUTES? 2) IMS IT BEEN VERIFIED THAT LESS TIMN OR EQUAL TO 3 MINUTES PRELUBE WILL NOT CAUSE EXCESSIVE OIL COLLECTION IN THE INVERIED UPPER CYLlhDERS AND l
CYllNDERLINES? REF. COLT SFRVICE MANUAL II.E. PAGE 8.
266.
PROVIDE A COPY OF F01 A0688.
I 267 RE: Q207. 1) WHO REVIEWS TE METER CAllBRATION DATA, DETERMINES CAL ACCEPTABILITY, AND REVIEWS PAST StRVEILLANCE TESTS IF TE *AS FOUND DATA IS OUT OF CAL"?
268.
NIRs 0537 AND 0538 REPORTED STICKING /,ND BINDING CONTACTS IN DI AND D2 JACKET COOLANT PLMP BREAKER CORRECTIVE ACTION REFERRED TO NIR 0518. 1) WHAT WERE RESULTS OF INVES11GATIONS UNDER 0518. 2) EXPLAIN t0W FAltlRE OF THESE CONTACTS AFTECT 01/D2 OPERABILITY. 3) $1NCE THE JACKIl COOLANT PUMP BKR CONTACTS W[RE STICKING ON BOTH EDGs $1MULTAN0USLY, DOES THIS VIOLATE SINGLE FAILLRE CRITERIA? EXPLAIN 7 4) THERE WERE OVER A DOZEN OCCURANCES OF THIS PROBLEM IN SR BRKRS BETVEEN MARCH 92 AND JAN 93. IMS IT BEEN CORRECTED? 6) WERE OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS MADE AS A RESULT OF NIR NOS. 0535, #22 GAP FAN; 0539, 22CS PLMP DISCHARGE; 0540, $1 LOOP G 101 LEG ISOL. VALVE; AND 0738, SHIELD BLDG EX VENT 7
,
269.
RE: Q.91. PROVIDE COPY OF THE FOLLOWING REFERENCE DOCtMENIS FOR EDG ROOM VEVTILATION M-379-ZG-001: 1) NO. 4, CALC M-378-20-003, REV. O.
2) NO. 6. LX-HI AW-2610-1156.
270.
RE: Q-89 HVAC CALCS FOR SB0 DIESEL BLDG. EXPLAIN t0W BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION IS MAIN 1AINED IF THE EXHAUST FAILS IN THE
$B0 DIESELGEN BLDG.
271.
RE: Q-189. CERTIFICAT!DN CHLCKLISTS FOR THE BELOW EMPLOYEE N05. HAVE "ND" OR BLANK CHECK-OFFS, BUT CERTIFICATION WAS SillL GIVEN. WHYT KRLA01, DRIUDI, FL1J04, AND NVKLC1.
272.
nim [ROUS NON SAFETY RELATED CABLES ENTERING BUS 16 FRDM TRAY ISM-1201 ARE BUNDLED WITH SAFETY RELATED (MEEN) CABLES IROM TRAY ISM-TB15. DOES THl$ MIET P1 SEPARATION CRITERIA? EXPLAIN.
273.
RE: M00. 91L272. 1) PROVIDE COPY OF DRAWINGS NE-40009-114 NF-74590-2, AND NF-39238, 2) PROVIDE COPY OF POST POD OR OPIRAT10NAL TEST.
{
274 RE: MOD 89tlD8. 1) IS KNIFE BLADE CONTACT RESISTINCE CHECKED ON A REGULAR BASIS. 2) PROVIDE AS-BUIL1 DWGS. X-H1AW-1-932, r
1-961,1-962,1-963. AND 1001-877. 3) PROVIDE QA-1 QUAL PACKAGE FOR KNIFE BLADE SW11CH.
"
,
=,
'275.
BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE BATTERY DISCt%RGE TEST PROCEDURES (SP1098, SP1314, SP2098, AND SP2314) IT APPEARED THAT WHEN TESTING 22 BATTERY,. TEMPORARY TEST CABLES FROM THE BATTERY TO THE LOAD BANK AND TEMPORARY CABLES FROM 42 BATTERY TO THE i
SUPPLY TO PANEL 22 PASS TIROUGH BATTERY 21 ROOM. OVERCURRENT PROTfCTION DID NOT APPEAR 10 BE PROVIDED BETWEEN THE BATTERY AND THE TEST BANK. THUS, A FAULT IN TESE TEST. CABLES OR THE LOAD BANK WOULD BE UNCLEARED AND COULD RESULT IN A FIRE IN THE 22 BATTERY ROOM. BECAUSE OF THE COMPROMISED SEPARATION UNDER THE TEST CONDITIONS, EQUIPMENT IN 21 BATTERY ROOM COULD BE j
INVOLVED. WMT ARE THE DC SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS DURING COLD SHUTDOWN, INCLUDING REFUELING 7 276.
RE: BATTERY DISCHARGE TESTING. PLEASE PROVIDE (ON A LOAN BASIS) A COPY OF THE. INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR THE BCT-1000 LOAD BANK FOR REVIEW.
277.
F/D NO. 91-51 WAS GRANTED AN EXTENSION TO 11/1/93 FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION. WIMT METHODS ARE IN USE 10 PREVENT RECURRENCET
278.
NT-40024 SHOWS UNIT 1 INVERTERS AS SkVA AND NF-4041B SHOWS UNIT 2 INVERTERS 21, 22, 23, & 24 AS 7.SkVA. PROVIDE AN EXPLAINATION WiY THE RATINGS ARE DIFf ERENT. PROVIDE SIZING CALCULATIONS ON THE INVERTERS.
279.
PROVIDE OR MAKE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW, IE BULLETIN BO-11. ANALYSIS FOR SAFITY RELATED BLOCK WALLS IN BATTERY R00MS.
280.
RE: CALC NO. ENG-EE-019, CABLE OVERFILL, F01 A0457 SECT 10N IV -REComENDATIONS NO.1, 2 AND 3 (PG. 8 0F 36). WHAT IS THE
,
STATUS AND WTN WILL THE CHANGES BE IMPLEMENTED FOR THE ABOVE REC 0mENDATIONS7 281.
PROVIDE THE MOST RECENT COPY OF THE PERFORMANCE TEST AND SERVICE TEST ON 21 BATTERY.
282.
. RE: TE VARIOUS DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING CALCULATIONS WHICH }RVE BEEN PROVIDED TO THE NRC EDSFI TEAM. - REVIEW OF TESE CALCULATIONS INDICATES THAT THE STARTING kVA VALUES FOR MOTORS POWERED BY THE DIESELS WERE IA5ED ON MOTOR NAMEPLATE '
,
VOLTAGES. IT DOES NOT APPEAR TimT TESE STARTING kVA VALUES WERE EVER ADJUSTED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR RATED
OUTPUT OF 4160V. PLEASE VERIFY THE ABOVE.
I 283.
RE: PREVIOUS REQUEST NO. 26D REGARDING ATTACIMENT *A" FROM THE IMPELL REPORT NO. 09-0910-0176. REY. 3, *0ESIGN BASIS LDAD STUDY", Mi!CH PROVIDES MOTOR POWER FACTORS ASSUMED FOR DIESEL GENERATOR CALCULATIONS. PLEASE PROVIDE SUPPORTING
,
DOCUMENTATION (i.e., VENDOR DATA, CATALOG INF0, ETC.) milch VAS USED 10 DEVELOP ATTACMENT *A".
!
284.
THERE IS AN UNSECURED CART BEHIND & AN UNSECLRED CART WITH A 2*x5'x12' FRAMEON IT IN FRONT OF BUS 11 AND BUS 12 PANELS (THE ALTERNATE POWER $0tRCE FOR SAFETY RELATED !WITCHGEAR BUS 15,16,25,&26). WiAT ARE PROCEDLRES OR PLANT WORK PRACTICES THAT GOVERN SECLRING CARTS IN THE TURBINE BLDG., BUT IN A SENSITIVE AREA WiERE BUS 11 AND 12 PANELS COULD BE JARRED BY CARTS IN A SEISMIC EVENT AND COULD TRIP TE PLANT.
l 285.
HAVE THESE FUSE DIFFERENCES BEEN IDENTIFIED AND DISPOSIT10NED7 SEE ATTACHED SHEET.
'
286.
DID PRAIRIE IS. RECEIVE 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFIEATION DATED 04/07/93 REGARDING ABB K-4000 CIRCUIT BREAKERS 7 WRT ACTION WAS IMPLEMENTED 7 RESULTS7
E87.
FOR SEVERAL MOVs REDUCED TERMINAL VOLTAGE Timi HAVE A SAFETY FUNCTION (MV-32405, MV-32023, AND MV-32335), PROVIDE LATEST VOLTAGE DROP CALCln.ATICNS. 1) MCC TO MOV. 2) 0FF SITE TO 480V MCC.
288.
ARE THE EDG EXHAUST SYSTEM AND PIPING BUILT TO WITHSTAND SEISMIC EVENTS 7 (FOR BOTH D1/D2 AND DS/D6).
289.
RE: 0-212 ALTERATION 90A162. VHEN IS DWG. NE-40007, SH.136 TO BE UPDATED TO REFLECT THE AS BUILT CONFIGtRATION OF THE 121 JOCKEY PUMP TIME DELAY 7 290.
RE: Q210 - ALTERATION 92A238. 1) PROVIDE ACOPY OF CGI PID068. 2) PROVIDE A COPY OF THE THERMAL OVERLOAD CALC FOR FUEL Dil TRANSFER PUMPS.
291.
PROVIDE A COPY OF PRAIRIE ISLAND'S SUBMITTAL OF SAFETY EVALUAT10N NO. 339 ASSOCIATED WITH D1/02 DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING ANALYSIS FOR SP1083, DATED 01/01/93.
292.
PROVIDE THE BASES FOR THE THE SETPOINT CHANGE FOR THE INVERTEVR STATIC SWITCH TRANSFER FROM NORMAL 10 ALTERNATE WHICH -
CHANGED THE SETPOINT IROM 90 +/-2Vac 10 60+/-2Vac (RE: FILE NO. 525).
293.
TO WMT CODES AND STANDARDS IS THE CLASS 1E ELECTRICAL SYSTEM C0mITTED7 294 MMT, IF ANY, MODIFICATIONS TO THE * BYPASS / INOPERABLE" INDICATION FOR CLASS lE CIRCUITS IMVE BEEN MADE?
295.
PROVIDE A CONTROLLED DRAWING OF 4160V BUS 25 AND 26. PROVIDE TRAINING MATERIALS FOR THESE BUSES.
.
i 296.
TE SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT Of F01 A0681 IMPLIED THAT OPERABILITY WAS BASED ON A PENETRATIONS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY IN THE PRESENCE OF A FAULT. CALC ENG-EE-039 IDENTIFIED 6 D. G. O'BRIEN AND 4 CONTAX TYPE PENETRATIONS WHOSE
THERMAL DAMAGE LIMIT SCOULD BE EXCEEDED IN THE EVENT OF A FAULT. PLEASE EXPAND ON THE RESPONSE 10 Q254 TO CLARIFY WHY NO
'
SHORT TERM ACTION IS REQUIRED AND WHY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY WOULD NOT BE COMPROMISED IN TE EVENT OF A FAULT IN A CIRCUIT OF ONE OF THE 10 PENETRATIONS.
'
297.
THE 21 BATTERY INTERACK CONNECTING CABLES ARE B-4/0 BETVEEN JARS 15 AND 16, 6-4/0 BETVEEN JARS 44-45 AND 34-3/0 BETWEEN JARS 29-30. LOAD TERMINAL CABLES ARE 3-3-750 EACH. WHY THE DIFFERENCE BETVEEN THE VARIOUS CONNECTIONS WITHIN THE BATTERY
'
CIRCUIT?
298.
THE RESPONSE TO 0256 AND SEC 3.2 0F TE BCT-ID00 INSTRUCTION MANUAL IMPLY THAT THE LDAD BANK USED FOR BATTERY DISCMRGE TESTING HAS SOME DEGREE OF DVIRCLERENT PROTECTION USING F'USES AND CONTACTORS. IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE MANUAL im TESE i
PROTECTIVE DEVICES ARE ARRANGED (NO DIAGRAMS PROVIDED). PLEASE ADVISE IF THESE PROTECTIVE DEVICES ARE INSTALLED AND SELECTED / SET TO PROTECT THE BATTERY UNDER TEST DN FAULT CONDITIONS WITHIN THE LOAD BANL WMT ARE THE DC INTERRUPTING RATING OF THE PROTICTION DEVICES?
299.
RE: WR NO. 49D2-EB-Q. DI STANDBY LUBE OIL PtMP THERMAL OVERLOADS WERE CHANGED TO HIGHER RATED TERMAL OVERLOADS DUE TO HIGH
AMBIENT TEMPERATlRES IN THE R00M (100 DEGREES F.).
1) 15 TE HIGHER AMBIENT REFLECTED IN EQ CALCULATION FOR EQUIPMENT '
-
LOCATED IN THE R00M7 2) I N DOES IT AFFICT D1 RATING DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS? 3) WHAT IS THE ACTlML HIGH AMBIENT
!
.TIMPERATURE IN 02 R00M?
300.
THE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR WESTINGHOUSE LETTER 91-208 (ELECTROLYTIC CAPCITORS IN POWER SUPPLIES) INCLUDED MEASUREMENT OF OtfiPUT RIPPLE FOR POWER SUPPLIES Q'JARTERLY, PERIDDIC REPL ACEMENT OF CAPACIIORS (APPROX. 5 YEARS). PROVIDE SAMPLE PROCEDtRES l
WITH THECORRECTIVE ACTION IN PLACE.
i
1
-
,
i i
301.
1) WHY 15 TE VPC ACCEP1ANCE CRITERIA FOR SP1187 (72.12V) DIFFERENT THAN SP1323 (a 2.13V)7. 2) IS >= 2.13 VPC ACCEPTABLE
!
CRITERI A FOR A 12SV BATTERY (58 x 2.13 = 123.5)7 3) WHAT IS THE MINIMLM BATTERY TERMINAL VOLTAGE ASStMED FOR USAR 8.5.2
REQUIREME NTS7
.
302.
D1 AND D2 SUPPLY MOTOR ROOMS HAVE SCAFFOLDING STORED ALONG WALLS. THE STORAGE COULD FALL ON OR BIMP OR ROLL INTO THE FAN
{
PITCH CONTROLLERS / MOTORS DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. HOW VOULD THIS AFFECT THE RDOM AIR SUPPLY 7 i
303.
RE: BATTERY SURVEILLANCES 1) WHAT IS AN ACCEPTABLE SPECIFIC GRAVITY RANGE FOR THE SAFETY RELATED BATTERIES 7 2) RE: MONTHLY l
BATTERY SLRVEILLANCE. WHY DOESN'T THE CORRECTED SPECIFIC GRAVITY HAVE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. 3) ALLSLRVEILLANCES THE PROCEDURES DO NOT REQUIRE READING THE VPC TO THE NEAREST HUNDRETH VOLT, IS THIS DONE7 4) DO THE BATTERY MANUFACTURERS REQUIRE SPECIFIC GRAVITY ADJUS1 MENT FOR ELECTROLYTE LEVEL 7 304 RE: TS 4.6.A.I.d WHICH IS IMPLEMENTED BY SP1190. IS TEIR A DG SlRVEILLANCE TEST itMT VERIFIES THE FUEL OIL TRANSFER PLMP
'
AUTOMATICALLY STAR 15 DUE TO LOW FEL OIL LEVEL 7
305.
RE: PM 3001-2-DI. CRANK Oil IS MOBIL DTE HVY MED. SP 1295 & 1093 SPECIFY MOBILGARD 450. ARE THESE EQUIVALENT.
'
306.
RE: RESPONSE TO Q-277. ACTION TAKEN TO CORRECT FINDING FG-91-51 INCLUDED CHECKING TESTING DEVICES THAT WERE SCHEDULED TO GO 10 PI VIKTER 92 OUTAGE TO AS$tRE THAT THEY WERE WITHIN TE CAllBRATION CYCLE TIME. AT THAT TIME. THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE SCE DULED TO BE COMPLETED BY 12/31/92. SINCE AN EXTENSION TO 11/01/93 FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS GRANTED, AND TEREFORE
A PROCEDWE FOR RECALLING AND SEGRATING TESTING DEVICES THAT ARE OUT OF CAL DOESN'T EXIST, WERE THE CALS OF TESTING DEVICES VRIFIED TO BE WITHIN CAL UNTIL Al LEAST 11/01/93.
'
307.
TE RESPONSE 10 0-275 WAS, IN PART. THAT THERE WERE NO TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DC SYSTEM. THIS IS RECOGNIZED.
HOWEVER, TE QUESTION WAS WITH REGARD 10 DC POWER REQUIREMENTS, IF ANY, TO SUPPORT REFUELING AND RELATED OPERATIDNS. PLWASE REVIEW ANDADVISE.
!
308.
PROVIDE COPY OF INTERNAL MEMO FROM S. HEIDEMAN TO T. C. SILVERBERG, "MOVs MAX. STR0KE TIMES" DATED 10/04/89.
309.
PROVIDE PROOF OF SEISMIC QUllflCATION OF STEAM HEATING INSTALLED IN EDG ROOM OF D1 UNIT. HAVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POTENTIAL STEAM LINE BREAK BEEN ASSESSED 7 310.
DURING TE WALKDOWN ON 04/29/93 IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE LUBE OIL TEMPERATlRES FROM THE ENGINE WAS INDICATEING APPROX.158 DIGREES F.. ACCORDING TO TO THE LUBE DIL HEATER PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS, THE LUBE Oil 1[MPERATURE IN THE ENGINE SLMP 15 TO BE MAINTAINED BETVEEN 135 AND 140 DEGREES F..
WHAT IS T E REASON FOR THE DISCREPANCY 7 311.
USING TE VOLTAGE REGULATION ANALYSES, SELECT WORST-CASE LOADING AND DETERMINE THE WORST-CASE SUBSTATION VOLTAGE REQUIRE 10 SUPPORT RIQUIRED PLANT BUS VOLTAGES ASSLMING A DUAL UNIT TRIP. DNE UNIT SHALL BE ASSUMED IN A LOCA CONDITION WHILE THE SECOND UNIT IS IN HOT SHUTDOWNMODE (i.e., ALL NORMAL LOADS ARE RUNNING). TIREE VOLTAGES SHALL BE IDENTIFIED FOR THIS ANALYSIS: 1) PRE-ACCIDENT VOLTAGE 2) LOCA START VOLTAGE (TRANSIENT DUE TO LOCA LOADS STARTING) 3) POST-ACCIDENT VOLTAGE (STEADY-STATE CONDITION VITH LOCA LOADS RUNNING). AS$lME ONLY TWO 34LkV TRANSMISSION LINES ARE AVAILABLE. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN 10 SELECTING THE " WEAKEST * TRANSMIS$1DN LINE AVAILABLE.
'
312.
RE: ABB INPELL RPT NO. 09-0910-0176. SEC. 4.2 " POWER FACTOR" DESCRIBES THE PROCESS USED TO DEVELOP VALUES OF POWER FACTOR (PF) IOR MOTORS RATED <= 450V AND THAT N010R CAT. DATA WAS USED TO DEVELOP THE VALUES SHOWN IN ATTACH. A.
BASED ON ATTACH.
A. T ABLE 2 StHMARIZED PFs FOR MOTORS LESS THAN 100HP. SEC. 4.3 ALSO STATES THAT 1ABLE 2 VALUES ARE CONSERVATIVE SINCE THEY ARE AT OR f5ELOW THE MIN VALUE FOUND IN ATTACH. A.
PROVIDE RESPONSES: 1) TK VALUES OF PF WERE USED IN VARIOUS EDG CALCS
,
(VIA THE ELECTRICAL NOTORS AND SOURCE BREAKER LIST) TD CALCULATE STEADY $1A4 kW LOADING GIVEN LVA LOAD. WHY 00ES PI BELIEVE TMSE VALUES TO BE CONSERV. FOR THEIR USE IN THE EDG CALCS7 2) WILL TABLE 2 PFs YEILD MORE CONSERV. VALUES OF kW
,
LOADING THAN ATTACH. A7 313.
RE: SB0 DEGRADED VOL1 AGE CALC NO E-415-EA-3, REV 3, PARAGRAPH 7.3 ASSlNES FOR MOVs 8 x FLA 9.2 PF. WHILE THE HOV IERMINAL VOLTAGE CAIC USES LOCKED ROTOR AMPS AND.9 PF. PROVIDE AN EXPLAINATION FOR THIS INCONSISTENCY.
314.
RE: CALC 194401-2,2-008 REV. 2 WITH REGARD TO W11HSTAND CAPABILITIES OF THE FUSE PANELS (i.e., FOR THE 800A MAIN BATTERY FUSES) TABLE 3 ON SHIET 7 INDICATES "N/A" PLEASE CLARIFY. SHOULD NOT THESE PANELS DE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING BATTERY PLYS CHARGER CONTRIBtTT10N7 315.
RE: BATTERY RACK IN ROOM 11. DtRING WALKDOWN, IT WAS NOTICED 1 HAT THE BATTRY RACK SIDE RAIL SUPPORTS HAVE A GAP OF APPROX.
1/4" ALL AROUND TK BAT 1 FRIES. THE LEISMIC SUPPORT FUNCTION OF TK RACK 15 NOT ACHIEVED. THIS OBSERVATION ONLY APPLIES TO BATTERY ROOM 11. AS A (dNERAL OBSERVATION, STRYFDAM SEPAAATION SHEETS BETWEEN BATTERIES IS IN MANY INSTANCES HAVE MISSING PORTIONS.
316.
RE: TELLh0NE DISCUSSION DATED 05/04/93 BE1VEEN MESSRS. R. SLOSS, J. REUTHER, AND GRAIG PIPIR (NSP) AND N. DEINHNA (NRC)
CONCERNING STABIll1Y STUDIES. (SEE ATTACHID LIST).
317.
THIS NUMMR WAS NEVf R USED. IT APPLARS IN 1HE DATABASE AS A PLACE tOLDER FOR TE NUMBERING SYSTEM.
318.
1) PROVIDE A COPY OF THE IMNDBOOK USED BY SYSTEMS OPERATION WHICH INCLUDES IDENTIFICATION OF NORMAL CONTINGENCIES CONSIDERED IN SYS1(M5 PLANNING. 2) PROVIDE A COPY OF AN UPDATED MAPPING OF TE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
319.
PROVIDE CDPl[5 0F ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT SPECIFICATIONS USED TO PtRCHASE THE FDLt0 WING: 1) 4160V SWITCHGEAR, 2) 480V SWITCHGEAR, 3) 480V MCCs, *4) COLT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (D1/D2), 'S) AkV MOTORS (SAFETY RELATED), AND 6) LARGE 400V MOTORS (SAFETY RELATED).
- PRIORITY, NEEDED ASAP.
- 320.
RE: CAIC E-415-EA-4, REV. I, 4.lfAV SV!1CHGLAR SHORT CIRCULI DUTY. ]NSERT A. SHEET 4 INDICATED THAT FOR SAFEGUARDS fiREAKERS,
" BREAKER DUTY = 97% OF BREAKER RAllNG" WOULD BE USED AS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA BASED ON A MAXIMtM GRID VOLTAGE OF 3SSkV OR 103%
OF NOMINAL VOLTAGE. WAS THIS THE ONLY CONSIDERAllDN GIVEN TO THE EFFECTS OF HIGHER THAN NOMINAL VOLTAGE ON SHORT CIRCulT CtRRENIS7 WAS ANY CONSIDERATION GIVf N TO THE INCRf ASED ABILITY OF POWIR CABLES TO PASS SHORT CIRCUIT CLEREN17
!
321.
RE: CALC E-415-E A-4, REV 1, 4.lEAV SWITCHGEAR SHORT CIRCUIT DUTY. INSERT A. SHEET 4 INDICATES THAT ITE 250NVA BREAKERS HAVE SUCCESSFttLY PASSED SHORT CIRCUIT TISIS IN EXCESS OF 10010F THEIR RAllMG. THE ONLY SUPPORTlhG DOClNENTATION PROVIDED IS A TEllCON ( ATT ACtNENT N) W11H THE MANUF ACTURIR. THE TELICON INDICATES THAT VENDOR WILL NOT CONFIRM IN WRITING SUCCESSUFUL PASSING OF SHORT CIRCUIT TESTS DP 10 28/MVA. IS A COPY Or 1HE TEST REPORT AVAIL ABLE FOR REVIEV?
,
F
_ _ ~ =
-
.
_
-
.
N
,
322.
CALC 199401-2.3-006 INDICATED THAT FULL SELECTIVE COORDINATION DID NOT EXIST IN THE 1120/130 VOLT SYSTEM. THE CONCLUSION TO
,
TE CALC STATED THAT A REVIEW OF TtOSE CASES MERE COORDINATION DID NOT EXIST SHOULD BE MADE TO DETERMINE IF REQUIRED.
,
FURTHER,IN CASES WHERE REQUIRED, MODIFICATIONS SHOULD BE MADE 10 fMSLRE COORDINATION. PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING THE STATT OF i-THE REVIEW AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
,
323.
WITH REGARD TO SH. 7.2 00 CALC E-3B5-EA-Z1, PLEASE EXPAND ON TK RATIONALE FOR THE ACCEPTABILITY OF LONG TIME TRIP '
. b5
ABOVE THE AMPACITY OF THE 4/0 AND 500 MCM CABLES SERVING MCCs. THIS ACCEPTABILITY APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY TO THE ',ER10N
GIVEN IN SEC. 3.1 ADDRESS HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULTS WHICH PRODUCE OVERCLRRENTS ABOVE CABLE AMPACITY.
.
324.
WITH REGARD TO SEC/ 7.3a OF CALC E-385-EA-Z1, PLEASE PROVIDE A COPY OF FIGURE 5 SHOWING THE TIME-CURRENT CURVE OF THE
!
OVERLOAD ELEMENT THAT 15 APPLIED.
!
325.
RE: CALC E-385-EA-9. SEC. 3.0 IMPLIES THAT RELAY PICKUP VALUES UP TO 13010F FEEDER CABLE AMPACITY ARE ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED
!
NORMAL MAX LOAD CURRENT IS LESS THAN THE CABLE AMPACITY. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THIS ACCEPTABILITT7 DOES * NORMAL MAX LOAD"
!'
CONSIDER MOTOR OPERATIDN VITH DEGRADED TERMINAL VOLTAGE AND POTENTIAL MOTOR OPERATION WITHIN ITS SERVICE FACTOR RANGE 7 326.
RE: CALC E-385-EA-9. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE RECOMENDATION MADE ON SEET 77 327.
RE: CALC E-385-EA-9.
IN SEC. 5.2, DOES THE ASStMED 8 SECOND STARTING TIME INCLUDE STARTING WHEN THE BUS VOLTAGE IS JUST I
ABOVE THE DEGRADED GRID SETTING 7 328.
RE: CALC E-385-EA-9. ON StEET 56, IT APPEARS AS Tt0 UGH THE MOTOR THERMAL LIMIT CURVE MIGHT EXTEND GLOW AND TO THE LEFT Of t
T E PROTECTIVE RELAY CURVE. PLEAE ADVISE.
t
'
329.
RE: CALC E-385-EA-9. THIS CALC DOES NOT ADDRESS THE PROTECTIVE RELAY SETTINGS FOR THE EMERS. DGS. DOES IT ADDRESS TE COORDINATION OF PROTECTION WHEN A DG IS ON THE LINE. PROVIDE TE DOCUMENTATION.
330.
RE: CALC E-385-EA-9.
IT IS NOT READILY APPARENT FROM TH15 CALC. OR FROM CALC E-385-EA-21 (480V SYSTEM) THAT PROTECTIVE
'
DEVICE SETTINGS WILL ALLOW MOTOR STARTING UNDER DEGRADED TERMINAL YOLTAGE CONDITIDNS (i.e>, JUST ABOVE DEGRADED GRID UV i
RELAY SETTINGS) VITHOUT UNNECCESSARILY HAUING THE OVERCtRRENT PROTECTION PICKUP. PLEASE ADVISE.
331.
WITH REGARD TO THE REVISION 2 RESPONSE TD Q-256, RELATING TO BATTERY PROTECTION DURING TESTING. PLEASE PROVIDE COPIES OF TK PROCEDURE SUBMITTAL FORMS.
332.
RE: SP1307. STEP 7.29 AND 7.30.
IS IT ACCEPTABLE TO LOAD THE EDG TO 2700kV AND 2250 kVAR7 THl$ 15 A PF OF 0.768. IN ADDITION, INCLUDE METER INACCURACIES (UP TO 3.5%) AND THE PF MAY BE FlRTHER EXCEEDED. 333. RE: SP 1307, STEP 7.10. WHEN D2 START TIME IS RECORDED, IS BUS IB STATUS LIGHT "0N" LIGHT (44232-07) EQUIVALENT TO 4160 +/- 420 VOLTS AND 60 +/- HZ7 OR, HOW DO YOU VERIFY THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND FREQUENCY ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (STEP 7.11) IS MET WITHIN 10 SECONDS AFTER TE FAST START $1GNAL7 334 RE: Q-303, NUMBER 4.
IS THE SYSTEM [NGINEER SP GR. ELECTROYTE LEVEL ADJUSMENT ACCEPTANCE DETERMIhATION DOClMENTED IN A
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CONTROLLED PROCEDURE?
335.
RE: Q-301. WITH A VPC OF 2.13 VOLTS AND A 58 CELL BATTERY, WOULD SUFFICIENT VOLTAGE BE AVAILABLE TO MEET USAR 8.5.2 REQUIREMENTS. (VOLTAGE REMAIN ABOVE 105 VOLTS FOR 110UR).
336.
ALTERATION 89A0124 INSTALLED E70000 AGASTAT TIME DELAY RELAYS IN D1/D2 CONTROL CIRCUITS. PLEASE PROVIDE PROCEDURES OR OTER METt0DS USED TO ASSLRE THAT THE INSTALLED RELAYS (AND WARDOUSE SPARES) DO NOT EXCEED THE 10 YEAR QUALIFIED LIFE.
337.
ETHODOLOGY AND ASStMPTIONS USED IN CALC 194401-2.3-015 DO NOT INDICATE WiAT BATTERY CAPACITY WAS CONSIDERED FOR THE MIN
ACCEPTABLE VOLTAGE CASES. THAT IS, WAS THE BATTERY AVAILABLE AT 100% CAPACITY OR 80% CAPACITY (AGED)7 338.
RE: 194401-2.3-015. VHY DOES THE CALCULATION NOT ANALYZE THE CONDITION FOR MIN VOLTAGE AT THE END OF 1 HOUR, WITHOUT TE F
BATTERY CHARGER, AND LOCAT THIS WOULD ADDRESS THE STATEMENT IN THE IST PARAGRAPH OF USAR SECTION 8.5.2.
339.
RE: CALC 194401-2.3-015. SECTION 5 DESIGN INPUT DOES NOT APPEAR TO ADDRESS THE INVERTERS. PLEASE ADVISE IF THESE LOADS WERE CONSIDERED.
340.
PROVIDE DWGS. NE 40009, SH. 74; AND NE40006, SHTS: 34, 40, 41, 74. AND 81 341.
RE: SP1015 AND 1014. RELAY 27R/B11 - WHY ls SP1015 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (STEP 7.B.13.8) LOWER THAN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITER!A IN SP1014 (STEP 7.3.10)? "If YOU ARE < 92.5 VOLTS, A CALIBRATION 15 REQUIRED"
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342.
RE: CALC E-415-EA-4, 4160V SVITCtEEAR SHORT CIRCUIT DUTY, SHEET 13, SEC. 2.6, DISCUSSES TAP SETTINGS FOR TRANSFORMER 2RS:
HOWEVER, THE TAP SETTING OF THE OTHER TRANSFORMERS ARE NOT DISCUSSED. M1AT ARE THE TAP SETTINGS OF THE OTHER TRANSFORMERS AND IS TERE ANY IMPACT ON THE St0RT CIRCUIT ANALYSIS? HAVE TRANSFORMER TAP SETTINGS BEEN VERIFIED?
343.
RE CALC E-415-EA-4, REF SHEET 11, A) VHY VAS IT NECESSARY TO CREDIT ANSI C37.06-1979 TO DETERMINE THE RATINGS FOR THE COOLING TOWER SWITCHGEAR? B) HOW VAS THIS DETERMINATION PERFORMED? C) PROVIDE A COPY OF THE PORTION OF ANSI C37.06-1979 USED TO DETERMINE THE RATING, 344.
RE: CALC E-415-EA-4, REF SHEET 12. PROVIDE A COPY OF THE TECHNICAL SOURCES FROM VHICH THESE EQUATIONS WERE DERIVED.
345.
RE CALC E-415-EA-4 AND E-385-EA-3 AL50 REF. QUESTION 42, AS$lMING A 15% DEG. DECREASE IN CABLE RESISTANCE (AS IDENTIFIED IN LICENSEE *S RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE REQUEST) DUE TO A CABLE CONDUCTOR TEMPERATLRE OF 25 DEG C. INSTEAD OF 65 DEG. C., ASSESS THE IMPACT ON St0RT CIRCulT CtRRENTS AT Ti.* 4160V AND 480V LEVELS.
.
346.
RE: CALC E-415-EA-12. GRID VOLTAGES AT DEGRADED VOLTAGE RELAY MAXIMUM TOLERANCE. THIS CALCULATION DERIVES THE 345kV GRID
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VOLTAGES REQUIRED 10 SUPPORT A 96.0% VOLTAGE AT THE 4.16kV SAFIGUARDS BUSES. 1) WHAT ANALYSES VERE PERFORMED TO VERIFY TE l
CAPABILITY OF THE 34SkV AND 161kV TRANSMISSION LINES 10 BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THESE MINIMlM VALUES OF SUBSTATION VOLTAGE DtRING LOCA TRANSIENT (MOTOR STARTING) AND STEADY STATE (MOTOR RUNNING) CONDITIONS?
347.
RE: CALC. E-415-EA-12, PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND OPERATING PROCEldRES DO NOT APPE/,R TO IDENTIFY THE NtMBER OF 161kV AND/OR 345kV TRANSMISSION LINES WilCH MUST BE OPERABLE OURING PLANT OPIRATION 10 SUPPORT THE PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS DURING E
AN ACCIDENT. HOW DOES PLANT OPERATIONS DETERMINE WlETHER SUFFICIENT CAPACITY IS AVAILABLE FOR A GIVEN NtMBER OF TRANSMIS$10NS LINES TO SUPPORT 10CA TRANSINT AND STEADY STATE CONDITIONS?
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_
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348.
RE: CALC E-415-EG-10. D5/D6 LOAD SEQUENCE TIMING AkALYSIS, SEC. 6.2.5.
THIS CALC INDICATES UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TE
CONTAINMENT SPRAY PLMP, AIR COMPRESSOR 123, AND THE 121 COOLING WATER PLMP COULD ALL START SIMULTANEOUSLY AFTER THE Atfil-LOAD SEQUENCE HAS TIMED OLTT. IT DETERMINES THAT A STARTING LOAD OF 77DSkVA CONCtRRENT WITH A RUNNING LOAD OF 2344kV IS f
ACCEPTABLE BASED ON ID. 2.5. (ATTACED TO CALC) ID 2.5 INDICATES TMT MAX STARTING KVA 0F APPROX. 7850 MAY BE SUCESSUFULLY STARTED. 10VEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED. THE STARTING KVA VALUES ARE BASED ON 4kV AND HAVE NOT BEEN ADJUSTED TO A 4160V BASE. PLEASE ADDRESS T E IMPACT OF THIS BASE CONVERSION DN THE RESULTS0F THis ANALYSIS.
349.
RE: CALC E-385-EA-2, 480V FEEDER SIZING - INTERFACE. REFElt TO S E ET 2 0F 15 PARA. 3.2 1) W M T IS THE DBJECTIVE OF
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PERFORMING A VOLTAE DROP CALC TO LIMIT CABLE VOLTAGE DROP 10 = 2% ASSLMING 480V7 2) THIS CALC 15 PERFORMED ASSUMING A 480V NOMINAL VOLTAGE AND STEADY STATE CONDITIONS. EXPLAIN WHY 480V NOMINAL VOLTAGE IS USED INSTEAD OF THE MINIMLM BUS VOLTAGE (ATSOURCE). WHY !$ ONLY THE STEADY STATE CONDITION EVAtlRTED AND NOT ALL THE STARTING CONDITI0lNS7 IS THIS TYPICAL OF
,
CABLE SIZING PHILOSOPHY IN ALL APPLICATIONS 7 IF $0 THE ABOVE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON A GENERIC BASIS.
350.
RE: TOLLOW ON ITEM. LOG NO. A0410 DATED 12/20/9151 PUMP MOTOR CABLE SIZE. REF. PAGE 3 0F 4 " CABLE SIZE COMPARISONS".
RESULTS OF THIS EVALUATION APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT A 3/C - 1/0 AWG CABLE tRS A SHORT CIRCUIT CAPABILITY GREATER TMN 27,000
AMPS AND IS THEREFORE ACCEPTABLE. l0 WEVER, INSPECTION TEAM'S PRELIMINARY CALCULATION INDICTAES A SHORT CIRCULI WITHSTAND CAPABILITY OF ONLY 26,297 AMPS (ASSlMING 5 CYCLE CLEARING TIME, INITIAL TEMPERATURE OF 90 DEG. C., AND FINAL TEMPERATlRE OF 250 DEG. C.) PLEASE REVIEW AND EXPLAIN TE CONCLUSION REACED IN TE ABOVE FOLLOW ON ITEM.
351.
WMT IS THE MINIMUM PICK-UP AND DROP-Olli VOLTAGES FOR SAFETY RELATED MCC STARTER $7 352.
RE: Q-333. WHAT IS THE SETPOINT TOLERANCE FOR THE BUS 16 STATUS LIGIT (44233-07) AND WHEN IS IT CALIBRATED 7
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353.
MIEN WILL THE 13 SAFETY RELATED MOVs IDENTIFIED IN THE RESPONSE 10 0160 HAVE THEIR THERMAL OVERLOADS EVALUATED AND Fl[LD VERIFIEDT
"
354.
BASED ON THE RESULTS OF CALC 194401-2.3-015, PLEASE ADVISE REGARDING TE ACCEPTABLIITY OF THE TEMP. MOD. 93T030 WHICH REMOVED ONE CELL FROM BATTERY 22.
i 355.
SEC. 6.5 0F CALC 1944401-2.3-015 STATES TMT 4KV BREAKER CLOSING COILS HAVE AN OPERATIONAL RANGE OF 10010140V DC.
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HOWEVER, THE CALC FURTHER STATES THAT TESTING BY PINGP MS SHOWN THAT THESE ColLS WILL OPERATE AT 67 VOLTS. PLEASE PROVIDE DoctMENTATION REGARDING THE TESTING. DOES THE SWITCHGEAR MANUFACTLRER CONCLR WITHTE TLATING PROCEDlRE AND CONCLUSIONS 7 356.
RE: Q-206, ALTERATION 92A262. 1) PROVIDE DWG. THAT SHOWS CS46424 SWITCH CONTACT POSITION IN * NORMAL". 2) PROVIDE DWG. THAT SHOWS RPS TEST CABINET 1ARP5 SWITCHES, $1, $2, AND $3. 3) PROVIDE DWG. THAT SHOWS PBI, 2, 3. AND 4 PUSH BUTTON SWITCHES IN CABINET 1ARPS. 4) PROVIDE DWG THAT SHOWS THE COILS FOR 33bc AND 33b0 /31998.
357.
THE CONCLUSION TO CALC 194401-2.3-015 INDICATE TMT THE VOLTAGE SUPPLIED TO THE D5 AND D6 FIELD FLASHING CIRCUITS COULD BE
,
LESS TMN THE REQUIRED 95 VOLTS. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO RESOLVE THIS CONDITION.
358.
FOLLOWUP 10 Q 295. 4160V TRAINING MATERIAL PROVIDED INDICATE DEGRADED VOLTAGE SETPOINT AS B7.5%, 85%, AND 90%. TECH SPECS Stow IT AS 94.8%. MfY THE DIFFERENCE 7
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3 59.
RE: EDG LOADING, SAFETY INJECTION PUMP STARTING CHARACTERISTICS. EXPLAIN HOW LOAD TORQUE CLRVES USED BY WESTINGHOUSE, AS SHOWN ON PUMP SPEED ClRVE NEG 17617 PN DATED 12-1-92 IS DBTAINED.
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350.
RE: EDG VETILATION SYSTEM DAMPERS 00AllFICATION FOR TORNADO INDUCED DEPRESSLRIZATION. HAS THE AIR SUPPLY DAMPER OF THE Dl/D2 EDG VENTILATION SUSTIM BEEN EVALUATED f 0R EFFECTS OF TORNADO INDUCED DEPRESSlRIZATION WHILE IN TE CLOSED POSITION 7
THE SAME QUESil0N IS RAISED TOR THE INLET / EXHAUST VENTILATION DAMPERS OF THE D5/D6 UNITS.
361.
RE: SP ll50-T.S.4.6.A.3.b.4 1) WHERE DO YOU VERIFY THE MCA RELAY (DWG. NE40009, SH. 74) WILL AUTOMATICALLY ENERGIZE IN RESPONSE TO AN SI SIGNAL 7 2) ARE THE OVERSPEED, DIFFERENTIAL AND GROUND FAULT TRIPS VERIFIED TO BE ABLE TO TRIP THE DIE SELS7 362.
PROVIDE F OL LOWUP ACTION 10 FG 92-38. FG 92-38 DISCUSSED PROBLEMS WITH TE TEMPORARY MODIFICATIUN PROCESS IDENTIFIED BY PS&A AUDIT 92-36-12.
363.
RE: SP 1150 NOTE: STEP 1.14 AND DWG. NE0009, SH. 73. WHAT IS THE CORRECT TIME DELAY SETTING IOR STDR (3 MIN OR 120 SECONDS)?
364.
RE: PREVIOUS REQUESTS CONCERNING SEQUENCING Of LOADS ON EDGs DI AND D2. 1) HAS AN ANALYSIS BEEN PERF0PMED TO ADDRESS PICK-UP AND DROP OUT Of MCC STARTERS DLRING THE Sf QUENCING OF LOADS ON THE DIESELS 7 2) HOW DO YOU ENSURE THE PICK-UP OF STARTERS FOR 480V LDADS BEING SEQUENCED 7 THIS INCLUDES ENSLRING THAT STARTERS WHICH HAVE ALREADY PICKED UP MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION DLRING TRANSFER TO THE DIESELS.
365.
PROVIDE TRENDING DATA f 0R MIGGER TESTS ON 11 SI PLMP MOTOR.
366.
RE: MOV 3202?. TE LATEST CALCULATED VOLTAGE IS 75.5% OF RATED MOTOR VOLTAGE WHICH IS BELOW THE DESIGN VOLTAGE MINIMtM OF
<
80%. PROVIDE TE ASSOCIATED TORQUE AND TIRUST CALCULATIONS (OR LOCATION WHEP.E THE CALCULATIONS CAN BE REVIEWED).
367.
WHAT IS THE CLERENT SETTING OF THE D1/D2 FUE.L RACK STOPS. PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SETTINGS.
368.
FOLLOWUP 10 LIR 90-007. TEST POINTS WERE TO BE INSTALLED 10 PREVENT REClRRENCE. IS 86L942 COMPLETED?
369.
RE: BATTERY CHAPGER TESTING. PLEASE ADVISE IF PINGNP HAD RECEIVED A RESPONSE TD THE LETTER TO NRC, DATED 10/28/91,
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REGARDING GE NERIC LETIER 91-06.
SPECIFICALLY, WERE COMMENTS RECEIVED REGARDING PINGP'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO ITLM 7c37 IF SD, PLEASE PROVIDE A COPY OF THE RESPONSE.
370.
RE: ALTERATION 92A262. 1) WHEN RELAYS 33x-1 AND 33i /31998 WERE REPLACED, SP 1301 WAS PERFORMED AS THE POST MODIFICATION TEST, WERE THE INDIVIDUAL RELAY CONTACTS VERIFIED 10 HAVE PERFORMID THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION? 2) WAS SP1301 AN ADEQUATE POST MODIF] CATION TEST?
371.
RE: IfR NO. L1-89-03. THE EVALUA110N OF THIS LER ATlRIBUTED THE CAUSE AS PERSONNEL ERROR PARlIAltY CAUSED BY WORKER FATIGUE. 1) HOW MANY totRS HAD THE INDIVIDUAL BEIN WORKING VHEN THE EVENT OCCtRED. 2) WHAT MEAStRES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISED 10 PRECtUDE RECtRRENCE DUL 10 WORKER FATIGUE 7 372.
WHIN TESTING THE UV LOGIC ON A SENSED UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION, IS THERE A TEST THAT VERIFIES THE UV LOGIC WILL AUTOMATICALLY TRIP ANY SOURCf BREAKER f EEDING THE SAFETY BUS UNDlR TEST 7
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373.
RE: 352 AND 333. FREQUENCY RELAY 81A/02 IMS A SETPOINT OF 59 Hz =/-5%.
THIS TDLERANCE HAS A HIGH PROBABILITY OF EXCELDING THE TS FREQUENCY RANCE OF 58.8 TO 61.2. tW WILL "% ENStRE 15 4.6.A.2.b IS NOT V10 LATED 7 374. PRDVIDE A REVIEW COPY OF TE K C INRUSH CALCULATION.
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12