IR 05000280/1989038
| ML18153C107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1990 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Larry Nicholson, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C106 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-38, 50-281-89-38, NUDOCS 9002130343 | |
| Download: ML18153C107 (15) | |
Text
Report No-s. :
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50-280/89-38 and 50-281/89-38 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection Conducted:
November 26 - December 31, 1989 In Spectors *.
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W. E. Holland, Se-<<for Resident Inspector
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L. E.. Nichol~on, Re_sict'ent Inspector'
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App roved by:
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Scope:
P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Date Signed
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Date Signed
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Date Signed
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Date Signed This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report review, and followup on inspector identified item Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekend Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on November 26, December 3, 10, 22, and 2 Results:
During this inspection period, no violations or deviations were identified. A limited review of implementation of Revision lA of the Emergency Operating Procedures was conducte This review concluded that implementation of the revision was being accomplished in an adequate manne However, a number of deficiencies regarding proper identification and/or labeling of plant components were note The licensee was aware of a general labeling degradation in the plant and is taking corrective actions in this area (paragraph 3.h). Several programmatic areas associated with heat trace circuitry and cleanliness control were reviewed during closeout of past enforcement issue Progress towards implementation of corrective actions for these problems was determined to be satisfactory (paragraph 7). Also, during rg:r~ 1 ~g5;?r
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closeout of enforcement. actions relating to operators either not following procedures or operators not having adequate procedure. to perform re qui red evolutions, the inspectors noted increased attention to detail and personal accountability of operators for their actions (paragraph 7).
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees -
W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer 0. Christian, Assistant"Station Manager D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- M. Kansler, Station Manager T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering J. Mc~arthy, Superintendent of Operations J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- Attended exit intervie Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Plant Status Unit 1 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power until December 21, when a manual trip was initiated due to a loss of the 1A1 reserve station service transforme The transformer was repaired and the unit returned to power operation on December 23, 198 The unit operated at power for the remainder of the inspection perio Unit 2 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power for the duration of the inspection perio.
Operational Safety Verification (71707 & 42700) Daily Inspections The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control -room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and LCOs; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure *.,
2 Weekly Inspections Th~ inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component, and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc Plant tours were conducted which included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation ~rotection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspectors routinely noted the temperature of the AFW pump discharge piping to ensure increases. in temperature were being properly monitored and evaluated by the license Biweekly Inspections The 'inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples);
observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Other Inspection Activities Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable pen.et ration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low 1 eve l intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit area RCS leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required. The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis. RWPs were reviewed, and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie Physical Security Program Inspections In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of _the licensee* s physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post ** *
Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports (1)
On December 15, 1989, the licensee made a report in accordance with
CFR 50.72 concerning instrument loop accuracy uncertainty associated with 1 ow pressurizer pressure safety injection setpoin The calculated instrument inaccuracy was determined to be outside of the TS limit for a SI initiation during a small steam line break accident inside containmen This finding was initially determined to be reportable due to identification of a potentially unanalyzed condition that could significantly compromise plant safety. A safety evaluation was completed by the corporate nuclear analysis and fuel division on December 20, 1989, and forwarded to the statio This evaluation concluded that an unreviewed safety question existed; however, additional information was provided to the inspector by the station manager on December 29, 198 That information was that the specific type of accident identified as the original problem (small steam line break inside containment) was not considered as an accident requiring response of the safety injection syste Therefore, for all accidents requiring a safety injection initiation based on low pressurizer pressure initiation, the pressurizer pressure instrumentation was operable in its present conditio The inspector reviewed safety committee approved documentation confirming the above information that was provide The licensee intends to change the FSAR, Chapter 14 to clarify this conditio (2)
On December 22, 1989 the licensee made a report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 concerning a Unit 1 manual reactor trip from full powe The trip was initiated following a fault on one of the three reserve station service transforme'r This transformer was providing offsite power to one of the two Unit 1 safety busse The fa ult was believed to have occurred when unusually high winds blew a piece of turbine building insulation onto the transformer wiring. This event is further discussed in paragraph 3.g of this repor, (3)
On December 25, 1989, the licensee made a report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 concerning an inadvertent ESF actuation of the Unit 2 containment instrument air compressor suction trip valve The actuation was caused by an operator trainee (who was under direct superv1s1on of a
licensed operator)
inadvertently turning the radiation monitor for the Unit 2 containment manipulator off while performing a source check of the monito When the monitor was turned back on, a voltage spike was received which caused the ESF actuatio After verifying that no actual alarm condition existed, operators reset the alarm and reopened the isolation valve This event will be reviewed by the residents during the LER closeout.
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4 Followup on Events The inspector responded to the site and followed events involving the Unit 1 trip that occurred on December 21 as discussed in paragraph 3.f.2 abov The unit was stable in hot shutdown when the inspector arrived. * The review consisted of interviews with the operators involved and a walkdown of all control room indication and strip chart The inspector concluded that operator response during the transient was appropriat The inspectors also participated in the granting of discretionary enforcement on December 22 to allow Unit 1 restart without performing the reactor protection interlock tests required by TS 4.1. The inspectors continued an overview of the unit restart by observing control room activity and monitoring the disposition of selected problems that occurred during the return to powe The reactor was declared critical at 2243 hours0.026 days <br />0.623 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.534615e-4 months <br /> on December 22, and placed on line at 0151 hours0.00175 days <br />0.0419 hours <br />2.496693e-4 weeks <br />5.74555e-5 months <br /> on December 2 Startup activities were accomplished in a satisfactory manne Emergency Operations Procedures During this inspection period, the licensee was in the final steps of upgrading the emergency operating procedures to revision lA of the Westinghouse owners group EOP This process consisted of three stage The validation stage consisted of writing the procedures and justifying any deviation from the owners guidelines. The next stage, verification, consisted of having two different operations teams evaluate the procedures on the simulato Also during this stage, the procedures are walked down to verify that each of the steps can be effectively accomplished, that the labeling on the equipment and in the pr6cedures is the same, et The third stage considers the findings from these evaluations in writing the final procedure The inspector walked down EOP l-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, with QA and operations personne This procedure was completed through the validation stage and was in the verification stag The inspectors noted three breakers that were not labeled the same as designated in the EOP, however, the operator was able to locate the breakers. Also noted, was one operation in the procedure that did not identify two valves by number nor the key required to unlock the valve This condition resulted in some operator confusio These discrepancies were also noted by the licensee and identified as open item The licensee compiles an open items list for each of the EOPs which ha*ve discrepancies identified during the verification
- proces This list was submitted with the fi.na l revision of the procedure to the SNSOC for final disposition and approva The inspector considers that the EOP revision process was being accomplished in an adequate manne However, the number of deficiencies regarding improper identification and/or labeling of
plant components was note The licensee was aware of a general labeling degradation in the plant and is taking corrective actions in this are This area will be further evaluated during an NRC team inspection at a later dat Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the ~nspectors reviewed maintenance activities* to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Inspection areas included the following: Main Control Room Chiller Service Water Pum The inspector witnessed the repair of the service water pump motor 1-VSS-PMO-lC that provides coolant to a main control room chiller unit. The flexible power cable that connects to the motor junction box failed when a welder connected a ground cable to an adjacent flange and the motor power cable took the curren The flexible cable was replaced under work order 3800088469 in accordance with maintenance procedure EMP-C-;EPL-1 The inspector witnessed the cable replacement and associated installation of cable splice No discrepancies were identifie Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger On December 13, 1989, the inspector witnessed the cleaning of component cooling water heat exchanger 1-CC-E-lC under work order 380008910 The appropriate procedure, MMP-C-HX-277, Tube Sheet and Channel Cleaning For Bearing and Component Cooling Heat Exchangers, was reviewed and the initialling of varfous steps was witnesse The inspectors reviewed tagging, torquing, radiation work permit, materials accountability, and the final cleanliness inspectio N discrepancies were identifie Modifications to Service Water Piping to MER During this inspection period; the inspectors continued to monitor the implementation of the subject modificatio Past inspection effort in this area was discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 280, 281/89-31 and 280, 281/89-3 Progress during this month included installation of the Unit 2 SW line from supply valve 2-SW-474 to the new SW manifold that has been installed in MER In addition, the last entry into the TS LCO which authorized use of the temporary SW supply line was accomplished on December 19, 198 The inspectors continued to monitor work at the jobsite in the turbine building and MER After completion of all work associated with TS LCD require-ments, the inspector walked down the new piping to verify install-ation in accordance with operational requirement No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as fol lows:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test procedures appeared to perform their intended* functio Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following: Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2 On November 30, 1989,.the inspector witnessed th~ monthly operability test of the Unit 2 EOG performed in accordance ~ith periodic test 2-PT-22.3 This test verified that the appropriate fuel transfer pumps and 1 i nes were operab 1 e as required by TS 4. 6A-1 In addition, the test verified operability of the air start syste The EOG was run for over six hours with parameters recorded during that period. The inspector witnessed the EOG start and recording of dat No discrepancies were identifie Hydrogen Analyzers On December 21, 1989, the inspectors observed the surveillance test being performed on the hydrogen analyzer This test was being conducted using periodic test procedure 1-PT-2.43, Hydrogen Analyzer (H2-GW-104), dated July 27, 198 This test is conducted on a frequency of 31 days as specified in TS Table 4.1-2A. The purposes of the test are to ensure that the containment hydrogen monitor is functional and to ensure the actuation of the annunciator The in specters reviewed portions of the procedure and observed the actuation of the annunciator_ in the control room anne Also, various instruments and charts concerning this test were observed in the control roo No discrepancies were identifie Turbine Inlet Valve Stroke Testing On December 26, 1989, the inspector witnessed selected portions of the subject tes The test was being performed on Unit 2 using periodic test procedure 2-PT~29.l, Turbine Inlet Valve Stroke and Oil Pump Auto Start Tests dated July 19, 198 The test is conducted
monthly and requires that the ~nit power level be reduced to less than that require~ to fully close one governor valve. The inspector verified that the test procedure was being followed as required and witnessed the testing of the reheat and intercept valves. During the test a problem was encountered with the testing circuitry for one of the governor valves (GV-1).
The inspector monitored discussions between the system engineer and operations personnel on how to resolve the problem and noted that the procedure was properly changed to conduct the required evolutions to satisfactorily complete the testing of this governor valve.*
On December 27, 1989 the inspector reviewed the comp 1 eted test procedure 2-PT-29.1 and noted that all documentation was completed as required and that the periodic test results were satisfactor No discrepancies were note Within the areas in~pected, no violations were identifie.
Licensee Event Report Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective actions. The inspector's revie~ also included followup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all required corrective actions*were complet (Closed) LER 281/89-07, Manual Reactor Trip Initiated to Reset Control Rods After Improper Bank Overlap Noted During Reactor Startup. The issue involved operators noting an improper bank overlap between the A and B control rod banks during reactor startup._ Immediate actions included a ma~ual reactor trip to insert all control rods into the c~re and resetting of the rod step counters to The reactor remained subcritical during the even Troubleshooting was conducted on the rod control system to include the.bank overlap controlle No problems were note The reactor startup was resumed and no problems were encountered with the control rod bank overlap during the subsequent startu Resident inspectors were in the control room during the event and monitored all licensee actions to include troubleshooting and subsequent startu No discrepancies were noted., This LER is closed. * Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702) (Closed)
TI2515/104, Fitness-For-Duty:
Inspection of Initial Training Program On December 14, -1989, one resident inspector attended a licensee FFD training session for general employee The session covered policy awareness training for all non-supervisory employees who were badged td enter the protected are The training also included FFD escort training*.
On December 15, 1989, another resident inspector attended one licensee FFD training session for supervisor **
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During the training periods, the inspectors monitored the class attention and participation in the sessions. They also completed the required checklist for each type of training to assure that the scope of training was as required by 10 CFR 26, the FFD rule, and that the FFD requirements were delineated in the* procedur The inspectors consider that these training sessions were accomplished in a
- satisfactory manne This item is close (Closed) URI 280, 281/87-09-01, Clarification of Requirements for Flushing Sensitized Stainless Steel Pip The issue involved the adequacy of fl us hes performed by survei 11 ance test procedures to comply with TS 4.1.E. The inspector concluded that certain portions of the sensitized piping in the safety injection system were not being flushed due to dead leg configuration The licensee performed an engineering study (Technical Report ME-0009) which concluded that although the current flush procedures do not cover all sensitized piping, adequate flushing is being performed if credit is taken for the normal testing of various pump These pumps draw water from the refueling water storage tank, which is sampled for chlorides and fluoride As a result of increased industry concerns regarding problems with stainless steel piping, the licensee performed an independent review (NES NO. NP-1370B, dated December 15, 1989) of the adequacy and need for the sensitized stainless steel flushing requirements*identified by TS This study included a recommendation to increase the scope of the Inservice Inspection Program to envelope the piping in questio The licensee reviewed this program and concluded that the subject piping is currently monitored under this program, and a review of the repair histories indicated that no ~rior significant repair work has been require The inspector reviewed the reports mentioned above and discussed the conclusions with appropriate licensee staff and managemen The licensee has established an internal goal to submit a TS revision that reflects the above findings in March, 199 The TS requirements as they are currently written are vague as to the extent and effectiveness of the flushe The inspector concluded that the actions taken by the licensee are adequate until a TS clarification can be processe This item is close (Closed) VIO 280, 281/88-04-01, Failure to Maintain and Verify Operability of Heat Trace Circuitry for Boric Acid Flowpaths as Required by T NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/88-04 identified violations pertaining to the operability and testing of the CVCS heat trace circuit Section 3.2 of the TS requires in part that two channels of heat tracing be maintained operable or repaired within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The inspectors identified numerous examples of inoperable channels exceeding the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time perio In addition, TS section 4.1.A ~equires a monthly verification of operability on the appropriate heat trace circuits. The inspectors found that the test
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used to satisfy this requirement was inadequate and did not enable verification of operabilit The licensee was informed of this violation via letter, dated June 13, 1988, and responded with their corrective actions in a letter dated July 13, 198 The inspector reviewed the licensee commitments contained in their response and verified compliance with the proposed action pla The licensee has demonstrated an increased sensitivity toward problems in the heat trace syste Weekly meetings are held to assess the progress of system repair and identify additional actions required to maintain a fully operable syste The inspector reviewed the operations procedures that are used to classify whether a heat trace circuit is required by TS and assign an appropriate priority to repair and consider them adequat In addition, the inspector reviewed the surveillance procedures used to ensure operability of the syste An additional issue with this system was the disregard for the heat trace trouble control room annunciator that remained illuminated for an extended period of tim Progress has been made by removing the circuits from this annunciator that are not required by T In addition, engineering work request 89-529 is currently working to change the circuit setpoint in an effort to prevent an under temperature condition and to reduce the number of alarms received in the control roo The inspector concluded that adequate attention is being placed on the repair and testing of the CVCS heat trace system. Although it is apparent from the number of work orders remaining that additional work is necessary, the licensee is routinely reviewing and prioritiz-ing these work orders in a satisfactory manne This item is close (Closed) IFI 280, 281/88-18-03, Followup on Implementation of the Procedure Upgrade Program:
This item was initially discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/88-1 In that report, the licensee was in the process of i~plementing of a Procedure Upgrade Program for technical procedures at the statio Since that time, the licensee has staffed the procedure writers group with the necessary personnel to upgrade the procedures, written the necessary administrative guidance to rewrite the technical procedures, and is in th~ process of implementing the progra The program will involve approximately 6500 technical procedures and is called the TPU The inspector has held several discussions with the licensee management responsible for the program and considers that proper management attention is being given this are A comprehensive tracking process is in place an~f t;.he program is expected to be completed in approximately 5 years.*~_This area was also addressed in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/89-:3 Additional inspections of procedure - improvements will be conducted *as a part of other inspection activitie This item is close (Closed)
VIO 280, 281/88-28-01, Failure to Provide Adequate Procedures, and/or to Follow Procedures for Cleanliness and Foreign Material Exclusion with Regard to Maintenance/Modifications on Safety-Related System NRC
Inspection Report
280,
281/88-28
identified several examples of the subject violation pertaining to
cleanliness/foreign material exclusion which indicated a programmatic
breakdown in this are The inadequate procedural controls which
were identified at the time of the inspections and the discovery by
the 1 icensee of foreign material in the pump suction flow paths of
both the Recirculation-Spray and Safety Injection Systems resulted.in
issuance of a Civil Penalty violation. The licensee was informed of
this violation via letter, dated November 10, 1988, and responded
with their corrective actions in a letter dated December 9, 198 The inspectors reviewed the licensee 1 s response to the violation and
noted that the licensee agreed that they had failed to implement an
adequate foreign material exclusion program for plant modifications
and maintenanc Immediate corrective actions taken were:
1)
Cleaning of both the Unit 1 and 2 sumps; 2) repair and replacement of
the sump screens; 3) inspection of the safety-related suction piping
connected to the sumps; and 4) evaluation of operability of the
safety-related pumps
subjected to the debri The
inspectors
verified that all of the above corrective actions were accomplishe In addition, the licensee instituted generic corrective actions for
the cleanliness problems to 1nclude: 1) revision of construction work
procedures to include appropriate cleanliness constraints; 2)
revision
of the
nuclear engineering
standard
procedure
for
preparation of design change packages; and 3) implementation of a
station administrative procedure to
provide
for
cleanliness
requirements to the maintenance departmen In addition,
the
licensee processed a TS change which requires inspection of the
containment sumps during each major outage i nvo 1 vi ng work in the
containment The inspectors have reviewed all the administrative
procedures for the revisions discussed above and considers them to be
adequat The inspectors have also reviewed the TS change which was
implemented as Amendment 132 in September 198 The inspectors also
reviewed several maintenance procedures in the past few months and
consider that the corrective actions for this violation are being
implemente This item is close (Closed) VIO 280, 281/88-51-01, Failure of Operations Personnel to
Follow Procedures and/or Inadequate Procedure NRC Inspection
Report 280, 281/88-51 i dent ifi ed severa 1 ex amp 1 es of the subject
violation with regards to operators either not following procedures
or operators not having adequate procedure to perform required
evolution The
improper
operations
involved
different
safety-related components on 6 different occasions withi~ a timeframe
of approximately 10 -day The licensee was informed of this
violation via letter, dated February 23, 1989, and responded with
their corrective actions in a letter dated March 23, 198 **
In their response to the violation, the licensee stated that the
reason for the violation was inadequate procedures and insufficient
attention to p 1 ant component status and systems configurations by
operations personne In addition, ther.e was an apparent misunder-
standing of the importance of the danger tagging process by some
station personnel and/or contractor Corrective actions taken by
the licensee included:
1) face-to-face meetings betwee.n station
management and operations personnel reemphasizing the importance of
high work standards, adherence to procedures, and personal respons-
ibility for attention to detail; 2) reinstruction of station
employees and contractors on the significance of danger tagging and
the importance of not disturbing tagged components; 3) removal of
operators from watchstanding duties if he or she has been involved in
an ope rat i ona 1 error unt i 1 station management accepts the operators
written account of the event and agrees that recommended corrective
actions are adequate; 4) minimizing the number of licensed personnel
assigned to shift for recertification watches; and 5) issuance of
operating standards documenting management expectations of the
operations staf In addition, an Abnormal Plant Status Log was
implemented which documents off-normal system configuration The inspectors have closely monitored the 1 icensee 1 s corrective
actions for this violatio This includes passive involvement in
management reviews of events with operators, discussions with station
personnel with regards to their understanding of the danger tagging
process, frequent reviews of the Plant Status Logs in the control
room, monitoring of operating shift personnel makeup, and reviewing
the operating standards documenting management expectation The
inspectors consider that personal accountability for actions has
improved due to these corrective action However,
continued
attention to detail is a requisite to safe operation and must
continuously be stressed by all levels (management, supervision, and
peers) at the statio The inspectors consider that the licensee 1 s
corrective actions were adequate and continue to be effectiv This
item i s c 1 o se.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 3, 1990, with
those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph No new items
were identified by the inspectors during this exi The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions with no dissenting
comment The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspectio, ** *
INDEX -OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS
ANSI
cc
ccw
CFR
CLS
eves
cw
DPI
DR
EOG
EMP
EDP
GDC
GPM
I FI
IOER
IRPI
LER
LCD
LHSI
MMP
MER3
MER4
MDV
NES
NRC
OP
ORS
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE
ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE
COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN
COMPONENT COOLING
COMPONENT COOLING WATER
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CONSEQUENCE LIMITING SAFEGUARD
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM
CIRCULATING WATER
DELTA PRESSURE INDICATORS
DEVIATION REPORT
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER
ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA
GALLONS PER MINUTE
HEALTH PHYSICS
HEAT EXCHANGER
HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION
INSTRUMENT AIR
INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM
INDEPENDENT OFFSITE EVALUATION REVIEW
INDIVIDUAL ROD POSITION INDICATION
INSERVICE INSPECTION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION
LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT
MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM 3
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM 4
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
MAIN CONTROL ROOM
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING SERVICES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OPERATING PROCEDURE
OUTSIDE RECIRCULATION SPRAY
PNEUMATIC CONTROL VALVE
PRESSURE INDICATOR
,
. PSIG
SI,
SNSOC
sov
TAVG
TI
TPUP
TS
URI '
vs
PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE
POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GAUGE
PERIODIC TEST
QUALITY ASSURANCE
QUALITY CONTROL
RESIDENT ACTION ITEM
REGULATORY GUIDES
REACTOR OPERATOR
RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM
RADIATION WORK PERMIT
REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK
STANDARD CUBIC FEET PER MINUTE
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
SAFETY INJECTION
STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE
SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
AVERAGE TEMPERATURE OF RCS
TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION
TECHNICAL PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
UNRESOLVED ITEM
UNDER VOLTAGE
VIOLATION
VENTILATION SYSTEM