IR 05000280/1989019

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Insp Repts 50-280/89-19 & 50-281/89-19 on 890605-09.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Followup on Previous Insp Findings Re motor-operated Valve Deficiencies,Ssfi Findings & Cooling Water Piping Mods
ML18153B821
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/06/1989
From: Belisle G, Jeffrey Jacobson, Tingen S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18153B820 List:
References
50-280-89-19, 50-281-89-19, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8907200422
Download: ML18153B821 (9)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:

50-280/89-19 and 50-281/89-19 Licensee:

Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:

50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:

Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:

June 5-9, 1989 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspectors:

~~

S. Tingen Accompanying Personnel:

G. Belisle, RII

.. ',L/

/

Approved by: G. Bel i~~-/:f~4 _;:

Scope:

Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY 2/J/Wj Date Signed

? 3 Date igned This special announced inspection was conducted in the area of followup on previous inspection findings relating to motor operated valve (MOV)

deficiencies, Safety system Functional Inspection (SSFI). findings, and Component Cooling Water piping modification Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie Strengths or weakness were not identified.

8907200422 890713 PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q

PDC

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • L. Adkins, Mechanical Maintenance Foreman
  • W. Benthall, Licensing
  • D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
  • P. Doody, Project Engineer, MOV Repair Project
  • D. Hanson, Electrical Maintenance Foreman
  • G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
  • J. Ogren, Superintendent, Maintenance
  • J. Price, Manager, Quality Assurance
  • T. Sowers, Superintendent, Engineering
  • J. Wolak, Mechanical En~ineering Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, technicians, and administra-tive personne NRC Resident Inspectors
  • L. Nicholson, Resident Inspector
  • J. York, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction
  • Atten*ded exit interview Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (25573) (Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/88-45-01, MOV Deficiencie During the 1988 and 1989 Units 1 and 2 outages, approximately 483 station deviations were written by the lic~nsee on MOV The licensee has categorized the station deviations as follows:

Deficiency Grease Broken Wire Strand Motor Sizing/Grounded Motor Personnel Tripper fingers Mechanical Torque/Limit Switch Damaged Component Other Number*of Station Deviations

61

139

48

20

The inspectors reviewed the following documents during the inspection:

/

MOV Action Plan, dated June 5, 1989 Operational Check Equipment Failure Repo.rt Completed station deviations for approximately 100 Unit 1 MOVs Nuclear operations motor operated valve program awareness training Engineering Work Request 89-397, Evaluate MI Valve~ Limitorque Grease Flushing

Procedure VPAP-0855, Motor Operated Valve Program Engineering* Nuclear Standard, GN-002, Motor Operated Valve Sizing Calculation Standard Review of station deviation reports, work orders, and MOV stroke times indicated that some causes of valve failures could not be determined because insufficient information was recorded at the time of the failur In the future, when MOV failures occur, personnel will be required to follow specific guidelines that will ensure that the desired information is obtaine In addition, when an MOV failure occurs, the previous practice of operations automatically cycling the MOV a second and third time will not be allowed unless an emergency requires another attempt or specified by troubleshooting instruction During the inspection, a review was conducted of VEPCO s_tandard No. GN-0002, Motor Operated Valve Sizing and Calc~lation Standar This standard is currently being used at Surry to ensure that all rising stem safety-related motor operators are sized sufficiently to permit valve operation under all postulated de~ign basis condition In order to determinq the thrust required for valve operati6n under design conditions, VEPCO used data from either the MOVATS dit~ base~

from the valve manufacturer, or from a* calculation using standard industry equation In actuality, the calculated values were the one~.

used for the large majority of the motor operators at Surr *

After the valve required thrust was determined, a calculation was performed to ensure the currently i.nstalled actuator could meet this requiremen The inspectors determined that VEPCO was properly using postulated degraded voltage conditions in motor torque/actuator thrust calculation In addition, the standard requires adding an equipment error factor as an added conservatism to account for instrumentation and test equipment inaccuracies and for the lack of precise repeatabilit The inspectors also verified that calcula-tions were required to be performed, as necessary, to ensure that the valve or motor actuator will not be overthrusted;

The inspectors reviewed the sections of VEPCO standard GN-0002 relative to the sizing of thermal overloads for safety-related motor operator It was noted that section 6.1.4.6 of this standard requires the setting of thermal overloads at between 45-55% of locked rotor current; however, no corresponding minimum or maximum trip times are delineate Using the appropriate trip curves.for the thermal overloads installed at Surry, the inspectors verified that a minimum of 20 seconds at locked rotor current would be required before a thermal overload trip occurred. This is in accord~nce with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.106, Thermal Overload Protection Electric Motors* Motor Operated Valves, which states that thermal overloads should be sized conservatively in the direction to prevent premature trippin VEPCO committed-to revising the standard as necessary to clarify the fact that a minimum of 20 seconds at locked rotor current should be allotted when sizing thermal overloads for motor actuator In order to resolve Units 1 and 2 MOV deficiencies, the licensee identified all safety-related MOVs and performed the foll owing to correct safety-related MOVs deficiencies:

Inspected MOVs to verify name plate information, and electrical and mechanical parameters Performed actuator-sizing design reviews for all rising stem MOVs Reviewed switch settings and standardized them to improve MOV reliability Diagnostic tested and made subsequent repairs Ensured correct actuator grease Rewrote design sketches for clarity Reviewed MOV work histories Differential pressure tested selected MOVs Developed a comprehensive MOV program that is scheduled to be fully implemented by September 1, 198 The licensee's actions to restore Units 1 and 2 MOVs prior to startup are considered adequat All concerns related to MOVs expressed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-280, 281/89-03 and 50-280, 281/89-10 have been acceptably addresse Within the areas inspected, no violations or* deviations were identifie IE Bulletin Followup

{Open) 50-280, 281/85-BU-03, 12515/73, IE Bulletin 85-03, Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failure During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Setting IE Bulletin 85-03 required licensees to develop _and implement a program to ensure that switch settings for High Pressure Cool ant Injection and Emergency Feedwater System MOVs, subject to testing for operational readiness in accordance with IO CFR 50.55a(g), are properly set, selected, and maintaine The information in this report supplements the IE Bulletin 85-03 followup contained in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-280, 281/89-03 and 50-280, 281/89-1 *

Although the licensee previously reported that all IE Bulletin 85-03 action items were complete, the recent MOV design review identified additional deficiencie IE Bulletin 85-03. Valves CH-1115B and CH-1286A spring packs were resized, and valves FW-260A,B and FW-160A,B actu~tors have been determined to be marginally sized and will be replaced with larger actuators during the next refueling outag The licensee has scheduled MOV differential pressure testing to be completed prior to Units 1 and 2 startup. Because changes have occurred in the Licensee's IE Bulletin 85-03 program since issuance of the last response, the licensee will submit an additional response to IE Bulletin 85...:0 Upon completion of replacement of the feedwater valve actuators, differential pressure testing and submittal of another IE Bulletin 85-03 response the licensee will have completed the IE Bulletin 85-03 progra Within area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie SSFI Issues

. The inspectors reviewed the latest draft of 1-PT-25.3C, Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump (1-SW-P-IC).

This PT is typical-for all three ESW pump Appropriate acceptance criteria had been included in this procedure based on recently completed ESW pump testin The inspectors reviewed results from ST-235, Control Room Chill er Equipment Performance Test, dated December 22, 198 This testing was completed during this inspection perio The inspector conducted an interview with the system engineer and was informed that certa-in anomalies in pump performance were being reviewed; conclusions about performance were still being evaluate Some additional testing may be require The inspectors reviewed results from ST-231, Emergency Service Water Pumps Performance Run dated January 21, 1989, for ESW pumps 1-SW-P~IB and I Pump 1-SW-P-IB testing was observed during the last

inspection conducted May 23-26, 1989. * This testing was performed after upgrading was completed on the*ESW pump diesel Each pump discharged in excess of 17,000 gpm for the existing conditions at the

  • time of the tes The purpose of this testing was to obtain pump dat Actual periodic* pump testing during plant operations is performed by PT-25. 3 as previously discusse The inspectors reviewed ST-252, Leak Test of Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Service Water Inlet and Outlet Valves, dated June 2, 198 This test is scheduled to be performed prior to Unit 1 startu The inspectors reviewed* Licensed Operator Requalification Program Lesson Plan R0-89.53-LP-1:

Outage Modifications. This is due to be taught the week-of June 12, 198 The following are some of the section (training) objectives:

Summarize the major assumptions made in the analysis done to support the design changes which will ensure adequate canal level for post accident condition Summarize the changes made to the SW systems and associated operating procedure Describe the i nstrume.ntati on added to the CC heat exchanger Describe the method used to ensure the RS heat exchangers remain dry during normal operations and during the performance of SW valve periodic test Describe the changes made to upgrade the CC piping to the RCP thermal barrier Summarize plant changes made during the current outag The inspectors reviewed Non-Licensed Operator Continuing Training Lesson Plan NL~89.4-LP-2, Modifications to Circulating and Service Wate This training is currently in progres The second of five shifts was being trained duting this inspection period time fram The following are some of the section (training) objectives:

State the TS requirements for intake canal minimum level and for emergency service water pump operabilit Describe the passive CW pump vacuum breakers in terms of thefr purpose, the intake canal level at which they are designed to function, and how they affect starting of a circulating water pum *

Describe the air operated vacuum breakers on the cdndenser water boxes in terms of their purpose, 1 ocati on, and safety precautions during local operatio *

Describe the discharge tunnel vacuum breakers in terms of their purpose, location, and operatio Explain why the power supplies for certain circulating water motor operated valves were changed to the emergency diesel motor control cente Explain how component cooling service water flow and differen-tial pressure instruments will be used during and after an accident to determine operability of the component cooling heat exchangers and to conserve water inventory in the intake cana Describe various design changes that are intended to conserve water in the intake canal during various accident scenario Within these areas, no violations or deviations were identifie CCW Issues The inspectors reviewed Design Change DC-85-21-1, RCP Thermal Barrier CCW System Modification/Surry/I, dated March 11~ 198 This design change added check valves (1-CC-1107, 1105, and 1106) on the three supply lines to the RCP thermal barrier; trip valves (TV/CC-120A, B, and C) on the three CCW return lines; and a relief valve (RV-CC150)

on the CCW return line heade This design change also added flow instrumentation on the return lines that provide signals to clos~ the trip valves on a high flow signal, added control switches with indicating lights in the main contfol room, and added a 10 second time delay relay in each valve circuitry to prevent spurious trips and high flow annunciation,on the CCW,return line heade These modifications were originally to be performed by Design Change 73-106; however, this design change was cancelle Regardless, the UFSAR, flow diagrams, and valve operating diagrams (valve numbers not included) were revised to show that these components had been installe The inspectors reviewed DC-89-08-3, RCP Therma 1 Barrier CC Check Valve Installation for Units 1 and This design change modified the CCW system to add two safety-related check valves in each CC supply line to the RCP thermal barriers and replaces the existing relief valves on the CC header with safety-related relief valve This work is the final solution (short term) in response to a thermal barrier leak into the CCW syste These actions are evaluated in the licensee's response made during an inspection conducted May 23-26, 1989, and documented in NRG inspection Report Nos. 50-280, 281/89-1,.,..

The licensee formally submitted their evaluation summary to the NRC on June 5, 198 The inspector reviewed results from containment leak rate testing (Type C) for selected CCW *valve This testing was performed in accordance with 1-PT-16.4, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leakage Rate Testing (Type C), dated February 22, 198 The following valves' test results were reviewed:

TV-CC-1098 TV-CC-109A TV-CC-107 TV-CC-1108*

TV-CC-110C*

TV-CC-110A TV-CC-105A TV-CC-105C TV-CC-10~8 1-CC-177*

1-CC-176*

1-CC-224 1-CC-233 l-CC-242 1-CC-59*

1-CC-58*

1-CC-1

  • AS FOUND DATA ONLY DUE TO EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE During this review, several questions arose regarding valve line ups and testing sequences. These were-adequately resolve The inspectors reviewed procedure l-CAl-540, RCP 11C 11 Thermal Barrier HX Outlet Flow (F-CC-107C), dated December 18, 1988 *. Similar procedures exist for the 11A 11 (1-CAL-538) and 118 11 (1-CAL-539) outlet fl ow valve This procedure is normally performed at refuelin This procedure verifies that the trip valves F-CC~l27 A, 8, and C isolat This test was last performed on 3/26, 3/25, and 3/21/86 respectively for each valv The test results were satisfactor Within these areas, no violations or deviations were ide~tifie.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 9, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed abov Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Licensee management was informed that the MOV related !FI discussed in paragraph 2.a was closed, the *actions performed and planned to perform to restore MOVs was acceptable to restart Units 1 and 2, the SSFI and CCW issues discussed in paragraphs 2.c and 2.d were ongoing and satisfactory, and that th licensee letter to the NRC, dated June 5, 1989, on the eyaluation of CCW, was being evaluated and after a pr~liminary review it appeared to be satisfactor...

8 Acronyms and Initial isms cc ccw ESW HX I FI MOV NRC PT RCP R SSFI SW TS UFSAR VEPCO Component Cooling Component Cooling Water Emergency Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspector*Followup Item Motor Operated Valve Nuclear Regulatory Commission Periodic Test Reactor Coolant Pump Recirculation Spray Safety System Functional Inspection Service Water Technical Specificatfon Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Virginia Electric and Power Company