IR 05000280/1989001
| ML18153B691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1989 |
| From: | Belisle G, Knox J, Scott Sparks, Taylor P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B690 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-01, 50-280-89-1, 50-281-89-01, 50-281-89-1, NUDOCS 8904240369 | |
| Download: ML18153B691 (10) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/89-01 and 50-281/89-01 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
January 17-20; 24-26; February 8, 9, 13-17 and Inspectors:0 ~~Jv-
~ 'March 2-5, 1989 P. A. Ta,yl
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<z. sfJ-0 S. E. Spa ks Approved by: ~
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G. A. Belisle, Chief
Tests Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope Date Signed Date Signed
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Date Signed This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of review and witness procedures, tests*, and methodology confirming power supply and train independence; and review and witness procedures and tests for integrated engineered safety features (ESF) and loss of offsite power (LOOP) test Results In the areas inspected, one violation and two Inspector Followup Items were identifie Failure to follow procedure ST-236 for the restoration of offsite powe This violation meets NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and is not cite (paragraph 3.c)
Two
!FI (280,281/89-01-01 and 89-01-02)
were identified:
Evaluate Corrective Action on Failure to Follow Procedure to Prevent Recurrence, Administrative Test Controls, and Evaluate 8904240369 890411 PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q
Agastat Timing Relay Repeatability and Improvements EMP-C-RT-45 (paragraph 3.c)
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Coordinator
- R. Blount, Superintendent Technical Services S. Burgold, Supervisor Advisory Operations
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager, Licensing
- M. Griffin, Assistant Engineer, Technical Services
- M. Hotchkiss, Assistant Shift Supervisor
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent Operations
- G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
- H. Miller, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- J. Ogren, Superintendent Maintenance B, Stanley, Senior Engineer, Advisory Operations
- T. Sowers., Superintendent, Engineering
- E. Turko, Senior Engineer, System Engineering
- Mi Wilda, Shift Technical Advisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included operators and technician NRC Resident Inspectors
- W.Holland
- L. Nicholson
- Attended exit interview by teleconference between Surry Sta ti on and Regional Office personnel on February 21, 1989
- Attended exit interview at the Surry Station on March 5, 1989 Intergrated ESF/LOOP Testing (61701, 72701) Background IE Information Notice (IE IN) 85-91, Load Sequencers For Emergency Diesel Generators,. dated November 27, 1985, identified a scenario at the Duane Arnold Plant which would bypass the emergency diesel generator (EOG) load sequencing logi This condition would cause ESF loads to be applied as a single load block to the EDGs resulting in the loss of the EDG The Surry Station EDGs are subject to a similar overload, in that, if a LOOP were to occur approximately five minutes or longer after a design basis accident (i.e., consequence limiting safeguards (CLS)),
- then all ESF loads running prior to the LOOP would be energized the instant the EDGs energized the emergency buse The Surry Station EDGs do not have ESF load sequencing that is based on a LOO The LOOP initiates the two out of three under-voltage logic that starts the EOG and supply breaker closure, providing permissive circuity is satisfied. There is, however, ESF load sequencing which is initiated by the CLS accident signal. Accident analysis are the consideration (e.g., sump level adequate) for the sequencing, not EOG loadin The ESF loads involved are the auxiliary feedwater pump (50 seconds),
inside recirculating spray pumps (120 seconds), and the outside recirculating spray pump (300 seconds).
To alleviate the worst case EOG overload scenario (i.e., CLS/LOOP five minute or greater), the licensee has installed ESF load sequencing in accordance with Design Change 88-31-1 for Unit 1 and Design Change 88-32-2 for Unit The ESF loads selected for sequencing were:
auxiliary feedwater pump, inside and outside recirculating spray pumps, pressurizer heaters, and filter exhaust fan The design modification utilizes the undervoltage (UV) protection circuits which causes ESF loads to be shed on a LOOP and delayed from starting until the emergency buses are re-energized by the EO Agastat timing relays are used to sequence the ESF loads as noted above on a selected timing schedul Review of Special Test Procedures The inspectors reviewed the following special test procedures issued and approved for Unit 1 Train 11A 11 (H Bus) and Train "B" (J Bus).
ST-236 (H BUS); ST-239 (J BUS), ESF Actuation with Instantaneous Undervoltage (UV)
ST-237 (H BUS): ST-238 (J BUS), ESF Actuation with Delayed UV (2.5 minutes)
ST 240 (H BUS): ESF Actuation with Delayed UV (5 minutes)
ST-232, Load Sequencing Test (J BUS)
These procedures were review to verify the following:
Appropriat~ levels of management review and approval had been conducte The design change (88-31-1) requirements for shedding the selected ESF loads, re-sequencing the ESF load in the prescribed time and order were identified and verified by the procedure steps. I
On a samp 1 e basis, selected ES F components, pumps, and ventilation were verified to go to their emergency position during accident signal (SI/CLS) initiatio The procedure established specific prerequisites, initial conditions, and precautions prior to conducting the tes Appropriate verification steps ensured that jumper cables were removed upon test completion. Acceptance criteria was provided and was qualitative or quantitative as appropriat The inspectors comments to the above procedures were presented to the licensee for resolution prior to the test Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Special Test Witnessing The licensee performed ST-236, ESF Actuation with Instantaneous UV (H BUS) on February 17, 198 The inspector attended the briefing given by the test director prior to the test performanc The operating sequences of plant systems, actions to be taken by data takers, and responses to be expected were discussed by the test directo Attachments to the procedure which were used to time ESF components, check for continuity, and record ESF components post-test position were handed out to the data takers for their review and us Plant personne 1 attending the briefing included shift operators, test personnel, and electrician The inspectors noted that it would take approximately 12-14 people to accomplish the test objective Following the briefing, plant operators completed the remaining prerequisites and initial conditions for the tes The inspectors accompanied plant operators while the above activities were being performe The inspectors verified, on a sample basis that ESF components and equipment were being aligned as required by the test procedur Plant personnel were placed at their assigned stations and the test was started by initiating a CLS accident signal in the control room with an instantaneous UV from the H Bus undervoltage relay panel in the switchgear roo Approximately eight minutes into the test, control room operators synchronized the EOG with offsite power for the purpose of loading the EO ESF loads for the test were minimal because emergency core cooling pumps and the auxiliary feedwater pump breakers were in the test positio Normal practice is not to leave the diesel generator minimally loaded for any length of tim Restoring offsite power was not scheduled to occur until later into the test procedur The test director became concerned with on going data collection activities and the effects on the data, because when offsite power is restored the UV/degrade voltage protection circuit is rese *
Following the test, licensee management reviewed* the event and determined that data points were effected by restoring the UV/degrade voltage protection circuit. The licensee considered the cause of the event to be lack of through understanding of the procedure and poor coordination and communication between control room operators and the test directo The licensee took the following corrective action to improve procedural adherence, coordination, and communication:
Provide guidance in -the test procedures that the EOG can remain minimally loaded up to an hou Clarify the test procedure sequencing step Ensure that personnel involved in the test have walked through their area of responsibility using the test procedure attach-ment Conduct dry runs of the test as specified by the test directo Repeat ST 236 in its entiret The inspectors identified the above incident as a failure to follow procedure during performing ST-236 when restoring off site powe This item indicates* an apparent violation to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawing This apparent violation was discussed with the resident inspectors and Regional managemen The requirements specified in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V were satisfied; therefore, a Notice of Violation will not be issue Until the licensee corrects these problems, this is i den ti fi ed as an Inspector Foll owup Item ( IFI) 280, 281/89-01-01, Evaluate Corrective Action to Prevent Re-occurrence, Administrative Test Control The inspectors observed the repeat of ST-236 on March 2, 1989, and noted that the conduct of the test was satisfactor The inspectors also witnessed ST-237, ESF Actuation with Delayed UV (2.5 minutes)
H Bus, on March 3, 1989, and ST-240, ESF Actuation with Delayed UV (5 minutes) H Bus on March 5, 198 The inspectors involvement for these tests were as described during witnessing ST-23 The inspectors attended briefings for both test and closely observed the communica-tion, coordination of test procedure steps and control room operator actions during the tes Problems with this aspect of the test were not identifie The basic purpose for requiring a delayed UV in ST-237 and ST-240 is to record the effects of load shedding, to observe re-sequencing of ESF loads as provided_ by the new design change, and to determine any adverse effects to existing logic and ESF component Preliminary review of test results indicated that the new design change, 88-31-1 functioned as require During the performance of the special test procedures, it was noted that some Agastat timing relays experienced drift outside their setpoint tolerance ban The Agastat t,ming relays were calibrated between each test but a few timers persisted in not remaining inside specific tolerance band The inspector 1 s concern was that the Agastat timing relays could not maintain consistent and repeatable setpoint tolerances. The inspector reviewed EMP-C-RT-45, Corrective Electrical Maintenance, dated March 20, 1987, which was used to set the timer The el ectri cal maintenance procedure could be enhanced for setting the timers since the Agastat catalog gives additional information for setting the timers that was not presently provide The inspectors identifie this as Inspector Foll owup Item, IF! 280-281/89-01-02, Eva 1 uate Agastat Timing Relay Repeatability and Improvement to EMP-C-RT-4.
Power Supply - Train Independence (61701) Background A Surry Station Deviation Report (December 1988) identified that the 11A 11 low head safety injection pump (LPSI) motor operated discharge valve was receiving electrical power from the 118 11 train power suppl Additionally, the 118 11 LPSI pump motor operated discharge valve was receiving electrical power from the 11A 11 train power suppl The crossover of power sources does not meet train independence require-ments specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 1 Resident Inspector 1s Report 50-280,281/88-45 provides the details of this issu This issue, along with those identified in NRC Inspection Reports 50-280,281/88-32 and 88-41, have identified similar concerns regarding system design control, system configuration control, and system maintenance practices at the Surry Statio On January 5, 1989, the licensee presented to the NRC staff in the Region 2 office a detai 1 ed program to correct these issue The licensee 1 s presentation to assure that redundant safety systems meet train independence, system design, a~d configuration control included reviewing all outstanding items for each safety system, walking down plant systems using design documents and system drawings, confirming power supply and train independence by special tests, and documenting all identified deficiencies and corrective action The NRC staff concluded that the licensee 1s program, when implemented, should determine system independence, design, and configuration statu Review of Power Supply Verification Procedures and Methodology Engineering Work Request (EWR) 88-584C, System Review for Startup Units 1 and 2, describes the approach the licensee is using to verify that the power supplies for system components and electrical train independence is establishe The inspectors reviewed the following procedures and methods to verify that the licensee 1s program details
those system components which require electrical power for operations and includes the plant's electrical power distribution board (1)
System Walkdowns Plant system walkdowns from an electrical prospective verified that transmitters were in their proper physical orientation and that component i den ti fi cation was correc The transmitters inspected were those used to monitor system process variables such as temperature, pressure, level, and flo The existing plant periodic test procedures used to conduct loop calibrations are being used to verify train independence by inserting a test signal at the transmitter while monitoring the results at their associated instrument racks and meter indica-tions in the control roo (2) Motor-Operated Valves - Air Operated Valves (MOV/AOV)
Special Test (ST) 244, Verification of Power Source for Safety Related Valves on Vital Buses, DC Panels, Hand J Motor Control Centers (MCC)
ST-244 list those MOVs and AOVs required to perform a specific function in cold shutdown or in mitigating the consequences of an acciden The lists of valves in ST-244 were developed from station drawings, Emergency Operating Procedures (EDP), Fi re Contingency Actions (FCA), and Function Restoration Procedures (FRP).
The review of station drawings 11448-FE-ll, Rev. 28 and 11448-FE-lM, Rev. 30, 480V diagrams indicated that safety related valves were included in the special tes ST-244 instructions for stroke testing each valve require that a person be stationed at the MCC breaker for the valve being stroke After successfully stroking the valve in one direction, the valve will be de-energized and another attempt will be made to stroke the valv The person at the valve and the control room will verify that the valve does not strok The valve breaker will then be reclosed and the valve stroked in the opposite directio The results of each valve tested will be recorde Discrepancies and corrective actions will also be documented to complete the tes The inspector witnessed the stroke testing of several valves during performance of ST 24 During the inspection, the licensee had completed approximately 60 percent of the valves in ST-24 The valves tested were noted as being fed from their proper power sourc *
(3)
Pumps The pumps selected for the tests were the safety-related pumps on the 4160V and 480V emergency buse The existing periodic test (PT) procedures for the pumps will be used to operate the pump The PT will be modified to require a person to be at the breaker for the pump being teste The pump will be started in accordance with the PT and the breaker wi 11 be verified to clos The pump will then be secured and the breaker will be verified to open completing the tes (4)
Dead Bus Test The plant electrical distribution system consists of the 4160V bus, 480V bus, 480V MCC, 120V AC bus and 125V DC bu ST-241, Unit 1 11A 11 Train Deactivation Test, systematically de-energizes each bus while monitoring voltage prior to de-energizing the buse The absense of voltage confirms train independenc The inspectors reviewed nine electrical drawings; 11448-ESK-6CD1, FE-llA, FE-3BK, ESK-SP FE-3BH, FE-lOA, FE-8BE, FE-AC, FE-8AZ, to verify that the selected locations for test points to monitor voltages, were acceptable for verifying power supplies and train independenc The inspectors made field trips to verify drawings and accessibility of the test points. Discrepancies were not note The inspectors noted that opening the cross tie breakers between 125V DC buses IA and lB was deleted from ST-24 Due to the length of time required to perform testing, these DC breakers were maintained in the closed position to prevent excessive battery loading (discharge).
Upon further review by t licensee, they concluded that the 118 11 Train Deactivation Test would include steps to open the DC cross tie breakers momentarily while monitoring voltage changes on the 125V DC bu This method of testing would minimize loading (discharge} from the plant batterie Unit 2 dead bus testing would include this test metho On February 8 and 9, 1989, the inspectors witnessed portions of ST-241 and verified that test personnel were observing procedure requirements, instruments used to measure voltage were calibrated, and test results were being properly recorde The inspectors reviewed the results of ST-241 and preliminary assessment indicated that power supply and train independence existed for Train 11A
- During the test a Train 118 11 Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring alarm was receive The licensee is investigating why this alarm was received sjnce only Train 11A 11 was being teste Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on February 21 and March 5, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Failure to follow procedure ST-236 in restoring offsite powe This violation meets NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and is not cited, paragraph IFI 280-281/89-01-01 Evaluate licensee corrective actions to prevent recurrence for failure to follow procedure, paragraph IFI 280-281/89-01-02 Evaluate Agastat timing relay repeatability and improvements to maintenance procedure EMP-C-RT-45, paragraph 3.c.