IR 05000280/1989007
| ML18153B666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1989 |
| From: | Kreh J, Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B665 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-07, 50-280-89-7, 50-281-89-07, 50-281-89-7, NUDOCS 8904030253 | |
| Download: ML18153B666 (14) | |
Text
Report Nos.:
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETIA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 HAR 2 2 198~
-
....
50-280/89-07 and 50-281/89-07 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry Power Station Accompanying Personnel:
F. Carlson (PNL)
M. Good ( PNL)
.
L. ~holson !NRC)
Approved by~,LJ.. ~
r:...~
\\~. Rankin, Chief Scope Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY
- 3 - L?. - r <?I Date Signed 3-Z-2 -8'!
Date Signed
- 3* ~~ - '29 Date Signed On November 2, 1988, after failing to recognize and.classify a Site Area Emergency during their November 1, 1988 Emergency Exercise, the 1 i censee committed to training and a redemonstration of key emergency plan functions prior to March 1, 198 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the Emergency Exercise to fulfill the licensee's November 2, 1988 commitmen Results In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie The licensee was successful in demonstrating the required corrective action by properly classifying a radiological release that escalated to a General Emergenc However, this emergency exercise again identified the excessive times required to c1.ctivate the Technical Support Center (TSC) anc Local Emergency Operations Faci 1 i ty ( LEOF) as wel 1 as i denti fyi ng a weakness 8904030253 890322 PDR ADOCK 05000280 G
PMU
- regarding the maintenance of contamination control access to the Control Room, TSC, and LEO Although five previous inspection findings were closed, the team leader informed the Plant Manager that the closings should not be considered as a positive indication of the status of the progra The Plant Manager acknowledged hi~ awareness of an emergency preparedness program that needed significant improvement * Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- R. Beckwith, Corporate Emergency Planner
- J. Costello, Surry Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- F. Cox, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
- S. Harrison, Corporate Emergency Planner
- R. Hayes, Quality Assuranc *M. Kansler, Surry Station Manager
- G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
- H. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, security forte members, and administrative personne Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. Holland, SRI
- L. Nicholson, RI
- J. York, RI
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the licensee 1s integrated capability as wel1 as a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee 1s Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed with licensee representatives on two occasion There were no significant scenario inconsistencies observed during the exercis The scenario adequately provided for the demonstration of corrective actions needed to close the significant exercise weakness for failure to recognize and
classify a Site Area Emergency that was identified during the November 1, 1988 Emergency Exercis However, specific observations were made by the inspectors that indicated neither licensee players nor controllers were being adequately trained or briefed on exercise criteri For example, the Control Room personnel were not aware of the need for demonstrating procedural adherence during reactor shutdown, and in another situation, a
controller in the LEOF prompted a player on the correct alignment of the LEOF ventilation syste No violations or deviations were identifie.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsi bil i ti es for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made upon declaration of an emergency classificatio However, prior to the initiation of the exercise, the controllers and observers Were informed that the assistant shift supervisor and the shift technical assistant had real plant responsibilities as well as being exercise player On one occasion, the assistant shift supervisor was required to perform real plant duties as a result of a plant overvoltage on a 4KV emergency bu Fortunately, during this period of time, scenario events did not occur that adversely impacted the exercise performance as a result of the reduced emergency drill staff available in the Control Roo No violations or deviations were identifie.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licens~e 1s onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented_ pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Revision 1:
(1) responsibilities for emergency were unambiguously defined; (2) adequate staffing was provided to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) onsite and offsite support organizational interactions were specifie The inspectors observed portions of the staffing, activation, and operation of the Control Room, TSC, Operations Support Center (OSC), and the LEO The responding emergency organization personnel appeared to have well defined responsibilities and both onsite and offsite support organizational interactions appeared to be adequat However, the licensee 1 s actions to activate the TSC and the LEOF were not timel Specific observations supporting this finding were as follows: (1) The TSC was not activated until one hour and 54 minutes after the Alert emergency declaratio The TSC was fully staffed,less the SEM approximately one hour and 25 minutes after the Aler (2) Peripheral duties such as follow-up notifications were still being made from the Control Room one hour and 40 minutes after the Alert because the TSC was not activate (3)"The LEOF was not activated until two hours and 32 minutes after the Aler During the players 1 critique in t~e LEOF, members of the emergency
organization questioned the extensive inprocessing of personnel to the LEOF which delayed activatio (4) During the November 1, 1988 Emergency Exercise, the delayed activation of the TSC and LEOF was identified by the licensee as a deficiency requiring corrective actio (5) One of the exercise objectives established by the licensee for this exercise was:
11 Demonstrate the ability to augment the onsite emergency organization to support emergency operations in a timely and effective manner during non-normal working hours.
The failure to fully demonstrate the above exercise objective _was identified as an exercise weaknes Although the delayed activations did not adversely affect the accident mitigation during this exercise, a faster moving scenario or event requiring significantly more reactor system manipulations could have negatively impacted the Control Room staff if it remained the controlling emergency response facility for all onsite and offsite emergency responsibilities as well as performing the inherent reactor system mani pul ati on One exercise weakness was identified (50-280, 281/89-07-01):
Failure to demonstrate the ability to augment the onsite emergency organization in a timely and effective manne No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to ensure that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made, that the arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility had been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I State emergency response personnel were accommodated at the LEO Although the scope of this exercise did not include the response for the offsite assistance resources, the licensee's Emergency Plan had letters of Agreement indicating provisions had been made for such suppor No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) and in the Implementing Procedure The system was adequate to classify the simulated emergency conditions of this exercise.
- .
No violations or deviations were identifie Notification Methods And Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established by the licensee for notification of State and local response organizations, 1 i censee emergency personnel, and that the content of i ni ti al and foll ow-up messages to response organi zati ens had been established; and the means to provide early notifications to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were available for use in providing information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to federal, State and local response organi za ti ons and to a 1 ert the 1 i cens*ee I s augmented emergency response organizatio Initial notifications were made promptly and update messages were provided according to procedure No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to' determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Communications among the licensee 1 s emergency response facilities and emeigency personnel appeared to be adequate with two exception First, the licensee again noted in their critique that the OSC ring-down phone was not ringing down in the OS Second, it was observed that chemistry results requested by the Control Room appeared to get lost and required approximately ten minutes of the Shift Supervisor's time to resolv The licensee identified these two observations as areas of concer No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Facilities And Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph JV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I There were no emergency facilities and equipment deficiencies noted by the inspectors during the eiercis No violations or deviations were identified.
1 Public Education and Information (82301)
1 This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercis During the exercise, a Local Media Center was promptly established to coordinate news announcements with offsite emergency response agencie Although the Local Media Center was evacuated from the Visitors Center at approximately 7:50 a.m. following the radioactive steam release,- the 8:13 a.m. press release still indicated the Loca.l Media Center at the Visitors Cente The licensee also established its Public News Center in Glen Allen, Virgini No violations or deviations were identifie Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the acciden The program appeared to be adequate for monitoring and assessing the consequences of the radiological release from a stuck open steam generator relief valve for this exercis A possible exception to the above statement would be the recovery manager's discussions regarding protective action recommendations ~ith the Virginia Department of Emergency Services representatives which slightly delayed the Site Area Emergency declaratio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l0), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector.verified that the 1 i censee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the 10-mile EP Protective action recommendations were discussed with the appropriate State personnel in the LEO Although the offsite
- protective actions appeared fully adequate, a significant finding was noted regarding onsite contamination contro Specifically, although there had been an onsite contaminated steam release, no area access control was established to determine if personnel coming into the Contro Room, TSC, or LEOF were contaminate This was identified as an exercise weakness (50-280, 281/89-07-02):
Failure to establish radiological access control to the Control Room, TSC, and LEOF following an onsite radiological releas No violations or deviations were identifie + Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-280/86-22-0l:
Scenario did not have adequate contingency messages to direct pl ayer response to track scenario events and dat Sufficient contingency messages were available to direct the desired player respons (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-280, 281/87-29-03:
Fai.lure to coordinate press releases with the State spokesperso An inspector noted that the Recovery Manager in the LEOF coordinated the press releases with the State personnel prior to releas (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-280, 281/87-29-06:
Improve the coordination from the TSC with the Control Room and the OS The coordination for TSC to the Control Room and OSC appeared to be fully adequate during this exercis (Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/87-29-08:
Verify that the OSC director is cognizant of the OSC task team's departure from the OS The OSC Director dispatched the only repair team required from the OSC for this exercis (Closed) Significant Exercise Weakness 50-280, 281/88-43-01:
Failure to recognize and classify a Site Area Emergenc The licensee demonstrated adequate corrective action to this finding during this exercis.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The 1 i censee' s critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to the licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section 1 A formal licensee critique was held on February 17, 1989, with licensee management and NRC in attendanc A licensee representative provided a summary of the strengths and weaknesses observed by the 1 i censee' s controller/observer tea The NRC inspector was also provided a more
detailed list of concerns that the licensee would consider for actio Following this, the NRC team leader discussed in detail the inspection observations and finding Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Number 50-280, 281/89-07-01 50-280, 281/89-07-02 Attachment:
Description and Reference Failure to demonstrate timely and effective augmentation of onsite emergency organization (Paragraph 4).
Failure to establish radiological access control to Control Room, TSC, and LEOF (Paragraph 12).
Surry Exercise Objectives and Scenario Narrative
- summary of the strengths and weaknesses observed by the 1 i censee I s controller/observer tea The NRC inspector was also provided a more detailed list of concerns that the licensee would consider for actio Following this, the NRC team leader discussed in detail the inspection observations and finding Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Number 50-280, 281/89-07-01 50-280, 281/89-07-02 Attachment:
Description and Reference Failure to demonstrate timely and effective augmentation of onsite emergency organization (Paragraph 4).
Failure to establish radiological access control to Control Room, TSC, and LEOF (Paragraph 12).
Surry Exercise Objectives and Scenario Narrative
Exercise Objectives 1. Demonstrate the ability to make proper decisions related to radiation exposure and to implement those decision. Demonstrate the ability to make protective action recommendations that protect station personnel and the general public, as appropriat. Demonstrate the ability to augment the onshift emergency organization to support emergency operations in a timely and effective manner (during non-normal working hours).
4. Demonstrate the ability to classify the emergency in accordance with EPIP. Demonstrate the ability to conduct radiological moniioring activities and offsite radiological dose projection in-plant, onsite assessments, and 6. Demonstrate effective and timely search and rescue activiti~ and offsite to formulate 7. Demonstrate that the LEOF can be adequately staffed to maintain communications, coordinate the utilization of offsite monitoring teams, and recorrrnend offsite protective measures to the Stat. Demonstrate coordinating news announcements with offsite response agencies, distributing press releases in a timely manner, ensuring the accuracy of press releases, and conducting timely and informative media briefing. Demonstrate the adequacy of coordination between the TSC, Control Room and os. Conduct an effective critique in order to disclose significant exercise findings which require corrective actio VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION FEBRUARY 16, 1989 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE A small scale emergency exercise is scheduled to be conducted at Surry Power Station on February 16, 198 Unit 1 has been designated as the affected unit for this exercis Unit 2 is considered to be in a simulated refueling outage with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel and no refueling activities in progres For exercise purposes, Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power ~quilibrium near the end of reactor core lif Reactor coolant fission product inventory is high, and a small primary to secondary steam generator tube leak is known to exis The exercise will be initiated upon receipt of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Letdown Radiation Monitor "alert
alarm in the Control Room, which is indicative of fuel rod integrity failur Indications of fuel failure will continue to increase to where conditions requ1r1ng the declaration of a
"Notification of Unusual Event 11 emergency exist. Shortly then~after, a unit rampdown is expected to be initiate Further into the scenario, the Control Room will receive indications of high vibration on "C" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) followed by erratic seal leakof Ultimately,
"C" RCP will trip followed by a reactor trip/turbine tri Additional fuel failure, due to loose parts, will occur and result in further increases in primary activit Indications on the Letdown Radiation Monitor will then exceed conditions requiring the declaration of "Alert" emergenc A steam generator tube leak will subsequently occur on the 11 C" Steam Generator, in~reasing to almost 50 gallons per minute (GPM) over the next twenty minute Condenser Air Ejector radiation monitor indications will increase respective to this even Eventually, a Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valve will fail open, resulting in an effluent release pathwa Conditions for a "Site Area Emergenci' wi 11 then exis While degrading plant conditions may be judged by emergency response personnel to justify the declaration of a "General Emergency", this declaration will, be blocked to allow the response team to demonstrate those activities specified by procedures related to the lower classification of "Site Area Emergency
- A
"General Emergency" declaration based on radiological release parameters ( projected offsite dose) will be allowed, if recommende Approximately forty minutes later, the Power Operated Relief valve will be isolate Sufficient time will be permitted to exercise offsite response actions, which will be followed by a termination of the exercis *
TIME 0315 0330 0345 0400 0415 0445 0500 0545 0600 0610 0615 0630 0650 0651 0700 SURRY POWER STATION FEBRUARY 16, 1989 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO TIME LINE EVENT CONTROLLERS/OBSERVERS DISTRIBUTE INITIAL CONDITIONS TO PLAYERS. PRE-BRIEFINGS INITIATE PRE-BRIEFINGS COMPLETED. CONTROLLERS/OBSERVERS POSITIONED FOR EXERCISE INITIATIO RCS LETDOWN MONITOR (CH-RM-118) INCREASES TO 1.5 E +5 CP CH-RM-118 INDICATIONS MEET EAL. TAB C. (NOTIEJCATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT CAN BE DECLARED)
POSSIBLESTART OF UNIT RAMPDOW CH-RM-118 INCREASES TO 7.5 E +5 CP CH-RM-118 READING MEETS E.A.L. TAB C. (ALERT CAN BE DECLARED).
RC-P-1C HI VIBRATION ALARM (FRAME= 3.5 MILS; SHAFT= 8.0 MILS).
RC-P-1 C OVERCURRENT TRIP (REACTOR/TURBINE TRIP).
REACTOR LCCSE PARTS AlARf'... REACTOR LOOSE PARTS ALARM CL.EAR NIS SOURCE P.N-JGE DETECTORS ENERGIZ AUX. FEEDWATER SECURED. SIG SLOWDOWN TRIP VALVES WILL NOT REOPE "C" STEAM GENERA TOR TUBE LEAK (LEAK INCREASES TO 45 GPM OVER THE NEXT 20 MINUTES).
SV-RM-111 (A.IE) INCREASE MS-RM-126 ("C" MS LINE) INCREASE MS-RM-126 READING INCREASES TO 0.06 MR/HR. SITE BOUNDARY THYROID DOSE PROJECTIONS BASED ON A 3 HOUR RELEASE DURATION MEETS EAL TAB E.1. (SITE AREAE.MEBGENCJ'. CAN BE DECLARED).
O 71 O
"C* STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK CONFIRME COOL.DOWN INITIATE "C* STE.AM GENERA TOR PORV OPEN. lf S.E.M. DECIDES PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAKAGE, THOUGH CALCULATED TO BE 45 GPM, HAS SUFFICIENT POTENTIAL TO EXCEED 50 GPM, I.l:il;tl A SITE AREA EMERGENCY MAY BE DECLARED PER EAL TAB. lf S.E.M. DECIDES RCS DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY, THOUGH NEVER EXCEEDING 50.2 UCVGM, HAS SUFFICIENT POTENTIAL TO EXCEED 300 UCVGM At:40 THE SIG TUBE LEAK IS DEEMED TO BE A LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT~ THE OPENING OF THE *c* SIG PORV IS DEEMED TO BE A LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY,~ A GENERAL EMERGENCY MAY BE DECLARED PER EAL TAB B.10. THIS DECLARATION OF
.G..ENERAL EMERGENCY WILL BE BLOCKED, 0745 MS-RM-126 READING INCREASES TO 0.7 MR/HR. SITE BOUNDARY THYROID DOSE PROJECTIONS BASED ON A 3 HOUR RELEASE DURATION MEETS EAL TAB E2 (.GEtiERAL EMERG~ CAN BE DECLARED).
0 80 0
"C* STEAM GENERATOR PORV CLOSED/lSOLATED. RELEASE IS TERMINATE RECOVERY ACTIO'JS INmATE O O O EXERCISE TERMINATED; FACIUTY CRITIQUES INITIATED.