IR 05000280/1987036
| ML18152A747 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1988 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A745 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-36, 50-281-87-36, NUDOCS 8802100386 | |
| Download: ML18152A747 (10) | |
Text
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UNITEDSTATES
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e
.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
. 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/87-36 and 50-281/87-36 Licensee:
Vi rgi ni a fl ectri c and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Faci 1 ity Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License *Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection Conducted:
December 5, 1987 - January 2, 1998 Inspectors: W. * * ~~¢(fnspector L.~~~s~
Approved by: ~
- F.. antre,~,2:"ief
. Division of Reactor Proj cts
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SUMMARY Scope:
This routine ins~ection was conducted in the areas of plant operati6ns, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, followup on inspector identified items, and licensee event report revie Results: No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection repor eso21003s~ sgg66~80 PDR ADOCK O PDR Q
e REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- D. L. Benson, Station Manager
- H. L.. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager J. A. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations D. J. Burke, Superintendent of Maintenance S. P. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics
- R. H. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services R. L. Johnson, Operations Supervisor J. A. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager J. B. Logan, Supervisor, Safety and Licensing
- G. D. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
- E. Brennan, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance
- Attended exit meetin '~ther licensee employees contacted.included control room operators, shift*
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne On December 15, the following NRC Region II personnel visited the Surry Power Station for a familiarization presentation and tou In. addition the residents provided an over11iew of the ongoing evaluation of the PRISIM process and its uses in the inspection program~
M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator A. F. Gibson, Director, DRS C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, ORP F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, DRP F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS R. H. Burnhard, Reactor Inspector, DRS Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 4, 1988, with those individuals identifjed by an asterisk in paragraph The following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exi One inspector followup item (paragraph 7) was identified with regards to followup on the licensee evaluation of stud lubricant Fel-Pro C-SA (280; 281/87-36-01).
One unresolved item (paragraph 7) was identified with regards to the controls for mater.ial substitution on safety-related components (281/87-36-02).
.. 2 Th~ licensee.* acknowledged. the inspection findings with no. de sent i ng comment The licensee did not. identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed. by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 began the reporting period at powe The unit operated at power for the duration of the inspection perio Unit 2 Unit 2 began the reporting period at powe The unit ~ommenced a routine shutdown on December 8 in order to conduct a scheduled maintenance/inspection outage after 247 days of continuous operatio The unit reached cold shutdown on December 9 and scheduled maintenance bega Maintenance activities were completed* and the unit commenced heatup on December 21, with power operation resuming on December 24, 198 The unit operated at power for the remainder of the inspection perio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
This item was not addressed during this inspec~ion perio.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may inv*olve violations_ or deviation One new unresolved jtem is identified in paragraph.
Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspect ions in the fo 11 owing areas:
C9ritrol room staffing, access~ and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, 't~chnical specifications, and limiting conditions for operations; examinati6n of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; review of contr9l room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
Verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve a*lignment, breaker positions, condition of equipme*nt or component(s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc *
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Plant tours which, included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical securit controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard The inspectors routinely monitor the temperature of the auxiliary
. feedwater pump discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevente The inspectors conducted biweekly inspect ions in the fo 11 owing areas:
Verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem i dent ifi cation system; verifi c*at ion of se 1 ected portions of containment isolation lineup(s); and verification that notices to workers are poste*d as required by 10 CFR 1 Certain tours were. conducted on backs hi fts or weekend Backs hi ft or w~ekend tours wer~ conducted on December 15, 17, 26 and 2 Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, Unit 2 containment, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fue 1 storage faci 1 ity, 1 ow 1 eve 1 intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected le&kage from the system* was recorded, investigated, and evaluated and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie The Pl ant Risk Status* Information Management System (PRISIM) was used by the resident inspectors during this inspection period to aid in -
determination of inspection prioritie On December 15, a review of
- PRISIM use by the residents was presented to NRC management at the Surry sit The *residents wi 11 continue to use the * program when p 1 an conditions indicate a need for review of the PRISI *
In the course of monthly activities,.the inspectors included a review of the 1 i censee' s phys i ca 1 security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in tt,e conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
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Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible areas of the safety related portions of containment spray syste This verification included the fo 11 owing: confirmation that the l i c*ensee' s system 1 i neup procedure matches pl ant drawi_ngs and actual pl ant configuration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed correctly and appear to be operable; fire protection/prevention is adequate~ major system components are properly lab~led and appear to be operab]e; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated, and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit statu '
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Inspection areas included the following:
Auxiliary Feedwater Modifications The inspector witnessed portions of the installation of steim drain p1p1ng upstream of the steam admission valves to the unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump 2-FW.,.P-This modification is similar to that performed on unit 1 to correct a problem with overspeed trips due to a buildup of water in the steamline (discussed in inspection report 280; 281/87-17).
The inspector reviewed the procedure and documentation available at the jobsite and discussed the task with the mechanics involve No discrepancies were note Main Stearn Trip Valves The inspector witnessed the repair of main steam trip (isolation) valves (MSTV) TV-MS-2018 & C during the unit 2 snubber outage.. The licensee noticed during the unit shutdown that the 8 & C trip valves were not closing full These valves are similar to check valves and are designed to have a normal travel of 80 degree The measured as-found travel of the 8 valve was 74 degrees and the C valve was 61 degree The inspector witnessed portions of the disassembly and troubleshooting of the valves per maintenance procedure MMP-C-MS-002, "Disassembly Inspect ion And Reassembly of Main Steam Trip Valve".
The licensee discovered tha binding inside the stuffing box of the rockshaft which the disc swings on was preventing the MSTV disc from traveling the full ar This binding appeared to be caused by foreign rnateri al becoming lodged inside the stuffing box as evidenced by the scoring on the rockshaf It was a 1 so noted that the rockshafts were very slightly bowe Analysis of the
- removed shafts revealed the correct material but on the low end of the acceptable hardness scal The licensee replaced the rockshafts with replacements on the high end of the hardness scale and reassembled the valve The closure of these valves during an accident would not have been affected by this minor binding. *This was demonstrated by the ability to push the dfscs closed by hand once the valve cover plate was remove During this outage the licensee also examined the closure studs on all three main steam trip valves.. Two of the one and seven-eight inch 8-7 studs on MSTV 2018 were discovered to exhibit i ntergrannul ar stress corrosion crack The defective studs were removed and are currently undergoing further examination, but initial indications are that the copper contained in the stud lubricant (Fel-Pro C-SA) may have contributed to the failure mechanis This issue is identified as an inspector followup item (280; 281/87-36-01) for followup on the licensee evaluation of the Stud lubrican The licensee replaced all studs on that valve and will continue to examine the MSTV studs on an accelerated schedul No discrepancies were note Motor Operated Valves The inspector followed the* maintenance and testing of motor operated valve 2-CH-MOV-2289 This 3" double-disc gate valve with a Limitorque SMB-00 actuate~ is one of two v~lves in series in the normal charging
. flowpath that must close during a safety injection to redirect the injection flow to the loop Operations had noted several months earlier that when this valve was manually closed, system pressure would cause the valve to ope It was also noted that the redundant valve in series, 2-CH-MOV-2289A, may also be experiencing this proble An engineering justification for continued operations was issued and approved that recommended operation in the motor (electrical) mode only with no manual operations until the actuators could be disassembled and refurbished during the fall snubber outag The evaluation also concluded that the problem must be in the declutch mechanism of the valve actuator, resulting in the actuator being in a "neutral" position (neither the manual or motor mode).
Conversations with Limitorque confirmed that the valve could come open if the clutch keys on the actuator drive shaft were allowed to disengage from the lugs on the handwheel ring gea This condition would defeat all the inherent locking mechanisms that would normally be engage During the subsequent disassembly and inspection of valve 2-CH-MOV-22898, during this inspection period, it was discovered that the actuator clutch tripper fingers were different than the replacement parts supplied by the vendo The licensee documented this condition on station deviation S2-87-521 and rep 1 aced the hand-made tripper fingers with the correct vendor supplied part The inspectors examined the removed parts and discussed their effect on valve operations with plant enginee~in The hand-made tripper fingers were fabricated from 304 stainless steel whereas those supplied by Limitorque are fabricated from ASTM A568 heat treated, high strength stee The two fingers required to be used in the SMB-00
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actuators are of different length to prevent the operator from jamming when the motor is engaged after being operated manuall The hand-made fingers removed are both the same length with approximately 40% less contact area that mates with the pivot arm; The removed fingers are also thinner than required, therefore the mechanic installed shims to compensate for this conditio A search of the previous mafotenance records revealed work order number 25897 which documented the installation of the hand-made parts in 198 The mechanic.at that time was investigating a problem with the manual clutch staying engaged even with the motor energized,. i.e. the actuator not kicking out of manual when going to motor operatio He documented on the work order that one tripper finger.was sheared and that the tripper was cracked, and that he installed a "hand-made tripper finger".
This work order was subsequant ly reviewed and signed by both the mechanics foreman and the quality assurance department prior to submission to station records on November 14, 198 The field fabricated tripper fingers apparently contributed to the clutch fingers becoming disengaged from the handwheel gear lug The f abri cat ion and i nsta 11 at ion of these parts into a safety re 1 ated component was apparently done without any formal evaluation, review or approva The inspectors expressed concern with the system that all owed this to occur and were continuing with a broader overview of the licensee program for material substitution when the inspection period ende This inspection effort will continue and is identified as an unresolved item (281/87-36-02).
The inspectors further questioned the licensee on the corrective actions planned for the second valve 2-CH-MOV-2289 The engineering justifi-cation discussed above indicated that this valve may also be experiencing a similar proble The licensee examined, adjusted, and retested this valve and found no evidence of a similar proble This inspection was documented by engineering in an additional plant memorandum dated December 19, 198 No discrepancies regarding this item were note Within the areas inspected,.no violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure* compliance with the appropriate procedures as follows:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accor~ance with approved procedure~.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended functio e
Adequate coordination existed among.personnel involved in~the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following:
Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump The inspector witnessed the testing of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump *2-FW-P-2 following the unit 2 return to criticality on December 2 The pump was observed to trip on overspeed several time The licensee began extensive troubleshooting, including replacement of the governor and adjustment of the turbine overspeed linkage, and the pump was tested satisfactorily on December 24, 198 No discrepancies were note *
On December 30, _ the inspector reviewed completed periodic test 2-PT-15. lC, "Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2-FW-P-2)".
This PT was performed to verify operability of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discussed in the proceeding paragrap No
- discrepancies were note On December 30, the inspector reviewed comp 1 eted periodic test 2-PT-10, 11 Reactor Coolant Leakage" which was performed on December 28, 198 The PT is used to determine i dent i fi ed and unidentified leakage from the Reactor Coolant Syste The inspector had independently determined the same leakage from Unit 2 on December 28 using the NRC computer program (RCSLK9).
Results of the two leak rate determinations were in agreemen No discrepancies were note Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280; 281/87-04-01, Followup on licensee inspection/testing of the Unit 1 turbine building service water fl ow path during the Unit 2 outag This i tern was i dent i fi ed in inspection report 280; 281/87-0 In that report the inspectors requested that the licensee consider if additional testing or inspecti6ns should be conducted during future outages to confirm that the integrity of the subject flowpath was not degradin The licensee provided the inspector with additional information which concluded that the service water piping failure was directly related to the past method of cleaning the pipe to remove marine growth buildu The testing of the pipe was accomplished after this cleaning method was used on the Unit 1 piping and no further cleaning oper~tions have been conducted on the flowpat Bas~d on this information, the inspector considers that this item is close.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
The inspector reviewed the LE Rs listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective action(s).
The inspector's review also included followup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all reqDired corrective action(s} were complet LERs that* identify violation(s) of regulation(s} and that meet the criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V shall be identified as Licensee Identified Violations (LIV) jn the following closeout paragraph LIVs are considered first-time occurrance violations which meet the NRC Enforcement Policy criteria for exemptiQn from issuance of a Notice of Violatio These items are identified to allow for proper evaluation of corrective actions in the event that similar events occur in the futur (Closed) LER 280/87-25, Excessive Reactor Cool ant System Leakage Due to Valve Seat Leakag The issue involved identification of leakage in excess of technical specification limit The inspectors were in the control room during this event and. monitored licensee actions. Also, the 1 i censee correctly i dent i fi ed the 1 eakage fl owpath and took appropriate immediate corrective actions within the time requirements of the technical specification LC Additional corrective action included revision of the leak rate surveillance procedure (PT-10).
The inspector reviewed the reviied procedur This LER is close (Closed) LER 280/87-26, LER 280/87-29, Main Control Room Ventilation Isolation Due to High Voltage Output on Chlorine Gas Detecto The. issue has been addressed 1n closeout of LERs 280/87-16, 87-20, and 87~22 in inspection report 280; 281/87-3 These LERs are close (Closed) LER 280/87-27, Spurious Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Due to Water Intrusion into Control Pane The issue involved initiation of automatic closure of two" of the four condenser circulating water inlet valves (MOV-CW-106A and C).
Operations personnel, responding to decreasing condenser vacuum, identified the condition, verified that the actuation was spurious, and fully reopened the affected valves:
The cause of the spurious actuation was water leaking from a moisture separator reheater manway causing a short in a flood protection circui The manway leak was repaired and the flood control system was returned to normal statu The inspector reviewed the LER and the circulating water valve protection logi This LER is close (Closed) LER 280/87-30, Inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Due to Inadequate Procedur The issue involved inadvertent actuation of the air ejector to containment divert *valve due to inadequate procedur Immediate corrective action included resetting of the radiatioh monitor which caused the actuation allowing for automatic closure of the divert valv Additional corrective action included revision of the calibration
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procedure to. def eat actuation of the* divert va 1 ve during the test. * The inspector reviewed the revised procedur This item is identifi~d as a LIV (280/87.:.36-02) for fai 1 ure to provide adequate procedure for a surveillance activit This LER is close *
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