IR 05000280/1987028
| ML18151A110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1987 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18151A109 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-28, 50-281-87-28, NUDOCS 8710160074 | |
| Download: ML18151A110 (12) | |
Text
Report Nos.:
50-280/87-28 and 50-281/87-28 licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Co~pany Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
August 30 - October 3, 1987 Inspectors:
/.
.-~
W.. Holland, Senior sid t Inspector Larr~t~tor Approved by: F~~hief Division of Reactor Projects SUMAMRY
/ifi/?7 Date'Signed
/rf1 /.&/ 1 Dite Signed 1~fak)
Date S'i gned Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, followup on inspector identified items, and licensee event report revie Results: No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection repor bAOD006~ g~i&&iao PDR PDR G
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- 0. L. Benson, Station Manager H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager J. A. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations D. J. Burke, Superintendent of Maintenance S. P. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. H. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services R. L. Johnson, Operations Supervisor J. A. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager J. B. Logan, Supervisor, Safety and Licensing
- G. D. Miller, Licensing Coordinator
- H. D. Collar, Supervi~or, Site Quality Assurance
- Attended exit meetin Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technicil advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 5, 1987,
- with those individuals identified by an asteri*sk in paragraph One inspector followup item (paragraph.7) was identified with regards to rev1ew of licensee corrective actions regarding the use of Grinnel valves (280; 281/87-28-01).
The 1 i censee acknowledged the inspection findings with no de sent i ng comment The license did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Plant Status Unit 1 Un.it 1 began the reporting period at powe The -unit operated at power
- until September 20, when at 8:28 p.m., the unit automatically tripped from 100% power due to tripping of the B Reactor Coolant Pum The reactor coolant pump tripped due to a phase_to ground fault in the B phase at the electrical connection on the pum Approximately 35 seconds after the trip, safety injection initiated on high steam flow with low Ta,v The safety injection. (SI) sign.al was initiated due to the steam dumps remaining open from the auctioneered high Tavg. signal from the B reactor-1
- coolant loop in conjunction with loops A and C Tavg. less than 543 degrees F (high steam flow with low-low Tavg,).
Safety systems functioned as designe The SI signal was reset in accordance with emergency procedure approximately five minutes into the even The unit was placed in cold shutdown on on September 22, and repairs were accomplished on the pum The lice~see also decided to remain shutdown for an additional two days to do additional maintenance on selected components in order to reduce their maintenance backlo The unit commenced heatup for return to power on September 28 and recommenced power operation on September 3 The unit operated at power until October 2, when at 8:22 p.m. the unit commenced an orderly shutdown to establish plant conditions to work the fasteners on the C main steam trip valve (MSTV).
The work was required due to a fastener failure when maintenance personnel were attempting to hot torque the body to bonnet studs to stop a small lea The unit reached cold shutdown at.approximately 6:00 p.m. on October 3, and remained in cold shutdown while repairs were being accomplished to the MSTV at the end of the inspection perio Unit 2 Unit 2 began the reporting.period at powe The unit operated at power for the duration of the inspection period.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
This area was not inspected during this inspection perio.
Unresolved Items No new unresolved items are identified in this repor.
Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspector conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
Control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditioris for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs,. jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure The inspector conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
Verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve a 1 i gnment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component(s), and operability of instrumentation. and support items essential to system actuation or performanc *
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Plant tours which included obs~rvation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of*
activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazardsL The inspectors routinely monitor the temperature of the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevente The inspector conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
Verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program (e.g., prima*ry and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup(s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekend Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on September 3, 9, 11, 20, 21, 28, 30, and October Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vauJts, vi ta l battery rooms, steam sa.feguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, Unit 1 containment, and safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The inspectors routinely independently cal~ulated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were r~viewed and specific work activiti~s were monitored to assure thej were being conducted per the RWP S~lected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were -verifie The Plant Risk Status Information Management System (PRISIM) was used by the resident inspectors during this inspection period to determine inspection priorities. Specific areas used during this period were risk implications of the current plant status and component failure data listings. The risk implications section was used to evaluate increase in risk associated with inoperability of a diesel generator on September 9, and inoperability of the Unit 2 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2FW-P-3B) on September 11, 198 The component failure section was used to review past licensee event reports in the auxiliary feedwater pump and diesel generator area The re$idents are continuing to evaluate this system.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee 1 s physical security progra The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
Protected and vital areas access controls; packages and vehicles; badge issuance and visitors; and patrols and compensatory post searching of personnel, retrieval; escorting of On September 1, 1987, the standby high head safety injection pump automatically started from an indicated 1 ow discharge header pressur An instrument technician was troubleshooting pressure transmitter PT-BR-121 in the boron recovery system when he erroneously isolated pressure transmitter PT-CH-121 from the Unit 1 charging syste The licensee is.evaluating this event for_a cause and corrective actions and will subsequently report this to the NRC pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7 The inspectors reviewed the calculations regarding shutdown margin performed during the Unit 1 reactor coolant pump forced outag The method used to obtain a shutdown margin appeared correct; however, the procedure used to perform these calculations (1-0P-lF) contained many errors. These errors included referencing the wrbng page numbers in the station curve book and incorrect algebraic signs in the reactivity formul The inspector discussed the procedure with the operations procedure coordinator and was shown a revision in draft to correct the errors. This procedure inadequacy was discussed with station management and the revised procedure was approved for us *The ins¢ector witnessed the startup of unit 1 on September 30, 198 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a walkdown of the -accessible areas of the safety related portions of the service water cooling to the high head safety injection pump cooling system for both units to verify their operabilit This verification included the following:
Confirmation that the licensee 1s system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and actual plant configuration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed correctly and appear to be -operable; fire protection/
prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labeled and
- appear to be operable; instrumentation is properly installed, calibrated and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit statu *
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie ** Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Inspection areas included the following:
High Head Safety Injection Pump 2-CH-P-18 During this inspection period the licensee performed an extensive preventive maintenance overhaul on the high head safety injection pump 2-CH-P-18 in accordance with maintenance procedure MMP-C-CH-089, 11Correct i ve Maintenance Procedure for Charging Pump/High Head Safety Injection".
The inspector toured the jobsite, interviewed the mechanics involved in the job, and reviewed the procedure during and after the course of this maintenance to verify the following:
Activities were not violating limiting conditions for operations Redundant components were operable Required administrative approvals and tagouti were obtained Approved procedures were being used and adequately contra 11 ed the activity Quality control hold points were established and observed Part of the inspection involved a review of a Quality Assurance Surveillance Memorandum entitled Surveillance of Maintenance on 1-CH-P-18 dated November 14, 198 In that memorandum numerous QA observatiens and comments were listed relating *to a lack of -work cre*w continuity, poor housekeeping, inadequate tool availability to perform the job, poor maintenance techniques, poor health physics practices, and a negative work attitude being displayed by the craft during previous work on Unit 1, B charging pum This memorandum was reviewed by station management and resulted in numerous changes to resolve the issue The inspector discussed these observations with station management and craft supervision and was provided the following list of corrective actions implemented for this job to resolve the above observations and comments:
Prior to the start of work, the foreman for the job assembled a package which included work orders, procedures, work schedules, and applicable drawings. A working copy of the package was placed at the jobsite. Also, a_ll repair/replacement parts were obtained prior to commencing work with exception of gasket material for-the pump
. casing which was not available at that tim *
Prior to commencing work, Health Physics insured that hot spots were temporarily shielded and that the work area -was prepared to minimize the spread of contaminatio Good housekeeping was emphasized and appropriate tool racks and work benches were staged to accommodate parts and to allow easy access for part inspection thus minimizing exposur Prior to commencing work, a scoping briefing was held by the job foreman with his cre In addition, daily meetings were held and each phase was discussed at length prior to commencing wor The craft also displayed a good attitude and professionalism toward the task at han In addition, review of the PM overhaul of 2-CH-P-lB by the Quality Assurance Staff during this period concluded that much progress had been made in resolving the past finding On October 1, 1987, the inspectors conducted a post job procedure review with craft supervision feedback and the following observations were noted:
The master procedure was organized in a notebook that allowed for easy review by the inspector The procedure had been deviated (changed) several times to help clarify steps and to provide data (tolerances, etc.) adjacent to steps requiring the informatio These changes were incorporated into a major procedure revision which was being prepared for safety committee review in parallel with the jo Management and supervision elected to use only on~ team of workers to perform the maintenanc This dedsion promoted a positive work attitude and a sense of job ownership by the craft which resulted in a better product. Craft supervision emphasized that work quality was directly related to this one job/one team concept and stated that this method of conducting maintenance should be used whenever scheduling would permi Maintenance engineering and the craft worked well together and resolved discrepancies in a timely and correct manne The inspectors concluded, *based on the preceding, that the maintenance on the Unit 2, B charging pump was done in a much improved manne Also, the quality assurance findings that were identified in previous jobs were appropriately reviewed, corrective actions were implemented, and the quality of maintenance was enhance No discrepancies were note **
Grinnel Diaphragm Valves During this inspection period, the inspector questioned the failure of the drain header isolation valve, l-DG-14, during the failed loop stop valve packing event described in LER 87-1 This valve is a Grinnel diaphragm valve which is used extensively at Surr It was obvious to the inspector reviewing the subject event that the operators generally expected this valve to fai The licensee stated that an engineering evaluation into the problem is pendin These valves uti.lize a rubber diaphragm that tends to deterioate with age, although the particular diaphragm for l-DG-14 was replaced in May, 198 The licensee states that the maximum expected life of the diaphragm is five year The inspector *also expressed concern over the licensee program that replaces these diaphragms on a routine basis. Station Management agreed that this program is not working as desired and committed to implement additional corrective actions. This item is identified as an inspector followup item (280; 281/87-28-01) to review the corrective actions regarding Grinnel valve *
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726, 61700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as fo 11 ows:
Test prerequisites were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test pr6cedures appeared to perform their intended functio Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following:
On August 31, 1987, the inspector witnessed portions of the surveillance test 2-PT-18.68, "Quarterly Testing Of Miscellaneous Containment Trip Valves 11 *
This test cycles the containment isolation valves that are not operated as part of other tests to their required accident positions and records their closing time to monitor proper operatio The inspector witnessed as component cooling isolation valve TV-CC-2098 would not close from the control roo This air operated valve can not be manually closed, therefore requiring the l~censee to enter a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> action statement to hot standby conditions. Troubleshooting revealed a defective air valve and it was replaced within two hour No discrepancies were note.
On September 4, 1987, the inspector witnessed portions of surveillance test 2-PT-2.5, 11 Steam Generator Level (L-2-485)
11 *
This monthly instrumentation test verifies the operability for the steam generator low-low level reactor protection logi No discrepancies were note On September 11, 1987, the inspector reviewed completed periodic test l-PT-22.3C, 11 Diesel Generator No. 3 Test 11 *
This monthly surveillance test verifies the operability of the No. 3 Emergency Diesel Generato No discrepancies were note On September 14, 1987, the inspector witnessed portions of the periodic test l-PT-8.5, 11Consequence Limiting Safeguards Logic (Hi-Hi Train)
11 *
This monthly surveillance test ensures that both trains of the 11 Hi-Hi
Consequence Limiting Safeguards logic are operable and function as,
require No discrepancies were note On September 18, 1987, the inspector witnessed portions of the periodic test 2-PT-15.lC, 11 Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2-FW-P-2)
This monthly survei 11 ance verifies operabi 1 i ty of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pum An alert operator noticed that an oil temperature gage did not have a calibration sticker. Therefore, he could not meet the prerequisites for the tes A work order was written to change out the gage and the test was subsequently performe No discrepancies were note On September 30, 1987, the inspector again witnessed portions of periodic test l-PT-15.lC, 11 Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (l-FW-P-2)
11 *
The test was conducted in conjunction with flow verification from the pump to the steam generators as required by technical specification prior to exceeding 10% power after reactor startu No discrepancies were identifie *
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280; 281/86-29-01, Followup on Relay Failure The issue involved followup on licensee determination of root cause(s) for reactor protection and safeguards relay failures and implementation of appropriate corrective action(s).
Since the issue was identified, the licensee relocated relays in Unit 2 cabinets to allow for better cooling by not having 3 relays side by side. In addition, engineering is investigating the feasibility of other actions including forced cooling of the c~binet The inspector considers that licensee action on this issue is adequat This item is close (Closed) IFI 280; 281/86-38-02, Followup on long term corrective action for reci rcul at ion spray heat exchanger tube degradatio The issue involved tube degradation of the heat exchanger tubes due to pitting. The pitting was due to the corrosive effect of the service water on the inside of the tube The inspector held discussions with licensee management and
- was informed that the four heat exchangers for each unit are scheduled to be replaced during the 1988 refueiing outage The inspector considers that proposed licensee action on this issue is adequat This item is close Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were id~ntifie.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
The inspector reviewed ttie LERs listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective action(s).
The inspector's review also included followup on implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation that all required corrective action(s) were complet LERs that identify violation(s) of regulation(s) and that meet the criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V shall be identified as Licensee Identified Violations (LIV)
in the following closeout paragraphs. LIVs are considered first-time occurrence violations which meet the NRC Enforcement Po 1 icy criteria for exemption from issuance of a Notice of Violatio These items are identified to allow for proper evaluation of corrective actions in the event that similar events occur in the futur (Closed) LER 280/87-09, Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable Due to Mechanical Bindin The issue involved inoperability of the inside containment isolation valve during performance of a containment sump in-leakage* tes Corrective action included shutting of the manual isolation valves to ensure containment integrit The valve was subsequently replaced with a spare valve during an outage in the spring of 1987. *The inspector verif~ed that th~ valve was replace This item is close (Closed) LER 280/87-10, Improper Routing of Appendix R Related Cable The issue involved licensee identification of a design change which had been implemented at the station which was not in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix Immediate corrective act1on included establishment of fire watches in the affected are Permanent corrective action included a station modification to reroute the affected cables out of the Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunne The inspector verified that the modification is complet This item is close (Closed) LER 280/87-11, Reactor Trip on Low RCS Flow Due to Failure of Loop Stop Valv The issue in_volved a automatic reactor trip from 100% power when the A hot 1 eg 1 oop stop va 1 ve stem failed, permi tt i-ng the disc to drop, partially blocking loop flo Corrective action included repair of the loop stop valve and ultrasonic testing of the other loop stop valve stem The inspector verified corrective actions were complete prior to unit restart~
This item is*close *
(Closed) LER 280/87-12, Failure of Recirculation Spray Pump due to Foreign Materia The issue involved inoperability of outside recircula\\ion spray pump l-RS-P-2B due to high vibration The unit was shut down in accordance with the Technical Specification Corrective action included pump disassembly and repai Also, misalignment problems were corrected and.the pump was reasse*mbled and teste The inspector verified that corrective actions and testing were complete prior to unit restar This item is close (Closed) LER 280/87-13, High Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Due to Failed Packing on Loop Stop Valve The issue involved identification of a reactor coolant system unidentified leak rate in excess of 40 GP The unit was shutdown and the leakage was identified as coming from a failed packing on loop stop valve MOV-159 Corrective action included repacking of.the affected valv In addition, the ioop stop valves were placed on their backseats in accordance.with vendor recommendation The inspector verified that corrective actions were completed prior to unit restar The inspector expressed concern over the failure of the diaphragm on the drain header isolation valve l-DG-1 This failure is specifically addressed in paragraph 7 of this repor This item is closed.
(Closed) LER 281/87-01, Loss of Operating Reactor Coo 1 ant Loop Due to Personne 1 Failing to Fo 11 ow Procedur The issue i nvo 1 ved 1 oss of the operating reactor coolant loop due to a loss of charging and seal injection to the operating reactor coolant pum The-loss of charging flow was due to personnel error in racking out of a charging pump breaker for maintenanc Corrective action included reinstruction of all licensed operators on the importance of following procedur In addition,
- addi ti on*a 1 contra 1 s have been incorporated to re qui re shift supervisor concurrence when racking out charging pump breaker The inspector verified that corrective actions were accomplished. Enforcement action on this item was documented in inspection report 280; 281/87-0 This item is close (Closed) LER 281/87-02, Reactor Trip by Turbine 'Trip at Intermediate Shutdown Due to Personnel Erro The issue involved a reactor trip during startup preparation due to failure to follow procedure by an instrument technician in verification of plant conditions prior to performanc Corrective action included reinstruction of all instrument technicians to obtain the status of plant conditions from the shift supervisor prior to performance of procedur The inspector verified that corrective action was accomp 1 i she Enforcement action
.on this item was documented in inspection report 280; 281/87-0 This item is close (Closed) LER 281/87-03, Reactor Trip by Generator Anti-Motoring Turbine Trip Due to Governor Va 1 ve Leakag The issue i nvo 1 ved a reactor trip from 11% power during unit rampdown for maintenance on the turbin The trip occurred due to a turbine trip caused by leakage past the turbine
governor valve Corrective action included removing of the differential pressure anti-motoring trip circuit from the turbine protection syste In addition, operating procedure was enhanced to open generator output breakers on receipt of either a reverse power or low differential pressure indication. The inspector verified that corrective action was complete This item is closed.