IR 05000280/1987015
| ML18150A204 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1987 |
| From: | Blake J, Newsome R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18150A203 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-15, 50-281-87-15, NUDOCS 8707060245 | |
| Download: ML18150A204 (8) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter: UNITEDSTATES e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.: - 50-280/87-15 and 50-281/87-15 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility.Name: Surry 1 and 2 Approved 1987 Chief Safety SUMMARY ~-Z~-87 Date Signed &!73&/ Date Signed Scope: This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of Nondestructive Examination (NDE) of Units 1 & 2 main feedwater piping replacement welds; Unit 1, loop A, isolation valve stem fracture; augmented NDE of selected Unit 2 recirculation spray system pipe wall and welds for growth of identified degra- _dation; and licensee actio~ on previously opened enforcement item Results: No violations or deviations were identifie b0245 e7500t5~80 PDR ADOCK O PDR G
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Manager
- H. L. Miller, Assistant Manager
- D. L. Benson, Assistant Manager, Virginia Power
- R. H. Blount, Superintendent, Technical Services e
- W. D. Grady, Supervisor Quality, Nondestructive Examination Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 22, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The.inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the licens~ The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during *this inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Units 1 and 2 (Closed) Violation 50-280, 281/86~34-0l, Failure to Provide Appro-priate !SI Drawing This item identified incorrectly revised pressurizer inservice inspection (ISi) drawings which shows the circumferential lower head to shell weld as being located three inches above the support skirt instead of at the correct location, 27 inches above the support skir As a result of the incorrect location of the circumferential weld, ultrasonic inspection of the correct weld was not accomplished as required. The licensee has now examined the weld as required and has issued a new revision to the pressurizer drawings which correctly locate the weld positio The licensee has initiated an ongoing program to review and upgrade isometric drawings for use in the !SI progra This matter is considered close '.
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(Closed) Violation 50-280, 281/84-05-02, Inadequate Corrective Action Measure This item identified a situation where the licensee did not obtain and utilize the services of an ASME Authorized Inspection Agency in a timely manner relative to inservice inspection (IS!) ultrasonic examination procedure deficiencies that were identified and questioned by the Authorized Inspection Agency Inspection Specialis The licensee has implemented a Corporate ISi Manual which provides more detailed administrative controls over all aspects of the !SI program and includes a new procedure 10-ISI-001 titled: Identification, Correction and Documentation of Corrective Action The inspector has_ reviewed this procedure and considers this matter close {Closed) Unresolved Item 50-281/84-05-04, Boric Acid Return Piping Stress Corrosion Crackin All potentially affected piping has been replaced. This item is considered close. Unresolved Items 5 * Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio Independent Inspection Effort On May 16, 1987, Unit 1 reactor was tripped from approximately 100% powe The trip was determined to be caused by restricted coolant flow through the loop A hot leg, reactor coolant loop isolation valve, MOV-159 The cause of the flow restriction through the isolation valve was not imme-diately know The valve is a 34 11 X 30 11 X 34 11 No. S350W DD series 1500 venturi gate valve with an SB-4 Limitorque motor operato The valve was fabricated by Darling Valve & Manufacturing C Following shutdown of the reactor, the licensee made the decision to remove the valve bonnet in order to expose the internal portions of the valve so that positive identification of the flow restriction could be determine Following removal of the bonnet and exposure of the internals of the valve, it was evident that the valve stem had fractured at a point where the valve stem backseat sealing surface begins to flare out from the main stem surfac The seperation allowed the valve disc to drop and lodge on the valve seat area in a partially closed position, thereby causing flow restriction through the valv The valve.stem is 17-4PH stainless steel material and is approximately four inches in diameter at the fracture locatio Discussions with knowledgeable licensee personnel following the visual observation of the fracture, indicated that this fracture was very similar to the fracture of the Unit 1 loop B isolation valve stem that occurred in November 1973 (See Westinghouse Electric Corp. Surry Unit No. 1 Reactor Coolant Loop Isolation Valve Stem Failure Report, ME-HE-12985, of March 7, 1974, for additional information).
The licensee intends to have portions of the failed stem subjected to structural and metallurgical analysis to
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determine the cause of the failur In addition, the licensee intends to have the remaining isolation valve stems* ultrasonically examined to determine if any of the remaining valve stems appear to have similar problem Upon conclusion of this inspection, neither the analysis or the ultrasonic examinations had taken plac The NRC intends to review the findings of the analysis and the ultrasonic examinations in the futur No violations or deviations were identified within the area inspecte. Main Feedwater Pipe Replacement, Units 1 and 2 The inspector reviewed radiographs of circumferential welds in the Unit 2 Main Feedwater Suction and Unit 1 Main Feedwater Discharge piping sys tern These welds were produced as a result of the pipe replacement of portions of these systems.. The welds were radio-graphed by a contractor for the licensee and the radiographs were originally interpreted by the contracto Certain portions of the welds reviewed were originally rejectable as interpreted by the contracto The licensee 1s qualified radiographic film interpreter subsequently re-evaluated the indications shown on the radiographs and accepted them using the applicable acceptance criteria. Sometime later, three of the areas accepted by the licensee 1s interpreter were questioned as to why the rejected areas were later accepte This inspector reviewed the questioned radiographs and felt they were acceptable under the app 1 i cab 1 e acceptance criteri However, in one instance on view 0-1, drawing ElOl WFPD-1-901, weld W-18; the inspector felt that one indication could not be adequately evaluated on the radiograph submitte The licensee had the area re-radio-graphed with the radiation source positioned directly over the area in questio The resulting radiograph revealed a broken slag line that would be acceptable under the acceptance criteria applied to this wel The below listed radiographic film were reviewed to determine if radiographic quality was in accordance with applicable Code require-ments and to specifically verify the following: penetrameter type, size, and placement; penetrameter sensitivity; film density and density variation; film identification; film quality; and weld coverag Also, the inspector reviewed the examination records for the listed welds to determine compliance with procedure requirements for examination records and to determine if disposition of the welds radiographed was in compliance with applicable Code and specification requirement The applicable code is ANSI 83 Unit
2
Drawing No./Weld N E202 WCPD-128-301 W-6 E202 WCPD-128-301 W-6 ElOl WFPD-1.901 W-18 Description Film Reviewed CS.5 11 thick, 18 11 di CS.5 11 thick, 18 11 di CS 1.156 11 thick, 18 11 di * e e
Unit Drawing No./Weld N (Continued) Description Film Reviewed
2
ElOl WFPD-1.901 W-18 E200 WCPD-128.301 W-2 E200 WCPD-128.301 W-2 CS 1.156 11 thick, 18 11 di CS.5 11 thick, 18 11 di cs.sir thick, 18 11 di The inspector reviewed the qualification documentation for both the contractor and licensee personnel radiographic film interpreters in the following areas: employer's name; person certified; activity qualified to perform; effective period of certification; signature of employer's designated representatives; basis used for certifica-tion; and annual visual acuity, color vision examination and periodic recertificatio The inspector reviewed the calibration documentation for the below listed radiographic film interpretation equipmen Densitometer - Serial No. 2473A NBS Film Strip - Serial No. CSY-129666 Radiographic Film Viewer - Serial No. RT-1 The inspector reviewed the magnetic practical examination data for all welds reviewe The *results indicated that no indications had been detected with this examinatio The inspector also performed a visual examination on the outside surface of weld W-18, drawing ElOl WFPD-1-901, prior to the re-radiography of area 0- The visual examination did not reveal any deficiencie * No violations or deviations were identified within the ~reas inspecte. Recirculation Spray System Unit 2 During the latter part of 1986, leakage was identified on 10"-RS-109-153, ASME Class 2 piping, near a welded expansion joint inside containment at the penetration are The expansion joint is located between welds 17 and 18 as shown on drawing VIR-1-4656 Rev. 1. The expansion joint was removed to evaluate the leakage and upon removal evidence of pitting was found*within the local expan*sion joint region as well as the associated piping connected to the weld This was confirmed by a random liquid penetrant examination of the are Exploratory grinding determined that the pits expanded in the base metal, characteristic of a microbic enhanced corrosion phenomen These pits were mechanically sized indicating* depths ranging from .003 11 to.170
- The pipe is stainless steel Sch. 40 with a nominal wall thickness of.365
- Residual water remaining within the system is considered to be the source of the infestation and it was apparent that the residual water existed beyond this local region. A volumetric, radiographic examination (RT),.program was initiated to determine the extent of the corrosio The RT examinations identified crack-like indications in three of the nineteen welds radiographe The crack-like indications were locat~d in welds 15 and 18 as shown on drawing
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VIR-1-4656 and weld 8 shown on drawing VIR-1-465 These three welds also had extensive pitting and two other welds, #16 drawing VIR-1-4656 and #21 drawing VIR-1-4658, indicated pittin RT examinations at low points next to the heat exchangers had no reportable indication Additionally, the expansion joint between welds 16 and 17 on drawing VIR-1-4657 was removed to allow visual examination of the area. The visual examination found similar but less severe conditions than those found at the expansion joint shown on drawing VIR-1-465 The licensee intends to replace the affected piping during the next refueling outag In the interim, the licensee has established a monitoring program and has modified procedures to insure water drainage from the affected are The extent of this program is as follows: (1) Modified Procedure PT 17.3 to insure water drainage on the pump discharge piping following testin (2) Perform a quarterly RT examination of_weld 8 (VIR 1-4658).
(3) During the next outage (refueling) perform RT examinations (random) on welds downstream of the check valves -{2-RS-17, 2-RS-11) to confirm original integrity still exist (4) Continue pipe walk-downs during PT 17.3 for evidence of leakag The current status of the welds exhibiting crack like indications is as follows:
0
Weld #18 (VIR-1-4656) replaced with new wel Weld #15 (VIR-1-4656) remains in syste Weld #8 (VIR-1-4658) remain in system - monitored quarterly for possible growt NOTE: -weld #8 has been radiographed three times including the ori~inal radiograp The crack like indications being monitored do not appear to have grown during the last two quarter The inspector reviewed the below listed radiographs relative to the recirculation spray system to determine the adequacy and extent of the radiographic examination Line N Weld N View Findings RS-109 l7B 0-1 Sat. new weld 1-2 Sat. new weld 2-3 Sat. new weld 3-0 Sat. new weld
) Line N Weld N View (Continued RS-109 RS-109 RS-109 RS-110 RS-110 RS-109 RS-109 RS-109
15
14
8
8
- Original radiograph 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-0 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-0 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-0 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-0 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-0 0-1*
1-2* 2-3* 3-0* 1-2 1-2
Sa Sat *. Sa Sa Findings base metal pitting axial & circ. cracks - base metal pitting axial cracks base metal pitting Sa. weld pitting pitting in weld and base metal Sa Sa Sa Sa Sa Sa base metal pitting base metal pitting possible shallow base metal pitting shallow pitting axial & circ. crack - base metal pitting base metal pitting Sa axial & circ. crack - base metal pitting (RT'd 2-24-87 - no crack growth) axial & circ. crack - base metal pitting (RT'd 5-21-87 - no apparent crack growth) No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspecte. Inspector Followup Items (IFI) Units 1 and 2 (Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/83-22-01, Clarification of ISI Administra-tive Procedure This item identified weaknesses in the licensee's administrative procedures for control of ISI activitie The licensee has issued several additional and revised station administrative procedures to more clearly define the organization, responsibilities, and conduct of operations for the ISi program at Surr The inspector reviewed the below listed procedures and has no further questions regarding this matte Procedure N Revision Title SUADM-M-23 7-5-86 Disposition of ASME Section XL* Inspection and Testing Discrepancies . SUADM-M-26 3-21-86 ASME Section XI Inspection and Examination Control
e Procedure N Revision .(Continued) SUADM-M-25 6-20-85 SUADM-M-33 10-28-86 SUADM-M-36 6-17-86 SUADM-M-20 10-8-85 SUADM-M-19 6-20-85 SUADM-ADM-29 7-03-86 e
Title ASME Documentation Control and Reporting Requirements Secondary Piping Inspections Support Program ASME Section XI Visual Examination Program (VT-2, 3 and 4) Weld Selection Program Inservice Inspection Program-Organization and Responsibilities (Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/85-06-02, Missing Record of Functional'Test After Valve Repai This matter will be addressed during the implementation review of the licensee's new procedure for pump and valve testing. This matter is considered close (Closed) I FI 50-280, 281/82-03-01, Processing of Changes to NOE Procedure This item identified a weakness in the method used by the licensee for control of*changes to NOE procedure The inspector reviewed revised procedure, NDE-3.1 (R3) - Preparation, Issue and Control of Nondestructive Examination Procedures, which standardizes the method for processing changes to NOE procedures. This matter is considered close (Closed) IFI 50-280, 281/85-15-01, Future Inservi ce *Inspection an Repairs for Steam Generator (SG) *Girth Weld Crackin This item identified the possible need for additional licensee examinations to locate cracking in the transition cone of the Steam Generators in Units 1 and Also, the need to*review actions relative to the adequacy of repairs to the SG cracking, the adequacy of examinations performed to verify remova 1 of cracking, and the frequency of subsequent inspection on the areas that have experienced cracking
- were addresse The licensee has examined and removed all cracking located in the Units 1 and 2 SG's transition cone weld and has an ongoing commitment to conduct surface and volumetric examinations of selected areas of these welds. This item is considered closed.
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