IR 05000280/1987020

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-280/87-20 & 50-281/87-20 on 870624-26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Actions on Previous Enforcement Matters & Verification of Compliance W/Order for Mod of Licensee
ML18150A273
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/21/1987
From: Blake J, Kleinsorge W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18150A272 List:
References
50-280-87-20, 50-281-87-20, IEB-80-08, IEB-80-8, IEB-83-06, IEB-83-6, NUDOCS 8707300508
Download: ML18150A273 (6)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:t.J"R REGu( UNITED STATES e,'- of)' . p~~' _ -*-., ,o.,:, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~ ~-, ..

REGION II

'**.* ~

    • ~

. 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900

~ .. ~ ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 '"' ~ . """

  • o'.

. ,, .,,; ...... *.... Report Nos.: 50-280/87-20 and 50-281/87-20 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection ~,,:----) June 24-26, _ 1987 Inspecr,. -i;~* * Approved

~-:-,,

~ . J/ J/ Blake, Chief Mat~rials and Processes Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Date Signed 16-{ ~7 Date Signed Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of 1 icensee actions on previous enforcement matters (92701) ( 92702).

Verification of Compliance with order for Modification of Licensee: Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, IE Bulletins (IEB) (92703) and inspector followup items (IFI) (92701).

Results: No violations or deviations were identiffe PDR ADOCK 05000280 G PDR

REPORT DETAILS Per~ons Contacted Licensee Employees*.

  • D. L. Benser; Station Manager
  • E. S~ Grecheck, Assistant:station Manager
  • W. Craft, Licensing Coordinator

..

  • G. D~ Miller, Licensing Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, and office personnel. *

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • W. E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview Exit Interv.ie The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 26, 1987, with those persons indic~ted in paragraph 1 abov The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting.comments were rece_ived from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio * Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92701) (92702)

(Open) Unresolved-Item (UNR) 50-280, 281/85-06-01 11Technical Specification Requirements for Photographs as ISl Records

  • This i tern concerns the* difference of the* interpretation of Technical Specification TS 6.5.B.7 which states: Records relative to the following i terns sha 11 be retained for the life of the pl an Primary records of *

inservice inspections including, but not limited to radiographs (of welds* . which are radiographed), photographs of the scope traces for welds which are tested by ultrasonit techniques, and photographs of the surface of those welds inspected by visual or surface examinations."

The specific concern of the inspector of record for 85-06 was with regard to the apparent requirement of the TS that the 1 icensee have and retain photographic records of IS The licens~e.indicated that their position with regard to this requirement was that they were not required to take photographs of ISi, but should they do so, they would retain the *

The licensee is currently preparing a TS amendment submittal expected to be transmitted to the NRC by October 31, 1987, which will make TS 6.5. consistent with the VEPCO positio Pending the results of the safety evaluation report for that submittal, this matter remains ope. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio. Verification of Compliance with Order for Modification of Licensee: Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation (Event V) Valve (Tl 25"15/84). Background The Reactor Safety Study (RSS), WASH-1400, identified in a PWR an intersystem loss of coolant accident (LOCA) that is a significant contributor to risk of core melt accidents (Event V).

The design examined in the RSS contained in-series check valves isolating the high pressure primary coolant system (PCS) from the low pressure injection system (LPIS) pipin The scenario which leads to the Event V accident is initiated by the failure of these check valves to function as a pressure isolation barrier against reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure. This causes an overpressurization and rupture of the LPIS low pressure piping which results in a LOCA outside of the containmen To better define the Event V, all light water reactor licensees were requested by letter, dated February 23, 1980, to provide the information in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f).

Based on licensee responses it was concluded that a valve configura-tion of concern existed at 36 plant On April 20, 1981, an order requiring the above described testing was sent to 32 PWR plants and two BWR plant This order included a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Technical Specification inserted pages to require leak rate testing of Event V pressure isolation valve The two additional plants had previously beer;i issued a licensee amendmen Inspection The inspector reviewed documentation associated with the implementation of the Event V order from 1980 to present to evaluate compliance, the specific areas examined are indicated belo (1) The inspector reviewed the plants' technical specifications (TS) to ensure the modification was entered as required by the Event V Orde (2)

The inspector reviewed the below listed test procedures to determine whether those test procedures reflected all require-ments of the TS inc 1 ud i ng: an acceptable test method* is used. (this would include a direct volumetric leakage rate measuremerit or other equivalerit means capable of demonstrating that leakage rate limits given in the TS are not exceeded); test procedure requirements which ensure that leakage rates obtained * are for.individual valves rather than for combined components; procedural. requirements.that leakage rates measured.at test pressures less than the maximum potential pres$ure differe~tial * across the.valve be ~djusted by assuming leakage to ba directly proportional to the pressure differential to the one-half power . {as noted in the SER whicti accompanies the Order)*; and procedural acceptanc& criteria stated in accordance with the T In addition, the inspector reviewed the. licensee's. procedures to verify that it identified corrective actions required in the event unacceptbale leakage rate result Procedures Reviewed Procedure *N *l-PT~18.11, dated October 2; 1986 2-PT-18.11, *dated February 24, 1987 Title

  • "SI Check Valve Leakage-Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves"

"SI Check Valve* Leakage-Primary Coolant System Pressure 1solation Valves" Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie. IE Bulletins {IEBs) {92703) (Closed) IEB No. 80~08: Examination of Containment Liner Penetration .Welds 11, Units 1 and The inspector has reviewed VEPCO's letter of July 7, 1980, and determined that the requested actions of the bulletin have been acceptably addresse The inspector held discussions with responsible utility representatives, reviewed supporting documentation and observed r~presentative * samples of work to verify that the actions identified in the 1 etter. of response have been completed. This matter is consideredclose \\.

  • c c

(Open) IEB N.0. 83-06: i*Nonconforming Materials Supplied by Tube-Lin Corporation Facilities at Long Island City, New York; Houston, Texas; and Carol Stream, Illinois 11, Units 1 and The inspector has reviewed VEPC0 1s letters of November 18, 1983, and December 9, 1983, and determined that the requested actions.of the bulletin have not been acceptably addressed. * The inspector held discussions with responsible utility representatives, reviewed supporting documentation and observed representative samples of work relative to tt.e actions identified in the letter of respons The bulletin indifat~d that although the specific details invdlving the nonconforming materi a 1 s supp 1 i ed by Tube-Line may not direct 1 y apply for a given facility, the licensee was requested to review the general concerns expressed in the bulletin for appl icabi 1 ity at their facilit The licensee's were requested to describe, in their responses to the IEB, the results of their review; and if the general concerns applied, they were requested to describe the short-term and long-term corrective actions to be taken and the schedules t~ereo The licensee's_ response did not address this issu The licensee identified 18 fittings that were -obtained Tube-Line.af Houston, Texa These fittings were accepted by the licensee based upon installation both NDE and hydrostatic testing were performed ** on the fitting Visual and 1 iquid penetrant examinations were performed on all welded joints with no indications foun Hydrostatic testing, as required by ASME Section XI, was successfully performed at 1.25 times system design pressure.* The licensee concluded that

  • * the successful completion of these tests and the fact that the components. have been in service trouble-free since installation *

provides adequate ass.urance that component and system integrity exists and will be maintaine * It is their conclusion that additional testing is not require * The inspector discussed the. above with the liri~nsee and indicated that the above testing did not provide adequate assurance of acceptabilit *

    • Therefore, pending the licensee'.s response to tt,e generic issues not addressed in* previous responses to this bulletin and the resolution of the material acceptability issue, the bulletin remains ope.

Inspector Followup Items (IFis) {92701) (Open) Item 50-280, 281/86~35-0l: "Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure Discrepancies

The licensee informed the inspector that the procedure in question had been revised but was still in concurrence routin This matter remains ope {Open) Item 50-280, 281/86-35-02: 11Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure Discrepancies" The licensee informed the inspector that the procedure in question had been revised but was still in concurrence routin This matter remains ope (Open) Item 50-280, 281/86-35-03: "Radiography Procedure Discrepancies" The licensee informed the inspector that the procedure in question had been revised but was still in concurrence routin This matter remains ope Within the areas examined, no deviations or violations were identified. }}