IR 05000280/1987017
| ML18150A496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1987 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Holland W, Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18150A495 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-17, 50-281-87-17, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, NUDOCS 8707310272 | |
| Download: ML18150A496 (11) | |
Text
Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATOR_¥ COMMISSION REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3032 /87-17 and 50-281/87~17 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmondi Vir~inia 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 1987 Inspectors:,....,....--=__,,.,..-i,~~~~~~~~:::.,._-111-~~~~~-,-~~
W. E. Holland, Senior Reside
~t:l- ~~
.kz Larry r.Nicholson, Resident ~tor Approved by:. * * *
- ?"'~ ~
k F. * S. Cant'reli,Sect ion Chief,-
. Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY Date Signed Date Signed
' Date Signed Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, followup on inspector identified items, and licensee event report revie Results:
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection.report.
8707310272 870727
~DR AD0CK 05000280
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. REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted *D. L. Benson, Station Manager
- H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- J. A. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations D. J. Burke, Superintendent of Maintenance S. P. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. H. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services R. L. Johnson, Operations Supervisor
- J. A. Price, 'Site Quality Assurance Manager W. D. Craft, Licensing Coordinator G. D. Miller; Licensing Coordinator J. B. Logan, Supervisor, Safety and Licensing
- Attended exit meeting Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
The NRC Region II Division of Reactor Projects Director, L.A. Reyes and the NRC Region II Section Chief,. Floyd S. Cantrell, visited the station on June 25, 198 Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 6, 1987, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1. The following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exi One unresolved item (paragraph 6) was identified with regards to conducting a 10 CFR 50.59 review when deviating from the FSAR (280; 281/87-17-01).
One unresolved item (paragraph 8) was identified with regards to evaluation of deficiencies noted during surveillance testing (280; 281/87-17-02).
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting comment The license did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 began the reporting period at powe However, the unit commenced a rampdown to hot shutdown on June 8, due to an inoperable outside recirculation spray pum The unit reached hot shutdown on that morning and arrived at cold shutdown on June 11, 198 Repairs were accomplished and the pump was satisfactorily tested on June 21, 198 The unit reached criticality and tied to the grid on June 22, 198 Paragraph 6 addresses the pump repair **
The unit operated at power until a Notification of Unusual Event was declared at 3:52 p.m. (EDT), on June 23, 1987, due to a measured reactor coolant system leakage in excess of 40 gpm. The leak was isolated by backseating all main loop stop valves and the unusual event was secured at
. 7:00 p.~. (EDT), that evening: The unit was subs~quently placed in cold shutdow Paragraph 6 addresses the main loop stop valve packing repai * Repairs were accomplished and the unit was taken critical on June 28, 198 The unit recommenced power operation tha~ evening and operated at power for the remainder of th~ inspection perio Unit 2 Unit 2 began the r~porting period at powe The unit operated at power for the duration of the inspection perio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) (Closed) Unresolved Item* (URI) 280; 281/87-13-01, Review of licensee justificati6n for b~ckseating loop stop valves during normal operatio The issue was identified ~n inspe~tion report 280; 281/87-13. The issue involved backseating of the* subject valves during normal operation which appeared to be in conflict with the valve technical manual and Vendor's recommendatio Since the issue was identified, the licensee has conducted an engi~eering evaluation of the concern. That evaluation was documented in Engineering Work Request (EWR) 87-25 The EWR was reviewed and approved by the station safety committee on June 26, 198 In that report, the litensee concluded, in pa~t, that backseating of the loop stop valves to 1/16 11 deflection maximum during operation is an acceptable practice and will.be continue The EWR also included a vendor letter which also *stated that backseating to 1/16' deflection maximum is acceptable and would not cause valve damag The inspector reviewed the EWR. * This item is close Unresolved Items Unresolved* items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation Two new unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 6 and.
Plant Operations Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspector conducted daily inspections in the following areas:* control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, t~chnital specifications, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; review of control room ~perator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedure **
The. inspector conducted weekly inspections in the foll owing areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve* alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or cornponent(s), and operability-of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performanc *
Plant tours were conducted which included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazard *
The inspector conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling* program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric atid t~nk samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup(s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 1 Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekend Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on June 8, 15, 21, 23, 28; and 2 Inspections included areas in the Units*1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, * Unit 1 * containment, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, cable penetration _areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level intake structure, and safeguards va.lve pit and pump pit area Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewe~ to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated and that appropriate actions were taken, if require The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed-and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verifie *
In the course of monthly activities,*the ins~ectors included a ~evfew of the licensee's physical security program~
The performance of v~rious shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of* daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls; searching of personnel, packages and. vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory post Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)
The inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible areas of the vital and emergency electrical system for both units to verify its operabilit This verification included the following:
confirmation that the licensee's system lineup procedure matches plant drawings and actual plant configuration; hangers and supports are operable; housekeeping is adequate; valves and/or breakers in the system are installed cor~ectly and appear to b~ operable; fire protection/prevention is adequate; major system components are properly labeled and appear*to be operable; instrumentation
is properly installed, calibrated and functioning; and valves and/or breakers are in correct position as required by plant procedure and unit status. During the system walkdown the inspector noted that the H and J bus crossconnect breakers (5Hl) were racked out; however, the inspector also had determined that the FSAR, para~raph 8.4.1 required that these breakers be removed from the cubicle This condition was identified to the licensee and a request was made for the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluatio The inspection period ended prior to the licensee providin~ the evaluatio This issue is unresolved (280; 281/87-17~01) pending.the inspectors review of the evaluatio *
Within the areas i~ipected, no violations or devi~ti6ns were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Inspection areas included the following:
Outside Recirculating Spray Pump (1-RS-P-28)
The outside recirculating spray pump 1-RS-P-18 was declared inoperable due to high vibration and high discharge pressure in accordance with the acceptance criteria of surveillance test procedure 1-PT-1 Th{s pu~~
is a *vertical, two stage centrifugal pump with a capacity of 3500 gpm at a design head of 249 fee Each pump has 50% of the spray capacity necessary to return the containment to subatmospheric conditions following a design basis acciden The repair work for this pump was performed in accordance with maintenance procedure MMP-C-RS-091, 11 Di sassembly,* Inspection and Reassembly of Outside Recirculating Spray Purilps 11 *
The inspector followed the job on a daily basis both at the jo~site and-at the.daily management status meeting Results.of the pump inspection revealed foreign material (bolts, nuts,
. etc.) lodged in the pump internals. The licensee also discovered the pump shaft runnouts to be out of tolerance as.well as evidence of eccentrfc
. loading. The inspector reviewed the corrective action~ documented on the appropriate engineering work requests and work orders. *,Although the procedure was generally adequate to perform this complex job, the licensee agreed that a subsequent revisio~ to incorporate specific items learned during this effort is appropriat No discrepancies were note Main Loop Stop Valve Packing Replacemen On June 23, 1987, Unit 1 shut down due to excessive identified leakage*
at one of the reactor coolant loop stop valves (MOV-1593).
Immediate c.orrective.action during the shutdown was to backseat the loop stop isolation valves in order to stop the leak. The unit was operating with the loop stop valves approximately l/8 11 off the backseat since repair of a broken loop stop valve in May 1987 (see inspection report 280; 281/87-13),
Corrective action during this outage was to repack two of the loop stop valves (MOV-1591 and MOV-1593).
Also, the vendtir was contacted concerning the maximum torque specified in the technical manual for the packing glan follower bolts. The torque specified in the manual was a maximum of 70 to
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80 ft-lb Additional discussions with the vendor indicated that this value was too low and should have been a maximum of 350 ft-lb This information resulted in _the licensee retorquing all* of the loop stop isolation valve packing gland follower bolts to 225 ft-lbs. Also, the vendor stated that backseating of the valves to 1/16 11 maximum spring pack deflection during operation was atceptabl~.
This issue is addressed in paragraph 4 of this repor The inspector reviewed the appropriate work-packages and verified that the loop stop valves were_backseated no more than 1/1611 deflect i ori during a containment entry at norma 1 operating temperature and yressure (tiot shutdown) on June 28, 198 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726, 61700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as follows:
Test prerequisit.es were me Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedure Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function..
Adequate co6rdination existed ~mong personnel involved. in the tes Test data was properly collected and recorde Inspection areas included the following:
Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump On June 22, 1987, the inspector witnessed surveillance testing of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. l-FW-P-2 per periodic.test 1-PT-15:l This test demonstrates the operability of the subject AFW pump with the unit stable at greater than 2% powe* The test was run using the train IIB 11 steam admission valve SOV-MS-102B following a-modification to the upstream steafu drain system. This modification was to improve the steam drain system foilowing a problem with overspeed trips on this pump as detailed in inspection report 87-1 No discrepancies were note Safety Injection Train Undervoltage Functional Test
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The inspector reviewed the below. tests that functionally verified the engineered safeguards feature of each safety injection train simultaneously with an undervo l tage condition on the appropriate * emergency bu The specific tests revi-ewed were performed during the 1986 refueling outages for both unit This review focused primarily on the documentation, evaluation, and co~rective actions performed as a result of the subject test The following items were identified during the review:
- General Comments:
Surveillance testing required by the technical specification is sometimes being performed in maintenance procedure This policy bypasses much of the review and approval process required for periodic tests. as delineated in administrative procedure SUADM-ADM-21, 11Station Procedures 11 *
Specifically, Technical
.Specification 4.6.A.1.b requires that testfng demonstrate that the loss of voltage and degraded voltage protection is defeated whenever the emergency diesel is the sole ~ource of power to an emergency bus and that this protection is automatically reinstated when the diesel output breaker is. opene The licensee stated that this test is performed by maintenance procedures 1-EMP-PRT-35, 50, 52, and 33 for Unit 1 and 2-EMP-PRT~73, 72, 86, & 87 for Unit The majority of items discovered during this review imply a failure to adequately document and evaluate test problems and discrepancies as they occurre Section 6 of each test procedure requires that a station deviation be submitted for. *
every component that fails to perform * as indicate No cross
- reference to station deviations are provided with the completed test package, therefore making it very difficult to confirm proper evaluatio A licensee search of station records was in*
. progress when the inspection period ende PT-18.2A, 11 Safety Injection Train A - H Bus Undervoltage Functional Test 11 completed 7-7-8 The test result~ on the test critique sheet is mirked 11 unsatisfactory 11 **
The acceptance criteria that are signed in* section 6 of the test requires a station deviation to be generated for each failed component and noted on the test critique shee The *only corrective action annotated on the test critique sheet for the many problems encountered is:
11 issued appropriate wr's.
11 with a work. order number 35926 This work order addresses only one component, 1-VS~MOD-lOOB, and concludes that the procedure was in erro *
The completed test results were not reviewed by the surveillance and test engineering group as required by station administrative procedure SUADM-ADM-21 and as committed to by the licensee response to the Notice of Violation included in Inspection Report 50-280,281/86-0 Acceptance criteria step 6. 6 was deleted with no reason for deviation stated. as required by administrative procedure SUADM-ADM-2.
Signoff for procedure step 5.24.4 was not made that verifies the emergency diesel generator was se.cured and restored in accordance with the appropriate procedur The licensee provided the inspector with* a special test (1-ST~189) that was performed as a retest following the above test. The inspector noted that ther~ is no traceability between the problems encountered in the original test and the subsequent special test, especially since no purpose is given in the special test. This is of particular concern since the spe~ial *
test addresses only a small fraction of the problems annotated on the original test critique shee The retest by means of a special test does not include the res~lts review and approval required by the original periodic test. It was also noted that the performance of this special test was not identified in the Monthly Operating Report to the NRC as required by administrative procedure SUADM-0-1 PT-18.2B, 11Safety Injection Train B - J Bus Undervoltage Functional Test 11, completed 7-6-8 The test *results were determined to be 11 unsati sfactory" as annotated on the test critique shee No corrective action was taken or initiated since the two components that failed to *
respond as required were determined to be from a proce_dure problem onl Administrative -procedure SUADM-ADM-21 requires that a request to change procedure form be initiated and evaluated for possible inclusion in the next procedure revisio The licensee could not locate the appropriate change request form, nor were the items corrected in the March 17, 1987 revision to the procedur *-
A review of the test results revealed that valve SOV-IA-103 did not respond as required by Attachment III of the subject tes This deficiency was not annotated on the test critique sheet nor*
evaluated via a station deviatio A review of the March 17, 1987 revision to the subject procedure revealed several component actuations that were altered with no revision bar in the margin to flag the change during the approval proces PT-18.2A; "Safety Injection Train A - H Bus Undervoltage Functional Test 11 completedll-23-8 The problem identified on the test critique sheet~ as well as the i terns changed on a procedure deviation, were all evaluated as "procedure problems 11 *
It appears that no procedure request change was initiated or evaluate The revision to the procedure issued March 17, 1987, did not correct the items identified. * PT-18.28, "Safety Injection Train B - J Bus Undervoltage Functional Test 11, completed 11-21-8 Technical Specification 4.11.B.3 states that all valves required to operate on a safety injection signal shall be tested for op_erabi l ity and paragraph 4.11.A. 2 states that t~ese valves
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shall have completed their strok No verification exists that valve MDV 28670 was actuated with a safety injection signal. -
Verification that fan 2-FS-F-43 wi 11 stop as required on a safety injection signal was not performe Technical Specification 4.12.B.2 requires that automatic shutdown be demonstrate The test critique sheet listed several components that failed to perform as required with the corrective action as 11 submitted procedure change request"._
The l_i censee * can not 1 ocate an applicable pr6cedure change request, - nor was the subject components required response modified in the procedure revision issued March 17, 198 The test critique sheet states that chargin_g pump* 2-CH-P-lA failed to ~ctuate as r~quired, and that retest will be require The inspector could find no evidence that this deficiency was subsequently evaluated and correcte *
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The above items indicate a general lack of systematic identification, evaluation, and corrective action for defici~ncies noted during this teit. These findings were discussed with the licensee on June 29, 198 This item is identified as an unresolved item pending the licensee search for additional documentatiori (280; 281/ 87-17-02).
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 280/85-25-01, Correction of Kaman radiation monitor displa The issue involved disparities between the process vent Victoreen and Kaman r_adiation display monitors which were observed by the inspector during review on an event in which a gaseous release _occutre The licensee's corrective act1on included procurement of new hardware to correct the Kaman displa The inspector verified that the licensee was implementing the corrective action; and, although the action was not complete, the inspector considers that this item is close.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
The fo specter reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of the corrective action(s).
The inspector's review also included followup
- ori implemeritation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation-that all required corrective action(s) were complet *
(Closed) LER 280/86-20, Limitorque E. Q. Uncertainty. The issue involved identification of questionable wiring of Limitorque motor valve operators as outlined in IEN 86-0 This area was reviewed by a environmental qualification inspection team in June 1986, and the results of their findings are documented in -inspection report 280; 281/86-1 In that report an unresolved item (280; 281/86-12-01) was identified with regards
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to the licensee's response.to IEN 86-0 After discussion of this LER with fegional inspectors, the inspector concluded that corrective actions for this item will be reviewed as part of the resolutioQ of the unr~solved ite This item is close *
(Closed) LER 280/86-28, Inoperable IRPis. * The issue involved movement of the Unit 1 individual rod position indicators down approximately 25 steps during plant startup. * The cause of this condition was failure of the normal negative power suppl Alternate power automatically was available, but this supply was at a reduced voltage causing !RPI to indicate lo Corrective action included replacement and calibration of the negative power suppl In addition, cal.ibration of the !RPI.power supplies was added to the !RPI refueling periodic test. This item is close (Closed)
LER 280/281/86-32, Inoperable Charging Pump Service Water Subsystem and Control and Relay Room Chillers Due to Loss of Service Wate The issue involved loss of the subject system due to air being introduced into the system when a newly installed SW supply line was valved in without insuring that the new line was full of wate Corrective action ~ncluded alignment of the normal flowpath ~nd venting of affected pump The system w~s returned to service in approximately 12 minutes. Additional corrective action inc.ludes installation of vents in the new line to allow for proper ventin This item is close (Closed) LER 280/86-36,.Failure to Perform Type 8 Testing of RSHE Due to Inadequate Testing Capabilit The issue iilvo l ved failure to test pressure retainin~ rubber gaskets on recirculation spray heat exchangers
- per the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Corrective action included replacement* of the heat *exchanger diaphragms with thicker diaphragm This action eliminated the need for testin The inspector verified corrective action was accomplishe This item is close (Closed) LER 281/85-03, Failure of Recirc~lation Spray Valves. The issue involved identification of inoperable* outside recirculation spray pump suction valves during performance of a type C test on the valves. Also the outside reci rcul at ion spray pump discharge va 1 ve was found to be inoperable during a. test 12 days later.* The cause of the failures was determined to be failed or loose linkage from the remote operator(s) for the v~lve(s).
Corrective action included refurbishment of the valve(s)
operator linkag In.addition, valve testing* procedures were modified to insure verification of proper valve movemen The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action This item is close (Closed) LER 281/86-13, Partial Engineered Safety Feature Actuations Due to Loss of Main Feed Pump Caused by Loss of Lube Oil Pressure and Loss of Suction Pressure Due to Misaligned Valves. * The issue.involved actuation of two Unit 2 engineered safety features (motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps start and steam generator blowdown (SGBD) trip valve closure) due to tripping of a main feed pump (MFP) breake This event occurred due to cycling of the MFP auxiliary oil pump due to the pump control being in aut Also, approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> later the auxi.liary feedwater pump
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dischirge isolation ~alves opened and the SGBD trip ~alves shu This event occurred due to operation~ personnel closing a mislabeled suction valve to the main feed pum Corrective action included correction of the labeling on the condensate valves and changing of the procedure to require
. changing the MFP auxiliary lube' oil pump control to manual for maintaining of steam generator level with the condensate pump(s). * The inspector verified that corrective actions were complete This item is closed.