IR 05000280/1987016
| ML18150A177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1987 |
| From: | Cantrell F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18150A176 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-16-EC, 50-281-87-16, NUDOCS 8706250249 | |
| Download: ML18150A177 (4) | |
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SUMMARY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50-280/87-16 and 281/87-16 Virginia Electric and Power Company 50-280 and 50-281 DPR-32 and DPR-37 SCOPE:
An enforcement conference was held in Regio~ II Office on May 19, 198 Messrs. M. L. Ernst and L.A. Reyes opened the meeting by expressing concern with the improper routing of Appendix 11R 11 related cables in the Surry Unit 2 cable vault and tunnel as reported in Special Report 87-010-00 (attachment 1)
and discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280,281/87-0 Virginia Electric and Power Company then made a presentation covering an overview, chronology of events, safety implications, corrective actions, the design change program, and conclusion Attachment 2 to this report contains information from the presentatio RESULTS:
The results of the NRC findings in this area will be forwarded under separate cove PDR ADOCK 05000280 G
- Attendees NRC:
REPORT DETAILS M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, RI!
L.A. Reyes, Director, Division ~f Reactor Projects, (DRP)
V. L. Brownlee, Acting Deputy Director, DRP G. R. Jenkins, Direc~or, Enforcement and Investigation Coordinat~on Staff !(EICS)
F. S. C~nt~~]l, Sectfon Chief, DRP
,
, I,
W. E. Hpllp.nd, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry R. P. Crot~au; Project Engineer, DRP M. D. Hunti,; Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. Wiseman,: Fire Protection Engineer, DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator (EICS)
R. J. Goddard, Regional Council, Region II G. C. Lainas, Assistant Director, DRP, NRR K. Eccleston, Reactor Projects I/II, NRR P. Milano, Reactor Engineer, Enforcement Licensee:
W. L. Ste~art~ Vice Presi~ent, Nuclear Operations N. E. Clark, ~anag~r, Nuclear Programs and Licensing E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager, Surry G. L. Ppnnel, Director Safety Evaluation and Control L. Warn,ck, Electrital Engineer T. A. Miller, Electrical Engineer 2 *.
Enforcement Meeting Messrs. M. L. Ernst and L. A. Reyes opened the meeting by expressing concern*with the improper routing of Appendix "R" related cables in the Surry Unit 2 cable vault and tu.nnel (CVT).
The event was reported in Special Report 87-010-00 and discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-280,281/87-0 A copy of the special report is attached (Attach-ment #1). Mr. W. L. Stewart, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, Virginia Electric and Power Company, gave a brief description of the even Mr. E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager, Surry, then presented an overview, chronology of events, safety implications, corrective actions, the design change program, arid conclusio Attachment 2 contains the handouts presented at.the meetin The event involved the rerouting of power and control cables for Emergency*
Diesel Generator (EDG) Number 1 through the Unit 2 CVT using Design Change Package (DCP) 83-39 The 1987 annual review and update of the Appendix R report revealed that cables associated wit~ the Number 3 EDG were also routed through the Unit* 2 CV This condition is not in accordance with
10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III, G.2 which requires separation of redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment. Surry has three EOG 1s, EOG 1 supplies Unit 1, EOG 2 supplies Unit 2 and EOG 3 can supply either Unit 1 or Unit 2. A fire in Number 2 CVT could disable cables for both EOG 1 and EOG 3, as well as Unit 2 safe shutdown equipment (Auxiliary feed pumps and high head safety injection pumps).
The sequence of events that led upto the improper routing of the cables and discovery of the noncompliance with Appendix R is contained in Attachment Appendix R engineering work had previously been contracted out to CVGNA Engineering; Stone and Webster; and Engineering, Planning and Management Inc (EPM).
The modification"S were made with EPM review for Appendix R compliance in 198 In.1985 a lack of cable block diagrams for EOG 3 was identified and the block diagrams were issued in 1986~
The noncompliance with Appendix R was then discovered during the Annual Appendix R Report Update using the block diagrams in March of 198 The licensee now uses an inhouse engineering staff for Appendix.Revaluation With respect to the safety implications, a fire in the Unit 2 CVT could result in the loss of EOG 1 and EOG 3 but the licensee stated offsite power would still be available to the lJ bu The lH bus would also be lost howeve The Unit 2 safe shutdown equipment (auxiliary feedwater pumps and high head safety injection pumps) would be lost in the event of a fire in the Number 2 CVT, however, Unit 1 equipment can be mechanically cross connected to supply Unit CFR 50 Appendix R requires that alternative shutdown capability shall be available assuming a loss of offsite powe A loss of safe shutdown equipment, including charging pumps, could result for both units assuming a loss of offsite power with a fire in the Unit 2 CV Corrective actions taken by the licensee included having a fire watch inspecting the area at least once a shift (the area already has two fire detection systems and two fixed fire suppression systems) and reviewing other OCPs for Appendix R. requirements at North Anna and Surr Ouri ng the reviews a communications cable was also found to be in violation of Appendix R requirements. This cable has been rerouted. The EOG 3 control cables will be relocate With respect to *the design change program, the licensee now has a OCP standard (STO-GN-0021) for Appendix R reviews which contaihs**-~n Appendix R checklis Also, Appendix R review expertise is now internal and the majority of engineering is performed by the license The licensee stated that multiple design cha~ges by multiple architect/engineers, concurrent with Appendix R reanalysis, contributed to the review prob 1 ems 1 ead i ng up to the non comp 1 i ance with Appendix R and current inhouse review should prevent recurrance *
3 Canel usi on The routing of cables through CVT No. 2 did not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III. The result of a
- fire in CVT No. 2 could result in the loss of safe shutdown*equipment and EDGs 1 and 3; however, backup equipment and offsite power would still be availabl Safe shutdown equipment, including charging pumps, would be lost for both units in the event of a fire in the Unit 2 CVT assuming a loss of offsite power per 10 CFR 50 Appendix Separate correspondence will provide further NRC findings in this are The event was identified by the licensee, promptly reported in Special Report 87-010-00, and corrective action has been taken or is schedule Previous performance in the Fi re Protection area has been good as illustrated by a rating of 1 in this area during the last systematic assessment of 1 i censee performance covering the period of March 1, 1.985, through August 31, 198 The licensee also stated that an update to Special Report 87-010-00 will be issued to describe long term corrective actions and the communications cable that was found to be in violation of Appendix R requirement Attachments:
1. Special Report 87-010-00 Presentation Handouts