IR 05000280/1987029

Insp Repts 50-280/87-29 & 50-281/87-29 on 871007-09.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Observation & Evaluation of Full Scale Emergency Exercise

ML18151A139
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/29/1987
From:	Decker T, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18151A138	List: IR 05000280/1987029 ML18151A137
References
50-280-87-29, 50-281-87-29, NUDOCS 8711130122
Download: ML18151A139 (21)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.: 50-280/87-29 and 50-281/87-29 Licensee:

Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:

50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:

Surry License Nos.!

DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection Inspector:

Conducted:

October 7-9, 1987 a. JJrrzrL__

A. Gooden Accompanying Personnel:

W.W. Stansberry Approved by:

J. A. Arildsen K. M. Clark R. P. Croteau*

E. F. Williams

. Jy-M.,'ill J/?o~

T. R. Decker, Section Chief Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY lo.. -2-°I-67 Date Signed ltJ-Z.9-S'I Date Signed Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved the observ.ation and evaluation of a full scale emergency exercis Results:

No violations or deviations were identifie B71113AOD01~ ~~&A&iao PDR

~

PDR G

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• D. L. Benson, Manager, Surry Power Station

• B. McBride, Coordinator, Corporate Emergency Planning

• R. E. Beckwith, Coordinator, Corporate Emergency Planning

• J. B. Costello, Coordinator, Surry Emergency Planning

• F. M. Cox, Supervisor, Corporate Emergency Planning

• E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Manager, Surry Power Station

• N. E. Hardwick, Manager, Nuclear Programs and Licensing

• B. H. Hendrix, Supervisor, Surry Telecommunication

• S. A. Harrison, Coordinator, North Anna Emergency Planning

• G.D. Miller, Coordinator, Licensing

• W. L. Stewart, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• J. L. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors

• W. E. Holl and

• L. E. Nicholson

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 9, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio.

Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I I. ** * *

The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on several occasion While no major prob 1 ems were noted, the scenario showed weaknesses in its message preparatio However, this did not detract from the overall performance by licensee personne The scena~io developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the ons i te and offs i te emergency organizations of the 1 i censee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercise. During the exercise, a real event occurred involving an unidentified leak in Unit As a result, licensee attention was momentarily diverted to the

.real event from the exercise scenario. The NRC Resident Inspector and the Exercise Evaluation Team Leader concurred with the actions taken by the licensee to mitigate the real event while maintaining the flow of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10.CFR 50.47(b)(l), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergenc The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, due to the scenario scope and objectives, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not demonstrate The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC}, and the Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF).

The assignment of responsibility and staffing for each emergency response facility appeared to be consistent with the licensee's approved procedure No violations or deviations were identifie Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

'

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Revision 1:

(1) responsibilities for emergency were unambiguously defined; (2) adequate staffing was provided to assure* initial facility accident

response in. key functional areas at all times; (3) onsite and offsite support organizational interactions were specifie The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of.the Control Room, TSC, OSC, and the LEO Staffing was adequate and prompt at all location The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Station Emergency Manager promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Station Manage The interface between the licensee's onsite emergency organization and State/local support agencies appeared to be adequat No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to ensure that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility had been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b){3), 10 CFR 50, Appendi*x E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C. *

State emergency response personnel were _accommodated at the Local Emergency Operations Facilit An inspector noted that according to the Letters of Agreement found in the Emergency Plan, the licensee had made arrangements for requesting offsite support to assist in the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear faci 1 ity licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the Implementing Procedure The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identified * Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established by the licensee for. notification of State and local response

organizations, licensee emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been

. established; and the means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section ! An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were available for use in providing information concerning*

the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert.the licensee's augmented emergency response organizatio However, the initial notification was not completed expeditiously due to the responsible personnel I s interpretation of the notification time allowanc Control Room personnel misinterpreted the 15 minute notification requirement for the initial notification, as the time measured from the declaration of.the event to the initiation of the phone cal The licensee's notification procedure (EPIP 2.01,

"Notification of State and Local Governments") clearly states that the initial notification must be made within 15 minutes following declaration of the emergenc Therefore, the licensee was informed that training and instructions should emphasize that initial notifications must be completed as compared to being initiated within 15 minute The licensee acknowledged this finding. This is an inspector followup ite Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-01):

Provide training and instructions to emphasize that initial notifications must be completed*

within 15 minutes following the declaration of an emergenc The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operationa The system w_as activated during this exercise to simulate warning the public of -

significant events occurring at the Statio No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Commu~ications (82301)

This area was observed to determine that prov1 s10ns exist for prompt communications among principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee I s emergency* response organization and offsite authorities were goo However, radio communications between the Offsite Monitoring Team and the LEOF was no in accordance with the pla The inspector noted that radio communications between the Offsite Monitoring Team and the LEOF were nonexistent after the first hour and a half of the exercis In addition, two Offsite Monitoring Teams and a site accountability team located at Hog Island, approximately 3 miles from the plant, were unsuccessful in establishing

radio contact with the LEO Problems with radio communications were evident throughout* the exercis Field teams demonstrated backup communications by use of the public telephones. However, this system was not very reliable in that the LEOF did not provide periodic updates or further instructions to monitoring team Contact was established only when initiated by monitoring team This item was also identified by the licensee observer. This licensee identified item will be tracked as an inspector followup item for evaluation during a subsequent exercis Licensee Identified, Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-02):

Evaluate offsite monitoring team radio communications system for adequacy in coverage of the 10 mile EP No violations or deviations were identifie.

Public Education and Information (82301)

This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Information was provided to the media and the public in advance bf the exercis The information included details on how the public would be notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergenc A rumor control program was also in plac A Local Emergency News Center (LENC) was promptly activated and an effective public information function was establishe The inspector noted that news releases were accurate, not too technical, and generally timel However, since the primary spokesperson for the licensee organization was located in Richmond at the Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC) and the State spokesperson was located in the LENC at Surry, coordination between the licensee and State prior to the news conference was either poor or non-existen In one instance, the State spokesperson was summoned to a microphone in _the LENC with no prior knowledge of what the licensee statements *would b The licensee was informed that this exercise finding was considered an exercise weaknes The licensee's corrective action for this item will be reviewed during a subsequent exercis Inspector Fo 11 owup I tern ( 50-280, 281/87-29-03):

Exercise Weakness -

Failure to coordinate press releases with State spokesperso The inspector also noted that no provisions were made for security at the LEN The licensee acknowledged this finding and was informed that this is considered an inspector followup item *

Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-04):

Provide security at the LENC during exercises and/or event **

The overall performance in both the local and corporate news center was goo However, areas where improvement could be made were:

(1) the LENC speaker system; and (2) the microphone system used at the Corporate News Center by the VEPCo spokesperso It was noted that the speaker system in the LENC was barely audible at times and would not be adequate in the presence of a large crow In addition, periodically during the news briefings from Richmond, the VEPCo spokesperson's voice faded out due to movement away from the microphon No violations or deviations were identifie.

Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the following emergency response facilities: Control Room - An inspector observed that Control Room personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available atid the response was prompt and effectiv Initially, some of the Control Room personnel experienced confusion as a result of the real event involving Unit The unidentified leak created divided responsibilities in that personnel had concurrent responsibilities with the exercise and real.proble The licensee acknowledged this finding and was informed that exercise players should be completely divorced from plant responsibilities and be easily identified as exercise player This matter is considered an inspector followup ite Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-05):

Normal plant responsibility should be temporarily removed from exercise participants to lessen Control Room confusio Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and staffed in approximately_ 30 minutes fol lowing notification by the Station Emergency Manager of the simulated emergency con.ditions leading to the Alert classification. The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities, and TSC operations appeared to be adequat The TSC appeared to have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff. It was noted that continuous communication with the Control Room was not maintained during the first several hours of the exercis The coordination from the TSC with the Control Room and OSC needs improvemen An inspector noted that the Control Room provided information to the TSC, but the TSC in return provided very minimal information to the Control Roo There was little or no coordination regarding accident assessment, *

classification, and mitigatio Further examples of the TSC lack of coordination and communication involved the OSC as follows:

(1) an incorrect equipment failure was reported to the OSC which resulted in over two hours of diagnostic work being performed without resolution; and ( 2) the DSC was not briefed regarding Unit 1 being manually trippe The licensee was informed that the coordination from the TSC with the Control Room and OSC is considered an Inspector Followup Ite Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-06):

Improve the coordination from the TSC with the Control Room and OS Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was staffed promptly following activation of the Emergency Plan by the Station Emergency Manage The OSC Director was knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities, and displayed significant command, control, and technical competenc A defined chain of command was established which designated an alternate to be in charge during the OSC Director's absenc As stated in the above paragraph, communications between the TSC and OSC needed improvement, and the inspector noted that the OSC staff exhibited some confusion in distinguishing exercise events and actual plant condition *

Health Physics personnel provided routine habitability surveys in the OSC and surrounding areas throughout the exercis Inplant Health Physics coverage appeared to be adequate with respect to Damage Control Team The inspector noted that the OSC maintained continuous monitoring of the radio transmissions regarding the various HP activitie It was al so noted that the OSC had a very limited supply of radios and personnel were not fully trained on the use of radio The licensee was informed that this* item is considered an Inspector Followup Ite Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-07):

Provide training to the OSC personnel regarding use of radio One task team was properly assembled and briefed by OSC personnel, yet actually departed the OSC prior to the OSC Di rector's orde Upon receiving a report of the team's departure, the OSC Director informed the OSC personnel that he would order all team departures to ensure that a proper briefing had been conducted and to make a final evaluation of the team's composition to ensure the efficient use of OSC personnel. * The licensee was informed that this item is considered an inspector followup ite Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-08):

Verify that the OSC Director is cognizant of the OSC Task Team's departure from the OS No violations or deviations were identifie Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF) - The LEOF was promptly activated and staffed in a manner consistent with the exercise scenari The facility staff appeared to be knowledgeable regarding their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities, and the required operation appeared to be adequat The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support and maintenance of the assigned staf Security was promptly established and effectively maintaine Personnel in the LEOF monitored the onsite and offsite radiological assessment This Health Physics information was processed and coordinated in an effective manner for use in protective action recommendation The flow of plant parameter information was provided by the Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS).

LEOF personnel performed habitability surveys throughout the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie. Accident Assessment {82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the acciden During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Station Emergency Manager concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency conditio Radiological assessment activities were spread over several group An accident assessment group in the TSC estimated the radiological impact in the plant based on inplant monitoring and onsite measurement Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC and LEO Offsite radiological monitoring teams were deployed to assess the level of radioactivity in those areas within the path of the plum The inspector noted that Offsite Monitoring Team No. 3367 did an excel lent job of tracking their whole-body exposure by making frequent checks of their direct dosimeter readin The air sampler and radiation detection equipment had recent calibration sticker *

NRC and 1 i censee observers* noted that the offs i te monitoring *team's emergency kit was incomplete when compared to the inventory sheet:

no tweezers were available for handling air sample media; there were no 100 cc gas bombs for noble gas sampling; and most of the lids provided for

the sample cups were the wrong siz Poor health physics practices were demonstrated during air sampling due to the absence of tweezers and protective glove The radio communications were inadequate in that monitoring team #3367 was unable to communicate with the LEOF for approximately an hou Other areas where improvement could be made were:

(1)

The failure of the Field Team Communicator in the LEOF and monitoring team members to preface communications with "This i~ a Drill.

(2) Monitoring Team #3367 did not follow the procedure (EPIP 4.16) for offsite monitorin Many of the items above were documented during the licensee's controller/evaluator critiqu The licensee's corrective action for the above findings are considered an inspector followup item and will be reviewed during a subsequent exercis Inspector Followup Item (IFI) (50-280, 281/87-29-09):

Verify that the contents of the offsite monitoring team kit is consistent with the inventory shee IFI (50-280, 281/87-29-10):

Assure that offsite monitoring teams conduct environmental monitoring in accordance with EPIP 4.1 IFI (50-280, 281/87-29-11):

Review the adequacy of radio communications for the 10-mile EP The NRC inspector noted that the initial command and control of the offsite monitoring team designated #3367 was poo The direction and mission assignments were constantly being changed and countermaned during the first 30 minutes of deploymen The licensee was informed that this matter is considered an-inspector followup ite I FI ( 50-280, 281/87-29-12):

Improve command and contra 1 of the offs ite monitoring team during the initial deploymen No violations or deviations were identifie.

Protective Responses (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations

within the 10-mile EP The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteri Additionally, onsit protective action involving personnel accountability was both adequate and promp No violations or deviations were identifie.

Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that procedL!res include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll),

and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector noted that exposure guidelines were in place for variou*s categories of emergency action Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared to be adequate with the exception of the offsite monitoring team (Paragraph 13) and coverage for the injured contaminated victim (Paragraph 16).

No violations or deviations were identifie. Medical and Fire Drills (82301)

An inspector observed the emergency medi ca 1 and fire dri 11 that was concurrent with the annual exercis Objectives of both drills were accomplishe During the medical drill, the NRC and licensee observer noted that the individual providing the initial notification to the Control Room, did not provide sufficient information regarding the condition of the individua This resulted in approximately a 20 minute delay before the Control Room was aware that ~he individual may also be contaminate This item is an inspector followup item which will be evaluated during subsequent drill Inspector Followup Item (50-280, 281/87-29-13):

During the initial notification to the Control Roorri, provide sufficient information to ensure that prompt and correct actions are being initiate Additionally, the NRC inspector noted that poor Health Physics practices were shown by Health Physics personne The detector that was used for surveying was not enclosed in a protective covering to prevent contamination of the probe during a survey of the spilled material. Also, personnel performing a contamination survey initially wore no gloves *

These examples of poor Health Physics practices are considered an inspector followup ite IFI {50-280, 281/87-29-14):

Improve health physics and contamination control in areas of suspected contaminatio The inspector noted that security for the fire drill was established in a very prompt manner, and included the access road to the fire, and the main roa The offsi te fire support agencies (Smithfield and Surry Volunteer Fire Departments) responded in a very prompt manner and the coordination at the scene of the fire appeared to be adequat No violations or deviations were identifie.

Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)

This area was observed to determine that general plans are made for recovery and reentry as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee briefly discussed recovery and reentry planning, but the exercise was terminated at this poin No violations or deviations were identifie.

Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee I s critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I A formal licensee critique was held on October 9, 1987, with exercise controllers, licensee management, and NRC personnel in attendanc The licensee discussed areas of the exercise in which corrective actions or additional investigation for possible improvernent will be require Following the licensee's presentation, the NRC inspector provided the preliminary findings as noted by the NRC evaluation tea The licensee was informed that an informal critique should be held in each emergency facility with all controllers, players, and observers immediately following termination of the exercis The inspector emphasized that the informal critique is considered a part of the exercis The licensee acknowledged this item as an inspector followup ite IFI {50-280, 281/87-29-15):

Conduct a critique in each emergency facility with all players irrmediately following the exercis A puplic meeting was held on October 9, 198 Representatives from licensee management, the State, local governments, FEMA, and the NRC were in attendanc Preliminary findings from the exercise were presented by NRC, State, and FEMA representative.

No violation~ or deviations were identifie.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

A report of FEMA's evaluation concerning the activities of offsite preparedness will be forwarded by separate correspondenc.

Inspector Followup (92701) (Closed) IFI 85-33-01:

Followup on licensee corrective action for exercis This item was closed previously under Report No. 87-1 As stated in Report No. 87-12, a sampling of self-identified exercise items indicated actions were being taken by licensee to correct exercise finding (Closed) IFI 85-33-02:

Offsite teams count particulate filter and iodine cartridge separatel The inspector noted that evaluation of the silver zeolite cartridge was made after the particulate filter was remove (Closed) 85-33-04:

Provide adequate traffic control for fire dril The inspector noted that security for the fire drill was posted at all key locations leading to the area of the simulated fir (Closed) IFI 86-22-02:

OSC was reported functional prior to health physics coverage which later resulted in delayed team respons The OSC was staffed and activated in accordance with procedural requirement (Closed) IFI 86-22-03:

Exerdse Weakness - Recovery Manager assuming the responsibility from Station Emergency Manage A review of the revised Surry Emergency Plan, Section 5.0, Page 5.8, dated April 22, 1987; clearly delineates the responsibilities that are transferred to the Recovery manager from the Station Emergency Manager once the LEOF is activate (Closed) IFI 86-22-04:

Exercise Weakness - Failure to provide frequent approved plant status and core assessment data to the LEOF and CEC The 1 icensee previously used an Emergency Status Transmission and Telecorrununications (ESTAT) system to distribute the informatio This method has been replaced by use of an Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) which continuously displays plant parameters. on monitors in the various fac.ilities. The ERFCS is backed up by plant status forms which are distributed by the Administrative Support Team Telecopier Operator if the ERFCS is inoperabl Use of the ERFCS was adequate; however, use of the backup plant status forms was not observe (Closed) IFI 87-12-02:

Untimely implementation of an identified error in AP-5.2 Revision 0.01 to AP-5.20, "Radiation Monitoring System Ventilation Vent Monitor(s) Alert/Alarm," incorporated a

correction to the conversion factor error identified by the licensee in June-198 The revision is dated September 11, 1987, and the procedure change action was signed as completed on September 24, 198 Attachment:

Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Summary

SCOPE OF EXERCISE On October 8, 1987, Virginia Electric and Power Company intends to demonstrate its ability to implement the Surry Power Station Emergency Pla The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of the Emergency Plan, associated implementing procedures, and selected portions of the Virginia Electric and Power Company Corporate Emergency Response Plan in accordance with 10CFRS0.47(b)(14),

and to participate in the implementation of State and local government emergency response plans as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agenc This exercise will be held in conjunction with full scale emergency response demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the counties of James City, Isle of Wight, Surry, and York, and the cities of Newport News and Williamsbur Simulations of response will be performed with Federal agencies and volunteer groups, as well as other supporting organization The exercise will demonstrate that those individuals and agencies assigned responsibilities in a radiological emergency are capable of providing the necessary protective measures to ensure the health and safety of the public in the event of an'accident at the Surry Power Statio The exercise is intended to demonstrate responses to the four emergency classes established by NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Station A scenario will be prepared to accomplish a successive escalation through these emergency classe Free play is encouraged and controllers will only interfere with participant's response if the exercise lags behind schedule, if emergency response personnel take inappropriate actions to carry them to the next event, or if action is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier than scheduled by the scenari At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the statio Station management may, at their discr~tion, suspend the exercise for any periQd of time necessary to ensure this goa Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the simulated incident or any parts thereo The Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and the Local Emergency Operations Facility will be activated in response to appropriate scenario action Also, Virginia Electric and Power Company intends to activate the Corporate Emergency Response Plan at its General Office Building in Richmond, Virginia, to. demonstrate the Corporate Emergency Response Center's capability to interact with the Local Emergency Operations Facilit *

OBJECTIVES OF EXERCISE The objectives of this exercise are to demonstrate by actual performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions as they relate to the Surry Power Station Emergency Pla The simulated accident will involve response and subsequent recovery actions to include:

emergency classification, notification of company personnel and off-site organizations, simulated actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the event, which will include a

simulated off-site radiological releas The intent of this effort is to demonstrate the adequacy of the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan (SEP),

the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs),

the Corporate Emergency* Response Plan (CERP),

and the Corporate Plan Implementing Procedures (CPIPs).

Simulations of some aspects of emergency preparedness, without actual demonstrations by the Station of Corporate entities, may occur where it is impractical to call for personnel imvolvemen The following objectives have been. developed in order to establish the scope of the 1987 Surry Power Station Emergency Preparedness Exercis The objectives ensure that required events are included in the exercise scenario, and establish criteria to be evaluated by controllers and observers during the conduct of the exercise.

• OVERALL STATION OBJECTIVES 1)

Demonstrate the ability to make proper decisions related to radiation exposure and to implement these decision )

Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain emergency management control of station operations and maintenanc )

Demonstrate the ability to make protective action recommendations that protect station personnel and the general publi )

Demonstrate the ability to clasify the emergency in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure )

Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization to support emergency operations in a timely and effective manne )

Demonstrate the ability to evacuate designated non-essential personnel from the sit )

Demonstrate the ability to transition into the recovery mod )

Conduct an effective critique in order to disclose significant exercise findings which require corrective action B~

OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES 1)

Demonstrate the ability to recognize operational symptoms indicative of degrading plant condition )

Demonstrate the ability to clasify the emergency in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ) *Demonstrate the ability to use notification/alerting procedures and method )

Demonstrate the ability to communicate with supporting location *

C. *SECURITY OBJECTIVES 1)

Demonstrate access control and security for the station and the Local Emergency Operations Facilit )

Demonstrate station employee accountabilit )

Demonstrate the ability to support site evacuatio )

Demonstrate call-out of station personnel, as necessar HEALTH PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OBJECTIVES 1)

Demonstrate the necessary radiological controls to remove a contaminated injured individual from an accident scene and to assist the medical team to prepare the individual for transport to an offsite medical facilit )

Demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessments, and to formulate offsite radiological dose projection )

Demonstrate the use of the Post Accident Sampling System to obtain samples in support of accident assessment activitie )

Demonstrate collection and analysis of water, vegetation, soil, and_ air samples both on-site and off-site, as appropriat )

Demonstrate use of communications by the monitoring team )

Demonstrate response to and analysis of simulated elevated airborne and/or liquid activity levels (as appropriate), and of simulated elevated area radiation level HEALTH & SAFETY OBJECTIVES 1)

Simulate the injury and contamination of one or more employees and demonstrate appropriate respons )

Demonstrate the ability to transport injured individual(s) to an offsite medical facilit )

Demonstrate participation by an offsite medical facilit )

Demonstrate that offsite rescue agencies can send supporting units to the statio EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY OBJECTIVES 1)

Demonstrate activation of the following Emergency Response Facilities:

Control Room (CR) or simulated facility Technical Support Center (TSC)

Operational Support Center (OSC)

Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)

Corporate Emerge~cy Response Center (CERC)

r EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY OBJECTIVES [continued]

2)

Demonstrate the communications capabilities of the Control Room, TSC, osc, LEOF, and CERC, and the ability to maintain these communications with Federal, State, and local government This shall include sending, receiving, and understanding the content of messages involved. *

3)

Demonstrate the proper utilization *of the Emergency Response Facilities and that adequate emergency response equipment exist CORPORATE OBJECTIVES 1)

Demonstrate that the LEOF can be adequately staffed and conununications properly establishe )

Demonstrate that the CERC can be adequately staffed and made functional (e.g., maintain communications, provide engineering assistance, provide logistic support, and establish a Rumor Control Group).

3)

Demonstrate the activiation of "the Local Media Cente )

Demonstrate coordination of news announcements with offsite emergency response agencie )

Demonstrate the timely release and distribution of news announcement )

Demonstrate the ability to conduct timely and informative media briefing )

Demonstrate the ability to respond to outside news inquiries, if receive r

SCENARIO NARRATIVE Initially, at 0815 on Thursday, October 8th, both units are operating at 100 percent powe The Unit #1 Stearn Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is inoperable due to sheared coupling. It has been out of service since 2015 hours0.0233 days <br />0.56 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.667075e-4 months <br /> October 7th and spare parts are enroute to effect repairs; return to service is not expected for an additional 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The Kaman High Range/Low Range Vent Vent monitor has been unavailable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> because the sample pump is out of cormnissio Spare parts for this equipment are also enroute, but not expected to arrive for 2 day The scenario begins with tropical storm "Bob" 220 miles east of Wilmington, North Carolina traveling on a heading of 350 degrees at 15 miles per hou The system has demonstrated erratic behavior in both speed and directio A tropical storm watch has been posted for eastern North Carolina and southeastern Virgini Prognosis is for the storm to strengthen to hurricane status within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and landfall is expected on the central North Carolina coast in approximately 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Locally, the forecast calls for 80 percent probability of early afternoon thunderstorms'

followed by clearing skies, tonight's low in the mid-60' At approximately 0945 an injury will be reported with possible contaminatio The station First Aid Team will respond to this ~ven The injury will require transport of the individual to the Medical College of Virginia by ambulanc A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT will be declared in accordance with Tab F of EPIP-1.0 At approximately 1345, Security and Warehouse personnel will report the crash of an aircraft into the Surry Power Station switchyar An ALERT is declared in accordance with Tab K of EPIP-1.0 The aircraft will have collided with the transmission tower for the 230KV line to Chuckatuck (Line

1. 290).

Additionally, the fuel oil storage tank for the Gas Turbine Generators will have been punctured and the associated dike for containing spillage from the tank will have rupture The aircraft's fuel tanks explode and ignite the spilled fuel oi A subsequent failure of the nearby natural gas line will cause a natural gas explosion and fir Response to this event will include initial response by the Surry Power Station Fire Brigade and subsequent response by the Surry and Isle of Wight Volunteer Fire Departments.

A failure of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) just before 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> results in a spurious trip of all reactor coolant pumps (RCP) on station service bus underfrequenc Under these conditions, the RPS would normally initiate a reactor trip on RCP breaker position and low loop flow; however, the RPS fails and the reactor continues to produce approximately 100% powe The combination of nuclear power generation and low coolant flow causes a departure from nucleate boiling condition resulting in fuel clad temperatures exceeding design, failure of fuel rod cladding, and a release of fission products to the reactor coolant system (RCS).

A SITE.AREA EMERGENCY will be declared in accordance with Tab A of EPIP-1.0 During the time period prior to the Reactor Operators locally opening the reactor trip breakers 6 the Control Room Operators observe core delta T rapidly increasin The reactor trip breakers are locally opened approximately five minutes following the RCP tri Fifteen minutes following the RCP trip, the letdown radiation monitor will be in hi alarm and indicating 1.0E6 counts per minut At 1710, there will be a Steam Generator Tube Rupture followed by a Steam Generator safety valve failing ope This results in an RCS leak flow path to atmospher A GENERAL EMERGENCY will be declared in accordance with Tab B of EPIP-1.0 The safety valve will remain open for approximately one hou During this time, a site evacuation will probably be ordere As the wind is in the direction of the primary remote assembly area, the alternate remote assembly area should be use The exercise is terminated when all objectives are me This is expected to be achieved at approximately 2115 hours0.0245 days <br />0.588 hours <br />0.0035 weeks <br />8.047575e-4 months <br />.