IR 05000354/1989099
| ML18095A624 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1990 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18095A623 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-89-99-01, 50-354-89-99-1, NUDOCS 9012060179 | |
| Download: ML18095A624 (35) | |
Text
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ENCLOSURE 1 FINAL SALP REPORT U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT NO. 50-354/89-99 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION ASSESSMENT PERIOD:
MAY 1, 1989 - JULY 31, 1990 BOARD MEETING DATE:
SEPTEMBER 19, 1990 9012060179 qn1129 PDR ADOCK 6§oocij54
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PDC b!
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I.* INTRODUCTION...
I SUMMARY OF RESULTS Overview...
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SUMMARY IV.A LICENSEE ACTIVITIES BACKGROUND The assessment period began May 1, 1989, with the Hope Creek reactor at full powe Automatic reactor scrams occurred on August 30, 1989, on December 30, 1989, on January 6, 1990 and on March 19, 1990. These scrams are further described in Section II Other than these four scrams, there were no unplanned shutdowns during the assessment perio On September 16, 1989, the Unit shutdown for its second refueling outag The Unit restarted on November 16, 198 At the end of the. period, the Unit had operated continuously for 124 day IV.B NRC Inspection and Review Activities Two NRC resident inspectors were assigned to the site throughout th assessment perio Regional inspectors performed routine inspections throughout the period, with added inspection emphasis during the schedule outag In addition, a special inspection of the Maintenance Program was performed in October 1989, and a Fitness For Duty inspection was performed in March 199 Also, a team inspection was conducted to review perform-ance during the annua 1 emergency pre pa redness exercise on October 14, 198 NRC performed a total of 3165 hours0.0366 days <br />0.879 hours <br />0.00523 weeks <br />0.0012 months <br /> of inspection dur-ing the period, which equates to 2453 hours0.0284 days <br />0.681 hours <br />0.00406 weeks <br />9.333665e-4 months <br /> on an annualized basi,/
IV.C Significant Licensee Meetings
- A meeting was held on February 28, 1990, at Hope Creek Generating Stati n to conduct a mid-SALP review and evaluation of licensee performa c IV.D Reactor Scrams and Unplanned Shutdowns.
Event Description Date Power Root Cause The reactor was manually scrammed when rods inserted due to a failed solder joint in the scram air header onnection to one control rod driv The solder joint had been inadequa ely installed dur-ing plant constructio /30/89 Component failure, inadequate installation
/
The reactor automatically scrammed due failure of the main turbine thrust bear*
age during surveillance testin Ma mented modifications that were scram in 198 /30/89 100~6
~bi ne trip caused by the eaJ detector trip bypass link-nt flad not aggressively imple-
- after a similar failure and
. *'
'*
..
............,............... ***... The reactor automatica y due to a main turbine trip caused by a high level in the A parator during surveillance testing. Al-though calibra~ed pe
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ve or's recommendation, the normal and emerg-ency drain systems
,.*' poo y tune This, when combined with an oper-ating error, caused ne m sture separator level to rise uncontrollabl /6/90 96%
Ina quate level Maintenance/
ca trol system Surveillance
~ aintenance, operating
~ error
- The reactor a tomatically scrammed on low. reactor level due to loss of. the d feedwater pumps when an offsite marsh fire caused an elec-trical bu transien Although an electrical transient. was predictable ous marsh fire events,*the licensee did not implement effective to prevent recurrenc %
Marsh Fire,
- electrical system transient; inadequate corrective actions Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification
26a IV.C.Significant Licensee Meetings A meeting was held on February 28, 1990, at Hope Creek Generating Station to.conduct a mid-SALP review and evaluation of.licensee performanc IV.D Reactor Scrams and Unplanned Shutdowns Event Description Date Power Root Cause Functional Area The reactor was manually scrammed when half of the control rods inserted due to a failed solder joint in the scram air header connection to one control rod drive. The solder joint had been inadequately installed dur-ing plant constructio /30/89 81%
Component failure, inadequate installation NA The reactor automatically scrammed due to a turbine trip caused by the failure oft.he main turbine thrust bearing wear detector trip bypass link-age during surveillance testin Management had not aggressively imple-mented modifications that were recommended after a similar failure and scram in 198 /30/89 100%
Component failure, inadequate corrective actions Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification The reactor automatically scrammed due to a main turbine trip caused by a high level in the A moisture separator during surveillance testin Al-though calibrated per the vendor's recommendation, the normal and emerg-ency drain systems were poorly tune This, when combined with an oper-ating error, caused the moisture separator level to rise uncontrollabl /6/90 96%
Inadequate level control system maintenance, operating error Maintenance/
Surveillance The reactor automatically scrammed on low reactor level due to loss of the condensate and feedwater pumps when an offsite marsh fire caused an elec-trical bus transien Although an electrical transient was predictable from previous marsh fire events, the licensee did not implement effective measures to prevent recurrenc /19/90 100%
Marsh Fire, electrical system transient; inadequate corrective actions Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification
TABLE 1 InsQection Hours Summary Hope Creek Generating Station May 1, 1989 - July 31, 1990 Annualized Functional Area Hours*
Hours
% of Time A. Plant Operations 1375 1066 43 Radiological Controls 283 219 9 Maintenance/Surveillance 9 Emergency Preparedness
62 3 Security and Safeguards 144 112 5 Engineering/Technical Support 191 148 6 Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification 128
4 TOTALS 3165 2453 100
- Does not include operator licensing hour TABLE 2 Enforcement Summary Hope Creek Generating Station May 1, 1989 - July 31, 1990 Functional Area Plant Operations Radiological Controls Maintenance/Surveillance Emergency Preparedness Security Engineering/Technical Support Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification TOTALS Number/Severity of Violations Level IV
1
TABLE 3 Licensee Event Report Hope Creek Generating Station May 1, 1989 - July 31, 1990 Number by Cause Functional Area A
B c D
E x Subtotal Operations
1
1 Radiological Controls
1 Maintenance/Surveillance
2
3 Emergency Preparedness Security and Safeguards F. *Engineering/Technical
3
Support Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification TOTALS
2
4
1 This analysis includes LERs 89-12 through 89-26, and 90-01 through 90-1 Cause Codes: B. E. Personnel Error Design, manufacturing or installation Unknown or external cause Procedure inadequacy Component fail~re Other
2
6
25 Root causes assessed by the SALP Board may differ from those listed in the LE Table 3 (Continued)
Clearly, the above causal analysis shows that personnel errors remained the major contributor to reportable event PSE&G's analysis also showed personnel errors to be the major contributor, but to a lesser extent than last perio These errors involved six violations of *Technical Specifications (all PSE&G identified).
PSE&G analyses, including the Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES),*have not identified any common root causes for.the personnel error Personnel at various working levels were involved, from technicians to proced-ure writers to engineers to supervisory licensed operator The next significant causal factor was component failur Review of these failures did not determine any shortcomings in the preventive maintenance progra ATTACHMENT 1
.SALP Criteria Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending on whether the facility is in a construction or operational phas Functional areas normally represent areas signifi.cant to. nuclear safety and the environ-men Some fun ct i ona l areas may not be assessed because of little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful observations in that are Special areas may be added to highlight significant observation The following evaluation criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each functional area: Assurance of quality, including management involvement and control; Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint; Enforcement hi story; Operational and construction events (including response to, analyses of, reporting of, and corrective actions for);
. Staffing (including management); and Effectiveness of training and qualification progra On the basis of the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated is rated according to three performance categorie The definitions of these per-formance categories are given below:
Category Licensee management attention to and involvement in nuclear safety or safeguards activities resulted in a superior level of performanc NRC will consider reduced levels of inspection effor Category Licensee management attention to and.involvement in nuclear safety or safeguards activities resulted in a good level of performanc NRC will consider maintaining normal levels of inspection effor Attachment 1
Category Licensee management attention to a11d involvement in nuclear safety or safeguards activities resulted in an acceptable level of performance; how-ever, because of the NRC 1 s concern that a decrease in performance may approach or reach an unacceptable level, NRC will consider increased levels of inspection effort..
Category Insuffi*cient information exists to support an assessment of licensee per-formanc These cases would include instances in which a rating could not be developed because of insufficient licensee activity or insufficient NRC inspectio The SALP Board may assess a functional area to compare the licensee's perform-ance during a portion of the assessment period to that during an entire period in order to determine a performance tren Generally, performance in the latter part of a SALP period is compared to the performance of the entire perio Trends in performance from one period to the nex~ may also be note The trend categories used by the SALP Board are as follows:
Improving:
Declining:
Licensee performance was determined to be improvin.
Licensee performance was determined to be declining and the*
licensee had not satisfactorily addressed this patter A trend is assigned only when, in the opinion of the SALP Board, the trend is significant enough to be considered indicative of a likely change.in the per-formance category in the near futur For example, a classification of
"Category 2, Improvi ng 11 indicates the cl ear potent i a 1 for "Category 1 11 perform-ance in the next SALP perio It should be noted that Category 3 performance, the lowest category, represents acceptable, although minimally adequate, safety performanc If at any time the NRC concluded that a licensee was not achieving an adequate level of safety performance, it wou 1 d then be incumbent upon NRC to take prompt appropriate action in the interest of public health and safet Such matters would* be dealt with independently from, and on a inore urgent schedule than, the SALP process.