ML19269D456
| ML19269D456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1979 |
| From: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19063C911 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906040079 | |
| Download: ML19269D456 (3) | |
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Frederick W. Schneider Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 201/430-7373 Vice President Production March 28, 1979 Mr. Boyce H.
Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Grier:
NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 50-272/79-03 JANUARY 30 - FEBRUARY l AND FEBRUARY 5, 1979 UNIT NO. 1 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION We have reviewed the report of your investigation conducted on January 30-February 1 and February 5, 1979, which was transmitted with your letter of March 8, 1979 and received on March 12, 1979.
Our response to the items of noncompliance in Appendix A of your Investigation Report is as follows:
Item A, Infraction:
Salem's Unit 1 Technical Specification 3/4.7.11 entitled "Pene-tration Fire Barriers," states in part, that:
. with one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />."
The Salem Maintenance Department Procedure M34 (SIC) entitled
" Repair of Fire Barrier and Flood Protection Seals," paragraph 4.0 states, in part, that:
"The Senior Shift Supervisor shall be noti-fled prior to opening a fire barrier or floor protection seal and the Supervisor in charge of the job shall be responsible for post-ing a fire watch during the entire time a fire barrier is open."
Contrary to the above, on January 30, 1979, a penetration at the 88' elevation between EE and DD building designation in the relay room wall of Unit 1 was not sealed and no fire watch posted.
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NRC Investigation Report 3-28-79 No. 50-272/79-03 Reply to A:
1.
To correct the situation a fire watch was posted immediately and the penetration was sealed later that day.
2.
The cause of the incident was failure of the contractor Catalytic, Inc. personnel to follow the prescribed Maintenance Procedure M3Y " Repair of Fire Barrier and Flood Protection Seals."
To prevent future items of noncompliance, training sessions were held in February 1979, for all Catalytic, Inc. personnel involved in the seal repair work at Sulem.
The classes empha-sized the requirements and importance of following Maintenance Procedure M3Y.
All future Catalytic, Inc. personnel involved in seal repair work shall also receive training in M3Y.
The Catalytic, Inc. Resident Project Manager has informed all his staff to strictly adhere to Maintenance Procedure M3Y.
3.
We are now in compliance.
Item B, Infraction:
10CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III states, in part, tnat:
" Design control measures shall be applied to items such as
. maintenance and repair; and delineation of acceptance criteria for inspections and tests."
The Salem FSAR, Section 7, Instrumentation and Control, page Q7.ll-3, Amendment 38, states in part, that:
" Written design and installation procedures are established to assure that non-safety related cables only run within one safety related channel."
The licensee's " Cable Control Manual" establishes the requirements for cable breakout and methods of cable tie-down during installation.
Contrary to the above, on January 30, 1979, the installation of security cables in safety related tray 1C2C7 at the 100' level of the Auxiliary Building, was not being installed in accordance with the requirements of the " Cable Control Manual" and the installation of the security system cables, where they associate with safety re-lated systems, was not being controlled in accordance with the re-quirements of the safety related installed cables, trays and pene-tration.
Reply to B:
1.
To correct the situation, the cables were untied from the underside of tray IC2C6 and then properly routed and secured in tray 1C2C7 where they belong.
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NRC Investigation Report 3-28-79 No. 50-272/79-03 2.
To prevent recurrence, the Catalytic, Inc. electrical supervisors were reinstructed in the requirements of the PSE&G Cable Control Manual for installation of cables and the Catalytic, Inc. Site QA Manager increased the QC surveillance of all cable pulling activity by Catalytic, Inc. personnel.
In addition, PSE&G Engi-neering Department has initiated a " Field Directive No. 101" to assure that new work being performed shall not violate any re-quirements for existing safety related equipment.
Also, PSE&G Engineering Department is preparing a letter that would provide a mechanism to reinforce control of design changes that are not safety related but are in the area of safety related installa-tions.
3.
We shall be in full compliance by April 15, 1979.
If you require additional information, we will be pleased to discuss it with you.
Sincerely, ?
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Director, Office of Inspection USNRC Washington, D.C.
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