IR 05000254/2019004
| ML20030A124 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2020 |
| From: | Dave Hills NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2019004 | |
| Download: ML20030A124 (29) | |
Text
January 29, 2020
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2019004 AND 05000265/2019004
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On January 14, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. H. Dodd, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David E. Hills, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000254 and 05000265 License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000254 and 05000265
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000254/2019004 and 05000265/2019004
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0060
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Cordova, IL
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2019 to December 31, 2019
Inspectors:
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
C. Matthews, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Tesar, Resident Inspector
C. Zoia, Senior Operations Engineer
Approved By:
David E. Hills, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.1
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Inhibit Spurious Start of High Pressure Coolant Injection Within 10 Minutes for an Appendix R Fire Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2019004-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1 Procedures, for the licensees failure to implement and maintain fire protection program safe shutdown procedures, Quad Cities Appendix R procedures (QCARP). Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain procedures QCARP 0030-01, [Fire Area] TB-III [Turbine Building] [Unit 2] Injection with SSMP [safe shutdown makeup pump] and Bringing the Unit to Cold Shutdown and QCARP 0030-02,
[Fire Area] TB-I [Turbine Building][Unit 1] Injection with SSMP and Bringing the Unit to Cold Shutdown, by not including steps which would inhibit spurious operation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system within the required 10-minute timeframe.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000254/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Phase to Ground Fault in Isolated Phase Bus Duct Led to Generator Trip and an Automatic SCRAM 71153 Closed LER 05000254/2018-005-01 LER 2018-005-01 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Regarding Loss of Safety Bus and Automatic Actuation of a Safety System During Undervoltage Relay Surveillance.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 The unit began the inspection period at full-rated thermal power, where it remained for the entire inspection period, with the exception of short-term power reductions for control rod sequence exchanges, testing, and as requested by the transmission system operator.
Unit 2 The unit began the inspection period at full-rated thermal power, where it remained for the entire inspection period, with the exception of short-term power reductions for control rod sequence exchanges, testing, and as requested by the transmission system operator.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems:
- heating steam system issues
- Units 1 and 2 standby liquid control system and room temperatures
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)reactor core isolation cooling QCOP 1300-01 for high pressure coolant injection work window on October 29, 2019 [Unit 2]
71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual)
Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance during an unannounced drill in the Unit 2 turbine building 95 motor control center 25-2 cubicle J-1 fire on October 24, 2019 [Unit 1/2].
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Fire Zones 8.2.6E, and 28.1, Unit 2 turbine building, elevation 595'-0" on October 24, 2019
- (2) Fire Zone 5.0, Unit 2 turbine building, elevation 595'-0", safe shutdown pump room on October 30, 2019
- (3) Fire Zone 11.3.1, Unit 2 reactor building, elevation 544'-0", southwest corner room 2B core spray on October 30, 2019
- (4) Unit 1/2 'B' control room emergency ventilation system water intrusion, Issue Report
===4291738 on November 5, 2019
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors continued review of the licensee's documents related to URI 05000254/2019001-01 and related discussion with NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff. The inspection activities remain on-going and will be documented in a subsequent report.
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03)===
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification biennial written examinations and annual operating tests administered from October 14 through November 22, 2019.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations
The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on October 25, 2019.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the Unit 2 load drop (control rod pattern adjustment and scram time testing) on November 16, 2019.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training on November 5, 2019.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
(1)emergency diesel generators on October 3, 2019 (2)high pressure coolant injection system on October 4, 2019 (3)automatic depressurization system on October 30, 2019
Quality Control (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance activities:
(1)residual heat removal system - quality control sample on December 23, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
(1)planned work - Unit 1A core spray work window during week of October 7, 2019 (2)planned work - 'B' control room emergency ventilation system [Unit 1/2] and Unit 1/2A fire diesel generator - emergent work on Unit 1 station blackout combined with planned work on contaminated condensate storage tank during week of October 28, 2019 (3)planned work - Unit 2 online auto blowdown logic test QCOS 0203-07 during week of November 5, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Issue Report 4271861, "[Unit] 1A RHR [residual heat removal] Pump Running with Tripped Alarm B6 on the 901-3 Panel" on October 1, 2019
- (2) Issue Report 4278317, "[Unit] 2A RHRSW [residual heat removal service water] Vault Door Found Not Dogged Closed" with Unit 1 EDG [emergency diesel generator]
out-of-service for maintenance on October 1, 2019
- (3) Issue Report 4254547, "Unit 1 HPCI did not Trip Locally During QCOS 2300-13" on October 1, 2019
- (4) Issue Report 4281888, "[Unit 1/2] EDG Vent Fan No Longer Working" on October 7, 2019
- (5) Issue Report 4291738, "[Unit 1/2] 'B' Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Water Intrusion" on October 28, 2019
- (6) Issue Report 4293501, "Unit 1 SBO S/D [station blackout shut down] Due to Unexpected Generator Excitation Alarm" on November 6, 2019
- (7) Issue Report 4295986, "[Unit] 1A 125 Vdc Battery Charger Fluctuations" on November 12, 2019
- (8) Issue Report 4298531, "Leak from Unit 1 EDG CWP [cooling water pump] and Extent of Condition" on November 21, 2019
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change 624474, "Automate Flow of Service Water to [Unit 1/2] 'A' Train Control Room HVAC [heating, ventilation, and air conditioning]" on December 2, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance tests:
- (1) Unit 2A core spray flow test following core spray logic test on October 4, 2019
- (2) QCOS 1400-01, "[Unit 1] 'A' Core Spray Pump Flow Rate IST [inservice testing]
Group B Pump Test" on October 10, 2019
- (3) QCOS 1300-5, "[Unit 1] RCIC [reactor core isolation cooling] Pump Flow Rate IST Group B Test" on October 11, 2019
- (6) QCOS 1000-27, "[Unit 1] Residual Heat Removal Pump Comprehensive Performance Test," following planned maintenance on November 14, 2019
- (7) QCOS 7500-08, "SBGT [standby gas treatment] Post Maintenance Testing Following Timer Relay Replacement" on November 17, 2019
- (8) Unit 1 EDG CWP post-maintenance testing following pump casing plug replacement on November 20, 2019
- (9) QCOS 0300-23 "[Unit 2] Control Rod Scram Timing for HCU [hydraulic control unit]
38-43 Following SCRAM Valve Replacement" on December 14, 2019
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) QCOS 4100-36, "[Unit 1/2] Emergency Portable Pump Surveillance" on October 23, 2019
- (2) QCOS 1000-45, "[Unit 1] RHR Valve Testing 1-1001-43B" on October 24, 2019
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
- 2017 Annual Preventive Maintenance
- 2018 Annual Preventive Maintenance
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)emergency preparedness drill on October 10, 2019 (2)emergency preparedness drill on October 15,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
and Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 02.01)
The inspectors evaluated radioactive material storage
- (1) The inspectors toured the following areas:
- Laundry and Tool Decontamination Area
- Interim Radioactive Waste Storage Building
The inspectors performed a container check (e.g., swelling, leakage and deformation)on the following containers:
- 4 bags of radioactive waste in the Laundry and Tool Decontamination Area
- 5 filled liners stored in the Interim Radioactive Waste Storage Facility
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive waste processing systems during plant walkdowns:
- (1) Liquid or Solid Radioactive Waste Processing Systems
- Floor Drain System
- Waste Collector System
- Chemical Waste System
- Laundry Drain system
Radioactive Waste Resin and/or Sludge Discharges Processes
- Bead Resin
- Condensate Resin
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the radioactive waste characterization and classification for the following waste streams:
- (1) Dry Active Waste Bead Resin Condensate Resin
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's radioactive material shipment preparation processes
- (1) The inspectors evaluated training and qualification records for selected individuals due to limited observation of the radioactive material shipment preparation process.
Shipping Records (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted package shipment records:
- (1) QC-18-111 QC-18-067 QC-18-113
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 02.12)===
(1)4th quarter 2018 through 3rd quarter 2019
EP02: ERO Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) 4th quarter 2018 through 3rd quarter 2019
EP03: Alert & Notification System Reliability (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) 4th quarter 2018 through 3rd quarter 2019
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
- (2) Unit 2 (10/01/2018-09/30/2019)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) 10/01/2018 - 09/30/2019
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in Unit 1 125 Vdc battery charger that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on November 13, 2019.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Issue Report 4271861, "[Unit] 1A RHR Pump Running with Tripped Alarm B6 on the 901-3 Panel"
- (2) Issue Report 4294771, "Framatome [fuel] Unanalyzed Condition [applicable to both units]"
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following LERs:
- (1) LER 05000254/2019-002-00, Phase to Ground Fault in Isolated Phase Bus Duct Led to Generator Trip and an Automatic SCRAM (ADAMS Accession:
ML19296B206). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the Results section.
- (2) LER 05000254/2018-005-01, Loss of Safety Bus and Automatic Actuation of a Safety System During Undervoltage Relay Surveillance (ADAMS Accession:
ML19329D083). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/0500265 2019-001. The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2019001; 05000265/2019001, Section
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Inhibit Spurious Start of High Pressure Coolant Injection Within 10 Minutes for an Appendix R Fire Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000254,05000265/2019004-01 Open/Closed
None (NPP)71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1 Procedures, for the licensees failure to implement and maintain fire protection program safe shutdown procedures, Quad Cities Appendix R procedures (QCARP). Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain procedures QCARP 0030-01, [Fire Area] TB-III [Turbine Building] [Unit 2] Injection with SSMP [safe shutdown makeup pump] and Bringing the Unit to Cold Shutdown and QCARP 0030-02,
[Fire Area] TB-I [Turbine Building][Unit 1] Injection with SSMP and Bringing the Unit to Cold Shutdown, by not including steps which would inhibit spurious operation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system within the required 10-minute timeframe.
Description:
On June 5, 2019, the licensee documented in Issue Report 4254547 that the HPCI pull-to-trip lever did not prevent the HPCI pump from starting despite having been actuated prior to the demand. The issue report recommended a review of the QCARP since they credited the pull-to-trip lever on the HPCI front standard as the method of preventing spurious start of the HPCI system during a fire event.
Station personnel evaluated the system response and determined that the system was operating as designed. Based upon this determination, the QCARP procedures were reviewed for adequacy. Station personnel credited closure of remotely operated steam supply valves for preventing the spurious start of the HPCI system, and therefore determined that no additional actions were necessary. Based upon questions from the NRC, it was determined that the closure of the remotely operated valves could not be credited based upon the location of the fire and as indicated in the fire protection reports and the QCARP procedures. On July 24, 2019, Issue Report 4266776 was initiated by the licensee identifying that procedures QCARP 0030-01 and QCARP 0030-02 for fire scenarios in fire areas TB-I (Unit 1) and TB-III (Unit 2) failed to prevent spurious start of the HPCI system within the required 10-minute timeframe.
This finding is being classified as NRC Identified as the licensee did not recognize and correct the condition without prompting by the Quad Cities resident inspectors.
Corrective Actions: The licensee implemented corrective actions including revising QCAPR procedures QCARP 0030-01 and QCARP 0030-02, adding actions to pull the control power fuses for the HPCI logic circuit within 10 minutes, thereby inhibiting spurious operation of the HPCI system.
Corrective Action References:
Issue Report 4254547, "HPCI Did Not Trip Locally During QCOS 2300-13" Issue Report 4266776, "HPCI Not Disabled for Fire Areas TB-III And TB-I"
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's QCARP procedures (QCARP 0030-01 and QCARP 0030-02) failed to prevent spurious operation of the HPCI system within the required 10-minute timeframe, and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to include steps to inhibit spurious operation of HPCI could have resulted in a failure to prevent overfill of the reactor pressure vessel resulting in the following potential consequences:
- (1) Hydrodynamic effects of water or two-phase fluid being discharged through the safety relief valves. This process could damage the safety relief valves.
- (2) Stressing of the vessel, steam line nozzles, steam line snubbers, pipe supports, and hangers as a result of:
- (a) the thermal transient caused by colder water flowing into the hot main steam line and reactor vessel;
- (b) the weight of water in the main steam lines; and
- (c) the dynamic transient loads caused by water flow in the main steam lines.
- (3) Potential for main steam isolation valves not to close if the steam lines are filled with water.
- (4) Placing the plant in a condition that has not been analyzed in the final safety analysis report.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors determined the finding screened as Green because they answered Yes to question: 1.4.7-B) Would the impact of the fire finding be limited to equipment which is not required for the credited safe shutdown success path? In the fire scenarios of concern, the safe shutdown makeup pump (SSMP) is the credited SSC for reaching safe shutdown.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. Specifically, the procedures discussed in this NCV were developed more than three years ago.
Enforcement:
Violation: Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, requires the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain written procedures for implementation of the Fire Protection Program.
Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 Safe Shutdown Report, Revision 21 (Fire Protection Report, Volume 2), in part, implements the Fire Protection Program. Section 5.2 requires actions to prevent adversely affecting safe shutdown by ensuring reactor water inventory is maintained and not inadvertently lost due to fire-induced spurious component operation in less than 10 minutes.
Contrary to the above, prior to July 25, 2019, the licensee failed to establish written procedures for implementation of the Fire Protection Program to prevent adversely affecting safe shutdown by ensuring reactor water inventory is maintained and not inadvertently lost due to fire-induced spurious component operation. Specifically, the licensee actions in QCARP 0030-01, [Fire Area] TB-III [Turbine Building] [Unit 2] Injection With SSMP and Bringing the Unit to Cold Shutdown and QCARP 0030-02, [Fire Area] TB-I [Turbine Building][Unit 1] Injection With SSMP and Bringing the Unit to Cold Shutdown, would have failed to prevent spurious operation of the HPCI system within the required 10-minute timeframe.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.15 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established QCAP 0250-06, "Control of In-Plant Flood Barriers and Watertight 'Submarine' Doors," as the implementing procedure for ensuring in-plant flood barriers were maintained, an activity affecting quality.
Procedure QCAP 0250-06, Step D.1.a states, "It is the responsibility of the individual using the door to verify it is properly closed and 'dogged' (latched)." Additionally the procedure states, in part, "If the flood protection barrier is breached for any RHR service water vault, then equipment in those rooms will be considered inoperable unless all the following criteria are met for all breached barriers: a dedicated individual is standing by to restore the breached flood protection barrier."
Contrary to the above, from 0209 to 0747 on September 11, 2019, the licensee failed to follow Step D.1.a of procedure QCAP 0250-06. Specifically, an individual used the Unit 2A RHRSW vault door at 0209 and failed to verify the door was properly closed and dogged.
Additionally, from 0209 to 0747, the licensee failed to ensure a dedicated individual was standing by to restore the breached flood protection barrier; therefore, the Unit 2 EDG CWP and 2A RHRSW pumps were inoperable, which also caused the Unit 2 EDG to be in an unplanned, inoperable condition.
Significance/Severity: Green. Using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions,"
the inspectors were directed to Exhibit 4, "External Event Screening Questions," because the finding involved the loss or degradation of a flood barrier specifically designed to mitigate a flooding hazard. The inspectors determined a detailed risk evaluation was required when they answered "yes" to Question 1 in Exhibit 4, because the loss of the flood barrier by itself during a flood event would degrade one or more trains of a system that supports a risk significant system or function. Specifically, the loss of the Unit 2A RHRSW vault flood barrier during a flood event would cause a loss of the Unit 2 EDG, which supports a risk significant system and function. A senior risk analyst performed a qualitative detailed risk evaluation of the finding. A major flood in the area could cause a plant transient, loss of the normal heat removal systems, and impact an RHR service water pump and diesel generator cooling water pump. However, multiple RHR service water pumps, the shared diesel generator, and the station blackout diesel generators were not impacted by the performance deficiency and would remain available. The exposure period was very short (less than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) and, combined with the remaining mitigation capability and the frequency of the flood event, would result in a change in core damage frequency much less than 1E-6/yr.
Corrective Action References: The licensee documented this issue in Issue Report 4278317, "2A RHRSW Vault Door Found Not Dogged Closed," dated September 11, 2019.
Observation: Framatome Fuel Unanalyzed Condition 71152 The inspectors reviewed licensee Issue Report 4294771, "Additional Framatome Analysis Required," which documented potential unanalyzed conditions for Framatome fuel installed in both unit reactors. The licensee identified that Framatome failed to analyze water injection transients (e.g. inadvertent intiation of HPCI) with the potential operational plant condition of having feedwater regulating valves in manual. When Framatome originally performed the safety analysis, it was assumed that the feedwater regulating valves would maintain water level while being in automatic operation, for all water injection transients. This assumption error would cause thermal limits to be worse than originally analyzed. Specifically, with one feedwater regulating valve in manual, there is less feedwater adjustment available than normal, and the high-high water level isolation would occur at a higher reactor power level, causing a reduced margin to thermal limits than originally analyzed.
The impact of this condition had very low safety significance. The licensee stated that based on early analysis, there are some power levels where the current thermal limits would be non-conservative Framatome provided Quad Cities with administrative limits - thermal limit penalties - for various thermal limits that can be implemented if one feedwater regulating valve needs to be placed in manual. Furthermore, the licensee implemented instructions to enter a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation if both feedwater regulating valves are in manual at rated conditions or if one feedwater regulating valve is in manual at lower power.
Quad Cities personnel stated, in an evaluation under Issue Report 4294771, that they had never operated in an unanalyzed condition. However, their position was based on retroactive application of their administrative thermal limit penalties. At the time of the inspection, Framatome was performing additional formal analyses for water injection transients with one feedwater regulating valve in manual operation, and Quad Cities personnel performed a technical evaluation looking at past operation with a feedwater regulating valve in manual mode. Quad Cities personnel determined that, assuming the interim administrative limits had been in effect at the time, they never operated outside of those limits. As none of their assessments were complete at the time Quad Cities entered those operating states, the licensee was essentially operating in an unanalyzed condition.
The licensee showed that at all times in their operating history, the unanalyzed condition was effectively bounded by other analyzed conditions. Therefore, the inspectors determined this issue was of very low safety/low risk significance as:
- (1) Quad Cities did not operate under any potentially unsafe conditions; and
- (2) the risk of them doing so was low given the infrequent occurrence of the water injection transient in conjunction with the length of time one feedwater regulating valve was in manual operation. Based on this information, the inspectors determined that the unanalyzed condition was not reportable.
Observation: Unit 1 125 Vdc Battery Charger Issues 71152 The inspectors reviewed failures of the Unit 1 125 Vdc battery chargers over the past 12 months as documented in Issue Reports 4204885, 4240708, 4254591, 4262057, 4287804, and 4295986. These failures were associated with oscillating voltage and current on the DC charger output, and in three instances, a trip of the battery charger. Although the licensee has determined that the battery chargers have remained operable, based upon the number of failures over the specified time period, there appears to be an adverse trend in the reliability of the safety-related Unit 1 125 Vdc battery chargers. The licensee has installed monitoring equipment and performed troubleshooting of the Unit 1 125 Vdc chargers; however, actions taken to date have not been effective in resolving the issue. The inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency related to the charger failures.
Observation: Unit 1A RHR Breaker Mechanism Operated Contact Switch Linkage Failure 71152 The inspectors reviewed Issue Report 4271861, "1A RHR Pump Running with Tripped Alarm
[B6] on the 901-3 Panel," and reviewed the licensee's evaluation. On August 14, 2019, the licensee started the 1A RHR pump during surveillance QCOS 1000-20, "RHR/ RHRSW Pump Local Breaker Control Test." Operators received indication that the pump was running (i.e. pressure and flow); however, they also received the RHR pump trip alarm. Local light indications for the breaker were not lit, but the pump was running. The licensee began investigating the issue.
The licensees troubleshooting revealed that the linkage for the 1A RHR pump breaker mechanism operated contact (MOC) switch had become disconnected, which prevented the MOC switch, which controls other component functions (e.g. alarms and minimum flow valve operation), from functioning as expected.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees Work Group Evaluation for IR 4271861, which identified that the licensees procedure for periodic inspection of the breaker cubicle lacked specific guidance to ensure the MOC switch linkage assembly hardware was adequately fastened. Specifically, the licensees procedures for performing maintenance and inspections of 4kV breakers lacked appropriate acceptance criteria, or instructions, that would ensure the linkage arm for the MOC switch would not come loose during repeated breaker cycling. The procedure, QCEPM 0200-11, Inspection and Maintenance of Horizontal 4kV Cubicles, Section 4.5.9.1, directed the user to Verify MOC switch linkage hardware is in place and tight. The procedure did not specify a method for ensuring the hardware was tight. The licensee implemented corrective actions to establish appropriate instructions (i.e.
mechanically verify tightness, by using a tool, etc.). Additionally, the licensee established a specified torque value to ensure the MOC switch linkage would remain properly secured.
The inspectors noted in the Work Group Evaluation under Issue Report 4271861 that there was a similar issue with this breaker's MOC switch in 2015, documented in Issue Report 2535590. Following that issue, the licensee implemented direction to "verify MOC switch linkage hardware is in place and tight" (procedure QCEPM 0200-11 as referenced above),since it had not previously been a part of the breaker inspection procedure. In 2017, the licensee documented the failure of another MOC switch in the Unit 1C RHRSW breaker from a similar condition (Issue Report 3967424). This issue was captured in Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2017001; 05000265/2017001 as NCV 2017001-01, "Failure to Ensure Hardware Secure for Breaker MOC Switch Linkage." Corrective actions from Issue Report 3967424 included adding instructions to QCEPM 0200-11 to specify torque values for the MOC switch linkage hardware. Additionally, the licensee had planned a phased approach to implementing extent of condition corrective actions to verify torque values in other similar breakers, based on planned maintenance outages. The MOC switch failure for the 1A RHR pump, which occurred on August 14, 2019, occurred before the planned corrective actions for the breaker. The licensee performed the corrective action on this breaker following this failure.
The inspectors considered whether the MOC switch failure should have been prevented by the licensee. The inspectors determined that the licensee had a reasonable justification for not prioritizing corrective actions (planning to implement sooner than they had) from Issue Report 3967424 to the 1A RHR breaker because they had corrected the failure in 2015.
Specifically, in 2015, maintenance workers mechanically tightened the connections on the MOC switch, but not to the newly specified torque value, after its failure.
Additionally, the inspectors considered the consequences of the MOC switch failure. The 1A RHR pump never lost its ability to perform its required function. Although the MOC switch controls the minimum flow valve, the valve is normally open, and the inspectors verified a licensee engineering evaluation showing that the RHR pump can perform its function and provide the required flow with the minimum flow valve open. The consequences of this event were minimal. The inspectors verified the licensee's planned corrective actions were complete for both units prior to the end of the inspection period.
Minor Performance Deficiency 71153 Minor Performance Deficiency: On August 25, 2019, Quad Cities Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor SCRAM from full power. The SCRAM was a result of a generator trip due to a ground detection relay exceeding its threshold and actuating the generator lockout device. The licensee identified water in the 'A' phase of the isophase bus duct, between the unit auxiliary transformer and the wall of the turbine building. The licensee determined that water had entered through a degraded gasket on an access cover for the isophase bus duct.
The water resulted in condensation forming within the bus duct and caused current leakage through one or more insulators that support the bus within the duct. The licensee replaced several insulators within the bus, replaced all associated gaskets, and implemented additional preventative maintenance activities for the isophase bus duct system.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause report for this event as documented in Issue Report 4274286, "U-1 Reactor Scram - Gen Trip From Gen Ground Relay (GIX 104)."
In June of 2000 during the Q1R16 outage, Quad Cities implemented a preventive maintenance item QCEPM 0400-09, "Electrical Inspection of Isophase Buses and Non-Segregated Buses," for inspections of the isophase bus ducts. This preventive maintenance was established based upon industry Operating Experience and EPRI guidance in "Isolated Phase Bus Maintenance Guide." The preventive maintenance was required to be performed every 4 cycles (8 years). The inspection utilizes a robotic camera-ready inspection vehicle capable of being installed into the isophase bus duct. The preventive maintenance was to be performed on accessible portions of the isophase bus duct which, for the unit auxiliary transformer, was defined as the section of ducting from the unit auxiliary transformer to the turbine building wall.
During the Q1R16 and Q1R20 (2009) inspections, QCEPM 0400-09 results indicated no unacceptable conditions existed in the unit auxiliary transformer portion of the isophase bus duct. The preventive maintenance inspection scheduled for Q1R24 (2017) was deferred until Q1R25 (2019) to support other scheduled maintenance. The preventive maintenance performance scheduled for Q1R25 was not fully completed because the robot that the vendor supplied was too large to fit inside the isophase bus duct. The licensee was only able to complete a limited visual inspection of the isophase bus duct from the transformer side and see only a few feet into the bus duct. The inspection was signed off as completed based on inspecting all "accessible portions of the bus duct." The licensee subsequently determined that the preventive maintenance was incorrectly credited as completed because the inspection of the bus duct to the turbine building wall was not completed.
Despite not fully completing the isophase bus duct inspection, the inspectors were able to verify the satisfactory results of the hi pot testing and megger test following the Q1R25 outage (indicating no grounds or paths for current leakage existed). Additionally, the inspectors noted that the licensee verified no moisture accumulation was present in the section of isophase bus duct that was visible, which included the area of the bus duct containing the gasketed covers, which were degraded and identified as the cause of the SCRAM. This gave the inspectors confidence that the licensee likely would have identified standing water in the bus duct if it was present at the time of the inspection. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the failure to complete the entire inspection was not a direct cause of the SCRAM.
The inspectors determined that this failure to perform the preventive maintenance within the required periodicity was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor because it could not be concluded that the performance deficiency was directly linked to the cause of the SCRAM (water intrusion). The inspectors also noted the significant amounts of rainfall which occurred in the months immediately following the Q1R25 outage, which was likely the source of the water intrusion into the bus duct.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 14, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. H. Dodd, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 25, 2019, the inspectors presented the Quad Cities Station Requalification Inspection Exit Meeting inspection results to Mr. P. Boyle, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 8, 2019, the inspectors presented the Exit Meeting for the EP Program Inspection, inspection results to Mr. M. Humphrey, Director of Organization Performance and Regulatory and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 6, 2019, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results inspection results to Mr. H. Dodd, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
U1 SBLC Tank Low Temp IN (901-5 G6)
10/31/2019
U1 SBO Room Low Temp
11/08/2019
71111.04Q Procedures
QCOP 1300-01
RCIC System Preparation for Standby Operation
Fire Plans
FZ 8.2.6.E, FZ
28.1
Unit 2 TB 595'-0" Elev. Hallway, Unit 2 TB 595'-0" Elev.
Storage Expansion Building
November
2018
Procedures
Fire Drill Scenario No.: 2019 4th Quarter #3
10/23/2019
71111.05Q Fire Plans
FZ 11.3.1
Unit 2 RB 544'-0" Elev. SW Corner Room - 2B Core Spray
October
2013
FZ 5.0
Unit 2 TB 595'-0" Elev. Safe Shutdown Pump Room
March 2018
FZ 8.2.6.E, FZ
28.1
Unit 2 TB 595'-0" Elev. Hallway, Unit 2 TB 595'0" Elev.
Storage Expansion Building
November
2018
Corrective Action
Documents
4.0 Critique: Turbine Control Valve #1 Suicided Close
10/30/2017
4.0 Critique for U1 HPCI Failure to Trip During QCOS
2300-05
11/07/2017
Operations 4.0 Critique for Unit 1 Turbine Control Valve #1
11/16/2017
Operations 4.0 Critique of U1 HPCI Surveillance QCOS
2300-05
2/08/2018
4.0 Critique HWCS Tripped Indication
04/24/2018
Operations 4.0 Critique, Control Rod Drift 5/30/18
05/30/2018
4.0 Critique for Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Trip
06/19/2018
4.0 Critique for U1 Unplanned Scram on 9/26/18
09/26/2018
4.0 Critique for the Loss of Busses 13-1 and 18 on 10/24/18
10/24/2018
4.0 Critique - 1A FRV Downpower
05/31/2019
4.0 Critique for U-1 Reactor Scram (Ref IR 04274286)
08/25/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID-LORT Annual Exam Grading Inconsistencies
10/25/2019
Miscellaneous
Operating Exam
Number Six
Simulator Training; License Requalification
Operating Exam
Number Twenty-
Simulator Training; License Requalification
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Four
TQ-AA-155-F04
Simulator Evaluation Forms - INDIVIDUAL for Crew C
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Exam 23 SBT
2019 LORT Annual Exam Scenario-Based Testing for
Exam 23
09/06/2019
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Exam 24 SBT
2019 LORT Annual Exam Scenario-Based Testing for
Exam 24
09/20/2019
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Exam 26 SBT
2018 LORT Annual Exam Scenario-Based Testing for
Exam 26
09/28/2018
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Exam 37 SBT
2019 LORT Annual Exam Scenario-Based Testing for
Exam 37
10/10/2019
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Exam 40 SBT
2018 LORT Annual Exam Scenario-Based Testing for
Exam 40
09/17/2018
TQ-AA-306-F-20
Exam 6 SBT
2019 LORT Annual Exam Scenario-Based Testing for
Exam 6
09/12/2019
Procedures
QCOP 6600-11
Diesel Generator Local Operation
Simulator Real
Time Test R8
Q1C26 Simulator Certification April 2019 Real Time
Performance Testing
Steady State
Comparison
Q1C26 Simulator Certification April 2019 Steady State
Performance Testing
TQ-AA-150-J020
Locally Start 1/2 EDG with a Failure of the 1/2 DGCWP; JPM
Number: LP-003-II-A
TQ-AA-150-J020
Transfer CRD System Flow Control Valves; JPM Number:
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
009
Conduct of Simulator Training and Evaluation
TR-1
Manual Reactor Trip Simulator Transient Test
TR-5
Trip of a Single Reactor Recirculation Pump Transient Test
TR-6
Main Turbine Trip Simulator Transient Test
Work Orders
Simulator Work Request - Clearing Digital Recorders
Remotely
05/29/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Failure
Classification
Form
HPCI Failure Classification Form for IR 4217557
03/06/2019
Failure
HPCI Failure Classification Form for IR 4117639
04/24/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Classification
Form
U1 HPCI FIC 1-2340-1 Erratic When In Standby
09/05/2018
U2 HPCI Emergency Oil Pump Fails to Stop in Auto
04/29/2019
U2 HPCI Emergency Oil Pump Thermals Tripped
06/27/2019
U2 HPCI Emergency Oil Pump Tripped Thermals
09/19/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified U1 HPCI FIC Potential Degrading Trend
10/16/2018
Miscellaneous
FN: RX0287-01
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document; Auto Blowdown
[ADS]
Work Orders
Replace 1-1001-7D Due to Galling Potential
03/31/2019
PSU# MM RHR Vent Valve Threaded Cap is Leaking
2-1099-178
08/30/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
Unit 1 SBO DG Voltage Regulator Not Responding
11/02/2018
1A RHR Pump Running with Tripped Alarm B6 on the 901-3
Panel
08/14/2019
2A RHRSW Vault Door Found not Dogged Closed
09/11/2019
EDG Vent Fan No Longer Working
09/24/2019
Water Found in Control Room HVAC Air Filtration Unit
10/27/2019
'B' CREV Fire Protection Abandonment
10/28/2019
U1 SBO S/D Due to Unexpected Generator Excitation Alarm
11/01/2019
U-1 MCR Received Alarm 901-8 A-9 125V Battery Charger
Trip
11/09/2019
Charger Firing Board Acceptance Inspection Reviews
11/19/2019
11/20/2019
EOC Report for the Emergency Diesel Generator
CWP 0-3903
11/21/2019
EOC Report for the Emergency Diesel Generator
CWP 2-3903
11/21/2019
EOC Report for the Emergency Diesel Generator
CWP 1-3903
11/21/2019
Create WO to Replace the U1 SBO Min/Max Excitation
11/01/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Limited
Drawings
Drawing 4E-
1351B
Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1-2 Auxiliaries and
Start Relays
Z
Drawing 4E-
1438Q
Schematic Diagram; RHR System SH 15; Pumps 1002A, B,
C, D; 4160V BKR Control Div I and II
Drawing M-813
Diagram of Diesel Generator Room Ventilation
G
Engineering
Changes
Need to Evaluate Effect of Removing Sub Door From 2A
RHRSW Vault
Miscellaneous
LER 254/2012-
2-00
Standby Gas Treatment System Loss of Safety Function
Due to Loss of Emergency Power
06/01/2012
Report
Unit 1 & 2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Required Equipment
Lists
Procedures
QCAP 0250-06
Control of In-Plant Flood Barriers and Watertight
"Submarine" Doors
QCOP 0250-06
Control of In-Plant Flood Barriers and Watertight
"Submarine" Doors
3.4.1.2.1.1
Design Modification of the Condensate Pump Room
3.4.1.2.1.2
Isolation of the RHR Service Water Pumps and the Diesel
Generator Cooling Water Pumps from Flood Water
Work Orders
25 Vdc Battery Charger #1A 4 Hr Load Test
2/18/2018
WO C4619620
25 Vdc Battery Charger #1A 4 HR Load Test
2/18/2018
Work Orders
Automate the Flow of Service Water to the 0-5792-B,
11/08/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
U2 SBO Engine B Fuel Oil AC Backup Pump C/S Issue
10/31/2019
EO ID: 2201-105 G-6 Received and Cleared During QCOS
20-12
11/01/2019
U1 SBO S/D Due to Unexpected Generator Excitation Alarm
11/01/2019
Miscellaneous
ROD ID: 38-43
Quad Cities U2 Control Rod Scram Timing Single Rod
Report
2/14/2019
Procedures
QCOP 6600-14
Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Manual
Operation
QCOS 0300-23
Control Rod Scram Timing in the Hot Condition
QCOS 1000-06
RHR Pump/Loop Operability Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
QCOS 1000-27
RHR Pump Comprehensive/Performance Test
QCOS 1300-05
RCIC Pump Operability Test
QCOS 1400-04
Core Spray Pump Operability Test
QCOS 6620-01
SBO DG 1(2) Quarterly Load Test
QCOS 7500-08
Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment Initiation and Reactor
Building Ventilation Isolation Test
Work Orders
QCOS 1300-5 RCIC Pump Flow Rate GP 'B' Test
10/10/2019
QCOS 1400-1 'A' Core Spray Pump Flow Rate GP 'B' PMP
Test
10/08/2019
11/01/2019
RHR 'B' Pump Flow Rate (IST); OP QCOS 1000-6 'B' RHR
Pump Flow Rate Group A Test (IST)
10/23/2019
Leakage Detected HCU (K-11) 38-43
2/14/2019
Procedures
QCOS 1000-45
QCOS 4100-36
Emergency Portable Pump (EPP) Surveillance (J.7.a.)
Work Orders
Emergency Portable Pump 'C' Surveillance
03/17/2019
OP Petroguard Pump Functional Test
08/14/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
EP-Siren Failure (QC32)
03/13/2017
EP-Siren Failure QC-32
06/19/2017
EP-Whiteside County Siren Command Panel Failure
09/14/2017
EP-Whiteside County Siren Countrol Panel Failure
2/18/2017
Miscellaneous
2018 PNS System Maintenance Report
2/2018
2017 PNS System Maintenance Report
2/2017
Offsite Emergency Plan Prompt Alert and Notification
System Addendum for the Quad Cities Nuclear Station
Corrective Action
Documents
NRC ID: Potential Enhancement to ERO Augmentation
Process
11/08/2019
Miscellaneous
Quarterly Call In Drill Reports
3rd Quarter
2018 - 3rd
Quarter
2019
Corrective Action
Documents
EP-Whiteside County Sheriff NARS Issue
07/24/2017
NOS ID: Emergency Preparedness Record Issues
04/19/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NOS ID: Material Condition Identified for Field Team
Equipment
04/17/2018
NOS ID: TSC Equipment and Material Condition Issues
Identified
04/19/2018
EP-NARS Inoperable for Multiple Offsite Agencies
2/22/2019
EP-Rock Island County EOC NARS Phone Inop
03/01/2019
NOS ID: TSC HVAC Mod was not Assessed by EP
04/18/2019
EP ID: Quad Cities 2019 EP Off Year Exercise - Sim DC
Failure
05/21/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Potential Enhancement to EP Equipment Issue
Trending
11/08/2019
Self-Assessments NOSA-QDC-18-
Quad Cities Emergency Preparedness Audit Report
04/25/2018
NOSA-QDC-19-
Emergency Preparedness Quad Cities Station Audit Report
04/24/2019
Miscellaneous
N-AN-RP-RSHIP-
CGP61
10CFR61 Waste Stream Analysis
09/24/2019
N-AN-RP-RSHIP-
CGVPI
Radioactive Vehicle and Package Shipment Inspection
09/24/2019
SRRS2B.128
Quad Cities 10 CFR 61 Program Waste Stream
Characterization and Scaling Factor Review
2018
Procedures
Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments
Highway Route Controlled Quantity and Advance
Notification for Radioactive/Waste Shipments
Shipment of Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material or
Waste (Category 2 RAMQC)
Surveying Radioactive Material Shipments
Self-Assessments AR 4207574
NRC: RAd Protection - Solid Waste Processing, Handling,
Storage and Transportation (IP 71124.08)
10/22/2019
Shipping Records QC-18-067
UN3321, Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity (LSA-II),
Condensate Resin
08/27/2018
QC-18-111
UN3321, Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity (LSA-II),
08/02/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Dry Active Waste
QC-18-113
UN3321, Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity (LSA-II),
Dry Active Waste
10/12/2018
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness
- Drill/Exercise Performance; 4th Quarter 2018 - 3rd Quarter
2019
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness
- ERO Drill Participation; 4th Quarter 2018 - 3rd Quarter
2019
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness
- Alert and Notification System Reliability; 4th Quarter 2018 -
3rd Quarter 2019
Monthly Data Elements for NRC Reactor Coolant System
Specific Activity and Supporting Data
Various
Dates
A
Site Performance Indicator Validation Sheet and Supporting
Data
Various
Dates
Corrective Action
Documents
1A 125v DC Battery Charger Failure
2/20/2018
Received Alarm 901-8 A9 125v DC Battery Charger Trip
04/17/2019
Received 901-8 Ap U1 125v DC Battery Charger Trip Alarm
06/05/2019
Received Alarm 901-5 G-1 Bat Charger 1A/1B AC/DC Ckt
Failure
07/05/2019
1A RHR Pump Running with Tripped Alarm B6 on the 901-3
Panel
08/14/2019
EO ID 1A 125v DC Charger Oscillating Voltage and Current
10/14/2019
Potential Part 21 - Engine Systems
10/25/2019
Received 250 Vdc Ground Alarm
10/27/2019
Additional Framatome Analysis Required
11/05/2019
U-1 MCR Received Alarm 901-8 A-9 125v Battery Charger
Trip
11/09/2019
Missed EQ Gearbox Lubrication Inspection 1-1001-185A L05 11/12/2019
Sample CRD Population Discrepancy Between Tech Spec
and Proc
11/17/2019
11/19/2019
Quad LAR: MSIV Leakage Conceptual Errors
11/26/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Regulator at Unit 1 North Bank HCUs Can't Get to Pressure
2/06/2019
1/2 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Flow Degradation
2/10/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
U-1 Reactor Scram - Gen Trip From Gen Ground Relay
(GIX104)
08/25/2019
Procedures
QCEPM 0400-09
Electrical Inspection of Isophase Buses and Non-Segregated
Buses
30